H2O Exchange Pty Ltd v Innovation and Science Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

H2O Exchange Pty Ltd v Innovation and Science Australia [2021] FCA 11

Appeal from: H2O Exchange Pty Ltd and Innovation and Science Australia [2019] AATA 4195
File number: NSD 1847 of 2019
Judgment of: STEWART J
Date of judgment: 22 January 2021
Catchwords: TAXATION – R&D tax incentive scheme – appeal from decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal which affirmed a finding that certain activities were not core R&D activities or supporting R&D activities within their meaning under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) – whether irrational and illogical to accept expert evidence – whether expert had the relevant expertise – whether the Tribunal denied the appellant natural justice by deciding that the existence of artificial intelligence research was a relevant issue in the proceeding without advising the parties – whether denial of natural justice for the Tribunal to proceed with the review where a purported variation application had been made – appeal dismissed    
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44(1)

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 355-5, 355-20, 355-25, 355-30

Industry Research and Development Act 1986 (Cth) ss 4(1), 6, 27A, 27D, 27F, 27J, 27M, 30D, 30E, 32A

Industry Research and Development Decision-making Principles 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Stoltenberg v Bolton; Loder v Bolton [2020] NSWCA 45; 380 ALR 145

Tame v NSW [2002] HCA 35; 211 CLR 317

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Taxation
Number of paragraphs: 46
Date of hearing: 18 December 2020
Counsel for the Appellant: Dr M Wolff
Solicitor for the Appellant: Aqualaw
Counsel for the Respondent: S Free SC and C Trahanas
Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth

ORDERS

NSD 1847 of 2019
BETWEEN:

H2O EXCHANGE PTY LTD

Appellant

AND:

INNOVATION AND SCIENCE AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

STEWART J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 JANUARY 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

STEWART J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 14 October 2019 reported as H2O Exchange Pty Ltd and Innovation and Science Australia [2019] AATA 4195. Such an appeal is provided for by s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). By that section, the appeal is confined to “a question of law”.

  2. The decision of the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent on 24 April 2017 that certain activities in which the appellant engaged in the 2013-14 and 2014-15 income years were not “core R&D activities” within the meaning of s 355-25 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (ITAA97), and that they were also not “supporting R&D activities” within the meaning of s 355-30 of the ITAA97. The decision of the delegate was an internal review decision under s 30D of the Industry Research and Development Act 1986 (Cth) (

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 11
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

H2O Exchange Pty Ltd has appealed against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that certain activities were not core research and development (R&D) activities or supporting R&D activities within the meaning of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). The appeal was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the appellant raised three main issues. First, it argued that the AAT's acceptance of the evidence of the respondent's expert, Mr Harding, was irrational and illogical. Second, it contended that the AAT had denied it natural justice by deciding that the existence of artificial intelligence research was a relevant issue in the proceeding without advising the parties. Third, it claimed that it was denied natural justice for the AAT to proceed with the review where a purported variation application had been made, and the respondent had failed to deal with the variation request.

The Federal Court found that the AAT had not erred in accepting Mr Harding's evidence. The court considered his experience in the trading of water rights and in collaborating with others in the design of software and the development of software platforms. The court also held that there was no denial of natural justice in the AAT's approach to the relevance of artificial intelligence research or in proceeding with the review despite the purported variation application. The court concluded that the appeal had no substance and dismissed it, ordering the appellant to pay the respondent's costs.

In summary, the Federal Court upheld the AAT's decision that certain activities were not core R&D activities or supporting R&D activities within the meaning of the ITAA97. The court found that the AAT had not erred in accepting the evidence of the respondent's expert, and that there had been no denial of natural justice in the AAT's proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

H2O Exchange Pty Ltd (H2O) appealed against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which upheld findings of Innovation and Science Australia (ISA) that certain activities of H2O were not "core R&D activities" or "supporting R&D activities" as defined under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). H2O had registered certain activities for the Research and Development (R&D) tax incentive scheme but ISA examined these activities and found they did not meet the criteria for R&D tax incentives. The AAT upheld ISA's findings that two specified activities were not experimental or uncertain in outcome as required by the legislation. H2O challenged the AAT's decision on the basis that the AAT erred in accepting the expert evidence of Mr Harding, that it was a denial of natural justice for the AAT to consider the relevance of artificial intelligence (AI) research without prior notice, and that it was unfair for the AAT to proceed with the review despite a purported variation application by H2O.

The case came before the court on appeal from the decision of the AAT. The AAT had reviewed a decision of ISA to find that certain activities of H2O were not eligible for the R&D tax incentive. The AAT upheld ISA's decision, finding that the activities did not meet the statutory criteria for "core R&D activities" or "supporting R&D activities". H2O appealed to the court, arguing that the AAT's decision was irrational and illogical, constituted a denial of natural justice, and that the AAT should not have proceeded with the review upon learning of a purported variation application by H2O. The appeal was heard and the court dismissed it, upholding the AAT's decision.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the appellant helpfully, and appropriately, reduced the grounds of appeal down to three which he put as follows:(1)The Tribunal’s decision was irrational and illogical in accepting Mr Harding’s evidence.(2)It was a denial of natural justice to make the presence or absence of research involving AI a relevant issue in the proceeding without advising the parties that that approach would be taken and giving them an opportunity to deal with it.(3)It was a denial of natural justice for the Tribunal to proceed with the review when it became evident during the review proceeding that the appellant had filed an application to vary the relevant registration definitions and that the respondent had failed to deal with the variation request.Ground 1: the evidence of Mr Harding The basis for the appellant’s criticism of the Tribunal’s acceptance of the evidence of Mr Harding was, so it was submitted, that he was not an expert in software development. Before the Tribunal, each party adduced the evidence of an expert. Mr Harding was the respondent’s expert and Dr Fearn was the appellant’s expert. The appellant challenged Mr Harding’s expertise in relation to software development but did not otherwise cross-examine him on the contents of his report. The appellant drew attention to the cross-examination of Mr Harding where he accepted that he did not study software design, he had never been hired as a software engineer and that he had never written a line of code in support of its contention that he did not have the requisite expertise to address the questions raised by the definition of “core R&D activities”. The Tribunal described Mr Harding as having experience in the trading of water rights and in collaborating with others in the design of software and the development of software platforms: Decision [8] and [50]. Mr Harding’s report identifies his experience as including having been appointed in 2006 when employed by the Uniting Church Investment Fund to assist with the design and testing of a replacement CRM program which included contributing to the design of the database component of the system and becoming familiar with database structure and design. In 2009, Mr Harding commenced work at Global Commodities Ltd where he was responsible for the administration of client and assets data using a proprietary software platform. He worked closely with the Research Officer to design a software platform capable of analysing and interpreting multiple data sources, then applying pre-determined rules in a systematic manner to generate output which was then observed and evaluated to prove or disprove their hypotheses. Beginning in 2011, Mr Harding was responsible for design and project management for the development of a later version of the software. On leaving Global Commodities in 2013, Mr Harding began developing his own software platform using MySQL (an open-source version of Microsoft SQL) as the database platform, Microsoft Excel for mathematical calculation and Microsoft PowerShell to extract data from various websites, interpret and convert the data into a predetermined format, and then update the data in the database.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Registration of an R&D entity’s activities for an income year under s 27A does not automatically render the registered activities “core R&D activities” or “supporting R&D activities” within the meaning of the ITAA97. Even after a s 27A registration, the respondent may examine the registration and make findings about whether or not a registered activity is “a core R&D activity conducted during the registration year” or “a supporting R&D activity conducted during the registration year”: IRD Act, ss 27F and 27J.The Tribunal’s decision The principal issue before the Tribunal was whether activities 1.1 and 1.2 were “core R&D activities” under s 355-25(1) of the ITAA97: Decision [17]. The Tribunal found that they were not “core R&D activities” because they did not meet the first limb of s 355-25(1) – that is, they were not experimental activities whose outcome could not be known or determined in advance on the basis of current knowledge, information or experience, but could only be determined by applying a systematic progression of work that (i) is based on principles of established science and (ii) proceeds from hypothesis to experiment, observation and evaluation, and leads to logical conclusions. As to activity 1.1, the Tribunal found that the outcome of the activity could be known or determined in advance on the basis of current knowledge, information or experience. The Tribunal’s reasons in support of this finding were that:(1)The outcome of parts of activity 1.1 – namely, the creation of a web-based trading platform, membership database and CRM, binding legal framework, and real-time settlement and payment of fees – was known to be achievable based on current knowledge, information and experience. These parts of activity 1.1 were “simple and easily accomplished by a competent professional” or involved “choosing between a suite of known software tools and incorporating them into the platform”: Decision [47]-[48], [52], [60] and [63]. Although building the online trading platform could involve complicated work, this did not mean that there was an uncertainty of outcome: Decision [45] and [48].(2)The outcome of the other part of activity 1.1 – complete automation of the conveyancing and registration process – was known not to be achievable because NSW and South Australia did not offer online registration of transfers. The outcome of this part of activity 1.1 depended on governments changing their procedures, which is not the type of uncertainty of outcome able to be determined only by applying a systematic progression of work as contemplated by the language of s 355-25(1)(a): Decision [42]-[44], [52], [61] and [63]. As to activity 1.2, the Tribunal found that there was no evidence on which it could be satisfied of the matters arising under s 355-25(1)(a): Decision [64]-[66] and [68]. Activity 1.2 “may have been achievable using AI [i.e., artificial intelligence] software but probably not otherwise”: Decision [64]. However, the evidence did not show that, during 2013/2014 and/or 2014/2015, the appellant intended “to have its system incorporate changes in water trading conditions by using AI software” or that the appellant “embarked on experimentation for that purpose which experimentation had an uncertain outcome”: Decision [65(b)] and [66], but see also [37], [41] and [64].The grounds of appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the circumstances, there is no substance to ground 2.Ground 3: the application to vary the registration definitions The appellant submitted that by letter to the respondent dated 21 March 2016 it had sought to vary its registrations but that the respondent had not treated the letter as an application for a variation. It submitted that during the course of the hearing before the Tribunal it sought an adjournment in order that the application for a variation could be considered, or that it could obtain an internal review by the respondent of its failure to approve the variation, but that it was met by the objection, which it accepts as valid, that an application cannot be varied while it is under review by the Tribunal. It says that it was denied procedural fairness by the Tribunal by the Tribunal’s refusal of an adjournment so that it could obtain an internal review by the respondent of its failure to approve the variation that had been sought in the letter. There are a number of difficulties with this ground. First, it is not at all clear that the letter of 21 March 2016 was an application for a variation. The letter is stated to be in response to a letter from the respondent dated 25 January 2016 in which the respondent notified the appellant that the respondent was commencing an examination of the appellant’s R&D tax incentive registration in accordance with s 27F of the IRD Act. The letter invited the appellant to provide further information or documentary evidence. The appellant’s letter of 21 March 2016 was on the face of it a response to that invitation and was expressed to set out “some more relevant details of our engagement with technology providers, Veritec, the company that helped develop our water trading platform”. The letter ends with the statement that “[w]e trust this information better describes the activities undertaken.” There is nothing in the letter suggesting that it is any form of application for a variation of the registrations. Secondly, it was only during the hearing before the Tribunal that the appellant for the first time sought to characterise the 21 March 2016 letter as an application to vary the registrations. If indeed the letter had been intended to be an application for a variation, the appellant had had the opportunity to pursue that at an earlier time. Thirdly, as the appellant ultimately accepted, once the decision of the respondent was under external review in the Tribunal it was too late. That was the reason given by the Tribunal (at [33]) to refuse the adjournment. The respondent may vary a s 27A registration if the R&D entity applies for the variation, the variation is consistent with the respondent’s findings under Pt III of the IRD Act (such as a finding under s 27J) and making the variation is justified in accordance with the decision-making principles: IRD Act, s 27M. The “decision-making principles” are principles, made by the Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research by legislative instrument, that the respondent must comply with when making certain decisions, including when deciding whether a variation under s 27M is justified: IRD Act, s 32A(c).