Hadfield and Hadfield and Ors

[2014] FamCA 1213

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HADFIELD & HADFIELD AND ORS [2014] FamCA 1213

FAMILY LAW – INJUNCTIONS – Financial proceedings – injunctions against third parties – injunction sought is proper – just and convenient – reservation of costs

APPLICANT: Ms Hadfield

RESPONDENT: Mr Hadfield

THIRD PARTIES: Mr Zeelie and Ms Zeelie

FOURTH PARTIES: Q Pty Ltd; Q 1 Pty Ltd; N Pty Ltd; M Pty Ltd; and
M 1 Pty Ltd

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

FILE NUMBER: MLC 341 of 2014

DATE DELIVERED: 25 November 2014

PLACE DELIVERED: Melbourne

PLACE HEARD: Melbourne

JUDGMENT OF: Bennett J

HEARING DATE: 24 November 2014

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Crofts

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Leanne Cain & Associates

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Ham and Mr D Robinson

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Lake Street Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE THIRD PARTIES Mr D Robinson

SOLICITOR FOR THE THIRD PARTIES: Northcote Lawyers

Orders

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1.There be leave to the husband to withdraw his response to an Application in a Case filed 20 November 2014.

2.Until further order, Mr Zeelie and Ms Zeelie, being the second and third respondents (hereinafter referred to as the third parties), be and are hereby restrained from doing any act or thing to recover the default judgment obtained by them against the husband and Q Pty Ltd (ACN …) on … in County Court of Victoria proceedings No. … .

3.The second and third respondents do all acts and things necessary to provide to the solicitors for the applicant wife the withdrawal of caveats … and … duly executed by them together with withdrawals of any other caveat lodged by them or at their request on or over the titles to the following properties:-

a)      The real property at … G Street, Town H;

b)     The real property at … J Street, Town H; and

c)      The real property at … L Street, Town H.

Such withdrawals of caveat to be held by the solicitors for the applicant wife and, subject to any further order of the Court, be provided at settlement of sale of any property to which they relate.

4.For the avoidance of doubt, in the event that the solicitors for the applicant wife cease to act on behalf of the wife in this proceeding or otherwise they are not permitted to hand to the wife or to put in to her possession custody or control the signed withdrawals of caveat provided for in this Order.

5.The following entities which are controlled by the husband and/or the wife be and are hereby parties to the proceedings for the purpose of being bound by and giving effect to orders subsequently made in this proceedings :-

a)      Q Pty Ltd;

b)     Q 1 Pty Ltd;

c)      N Pty Ltd;

d)     M Pty Ltd; and

e)      M 1 Pty Ltd.

6.There be liberty to the parties and the third parties to apply for further interim orders in relation to the sale of the properties referred to herein together with the proceeds of sale currently affected by the Order made on 7 August 2014.

7.The applicant wife and/or the husband each advise the third parties, through their respective solicitors, of any contract of sale affecting any of the properties described in this Order.

8.The husband and the wife, through their respective lawyers serve on the third parties all and any documents filed on their behalf in this proceeding and the solicitors for the applicant wife be responsible for providing a copy of each and every order made by the Court in these proceedings to the third parties.

9.Upon the Court rising my Court Officer provide to the lawyers for the third parties a copy of the Court file index.

10.The costs of this day be reserved and any party seeking costs give to the other parties not less than 7 days’ notice of the date and the Court appearance at which that application will be prosecuted NOTING THAT this reservation of costs as otherwise brought on will continue until the final hearing.

11.There be liberty to the parties through Mr Crofts to liaise with my Associate in relation to the rescheduling of the mention of this matter on 15 December 2014 to a date in early February 2015 in the event that the mediation to be convened by Mr Puckey can take place in the weeks of 9 or 16 February 2015.

12.The solicitor for the Third Parties file a Notice of Address for Service promptly.

13.Otherwise, the Application in a Case filed by the wife on 10 November 2014 be dismissed.

IT IS DIRECTED THAT:

14.The orders sought by the wife be marked Exhibit “W1” and remain on the Court file.

15.The signed undertaking given by the wife be marked Exhibit “W2” and remain on the Court file.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Hadfield & Hadfield and Ors has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: MLC 341 of 2014

Ms Hadfield

Applicant

And

Mr Hadfield

Respondent

And

Mr Zeelie and Ms Zeelie
Third Parties

And

Q Pty Ltd; Q 1 Pty Ltd; N Pty Ltd; M Pty Ltd; and M 1 Pty Ltd

Fourth Parties

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

EX TEMPORE

1. This matter came before me yesterday on the wife’s application in a case filed 10 November 2014, in which she sought various orders, including:-

   ·to join Mr Zeelie and Ms Zeelie to these proceedings as respondents;

   ·to restrain Mr and Ms Zeelie from taking further steps to enforce a judgment debt obtained by them against the husband and a corporate entity; and

   ·to procure from Mr and Ms Zeelie withdrawals  of caveats which they have lodged for registration over real property owned by the corporate entity.

   I pronounced orders and said that I would deliver reasons subsequently and excused the parties from remaining in Court whilst I commenced the reasons. These are my reasons for decision.

2. This is an interlocutory application.  The final hearing has been fixed to commence on 16 March 2015, estimated to take five days.  The proceedings are solely financial proceedings. 

3. When the matter commenced before me, the husband sought orders in the terms of a response to the wife’s application in a case.  During the proceedings, he withdrew that response.  The wife has reduced to writing the orders that she seeks, which include an order to join various entities over which the husband and the wife exercise control for the purpose of any orders subsequently made by this Court binding such entities.  There was no opposition to the joinder of the entities, which I will henceforth refer to as the fourth parties.

RECORDED:  NOT TRANSCRIBED

1. This matter has had a fairly active interlocutory history thus far. On 7 August 2014, I made orders and delivered reasons. I won’t repeat the matters set out in those earlier reasons, which appear at case neutral citation [2014] FamCA 715, save where it is necessary to do so. I note that in August 2014, the parties were unable to inform me with precision of the composition of various entities being companies and trusts and, unfortunately, that does not seem to have improved with the passage of time.

2. The relevant history is that Q Pty Ltd is a company of which the husband is a director and the husband and the wife are shareholders.  I was informed that it is both a trading company and a trustee.  The trust is either a discretionary trust or a unit trust.  The parties are not sure, although the husband indicated through counsel that he suspects it is a unit trust.  The “beneficiaries” of the trust are either the husband and the wife and the children of either of them, or the husband and his spouse and the children of either of them.  Given the description of the beneficiaries, it sounds to me like Q Pty Ltd (“the company”) is the trustee of a discretionary trust.

3. On 7 August 2014, I made orders which provided, inter alia, for three real properties to be placed on the market for sale.  All of the properties apparently appear in the books of the relevant trust, and the company is the registered proprietary of the properties.  The properties are:

   (a)G Street, Town H, which is vacant land (“the G Street property”); 

   (b)J Street, Town H, which is a factory property (“the J Street property”); and

   (c)L Street, Town H, which is vacant land (“the L Street property”).

   Pursuant to the orders, the properties were placed for sale with a Ms E, whose place of employment is misdescribed in the orders of 7 August 2014.  In fact, Ms E operates from within the estate agency business W Real Estate Agents of Town H.  No sales have occurred.

4. The G Street property was scheduled to be auctioned on 8 November 2014.  A reserve price had been agreed between the husband and the wife in the sum of $450,000.  The property was withdrawn from auction when contracts of sale could not be completed because of noncompliance or lack of conformity with certain council requirements.  The G Street property is subject to a cultural and heritage overlay, for which one permit has been granted and another permit was, according to the husband, thought to be readily available.  It transpires that the council has uncovered some matters of cultural and heritage significance, which requires further work to be done before a permit can be issued to develop the property.  The husband, on behalf of the company, has retained X Pty Ltd, a specialist firm, to undertake work necessary to obtain the permit so that a new permit can issue and the property be sold.

5. The J Street property is a commercial property and was the location from which the husband’s business operated previously.  It has an agreed reserve price of $750,000.  At the time of the order for sale, the property was vacant and I commented on the fact that it was costing the parties money by way of mortgage repayments and they had no tenant in situ.  That property was also withdrawn prior to the auction date of 6 November 2014.  The wife’s case is that the husband put tenants into the property and any auction of the property could not proceed because the parties were unable to offer vacant possession.  The husband’s case is that he, at all times, told the estate agent with handling of the sale that the property was tenanted. 

6. The tenants of the J Street property are a small business, apparently on a week to week tenancy, with an entitlement to lease the property into the future if, by 1 December 2014, they have obtained a council permit for various works to be effected to the property.  It was implicit in the wife’s case that the husband had, in some way, stymied a sale of the property by virtue of installing tenants.  However, that does not seem to be borne out by subsequent submissions made on behalf of the husband and the wife.  It seems that no formal written offer has been received to purchase the J Street property. The husband alleges that the estate agent recommended that the property be withdrawn temporarily and then remarketed.

7. The L Street property was also to be auctioned on 6 November.  It has an agreed reserve price of $670,000.  I was informed that there was only one buyer interested and that the offer was approximately $170,000 below the agreed reserve and the property was withdrawn from auction three days prior to the date of auction due to lack of interest. 

8. It is estimated by the husband and the wife that, excluding the husband’s business interests which are yet to be valued, there is approximately $1.3 million in the asset pool, bearing in mind the reserve prices attributed to the properties by the parties and the amounts owing in respect of collateralised mortgages over the properties.

9. The moneys owing pursuant to mortgages are all owing to ANZ Banking Corporation Limited and it is said that there is approximately $750,000 owing in respect of the J Street property and $250,000 owing in respect of the L Street property but, as indicated, the indebtedness is cross-collateralised over the G Street property as well. 

10. Pursuant to orders made on 7 August 2014, at such time as any properties are sold, the proceeds are to be invested in an interest bearing account under the control of the husband and the wife, save for certain minor payments by way of land tax that can be made from the proceeds.

11. When the proceedings were before me on 7 August 2014 it was indicated that the husband had an indebtedness or had procured funds from the parents of his partner, Ms P, and the sum of $400,000 was mentioned.  The matter again returned to me for mention in October 2014, at which time there was some mention of the possibility of Mr and Ms P Snr becoming parties to the proceedings, either of their own volition or by being joined.  Today, they oppose being joined to the proceedings and they oppose the orders which the wife seeks be made.

12. It is common ground that the husband received $400,000 from Mr and Ms P Snr.  There was a loan agreement executed by the husband and Mr and Ms P Snr and the husband’s execution of it was in his own right, as well as on behalf of the entity. 

RECORDED  :  NOT TRANSCRIBED

1. The deed of loan is exhibit H1 in these proceedings.  It is dated 29 April 2013.  It provides that Mr and Ms P Snr, as lenders, will advance the principal sum of $500,000.  In fact, only $400,000 has been advanced, whereas they now claim $500,000.  The difference is made up of interest and the cost of recovery proceedings.  The date for repayment of the loan was 31 December 2013.  That is about eight months after the document was executed.  Significantly, paragraph 3 of the deed of loan provides that:

   The borrower (the husband and the entity) will utilise the principal sum for the purpose set out in the Schedule.

2. The schedule refers to the purpose as being:

   The principal sum has been utilised for the acquisition and development of three units of land at [G] Street, [Town H], 3… .

3. There are a number of matters arising out of the specified purpose for which the moneys were advanced.  First, it is common ground that at the time of any advances the entity already owned the G Street property so arguably the moneys were not “utilised for the acquisition” of that property.  Second, there has not been any development of units or any other development at the G Street property so the funds have necessarily not been utilised for “development of three units.”  The description of “development of three units of land at [G] Street, [Town H],” is poor expression. The husband says that what was intended was that three units would be constructed on the G Street property. 

4. It is also significant that paragraph 9 of the deed of loan provides:    

   If the borrower fails to repay the lender the sum on the due date the borrower charges the property referred to in the Schedule in favour of the lender as security for this loan.

5. When this deed of loan was described to me in October 2014 (but no copy tendered), it sounded like it was an agreement to charge the property subsequently.  Today, Mr Robinson of counsel says that paragraph 9 constitutes a charge, subject to a condition precedent which was the borrower failing to repay the loan.  It is common ground that the entity and the husband have failed to repay the loan and Mr Robinson submits that the property is thereby charged as security for the loan.  Interestingly, however, Mr Robinson of counsel concedes that the deed of loan does not give his clients, Mr and Ms P Snr, any power of sale of the G Street property.  I take that to be a direct power of sale and not one to which recourse could be had pursuant to any County Court judgment.

6. At paragraph 28 of the husband’s affidavit sworn on 20 November 2014, he deposes, inter alia:

   I further state that the debt to [Ms P Snr] was known to the wife at all times.

   The wife contends otherwise.  It is common ground that, in 2013, the wife was aware that the husband was trying to raise capital to develop the G Street property.  However, the wife maintains that she was not aware that the loan had been made or that the lenders were the parents of the husband’s new partner.  That is, the wife knew that the husband was seeking funds but was unaware of any specific loan or the identity of the lender until approximately April of 2014, which was one year after the loan had been made and documented and after it should have been repaid.

7. The wife’s application for injunctive relief is brought in anticipation of the G Street property being sold and her desire that the parties be in a position to settle the sale.  Mr and Ms P Snr have lodged a caveat over the G Street property, being instrument number … .  They refer to a caveatable interest pursuant to the deed of loan dated 29 April 2013.  The wife deposes that, on 14 October 2014, her solicitors received a facsimile from the husband’s solicitors enclosing a copy of a County Court writ served on the respondent for proceedings in which Mr and Ms P Snr were the plaintiffs.  The first defendant is the entity and the second defendant is the husband.  The writ was filed with the County Court on 7 October 2014.

8. On 16 October 2014, the wife’s solicitors wrote to the husband’s solicitors inquiring as to whether the husband intended to enter an appearance and file a notice of defence.  The County Court proceedings were not mentioned to the wife or to the Court at a mention of this matter on 10 October 2014.  The wife deposes that, on 21 October 2014, her solicitors again sought clarification, this time urgently, from the husband’s solicitors as to whether the husband was going to enter an appearance or file a notice of defence and, if he was to do so, a request was made that copies of those documents be sent to the wife’s solicitors.

9. The wife deposes that, on 28 October 2014, her solicitors received a letter from the husband’s solicitor which was dated 20 October 2014 (that is, eight days previously) in which they advised that the husband was not proposing to file an appearance or notice of defence “as he does not dispute the debt and, as you are aware, the moneys have been borrowed and are a legitimate business debt”.  The husband’s solicitors contended:

   Our client is requesting [Ms P Snr’s] solicitors place a stay on the writ and wait for sale of the three properties to go through from which they can obtain payment and satisfaction of their debt.  Our client instructs that an undertaking from your client acknowledging that the debt will be paid upon the sale of the property needs to be provided.  Otherwise, we are instructed that [Ms P Snr’s] solicitors will not place a stay on the writ.

10. Subsequently, judgment was obtained by Mr and Ms P Snr and the County Court proceedings are concluded.  The wife deposes that:

    My solicitors wrote to Northcote Lawyers on 6 November 2014 requesting an undertaking from [Mr and Ms P Snr] that they will refrain from further prosecuting in County Court proceedings, that they refrain from doing any act of thing to execute any judgment obtained by them in the County Court, and that they will refrain from lodging by way of security or enforcement any caveat, charge or other notice, preceding or action against the three properties.  Further, my solicitors again requested that they provide withdrawals of caveats immediately.

11. The position of Mr and Ms P Snr today is that they will provide withdrawals of caveats in registrable form to be held in escrow pending settlement of the sale of various properties providing that they have an assurance, by way of an order of the Court, or an irrevocable agreement from the husband, wife and the company that they will receive the $500,000 owing to them from the proceeds of settlement of the sale.  The wife is not prepared to give any assurance that they will ultimately be repaid, although she does not say that they will not necessarily be repaid.  She seeks the orders set out in the exhibit W1.

1. Section 114 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) provides that the Court may make such order or grant such injunction as it considers proper with respect to a matter to which the proceedings relate. The wife seeks injunctive relief which affects third parties. Div 3 of Pt VIIIAA of the Act and, in particular, s 90AF(1), provides that:

   In proceedings under section 114, the Court may:

   (a)make an order restraining a person from repossessing property of a party to a marriage; or

   (b)grant an injunction restraining a person from commencing legal proceedings against a party to a marriage.

   It is in relation to the former that the wife now makes her application.

2. Section 90AF(2), provides that:

   In proceedings under section 114, the Court may make any other order or grant any other injunction that:

   (a)directs a third party to do a thing in relation to the property of a party to the marriage; or

   (b)alters the rights, liabilities or property interests of a third party in relation to the marriage.

3. Section 90AF, subsection (3), provides that:

   The court may only make an order or grant an injunction under subsection (1) or (2) if:

   (a)the making of the order, or the granting of the injunction, is reasonably necessary, or reasonably appropriate and adapted, to effect a division of property between the parties to the marriage; and

   (b)if the order or injunction concerns a debt of a party to the marriage — it is not foreseeable at the time that the order is made, or the injunction granted, that to make the order or grant the injunction would result in the debt not being paid in full; and

   (c)the third party has been accorded procedural fairness in relation to the making of the order or injunction; and

   (d)for an injunction or order under subsection 114(1) — the court is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is proper to make the order or grant the injunction; and

   (e)for an injunction under subsection 114(3) — the court is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just or convenient to grant the injunction; and

   (f)the court is satisfied that the order or injunction takes into account the mattes mentioned in subsection (4).

4. Counsel for the third parties contends that the injunction sought by the wife is not, within the meaning of section 90AF(3)(a), reasonably necessary or reasonably appropriate and adapted to effect a division of property between the parties to the marriage.  I do not accept that submission.  The wife seeks an interim injunction which will permit the orderly sale of properties and preserve the proceeds of sale until the Court orders otherwise.  It is not necessary, in my view, for the injunction to relate directly to the final division of property between the parties to the marriage.  It is sufficient that I am asked to make a holding order, which appears to be appropriate and the purpose of which is to preserve the subject matter of proceedings, so that a division of property between the parties of the marriage can be effected in due course.

5. I am satisfied, within the meaning of s 90AF(3)(b), that it is not foreseeable that if I make the injunction sought that injunction will result in the debt of $500,000 not being paid in full to Mr and Ms P Snr. 

6. In the context of s 90AF(3)(c), I am satisfied that Mr and Ms P Snr have been accorded procedural fairness today.

7. The issue is whether or not, within the terms of s 90AF(3)(d) and (e) I am satisfied in all the circumstances that it is proper and just or convenient to grant the injunction. 

8. Mr and Ms P Snr attended Court saying they want repayment of the moneys which they advanced in April 2013 for a period which is expressed in the deed of loan to be approximately eight months and which has long since passed. 

9. Counsel for Mr and Ms P Snr sought specific instructions and informed the Court of their concession that they did not provide notice to the wife of the fact that they were advancing moneys to the husband.  They apparently entered into the loan arrangements with the entity without instructing any solicitors to obtain a company search or undertake other basic commercial steps.  They were aware that the husband was estranged from the wife and that there were pending proceedings before this Court for a final alteration of property interests between the husband and the wife. 

10. Mr and Ms P Snr clearly had access to information about the husband.  It was not a purely commercial transaction because they are the parents of the husband’s partner.  The husband and their daughter were residing together in a permanent relationship.  They are the husband’s putative parents in law.  On my rough calculations, if the properties were to sell at the reserves attributed to them by the parties, which may now be unlikely, the amount owing to the Mr and Ms P Snr would account for about 40 per cent of the net proceeds of sale of the properties.  Excluding the husband’s business, which is yet to be valued, that is really all that the husband and wife have to divide between them. 

11. Prima facie, Mr and Ms P Snr entered into the loan transaction with the husband and with the company without taking all prudent safeguards that they may otherwise have taken if it were a purely commercial transaction. 

12. The wife has filed a further amended initiating application pursuant to which she seeks that, pursuant to s 90AE(1)(c), the husband be “100 per cent liable for any moneys owing to [Mr and Ms P Snr], such sum to be paid from his property entitlements pursuant to orders of this honourable court.”  It is fair to say that counsel for the wife concedes that the feasibility of her being able to obtain an order in those terms will depend on the value of assets which may ultimately be divided between the husband and the wife, and that is uncertain because there is no business valuation as yet.  It is submitted, however, that the amount which Mr and Ms P Snr now seek to extract from the divisible assets is an amount which the wife does not concede the husband will necessarily receive as an entitlement in these proceedings. 

13. Section 90AF(4)(e) requires me to take into account the capacity of “a party to the marriage to repay the debt after the order is made or the injunction is granted”.  I do so, noting that this is an interim injunction only.  It is a holding order.  It should not, and in my view does not, impact upon the capacity of the husband and the entity to repay the indebtedness eventually.  However, it has the effect that the indebtedness will not be able to be repaid immediately from the proceeds of sale or without the benefit of a further order from the Court. 

14. I have considered whether the injunction sought by the wife is proper, and I conclude that in the circumstances of this case it is a proper order to make. 

15. I specifically asked counsel for Mr and Ms P Snr what prejudice flows to Mr and Ms P Snr now as a consequence of the injunction sought.  Counsel conceded that until settlement of the sale of the properties occurs there is no prejudice because there are no available funds from which Mr and Ms P Snr can be paid.  I reiterate the concession that his clients have no power to sell the G Street property at this point in time. 

16. In the circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that the injunction sought by the wife, including the provision of withdrawals of caveat in registrable form, are proper, just and convenient orders to make, and I will proceed to make them. 

17. As part and parcel of my satisfaction that the wife has made out her case under s 90AF(3)(d) and (e), I will require the wife’s practitioners to notify Mr and Ms P Snr of the sale of any of the three major properties owned by the entity.  I am aware that my reference to the three major properties exceeds the purported security interest provided for in the deed of loan which, of course, refers only to the G Street property as being security for the indebtedness.  However, in the circumstances of the case I think that Mr and Ms P Snr should have proper information about what funds are realised from the sale of all properties, and not just the G Street property. 

18. Now, there are a few matters which I should record for future reference.  The deed of loan which is exhibit “H1” was prepared by solicitors retained by the husband.  That was Mr Coleman Molony of the firm Davies Molony Solicitors of William Street, Melbourne.  They acted for the husband and the company; they did not act for Mr and Ms P Snr.  Mr and Ms P Snr did not have solicitors act for them in the loan transaction. 

19. The husband has contended repeatedly in these proceedings that the wife has been unable to demonstrate that the $400,000 received by him from Mr and Ms P Snr are not repayable “as it was not expended for proper purposes”.  I recognise that the wife concedes that the $400,000 was advanced.  I do not know whether she concedes that $100,000 has since accumulated by way of interest and recovery costs to make the round figure of $500,000.  It is apparent, however, that the wife does not concede that the moneys were appropriately or properly expended by the husband, at this stage anyway.  I note that the deed of loan provided that the moneys would be utilised for a specific purpose.  It appears beyond doubt that whilst the moneys were advanced they were not applied by the husband for the purpose stated in the deed of loan. 

20. As indicated earlier, I will make provision for various other entities controlled by the husband and/or the wife to be parties to these proceedings.  It is not intended that those entities will retain solicitors or make applications in this proceeding; those entities are made parties for the purpose of being bound by orders of the Court and it is acknowledged that all persons with any interest in the entities and the power to control them are before the Court as parties to the proceedings. 

21. Finally, the wife seeks that the husband and/or Mr and Ms P Snr pay her costs of this application on an indemnity basis.  It will be difficult for the wife to succeed on an indemnity basis given the authoritative statements of law in relation to such applications.  However, it was fair enough for her counsel to say that he wanted to look at the reasons for decision prior to making an application for costs.  These reasons are given following me having pronounced orders and the parties having left court. 

22. Accordingly, I have made provision for that application to be made on notice to the parties against whom the application is made and following the publication of these reasons.  It is not my intention that the costs should await determination at a final hearing.  It is a discrete proceeding but I will be guided by the parties as to when they want it to be determined by me.  The wife relies on her affidavit sworn 6 November 2014; the husband relies on his affidavit sworn on 20 November 2014.  No party sought to cross examine the husband or the wife so all evidence relevant to the costs issue is already before the Court.

I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Bennett delivered on 25 November 2014.

Associate: 

Date:  25 November 2014