H and S
[2007] FMCAfam 767
•5 October 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| H & S | [2007] FMCAfam 767 |
| FAMILY LAW – Property – alteration of property interests – short marriage – proceedings twenty-two years after separation – post separation contributions – s.75(2) factors – valuations of land with no legal right of access – prescriptive right. |
| Family Law Act 1975, ss.44, 75, 79 Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) |
| Dewhirst & Edwards [1983] 1 NSWLR 34 Hickey & Hickey & Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia (Intervener) (2003) FLC 93 Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 |
| Applicant: | H |
| Respondent: | S |
| File number: | SYC 383 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Altobelli FM |
| Hearing date: | 6 August 2007 |
| Date of last submission: | 6 August 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 5 October 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Shaw |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Bruce Macdonald Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Lloyd |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | McDonell Milne Tolsz |
ORDERS
That within 60 days of the date of this order the Respondent do all things necessary to transfer to the Applicant her one half share as tenant in common of the property 253A WB Road, Webb Creek via WF.
That the Applicant pay to the Respondent the sum of $25,000.00 simultaneously with the transfer in Order 2.
Except as otherwise provided for in these orders each party is to retain all other items of real and personal property in their respective names or possession, including but not limited to bank accounts, real property, shares, investments, jewellery, motor vehicles, furniture, furnishings, appliances, retirement and superannuation benefits.
Leave granted to re-list on seven days notice as regards implementation and/or enforcement of these orders.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYC 383 of 2007
| H |
Applicant
And
| S |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction and Background
This is an application for alteration of property interests filed by the husband, H. The respondent is his former wife. The applicant husband is now 63 years old, and the respondent wife 51 years old. They married on 26 May 1979, separated in early 1985 after a period of cohabitation of about six years and divorced on 24 May 1988. Despite the lengthy period since separation in 1985 (22 years) the parties had not entered into orders under s.79 of the Family Law Act. By consent, on 19 April 2007 orders were made pursuant to s.44(3) of the Family Law Act granting leave to the applicant to institute these proceedings out of time.
The issues in these proceedings are relatively discrete. It is common ground that at the time of cohabitation the parties had minimal assets. During the marriage, in August 1980, they purchased land at 253A WB Road, WB, near WF, New South Wales, as joint tenants for $11,500. At the time the only improvements of the land consisted of an asbestos lean-to dwelling which was in a poor condition. It is agreed that the husband has remained in exclusive occupation of the property since separation in 1985. It is agreed that, as at the time of separation, the contribution between the parties for the purposes of s.79(4) of the Family Law Act was equal. It was further agreed that, for all practical purposes, issues of contribution would be determined by reference only to the property at WB on the basis that any other property accumulated by either party since separation was not acquired as a result of the contribution of the other.
The issues therefore to be determined were as follows:
a)the value of the WB property;
b)whether there should be an adjustment in favour of the husband for post-separation contribution;
c)whether there should be an adjustment in favour of the husband pursuant to s.75(2) of the Family Law Act.
Obviously, if there was to be an adjustment I would need to determine the quantification of such adjustment.
Notwithstanding the application filed by the husband, his position at the hearing was that he should receive 80 per cent of the legal and beneficial interest in the WB property, that percentage reflecting not just his contribution but also his s.75(2) future needs factors as well. The husband's position was also that irrespective of the percentage allocated to him by way of adjustment, he wished to remain in the property and to have the opportunity to purchase his former wife's share from her. His submission was that the evidence would indicate that the value of the WB property was $100,000, that his entitlement should be quantified at 80 per cent, and that accordingly an order should be made for him to pay to the wife $20,000 within a specified period in return for her transfer to him of his interest in the WB property.
Notwithstanding the amended response filed on behalf of the wife, her position at the hearing was that the Court should order one of three things:
a)that the WB property be sold and the net sale proceeds be divided equally between the parties; or
b)that the husband be ordered to pay to the wife $75,000 for her transfer to him of her interest in the property; or
c)the reverse, namely that she pay to him $75,000 in return for his interest in the property.
The wife's position was that the land was worth $150,000.
The applicable law
The preferred approach to the determination of an application under s. 79 of the Family Law Act is set out in a passage found in the Full Court’s decision in Hickey & Hickey & Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia (Intervener) (2003) FLC 93-143 at 39.
The Full Court states that there are four inter-related steps:
a)Identify and value the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties; and
b)Identify and assess the contributions of the parties and express them as a percentage of the net value of the property; and
c)Identify and assess the other facts relevant under s.79(4)(d)-(g) including s.75(2) and determine the adjustment (if any) to be made to the contribution entitlements at step two; and
d)Consider the effect of the above and resolve what order is just and equitable in all the circumstances.
The evidence
The evidence about the value of the WB property was contained in the valuation report of Messrs Hausfeld Johnson, property advisers and valuers, dated 1 August 2007. The valuation became exhibit A1. It was a single joint expert report and, as such, it was adhered to by both the husband and the wife. There are special features about this property which I will refer to below. As a result of the special features, however, the valuation report provided two alternative valuations. The open market value of the WB property on the basis of there being access to the property via 255 WB Road, WB is expressed to be $150,000. However, the open market value of the property on the basis of there not being access to the property via 255 WB Road, WB is $100,000.
The valuation report explains that the property has no road access and fronts the western side of WB at WB, near WF. The property itself has an area of 11.84 hectares. The improvements on the property consist of a single storey residential dwelling of timber frame construction with a pitched corrugated galvanised roof, a meditation hut and shed.
The property has a number of other problems, apart from the lack of road access. For example, there are no mains services available except telephone. Electricity is available to the eastern side of WB but is not connected to this property. The property relies on tank water and a septic sewerage system. WB Road itself is a barely maintained gravel road with no kerbing and guttering. The zoning allows for agriculture and rural residential dwelling houses, but the improvements erected on the property do not have council approval, and the valuer believes that the property is partly affected by the Probable Maximum Flood Level.
The dwelling constructed on the property is made with timber pole footings, timber frame walls and a pitched corrugated galvanised iron roof. The valuer describes the construction of the wall cladding as "unconventional as it comprises in part second-hand building materials from demolition sites, such as doors, old window frames and some glazed sheeting". As it will become apparent, the husband constructed this property himself.
At pages 7 and 8 of the valuation, the valuer seems to identify what he regards as the key factor that influences the value of this property. Apparently, the only public access to the property is by powerboat from WF Public Wharf, a 20-minute journey along the River and then into WB. However, the alternate means of access, and apparently the means of access used by the parties throughout the entire period of ownership of this property, is via 255 WB Road, a property having frontage to WB Road, as well as to WB, and being situated directly opposite the subject property on WB.
The valuer records that Mr H explained that he has a personal arrangement with the owner of that property that allows him to drive a hundred metres across the land from WB Road to the creek, whereupon he then crosses the creek, approximately 15 metres, by boat. The valuer records that the owner of 255 WB Road has allowed Mr H to construct a carport to shelter his vehicle, and his garbage and gas bottle supplies are collected from an access point at this property. He also records that Mr H reiterated that this arrangement is a personal one to him only. However, according to the valuer, S, the respondent wife, refuted this contention. She stated that access from across the creek via 255 WB Road has always been in existence. In fact, the valuer records that she stated that when the property was jointly purchased by them in 1980, the vendor advised that access was gained via the property directly opposite on the creek.
The issue of access is critical, as the ease of access impacts upon the value of the property. The valuer noted that if S's contention is correct, it could be that some form of right of way through possessory title exists. The valuer expressed the view that notwithstanding Mr H' contention that the arrangement is a personal one, his understanding of encumbrances such as rights of way is that they attach to the property, not the individual. However, the valuer is quick to explain that this is a legal matter, and one in respect of which he is not qualified to determine. It was on that basis, therefore, that he provided two valuations. The first one assumes that access via 255 WB Road does benefit the property, as a result of which it is worth $150,000. However, if the property does not have the benefit of access via 255 WB Road, the value was $100,000. In each case, the value has been rounded.
The calculations which are annexed to the valuation also set out that the total value of the improvements on the land are, rounded off, $50,000. The improvements in question consist of the residence, the meditation hut, the sheds, the ground improvements, and the water tanks and plumbing. This means that, in simple terms, the land value is either $100,000, or $50,000.
Having regard to the agreed facts, the evidence of the parties is relatively uncontentious except for one matter only. There is no doubt, for example, that the property was purchased in 1980 initially as joint tenants, but that was converted to a tenancy in common quite some time later. It is undisputed that the applicant husband has had exclusive occupation of the property since separation in 1985, and paid all the expenses and outgoings relating to the property. Also, he gathered the second-hand building materials that were required to build the house, and he built the house and all of the improvements that are on the property. He also maintained the property by clearing fire hazards, weeds, maintaining lawns and fruit trees.
It is uncontentious that when the property was first purchased there was a small asbestos hut on the land which was subsequently destroyed in a bushfire.
Whilst the husband's evidence about the total value of the materials that was used to construct the home was $60,000, he conceded that the cost of these materials was only $6000. There was no serious challenge to these figures, in any event, and that was a realistic position to adopt having regard to the valuer's evidence about the improvements having a value of $50,000 today.
At paragraph 22 of the husband's affidavit filed 22 January 2007 he deposes to other moneys that he spent on the property, including the following:
a)mowers $3000
b)whipper-snippers $1200;
c)fuel $3000
d)rates 1985-95 $2527
e)rates 1996-2006 $5193.38
f)Rural Lands Protection Board rates 1987-2006 $801.56
g)Chainsaws $1200
h)repairs to mowers, et cetera $2500
i)boat and motor $3500
j)fruit trees $1000
k)fencing $1000
l)pontoon $1000
total $25,921.94.
The evidence also clearly indicated that if there was a legal right of access to the property over the property at 255 WB Road, it was not a right that had been formally created by way of right of way, easement or other right of access that is noted on or referred to on the title of either the property at 253A WB Road, or the property at 255 Webb Creek Road.
The only admissible evidence that the applicant husband was able to give in relation to his access to the property was that it was an arrangement with his neighbours, Mr and Mrs M, the registered proprietors of 255 WB Road. His evidence was that Mr M had given him permission to cross his land in order to get access to the property ever since he purchased the property in 1980. He did not pay anything for that right. It is interesting that notwithstanding what the valuer records S told the valuer about arrangement for access over the neighbour land, S gives no evidence about this in her affidavit filed 12 February 2007, nor was an application made for her to lead this evidence in-chief, or by way of reply. At paragraph 3.13 of her affidavit, responding to paragraph 20 of the husband's affidavit filed 22 January 2007, all she states is “I do not admit the remaining allegations contained therein.”
I record the fact that the assertion by the applicant husband in paragraph 20 of his affidavit, as to an informal arrangement with his neighbour to cross the river by driving through his property to the river bank was formally objected to by counsel for the wife. I upheld the objection, but granted leave to adduce oral evidence. Under the circumstances, I am left with no alternative but to accept the oral evidence of the husband that there is an informal arrangement with his neighbour, that has been in existence for at least 18 years, and which provides some access from WB Road, over Mr and Mrs M's property, to the creek bank, thus enabling the husband and the wife in these proceedings to then access their property across WB.
In cross-examination the applicant husband conceded that he had not received any notice revoking the right that he has to access and cross the property in question to WB. He agreed that he had relied on that agreement by constructing a carport on Mr and Mrs M's property. Mr H also agreed that many of the items that are referred to in his list of expenditure (referred to above) are items still in his possession. He readily conceded that his occupation of the property since separation was a significant benefit to him. He was cross-examined about his capacity to pay and it was apparent that he has about $23,000 in savings together with superannuation entitlements which, if he could access, and subject to issues of taxation, might provide him with another $17-18,000. Mr H also readily conceded that he had built the improvements on the property without council approval and there was the distinct possibility that the local council could require changes to be made.
The respondent wife was not required for cross-examination.
Contribution
By way of summary of the evidence, I find that since separation the wife has made no contribution, financially or non-financially, directly or indirectly, to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of the property, save to the extent that she acquiesced in the husband remaining in the property. Conversely, and subject only to the wife's contribution aforesaid, since separation the husband has made all the direct and indirect, financial and non-financial, contributions to the acquisition, conservation and improvement of the property. Whatever the value of the property is (and that I will shortly refer to), the evidence indicates that the improvements to the property have a value of $50,000 and the husband made the contribution to this.
The question I need to determine, however, is the value of the contribution that the wife has made in acquiescing to the husband's exclusive occupation of the property. Another possible way of conceptualising this contribution by her is to offset the contribution made by the husband by reference to the value of the benefit he has derived as a result of his continued occupation of the property. It must be remembered and acknowledged, moreover, that the agreed starting point between these parties is that as at the time of separation contribution was equal.
Mr Shaw, counsel for the applicant husband, submitted that the value of the husband's post-separation contribution results in a further adjustment in his favour of 30 per cent, resulting in a final 80:20 split in the husband's favour. However, Mr Shaw concedes that there is a s.75(2) component in that figure.
Mr Lloyd, counsel for the respondent wife, submits that there should be no further adjustment in favour of the husband because he has had the exclusive benefit of occupying this property, which benefit at least offsets the contribution he has made by effecting improvements to the property.
I had no evidence about the actual value to the husband of occupying this property. That value might, for example, have been expressed as a rental value.
The evidence indicates that the respondent wife acquiesced to the husband continuing to occupy the property. There is no evidence to the contrary. There was every opportunity for the wife to have asserted that she did anything other than acquiesce to the husband remaining there. The evidence indicates that in 1993 she joined in with the husband in converting their joint tenancy into a tenancy in common in equal shares. Whilst this might be taken as evidence that, at that time, she felt her interest in the property was one that was equal to that of the husband's, it was also an opportunity for her to have asserted her right to possession, but does not appear to have done so.
I record the fact that, according to the parties, there was an informal agreement whereby the wife would transfer to the husband her interest in the property in consideration of payment to her of $15,000. It is apparent that that agreement was not implemented. For family law purposes, the agreement was clearly unenforceable and if there was an agreement between the parties, it certainly played no role whatsoever in the conduct of the case of either the husband or the wife. Overall, the fact remains that at any time since separation either party could have sought to crystallise any rights they had in relation to the property, proprietary or possessionary, but they chose not to. As a result of the husband's contribution, the value of the property was enhanced by $50,000. The wife made no contribution to this. She, nonetheless, enjoys the benefit of the enhancement to the value of the property as a result of a contribution to which she has not made. Her assertion that the contribution made by the husband is entirely offset by the benefit of his occupation, to which she acquiesced, results in an outcome that is not, in my opinion, just and equitable to the husband, or which properly recognises the contribution he has made.
The real question is not whether the benefit of the husband's occupation of the property should be recognised, but how it should be quantified. To fail to recognise the benefit to the husband of occupation of the property would be to fail to do justice and equity to the wife, and to recognise the contribution she made by acquiescing to this situation.
Assessing post-separation contribution on the particular facts of this case, having regard to the very lengthy period since separation, and the very unusual property in question, is fraught with difficulty. It is impossible to be scientific. The parties had the opportunity to obtain evidence about the value to the husband of his continued occupation of the property, but have not done so.
Doing the best I can, therefore, by making a further adjustment in the husband's favour of 20 per cent I am satisfied that I am recognising the value of the contribution he has made post-separation, and the value that the wife has made by acquiescing to his occupation of the property.
On the facts of this case, of course, 20 per cent means either $20,000, or $30,000. It is not a large sum of money when viewed in these terms.
Valuation
The other major issue, of course, is what is the value of the property.
On behalf of the husband, Mr Shaw's submission is that the only finding that is available on the evidence is that an informal arrangement existed between the parties and their neighbours across WB, Mr and Mrs M, and continues to exist between Mr H and his neighbours that allows access to the property. It is an informal right. There is no evidence to indicate that it attaches to the land. Mr Shaw's submission is that even if such a personal right has not been revoked to date, it could be revoked, particularly in the event of a sale either by the husband or the wife, or by the Ms S.
Mr Lloyd, for the respondent wife, contended that I should adopt the higher value of the property, i.e. based on assumed access via 255 WB Road. He submits that, in effect, the husband and the wife, or alternatively just the husband, has what amounts to a legal right of access to the subject property, over 255 WB Road, being a right that attaches to the subject property. In support of his submission he referred me to a 1983 decision of Powell J in the Equity division of the Supreme Court, Dewhirst & Edwards [1983] 1 NSWLR 34. Mr Lloyd's submissions about how, precisely, the facts of this case and the evidence before me creates rights which, somehow, mean that I should adopt the higher valuation, were quite unhelpful. I was left to read the decision and to try to distil the essence of Mr Lloyd's submissions, and then apply them myself to the evidence. In this regard, I could readily identify with obiter comments made by Powell J at page 49 of the judgment where, no doubt in a reflective moment, he muses on how entertaining it is "to divert oneself in an idle hour with a disquisition upon such semantic or philosophical differences". I felt very much in the same position myself. I would have appreciated some greater assistance as to how, precisely, this case assists his client's case.
Notwithstanding that, Powell J's decision in Dewhirst & Edwards [1983] 1 NSWLR 34 confirmed, firstly, that the general law of prescription is not applicable to land under Torrens title, i.e. land under the Real Property Act 1900, except in a very narrow range of situations that are not relevant in this case. The evidence indicates to me that both the subject property, and the property at 255 WB Road, are titles under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).
The decision also indicates that an easement can be established by acquiescence and, therefore, enforced in equity, subject to five preconditions. Before setting out those preconditions out, it is important to understand that even if an easement by acquiescence could be established, it would depend on the parties to this litigation commencing proceedings in equity against their neighbours, across WB. These are equitable rights, if they exist, and depend on a declaration to that effect. Even if these preconditions were satisfied, the cost of the proceedings in equity would need to be taken into account in establishing the value of the land with the benefit of these equitable rights.
In any event, the preconditions referred to by Powell J for the creation of an easement by acquiescence are expressed by his Honour at pages 49-50 as follows:
(1) That the plaintiff has made a mistake as to his legal rights;
(2) That the plaintiff has expended money, or done some act – not necessarily on the defendant's land – upon the faith of his mistaken belief;
(3) That the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of the existence of his own right which is inconsistent with the right claimed by the plaintiff;
(4) That the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of the plaintiff's mistaken belief as to his rights;
(5) That the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must have encouraged the plaintiff in the expenditure of money or in the other acts which he has done either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal right.
The evidence before me goes nowhere near establishing the preconditions to the grant of an easement by acquiescence, in equity. It was open to the respondent wife to have led evidence from the neighbours about this. She did not do so.
The next basis upon which an easement by acquiescence could be established is described by Powell J as having a basis in equitable, or promissory estoppel. However, as his Honour notes at page 51:
The received doctrine appears clearly to be that the doctrine cannot be relied upon to create a new cause of action when none existed before.
On the facts of this case, of course, in order for the current arrangement which exists between the parties to this litigation, and their neighbours, which can be characterised as a revocable licence, the only way in which that right can be converted into an equitable right is by instituting proceedings. In other words, an easement by acquiescence created by equitable or promissory estoppel can only be a shield, and not a sword. It cannot be invoked to create a new cause of action when none existed before.
The decision in Dewhirst & Edwards [1983] 1 NSWLR 34 does not assist the respondent in seeking to convince me to adopt the higher value. Indeed, the decision convinces me that the right that exists to cross 255 WB Road is neither legal nor equitable and is at most a licence revocable at will.
Accordingly, it is impossible to adopt the higher value under the circumstances of this case as the right to cross 255 WB Road is a personal one, not a legal or equitable one. The lower value adopted by the valuer is the correct one in these proceedings.
I conclude, on balance, that no such legal right exists and that the arrangement for access is a personal one that does not attach to the property . Accordingly, the value of the property is $100,000.
Section 75(2) factors
In relation to s.75(2) factors Mr Shaw submitted that if 30 per cent was granted by way of adjustment to the husband, it would capture the relevant s.75(2) factors in his favour. Mr Shaw submits that principally by reference to s.75(2)(b) there is a disparity in the income, property and financial resources of the husband and the wife, and their capacity for appropriate gainful employment, that results in an adjustment in favour of the husband, though he was not able to quantify the same except in the broad brush method referred to above. On behalf of the wife, Mr Lloyd submitted there was no s.75(2) factors.
The financial statement filed by the husband indicates that he has an average weekly income of $451, which appears to be derived from his employment as a casual ferry master, and sometime actor. He deposes to total personal expenditure of $111.16 each week, but this seems improbable because he discloses no expenditure whatsoever for food and household items. His assets consists of his interest in the property at WB, $23,000 in the ANZ Bank, a Landcruiser truck having an estimated value of $2500, and a Subaru station wagon having an estimated value of $1700. He also deposes to having household contents of $4000, and other personal property of $500 consisting of tools. The husband also has superannuation of about $21,000.
In the wife's financial statement she deposes to an income of $673 per week. In the financial statement this is stated to be money derived from salary or wages, and in the same statement she describes her occupation as part-time PA. This seems inconsistent with para.3.19 of her affidavit sworn 12 February 2007 in which she deposes to the fact that her only income is an income received from a discretionary trust controlled by her husband. She deposes to receiving approximately $55,000 per annum and after payment of income tax, "the balance is expended by me providing food, clothing and other necessities for the household, including my husband and children". At paragraph 3.19 she deposes to the fact that she is not employed outside of the home and is engaged full-time as a parent and homemaker. Her affidavit was sworn on 9 February 2007, but her financial statement sworn 18 April 2007. It is impossible to reconcile this conflicting evidence. Even if I multiply the weekly total salary or wages figure at item 9 of the financial statement filed 18 April 2007, the result is $34,9996, not the $55,000 per annum referred to at para.3.19 of her affidavit.
In her financial statement, by way of note 1 at part O she deposes to the whole of the income referred to being applied to provide for clothing for the deponent and for food and household necessities for the deponent, her husband and two children. Apart from her interest in the property at WB, she deposes to the fact that her 25 per cent share in the family home she owns with her current husband, has a value of $700,000. Her superannuation entitlements total $47,483. In terms of liabilities, she deposes to being responsible for $220,000 representing 25 per cent of the home mortgage secured over what I presume is the family home which she owns with her husband.
However, she also deposes to a liability of $400,000, representing a 25 per cent share of a borrowing by S Pty Ltd GE Business Home Plan. At note 2 to part O of the said financial statement she deposes that she is also a guarantor of the whole of the said loan and accordingly has an exposure of $1,600,000 in the event of death or default by her husband. If the contingent liability of the wife pursuant to the S Pty Ltd loan is excluded, she is in a substantially stronger asset position than the husband, even excluding the WB property. If the contingent liability is included, the difference in asset positions is smaller, though still significant. She has significantly more superannuation than the husband.
As indicated above, the evidence that she gives about the income available to her is quite unclear. She was not cross-examined about any aspect of her evidence. However, she had a duty of disclosure, and a duty of disclosure includes making her evidence clear. The evidence that she gives about the income available to her is by no means clear. I am satisfied that even with the level of expense that she deposes to, for the benefit of her family, she is in a better financial position than the husband both in terms of income and assets. I find, therefore, that there is a disparity for the purposes of s.75(2)(b). Again, the task of quantifying this disparity is made much more difficult by the lengthy period of separation. Under the circumstances, I find that an adjustment of 5 per cent is appropriate.
Final outcome
The final outcome, therefore, is an order that gives to the husband a 75 per cent interest in the WB property, on the basis of equal contribution at the time of separation, 20 per cent to reflect net post‑separation contributions after taking into account the value to him of residing in the property, and then a further 5 per cent for s.75(2) factors.
As I have found that the value of the property is $100,000, this means that quantifying the wife's interest in the property results in a dollar value of $25,000. It is a modest amount. However, so too is the value of the husband's interest in the property, and he assumes all the risks and responsibilities associated with a property which has many highly problematic features to it.
The husband's application expressed a preference for paying out the wife in return for a transfer of her interest in the property. I will provide him with a short opportunity for that to take place. If he is unable to pay the wife $25,000 within two months, the property will need to be listed for sale in the usual way, with the net sale proceeds being divided 75 per cent to the husband, and 25 per cent to the wife.
I certify that the preceding fifty-eight (58) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Altobelli FM
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