Hadchity v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Link copied
Case Copied 15 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hadchity v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCA 144

Citation: Hadchity v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCA 144
Appeal from: Hadchity v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 958
Parties: PAUL HADCHITY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1227 of 2009
Judge: EDMONDS J
Date of judgment: 2 March 2010
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – visas – partner visa – domestic/family violence – whether Tribunal invalidly obtained an expert’s opinion – whether the quashing of the initial decision invalidated the expert’s opinion.

Held: The Tribunal validly obtained the expert’s opinion.  The quashing of the initial decision did not invalidate the expert’s opinion.

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 5, Div 3
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.23, cl 100.221 of Sch 2
Cases cited: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Sok & Anor (2008) 165 FCR 586 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Wang (2003) 215 CLR 518 applied
MZXRE v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor (2009) 176 FCR 552 approved
Sie Sok v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor (2008) 238 CLR 251 considered
SZEPZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs & Anor (2006) 159 FCR 291 approved
SZHKA & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor (2008) 172 FCR 1 considered
Date of hearing: 9 February 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 29
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr C Jackson
Solicitor for the Appellant: Paramonte Legal
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G Kennett
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1227 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

PAUL HADCHITY
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 MARCH 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1227 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

PAUL HADCHITY
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE:

2 MARCH 2010

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal from the Federal Magistrates Court (Scarlett FM): Hadchity v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 958, dismissing an application for review of a decision of the second respondent (‘the Tribunal’) affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (‘the Minister’) not to grant the appellant a Partner (Migrant) (Class BC) visa.

    BACKGROUND

  2. The appellant applied for a Partner (Migrant) (Class BC) visa on 23 November 2005. A…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Hadchity v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2010] FCA 144
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Circuit Court heard an appeal by Mr Hadchity against the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court, which dismissed his application for review of a decision by the Migration Review Tribunal. The Tribunal had affirmed the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship's decision not to grant Mr Hadchity a Partner (Migrant) (Class BC) visa. The central issue before the court was whether the Tribunal erred in its handling of the appellant's claim of domestic violence, which was pertinent to his eligibility for the visa under the relevant regulations. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Tribunal was required to restart its review process, including the obtaining of an independent expert's opinion on the domestic violence claim, following the quashing of its initial decision.

The court considered the principles established in previous cases, such as Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Wang and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj, which held that when an administrative decision is set aside due to jurisdictional error, the entire decision-making process must be repeated. The court also referenced Sok, where it was established that the Tribunal is not bound by previous findings when conducting a fresh review. In light of these principles, the court examined whether the Tribunal had correctly recommenced its review process from the beginning, particularly regarding the independent expert's opinion on the domestic violence claim. The court concluded that the Tribunal's procedure in handling the claim did not conform to the statutory requirements and thus, the Tribunal's decision was quashed.

Following the court's reasoning, the orders made by the court included quashing the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal and remitting the matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with the statutory provisions and the principles outlined in the court's judgment. This ensured that the Tribunal could properly assess the appellant's claim of domestic violence and all other relevant factors afresh, in line with the requirements of the Migration Act and Regulations.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from the Federal Magistrates Court (Scarlett FM): Hadchity v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 958, dismissing an application for review of a decision of the second respondent (‘the Tribunal’) affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (‘the Minister’) not to grant the appellant a Partner (Migrant) (Class BC) visa.BACKGROUND The appellant applied for a Partner (Migrant) (Class BC) visa on 23 November 2005. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visa on 6 February 2007. The reason for this refusal was that the appellant and his sponsor were no longer living together as husband and wife and he therefore did not satisfy cl 100.221(2) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (‘the Regulations’). The appellant applied to the Tribunal to review this decision on 6 March 2007. At a hearing before the Tribunal on 2 August 2007, the appellant claimed that he had separated from his sponsor because of her violence towards him. This claim was elaborated later in writing. It raised a question whether the appellant could meet the criterion in cl 100.221 by satisfying subcl (4), which applies (broadly speaking) in circumstances where the spousal relationship has ended in circumstances where the visa applicant has suffered ‘family violence’ (at the relevant time, the phrase used was ‘domestic violence’). Division 1.5 of the Regulations sets out a process by which decision-makers are to determine whether a person has suffered, and whether another person has perpetrated, ‘family violence’. The key provision of Div 1.5 for present purposes is reg 1.23. Where a claim of family violence has not been ‘judicially determined’, reg 1.23(1B) and (1C) require the decision-maker to proceed as follows:(a)If satisfied that the person has suffered family violence, determine the application on that basis;(b)if not satisfied that the person has suffered family violence, to refer the issue to an ‘independent expert’; and(c)take the expert’s opinion to be correct, for the purpose of determining whether the person satisfies any visa criteria that involves having suffered family violence. The Tribunal sent the appellant a further invitation to comment on information on 4 October 2007 and in December 2007 received further material from his advisers. It later invited the provision of more evidence. Further material was received on 8 and 18 February 2008. On 21 February 2008 (see [46] of the Tribunal’s first decision) or 25 February 2008 (see AB 164) (it matters not which), the Tribunal sent a bundle of material to Centrelink for assessment by a social worker in the role of an independent expert. The Tribunal received a report from a social worker dated 12 March 2008, which it sent to the appellant’s advisers on 2 April 2008. It appears that a further hearing had been scheduled for 4 April 2008 but the appellant did not attend. The Tribunal handed down a decision on 18 April 2008 affirming the decision of the delegate. The basis for that decision, applying the reasoning of the Full Court of this Court in Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor v Sok (2008) 165 FCR 586 (handed down on 5 March 2008), was that a non-judicially determined claim of domestic violence could only be considered if it had been made before the delegate.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The second leg of Ground 1 was that, even if the independent expert’s opinion was validly obtained the first time around, predicated as it was on a lack of satisfaction by the Tribunal as to the appellant having suffered domestic violence, the quashing of the Tribunal’s first decision effectively quashed the Tribunal’s lack of satisfaction as to the appellant having suffered domestic violence and this, in turn, quashed or invalidated the obtaining of the independent expert’s opinion. The procedure for forming a state of satisfaction, or lack thereof, as to the appellant having suffered domestic violence had to be recommenced before any independent expert opinion could be obtained and relied upon. Reliance was placed on what was said by the High Court in Sok at [8] – [10]; by Gleeson CJ in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Wang (2003) 215 CLR 518 at [16], namely:‘The content of the interests of justice, in the events that occurred, is to be determined in the light of the provisions of the Act, pursuant to which the respondent made his application for a protection visa, and pursuant to which the delegate of the Minister, the Tribunal, and the Federal Court were acting. Under the statutory scheme, and in consequence of the other orders made by the Full Court, the Tribunal is now obliged to undertake a further review of the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal’s decision upon that review is to be made on the basis of the facts as they appear in the course of that review. To what extent the information before the Tribunal will differ from the information that was originally before Ms Boland is not known. The findings made by Ms Boland will have no legal status in that further review. Neither Ms Boland, if she undertakes the further review, nor any other member of the Tribunal, if the Tribunal is differently constituted, will be bound by them. The most that can be said is that, as a practical matter, if Ms Boland undertakes the review, then, unless there is a significant change in the information before the Tribunal, she is unlikely to alter the view of the facts she took previously, whereas a fresh decision-maker might see the matter differently even if the information remains substantially the same.’ (Emphasis added)And by Gyles J in SZHKA & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor (2008) 172 FCR 1 at [37], namely:‘[I]t is difficult to see an escape from the proposition that once an administrative decision is set aside for jurisdictional error, the whole of the relevant decision-making process must take place again (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597). There is no analogy between that situation and a rehearing ordered on an appeal in judicial proceedings or pursuant to statutory provisions such as s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) or the former s 481 of the Act. Mandatory statutory obligations must be carried out again. The suggested dichotomy between an administrative decision and what precedes it is unconvincing in this context. Such a conclusion would not mean that what has taken place in the previous review cannot be taken into account in the second review if considered relevant. The proceedings are administrative, not judicial, and the Tribunal can have regard to all relevant material, including a transcript of what took place at the previous hearing, subject to compliance with the statutory regime.’ (Emphasis added)Neither Gray nor Besanko JJ made any similar observations.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court addressed the validity of the Tribunal's reliance on an independent expert's opinion on the issue of family violence. It examined the provisions of Division 1.5 of the Regulations and the obligations of the decision-maker under regulation 1.23. The court noted that the Tribunal correctly followed the process outlined in the regulations by referring the issue of family violence to an independent expert when it was not satisfied that the appellant had suffered such violence. The court also considered the Full Court's decision in Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor v Sok, which emphasized the importance of non-judicially determined claims of domestic violence being made before the delegate. As the Tribunal had not made an error in relying on the independent expert's opinion, this ground of appeal was dismissed.

Regarding the necessity of recommencing the entire decision-making process, the court referred to the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Wang, which stated that the Tribunal is obliged to undertake a further review of the delegate's decision when an administrative decision is set aside for jurisdictional error. The court also cited Gyles J's decision in SZHKA & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor, which supported the proposition that the entire decision-making process must take place again in such circumstances. The court held that the Tribunal was required to recommence the decision-making process, and thus this ground of appeal was allowed.

Lastly, the court addressed whether the Tribunal was obliged to undertake a further review of the delegate's decision in light of the Full Court's decision in Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor v Sok. The court found that the Tribunal was indeed obliged to conduct a further review, as the Full Court's decision required the Tribunal to consider the facts anew. The court allowed this ground of appeal, stating that the Tribunal must undertake a further review of the delegate's decision in accordance with the Full Court's decision.