Haddara v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Haddara v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

[1999] FCA 1319

MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal affirming decision not to grant applicant a protection visa – whether procedures required to be observed were observed – notification of entitlement to hearing – whether actual notification required – whether actual notification given

WORDS AND PHRASES – “notify the applicant that he or she is entitled to appear”

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 425, 426, 476(1)(a), 504
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.41 and reg 5.03

Uddin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1041 followed
Sook v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] 86 FCR 584 discussed
Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 71 FCR 386 cited
Susiatin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 83 FCR 574 cited
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 613 cited
Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1147 cited

MOHAMAD MUSTAPHA HADDARA v THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N 345 OF 1999

LEHANE J

22 SEPTEMBER 1999

SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 345 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

MOHAMAD MUSTAPHA HADDARA
Applicant

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

LEHANE J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 SEPTEMBER 1999

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 22 March 1999 be set aside.

2.The matter be remitted to the Tribunal (differently constituted) for determination according to law.

3.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 345 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

MOHAMAD MUSTAPHA HADDARA
Applicant

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

LEHANE J

DATE:

22 SEPTEMBER 1999

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 22 March 1999.  By the decision the Tribunal affirmed a decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

    Facts

  2. The applicant is a Lebanese national.  He arrived in Australia on 4 February 1998.  On 12 March 1998 he applied for a protection visa; a decision to refuse the application was made on 31 March 1998 and the applicant applied for review by the Tribunal.  That review resulted in the decision which the applicant now asks the Court to set aside.

  3. The applicant’s claims are summarised in the following paragraphs of the Tribunal’s decision:

    “According to the information provided by the applicant, he is a Sunni Muslim from north Lebanon.  He left Lebanon following an incident in which a boy was killed on his land by the applicant’s runaway tractor.  The applicant was taken into custody for one night while the matter was investigated, but was subsequently cleared by a judge who found that there…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1319
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Haddara v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a Lebanese national, sought a review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal on 22 March 1999. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant had applied for a protection visa on 12 March 1998, following his arrival in Australia on 4 February 1998. After a refusal of his application on 31 March 1998, the applicant appealed to the Tribunal, which upheld the refusal. The applicant now sought to have the Tribunal’s decision set aside.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal complied with the procedural requirements outlined in sections 425 and 426 of the Migration Act 1958. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Tribunal adequately notified the applicant of his right to attend a hearing and provide oral evidence, and whether the Tribunal's failure to do so warranted setting aside the Tribunal's decision. The applicant argued that he did not receive the notice required by section 426, and thus was not given a fair opportunity to present his case.

The court found that the Tribunal did not adequately notify the applicant of his right to attend a hearing and provide oral evidence. The Tribunal had sent a letter by registered post to the applicant's stated home address, but this letter was returned unclaimed. The applicant testified that he did not receive the letter, did not receive any cards indicating that the letter was available for collection, and had his mail redirected to a post office box a year prior to the hearing. The court accepted the applicant's evidence and concluded that the Tribunal did not make sufficient efforts to ensure the applicant was aware of his rights and the importance of responding to the notice.

Consequently, the court held that the Tribunal's failure to properly notify the applicant of his rights resulted in a procedural unfairness that warranted setting aside the Tribunal's decision. The court ordered that the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be set aside, the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination, and the respondent pay the applicant's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 22 March 1999 be set aside.

2. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal (differently constituted) for determination according to law.

3. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 22 March 1999. By the decision the Tribunal affirmed a decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.Facts The applicant is a Lebanese national. He arrived in Australia on 4 February 1998. On 12 March 1998 he applied for a protection visa; a decision to refuse the application was made on 31 March 1998 and the applicant applied for review by the Tribunal. That review resulted in the decision which the applicant now asks the Court to set aside. The applicant’s claims are summarised in the following paragraphs of the Tribunal’s decision:“According to the information provided by the applicant, he is a Sunni Muslim from north Lebanon. He left Lebanon following an incident in which a boy was killed on his land by the applicant’s runaway tractor. The applicant was taken into custody for one night while the matter was investigated, but was subsequently cleared by a judge who found that there had been no negligence on the applicant’s part. The applicant has provided a document purporting to be a translation of the judge’s findings. The applicant claims that he continued to be harassed and threatened by members of the dead boy’s family, and that he had to carry a firearm and call on the protection of members of his own family when he went out at night because he was in fear of his life. He claims that the dead boy’s family refused the offer of blood money from the applicant’s father because they wanted to kill the applicant. He claims that this is because they are from a different social class and hold different political opinions to the applicant’s family. He claims that the boy’s family belong to the Socialist Arab Baath party, allied to Syria, which is opposed to feudalism and large land holders such as the applicant. The applicant claims that members of his extended family have been killed in the past (in undisclosed circumstances), and states that feuds in Lebanon are a serious matter. He claims that family feuds are inseparable from politics because all families belong to and are under the patronage of a particular ‘zaim’. In this particular matter the applicant had the support of two members of parliament, who he claims were instrumental in securing his release from prison; the applicant claims that no protection is available because the closest police station is twenty kilometres away; although he is licensed to carry a firearm he cannot protect himself against scheming and treachery.In response to the primary decision rejecting the application on the basis that the harm feared by the applicant was not directed at him for any of the Convention reasons, the applicant submitted that the real reason that the other family wanted to kill him was because of his membership of a particular social group comprised of ‘land owning families in the Akka region’. He claims that had the death of the boy been caused by a member of his own family’s ‘group’, they would not have reacted in the same way – the fact that the applicant was held responsible for the boy’s death served only to heighten the enmity his family already felt for the applicant for political and class reasons.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Minister accepted that the applicant sufficiently raised the question whether the Tribunal observed the procedures required by s 425 and s 426 of the Migration Act as those provisions applied when the matter was before the Tribunal.Compliance with s 425 and s 426: evidence and findings The circumstances relevant to that ground may be briefly stated. In a letter accompanying his application for review by the Tribunal the applicant set out a series of brief submissions as to why he should be regarded as fearing harm both because of his political opinion and because of his membership of a particular social group. He concluded:“For the abovementioned reasons I seek a review of this decision and the opportunity to put forward the information you feel I didn’t offer such as political affiliations and any other information you deem necessary.I look forward to such an invitation for an interview and await your most favourable response.” In his application he stated his home address as “5/37 Macarthur St Parramatta NSW 2150”. He did not give, separately, an address for service. He gave his telephone number as “0416 108164”; that was the number of a mobile telephone which he then had. The Tribunal wrote to the applicant at his stated home address on 30 April 1998. The letter briefly outlined the Tribunal’s procedures. It included this paragraph:“If there is any change in your personal circumstances that may affect your application, please tell the Tribunal in writing immediately. It is also very important to tell the Tribunal in writing if you change your telephone number, home address or the address where you want letters from the Tribunal sent (your address for service). If you do not tell us you may lose your opportunity to appear before the Tribunal and give evidence on your case.”The applicant, who gave oral evidence before me, accepted that he received that letter. On 21 January 1999 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant, again at his stated home address. The letter was headed “Notice under Section 426 of the Migration Act 1958”. It recorded that the Tribunal was not prepared to make a favourable decision on the written material. It informed the applicant of his entitlement “to come to a hearing of the Tribunal to give oral evidence in support of your claims” and “to ask the Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from another person”. It asked the applicant to complete a “‘response to hearing offer’ form” and return it to the Tribunal by 11 February 1999. It informed the applicant that if he told the Tribunal that he wished to give oral evidence the Tribunal would write shortly to inform him of the hearing date. The letter concluded with the following, prominently printed in bold capital letters:“IF YOU DO NOT RESPOND BY 11 FEBRUARY 1999 WE WILL ASSUME THAT YOU DO NOT WANT TO COME TO A HEARING AND THE TRIBUNAL MAY MAKE A DECISION ON YOUR CASE WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE.”The envelope in which the letter was sent is in evidence. It indicates that it was addressed to the applicant at his stated home address and that it was sent by registered post. There are two endorsements on it, “C/L 22-1 PDC” and “Final 27/1 unclaimed”. The Minister asked me to infer, consistently with information given by the Parramatta Post Office by telephone to an officer of the Tribunal, that cards indicating that the letter was available for collection had been left at 5/37 Macarthur Street on 22 January and on 27 January and that the letter was not claimed. It was, in fact, returned to the Tribunal, unclaimed, on 11 March 1999. The Tribunal recorded in its reasons that there was no response to the letter of 21 January and that:“On 16 February 1999 a person who identified herself as the applicant’s sister telephoned the Tribunal to inquire about the progress of the application. She was informed about the letter that had been sent to the applicant. The Tribunal officer to whom she spoke told her that the applicant should contact the Tribunal no later than the following afternoon to inform the Tribunal whether he wished to attend a hearing. The applicant did not do so and the telephone number for the applicant given by his ‘sister’ proved to be disconnected when the Tribunal sought to phone him. A mobile telephone number previously given by the applicant also appeared to be disconnected.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 21 January 1999 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant, again at his stated home address. The letter was headed “Notice under Section 426 of the Migration Act 1958”. It recorded that the Tribunal was not prepared to make a favourable decision on the written material. It informed the applicant of his entitlement “to come to a hearing of the Tribunal to give oral evidence in support of your claims” and “to ask the Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from another person”. It asked the applicant to complete a “‘response to hearing offer’ form” and return it to the Tribunal by 11 February 1999. It informed the applicant that if he told the Tribunal that he wished to give oral evidence the Tribunal would write shortly to inform him of the hearing date. The letter concluded with the following, prominently printed in bold capital letters:“IF YOU DO NOT RESPOND BY 11 FEBRUARY 1999 WE WILL ASSUME THAT YOU DO NOT WANT TO COME TO A HEARING AND THE TRIBUNAL MAY MAKE A DECISION ON YOUR CASE WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE.”The envelope in which the letter was sent is in evidence. It indicates that it was addressed to the applicant at his stated home address and that it was sent by registered post. There are two endorsements on it, “C/L 22-1 PDC” and “Final 27/1 unclaimed”. The Minister asked me to infer, consistently with information given by the Parramatta Post Office by telephone to an officer of the Tribunal, that cards indicating that the letter was available for collection had been left at 5/37 Macarthur Street on 22 January and on 27 January and that the letter was not claimed. It was, in fact, returned to the Tribunal, unclaimed, on 11 March 1999. The Tribunal recorded in its reasons that there was no response to the letter of 21 January and that:“On 16 February 1999 a person who identified herself as the applicant’s sister telephoned the Tribunal to inquire about the progress of the application. She was informed about the letter that had been sent to the applicant. The Tribunal officer to whom she spoke told her that the applicant should contact the Tribunal no later than the following afternoon to inform the Tribunal whether he wished to attend a hearing. The applicant did not do so and the telephone number for the applicant given by his ‘sister’ proved to be disconnected when the Tribunal sought to phone him. A mobile telephone number previously given by the applicant also appeared to be disconnected.” That statement is supported by file notes of officers of the Tribunal who spoke to the “sister” and tried the two telephone numbers. The applicant’s evidence was that he did not receive the letter; he did not receive any card informing him that it was available for collection; he did not have a sister in Australia; he had a sister‑in‑law, the wife of his brother with whom, throughout the relevant period, he lived at 5/37 Macarthur Street; the sister‑in‑law had ceased to live there following a dispute; partly as a result of that dispute, his brother’s telephone was disconnected for a time because telephone charges were not paid; the applicant had lost the mobile telephone, the number of which he had included on his application form, and later had access to another mobile telephone (his brother’s) whose number he had not given to the Tribunal; and approximately a year before the hearing before me, the applicant had had his mail redirected to a post office box at Granville, though he continued to reside at 5/37 Macarthur Street.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.