H v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

H v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

[2001] FCA 906

MIGRATION – REFUGEE CLAIM – JURISDICTION OF REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL TO REVIEW A DECISION OF A DELEGATE REFUSING TO GRANT A PROTECTION VISA TO THE APPLICANT – APPLICATION LODGED ON EIGHTH OR NINTH DAY AFTER DATE OF DELEGATE’S DECISION – FOUR DAYS DELAY IN TRANSMISSION OF A DOCUMENT OUT OF DETENTION CENTRE IN WHICH APPLICANT WAS DETAINED – WHETHER APPLICATION FILED WITHIN THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY THE REGULATIONS – INTERPRETATION OF REGULATIONS – DISTINCTION BETWEEN “SENDING A NOTICE” OF THE DELEGATE’S DECISION TO A NOTIFIED ADDRESS AND “HANDING A NOTICE” OF DECISION TO THE APPLICANT – COMPUTATION OF TIME IN THE PRESENT CASE – CONCLUSION THAT APPLICATION FILED OUT OF TIME AND TRIBUNAL LACKED JURISDICTION – OBSERVATIONS ABOUT POTENTIAL FOR INJUSTICE IN LEGISLATION FIXING A SHORT TIME FOR TAKING A PROCEDURAL STEP WITHOUT ANY PROVISION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME.

Migration Act 1958 ss 66, 412.
Migration Regulations regs 2.16, 4.31, 5.02, 5.03.

H v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

W 40 of 2001

WILCOX J
31 JULY 2001
SYDNEY (HEARD IN PERTH)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 40 of 2001

BETWEEN:

H
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WILCOX J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 JULY 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN PERTH)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Court record be amended to identify the applicant, in all published documents, only as “H”.

2.The application be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 40 of 2001

BETWEEN:

H
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WILCOX J

DATE:

31 JULY 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN PERTH)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WILCOX J:

  1. The issue in this case is whether the Refugee Review Tribunal (“RRT” or “the Tribunal”) was correct in ruling it did not have jurisdiction to review a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs refusing to grant a protection visa to the applicant.

  2. The issue arises because of a combination of three factors:

    (a)the short time (seven working days) allowed under the Regulations for a person in immigration detention to file an application for review of a decision of a delegate;

    (b)the fact that nobody (neither the Tribunal, the Minister, nor anyone else) has a discretion to extend this time limit, whatever the reason for non-compliance with it; and

    (c)unfortunate delays (including a four-day delay within the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs itself) in taking the steps necessary to file the application for review.

  3. The case turns on the proper construction of relevant provisions of the Migration Act 1958 and the Migration Regulations. 

    THE FACTS

  4. The applicant claims to be a citizen of Iran who fears persecution from the Baseji if returned to that…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 906
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of H v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved a refugee claimant from Iran who had been detained upon arrival in Australia. The applicant sought a protection visa, fearing persecution from the Baseji if returned to Iran. After his application was rejected by a delegate of the Minister, he sought review by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The dispute centred on the interpretation of the regulations governing the time within which an application for review must be made. Specifically, it was questioned whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the application, which was lodged on the eighth or ninth day after the delegate’s decision, following a delay in the transmission of the decision notice from the detention centre.

The central legal issue was whether the application for review by the Tribunal was lodged within the prescribed period as stipulated by the Migration Regulations. This hinged on the interpretation of the regulations, particularly the distinction between the methods of notification of the delegate's decision—whether sent to the notified address or handed directly to the applicant. The crux of the matter was whether the time for lodging the application for review began to run when the notice was sent or when it was actually received by the applicant. The court had to determine whether the delay in the transmission of the notice, due to administrative processes, should be considered in computing the time for making the application.

The court found that the notification of the delegate’s decision was effectively handed to the applicant on 26 or 27 October 2000, thereby commencing the running of the seven working days allowed for filing an application for review. Even considering the delay in the transmission of the notice, the prescribed period expired on 7 November. Consequently, the application lodged on 8 November was deemed to be out of time. The court concluded that the Tribunal was correct in finding it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application for review. The court observed that while the strict time limits set by the legislation could lead to potential injustice, the regulations did not provide for an extension of time in such circumstances.

ORDERS:
1. The Court record be amended to identify the applicant, in all published documents, only as “H”.
2. The application be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Court record be amended to identify the applicant, in all published documents, only as “H”.

2. The application be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case turns on the proper construction of relevant provisions of the Migration Act 1958 and the Migration Regulations. THE FACTS The applicant claims to be a citizen of Iran who fears persecution from the Baseji if returned to that country. He arrived in Australia by boat on 27 September 2000. He was detained on arrival and sent to the Curtin Detention Centre near Derby, Western Australia. On 12 October 2000 the applicant made an application for a protection visa. He claimed to be a “refugee”, within the meaning of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees. The applicant was assisted, in formulating his application, by a migration agent associated with Craddock Murray Neumann, solicitors, of Sydney. It seems Craddock Murray Neumann had been retained by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“DIMA”) to provide advice and assistance to a substantial number of newly arrived “boat people”. The applicant was interviewed, in relation to his claims, on 21 October 2000. On 26 October a delegate of the Minister issued a decision rejecting his application for a protection visa. This was done in Melbourne. The delegate signed a letter notifying that decision and enclosing a statement of reasons and an intimation that the applicant was entitled to apply for review of the decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The letter was addressed to the applicant “c/- DIMA Business Manager, Immigration Reception and Processing Centre, Curtin, Derby WA 6728”. It seems the letter and enclosed documents were faxed that day to the detention centre. A copy of the letter was sent to Craddock Murray Neumann, apparently also by fax, on that same day. An officer of Curtin IRPC handed the fax to the applicant at the detention centre. There was evidence before the Tribunal that this was done on Thursday, 26 October, although that evidence seems to depend on usual practice rather than any officer’s knowledge of the facts of this particular case. Certainly, the applicant received the fax not later than the following day, 27 October. I say that because it was accepted by the Tribunal that, on 27 October, the applicant had a telephone conversation with someone at the office of Dr Al Jabiri & Associates, migration agents, of Fairfield, Sydney. In that conversation the applicant retained that firm to act on his behalf in connection with an application to the Tribunal. According to its letterhead, Dr Al Jabiri & Associates is a division of Human Rights Services Pty Ltd. On the following Monday, 30 October, Dr Al Jabiri faxed to the applicant, at the detention centre, a document known as “Form 956”. This is a form used to appoint a person to act as an applicant’s agent in dealings with DIMA. According to a fax notation on the document, it was sent by “Human Rights Services Australia” at 3.10pm on 30 October 2000. That would have been 12.10pm Western Australia time. The applicant claimed he signed the Form 956 as soon as it was handed to him at the detention centre and that he requested a DIMA officer at the detention centre to transmit it back to Dr Al Jabiri. That claim is supported by the fact that the form bears a hand-written date, opposite the applicant’s signature, “30 Oct 2000”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WILCOX J
Mr Curthoys argues reg 5.03 applies only to a notification made under para (c), where the notification is made “by sending a notice of the decision” to the address provided to the Minister by the applicant. He says it has no application to a decision notified under para (d) “by handing a notice of the decision to the applicant” or the applicant’s representative. Mr Curthoys contrasts reg 5.03 with reg 5.02, which provides for service of documents on persons in immigration detention. Regulation 5.02 provides:“For the purposes of the Act and these Regulations, a document to be served on a person in immigration detention may be served by giving it to the person himself or herself, or to another person authorised by him or her to receive documents on his or her behalf.”CONCLUSIONS Mr Curthoys’ construction argument seems to be correct. It is surprising that the drafter of the regulations used different verbs, in reg 5.02 (“giving it”) and reg 2.16(d) (“handing it”), for what is said to be the same action. However, in the present context, I agree they must be taken as having the same meaning. The contrast is between a document communicated by direct delivery to the person by a DIMA officer and a document communicated indirectly, by being sent through the post or by facsimile transmission. Regulation 5.03(1) is directed to a case where the notification is by a document “sent” from one place to another. Where a document is sent by post or facsimile transmission, there may be uncertainty as to the time of its receipt by the addressee. So it is understandable that it was thought desirable to make a regulation deeming the document to be received at a particular time after the date of the document. This deeming provision applies regardless of the time of actual receipt. Contrary to the submission of Mr Curthoys, I think reg 5.03(1) applies even to a case in which it is established that, in fact, the notice was received within less than the prescribed number of days. However, reg 2.16(1) draws a distinction between a notification being made by sending a notice to, or leaving a notice at, the last notified address, on the one hand, and, on the other, “handing a notice of the decision to the applicant” or the applicant’s representative. Where a decision is notified in the latter way, there should be no uncertainty as to the date of notification. Accordingly, there is no need for a deeming provision. In the present case, it is clear that notice of the decision was handed to the applicant on 26 or 27 October 2000. The period of seven working days allowed for the filing of a application for RRT review commenced to run from that moment. Even if the document was delivered on 27 October, the prescribed time expired at midnight on 7 November. Consequently, the application was out of time when filed with the Tribunal on 8 November. It follows the Tribunal was correct in holding it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for review.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WILCOX J

Full text does not contain this section.