H and H
[2002] FMCAfam 237
•9 August 2002
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| H & H | [2002] FMCAfam 237 |
| FAMILY LAW – Property settlement – application by litigation guardian of the wife – contributions of the parties during marriage – section 75(2) factors – division of property. Family Law Act 1975, ss.75(2), 79 Ferraro and Ferraro (1993) FLC 92-335 |
| Applicant: | A T M H |
| Respondent: | S P H |
| File No: | NCM3026 of 2000 |
| Delivered on: | 9 August 2002 |
| Delivered at: | Parramatta |
| Hearing Date: | 16 April 2002 |
| Judgment of: | Scarlett FM |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Bates |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Ms Garrick Barbara Garrick and Associates DX 7979 NEWCASTLE NSW |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Mr Peters Hills Solicitors DX 21602E MAITLAND NSW |
ORDERS
The parties are to do all such things and execute all such documents and instruments as shall be necessary to divide the balance of the proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home at 70 A Road, R T, presently held on trust, between the parties in the following manner:
(a)As to the sum of $28,300.00, to the Respondent Husband; and
(b)the balance remaining to the Applicant Wife.
The Respondent Husband is declared to have the sole right, title and interest in the Nissan Patrol motor vehicle currently in his possession.
The Applicant and the Respondent are otherwise declared to have the sole right, title and interest in:
(a)all other chattels, goods, furnishings and other property currently in their respective possession;
(b)any moneys, shares, debentures and cash at bank currently standing in their sole name respectively.
In the event that either party refuses or neglects to sign or execute any deed or instrument necessary to give effect to these orders within 14 days of being called upon to do so, the Registrar of the Federal Magistrates Court is hereby appointed pursuant to section 106A of the Family Law Act to sign or execute such deed or instrument in the name of such party and to do all acts and things necessary to give validity to the operation of the said deed or instrument.
All documents produced in answer to any subpoena may be returned.
All exhibits may be returned after the expiry of a period of one month.
The Application is removed from the Pending Cases List.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA |
NCM3026 of 2000
| A T M H |
Applicant
And
| S P H |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Application
This is an application by the wife, through her sister, who is her litigation guardian, for a property settlement, whereby she seeks orders that the parties should divide the net proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home, after payment of the costs of sale and the discharge of the mortgage over the property, in the ratio of 70% to the wife and 30% per cent to the husband. In his Response, the husband asks that the net proceeds should be divided equally.
Background
The parties were married on 20th September 1986. The husband was born on 7th March 1964, so he is now 38 years of age. The wife was born on 23rd June 1965, which means that she is now about to reach the age of 37 years. Both parties were in employment at the time of their marriage.
There is one child of their marriage, J S H, who was born on 22nd January 1992. He resides with the husband, and has done so for most of his life. On 16th April 2002, orders were made by consent in this court whereby it was agreed that he would continue to reside with his father and have regular contact with his mother.
The wife has suffered from a serious medical condition for nearly ten years. This has meant that she is confined to a wheelchair and requires full-time nursing care. She has speech difficulties and loss of memory. Her condition is such that she cannot return to live at home.
The wife complained of loss of movement and other symptoms on 15th July 1992. After surgery had taken place less than a week later, she was diagnosed as suffering from an astrocytoma in the left front region of her brain, which is a form of brain tumour. It is inoperable. As a result of this tumour, the wife has developed a paralysis to the right side of her body.
The wife was able to return home for about four weeks in August and September 1992 and then about three to four weeks in October 1992. She has not been able to return home since that time. The wife was transferred from the M Hospital to the R R Rehabilitation Hospital on 27th January 1993. From there, she was transferred to the O Nursing Home at R T in March of that year. She has resided at this nursing home ever since, apart from stints of about a month at a time at the R R Rehabilitation Hospital in 1996, 1997 and 1998.
The wife’s condition has stabilised but a long-term prognosis cannot be provided. What is clear is that it is highly unlikely that she can ever be cared for at home.
The parties have now separated. The husband has formed a new relationship, and he has been living with another woman since 15th August 1996. The husband and his new partner have a child of their own, a little girl who was born in August 2000. They live in a home owned by the new partner. The child of the marriage, J, lives with them.
The former matrimonial home at 70 A Road, R T, has been sold. The sale price of the property was $113,000.00. After sale costs and the amount required to discharge the mortgage over the property, the balance of $96,151.59 was paid into the husband’s solicitors’ Trust Account.
On 26th September 2001, orders were made by consent in this Court that an amount of $10,000.00 should be taken from the moneys held in trust for the parties and divided equally between the parties. The terms of that consent order were:
“1. That by way of Partial Property Settlement the Parties do all acts and execute all documents to cause part of the proceeds of the sale of the property at 70 A Road, R T currently being held in trust on their behalf to be distributed as follows:
(a)to pay the sum of $5,000.00 to the Protective Commissioner on behalf of the wife; and
(b)to pay the sum of $5,000.00 to the husband.”
The balance remains held on trust for the parties, awaiting the outcome of these proceedings.
Issues
The issue between the parties is in a comparatively narrow compass. In effect, the Court is being asked to decide whether the property remaining after the premature distribution referred to in paragraph 10 should be equally divided between the parties, or whether there should be an adjustment in the wife’s favour, to the extent of some 20%.
Evidence
The evidence for the Applicant Wife comes by way of her Litigation Guardian (or Next Friend), M J L. Mrs L, who is the Applicant’s sister, swore an affidavit on 19th September 2000. A Financial Statement accompanied the affidavit, and both documents were filed on 21st September 2000. An Amended Financial Statement, being essentially an updated statement, was filed in Court on the day of the hearing. It is dated 16th April 2002.
Mrs L was not required for cross-examination. Mr Peters, Solicitor, for the Respondent husband, conceded that the wife required certain services, such as podiatry and physiotherapy. Physiotherapy costs $30.00 a visit and podiatry costs $35.00. Mr Peters also conceded that physiotherapy was required on a monthly basis and podiatry was only required twice a year.[i]
Mr Bates, Counsel for the wife, indicated that she formally adopted paragraphs 1 to 24, 27 and 28, 32 to 50, 88, 89, 91 and 92 of the husband’s affidavit sworn 4th September 2001. This affidavit was filed on 6th September 2001.
As Mrs L was not required for cross-examination and there were no other witnesses, this was in fact the wife’s case.
The husband’s case consisted of his Response, his affidavit referred of the 4th September 2001, a Financial Statement filed on the 6th September 2001, and some oral evidence in chief. This oral evidence related to some changes to his personal and financial circumstances. He was required for cross-examination.
In her affidavit of the 19th September 2000, Mrs L, gave brief details of her sister’s medical history, up to the stage where she was transferred to the O Nursing Home at R T on 15th March 1993. This evidence is uncontroversial.
Mrs L also deposed to the fact that she and her other sister, I G, were appointed as financial managers for the wife on 7th January 2000. She annexed to her affidavit a copy of the Directions and Authorities made by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in its Equity Division, giving her and I G various powers. I G took no part in these proceedings, but Mrs L sought to be appointed the Applicant’s Next Friend. Federal Magistrate Donald made an order to that effect on 23rd October 2000. This evidence, too, is uncontroversial.
The husband’s affidavit sworn on 4th September 2001 commences with an account of the relevant details of the parties, and then, in paragraphs 6 to 28, covers in some detail the history of the wife’s illness, hospitalisation and treatment. It will be recalled that the wife adopted all but paragraphs 25 and 26 of that affidavit.
The husband’s affidavit goes on to give a history of the parties’ financial matters and employment from the time of the marriage. The husband deposed to the fact that he was working as a qualified fitter whilst the wife was employed as a secretary. He had savings of about $6,000.00, which were used as a deposit when the parties purchased the house at 70 A Road, R T. He said he also had a motor vehicle and various personal belongings.
The husband deposed that he had no debts at the time of the marriage, but that the wife had credit card debts in the range of $400.00 to $600.00. She did own some personal belongings.
The husband said that the parties purchased the house at R T for $51,000.00, in April 1986. They used the husband’s savings as a deposit and borrowed the sum of $46,450.00 from the N Permanent Building Society.
The child J was born on 22nd January 1992. The husband says that the wife was his principal carer until her illness in July 1992. At that stage, J was only about six months old.
The parties increased the mortgage debt over the property to build a garage and buy a motor vehicle. In 1992, they had two motor vehicles, a Nissan Patrol and a Holden Commodore.
When the wife became ill and was hospitalised, the husband and J moved in to live with his parents. He continued to work, and his mother help look after the child.
In March 1993, the wife was moved into the O Nursing Home, where she still resides. The Department of Social Security commenced to pay her a Disability Support Pension, which goes mainly towards her nursing and accommodation costs. The parties were also able to access the wife’s superannuation, and received the sum of $83,995.19 from the State Authorities Superannuation Board. This amount was paid into an account in joint names with the N Permanent Building Society. The husband says that the account already had a balance of about $5,000.00 or $6,000.00.
It is the husband’s evidence that although he had told the Department of Social Security that the parties had separated on medical grounds, he still regarded the marriage as being on foot and he conducted the parties’ affairs as if they were still a family unit. He described some of the expenses that he had to pay and said that he had difficulty meeting all of those expenses.
The husband decided that he needed a larger motor vehicle in order that he could transport the wife, who was confined to a wheelchair, and the child J, who had to travel in a safety capsule. He traded in the Holden and the Nissan Patrol (which was a short wheelbase model), on a long wheelbase Nissan Patrol. He said that he received a trade-in allowance of about $19,000.00 and expended a further sum of $18,475.00 to purchase the new car. This amount came out of the joint savings account at the building society.
On 1st October 1993 the husband was appointed the wife’s Financial Manager as a result of an order by the Guardianship Board. The husband later set up an investment account in the joint names of the parties with the N Permanent Building Society and says that he transferred funds totalling $56,000.00 into it from the joint savings account.
The husband said that in January 1995 he began to form the view that the marital relationship had broken down. He eventually decided to reduce the mortgage debt over the house at R T, and paid off the amount of $35,000.00 in a series of lump sums. He also set up a separate account in the wife’s name. Her Disability Support Pension was paid into that account.
The husband arranged to put a tenant into the house at R T in February 1995. Half of the rent was paid into the account in the wife's name.
The Management Order required the husband to lodge Annual Returns with the Office of the Protective Commissioner, which he did. The husband says that the Protective Commissioner also recommended that he divide the proceeds of the joint investment account equally between the wife and himself, which he also did.
The husband gave an accounting in his affidavit as to the way he says that the superannuation monies of $83,575.00 were disbursed. His figures are as follows:
a)reduction of mortgage $35,000.00
b)balance of purchase price for Nissan $18,475.00
c)Mobile telephone $2,100.00
d)paid to the wife’s account $11,000.00
e)paid to the husband’s account $11,000.00
f)general house and family expenses $6,000.00
Total $83,575.00.
The husband retains the Nissan Patrol motor vehicle.
The former matrimonial home at R T was sold for $113,000.00 in February 2001. The balance of purchase money, namely $96,151.59, was invested in an interest bearing deposit. As was referred to in paragraph 10, a partial distribution of $5,000.00 each was made on 26th September 2001. The balance is held on trust for the parties.
The husband gave oral evidence. He affirmed the truth of what was in his affidavit and Financial Statement. He also gave updated evidence about his own personal life. He and his de facto partner were expecting a second child, due to be born in early May. His partner returned to work for approximately six months, and she was currently on maternity leave. He also said that he still had the Nissan Patrol referred to earlier, but they had to replace his partner’s car, a Magna, which they traded in on a two-year old Commodore. They had to borrow the sum of $25,000.00 for that purpose, which they did by increasing the mortgage on his partner’s home.
The husband was cross-examined by Mr Bates of Counsel. He conceded that the wife’s accommodation was fairly constrained, indeed overcrowded, in fact. He admitted that assessments had been done over the previous six months as to the wife’s capacity to live in semi-supported outside accommodation, like a halfway house. It was his view that she would not be capable of doing so. Once a fortnight, he and his current partner take the wife out for an outing, often to their home.
The husband conceded that a friend of the wife’s had arranged to take her for a holiday to C, where they stayed for a week. They stayed in a ground floor apartment, and he believed that the wife was able to manage during that time.
On the financial side, he denied the suggestion that was put to him that the savings of $6,000.00 that he said he had at the time of the marriage were in fact joint savings. He denied that the wife had contributed to those savings.
The husband conceded that the sum of $18,475.00 used to purchase the Nissan Patrol came from the wife’s superannuation payout.
It was put to the husband that there had been a delay in obtaining a tenant for the property at R T, and that the property was not in fact tenanted until July 1998. He was shown copies of the annual returns that were submitted to the Protective Commissioner for the years 1996 and 1997, and conceded that they did not show any rental income. He also conceded that the first records of rental having been received for the property were in 1998.
The husband was also asked about the sum of $35,000.00 that he paid off the mortgage out of the wife’s superannuation payout. He conceded that he made the payment in five individual lump sums. He was unable to give any answer as to why he did not just draw the one cheque for $35,000.00, and pay the mortgage in a lump sum. He disagreed with the proposition that over a period of time he had had the benefit of a significant sum of money.
The relevant law
In determining an application under section 79 of the Family Law Act 1975, the authorities make it clear that a three-stage process should be followed (Ferraro and Ferraro (1993) FLC 92-335; McLay and McLay (1996) FLC 92-667).
First, the Court should identify the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties at the time of the hearing. Next, the Court should evaluate the contributions made by the parties as defined in section 79(4)(a), (b) and (c), which cover the contributions made by or on behalf of the parties, the contributions made directly by or on behalf of the parties, and the contribution made by a party to the welfare of the family (Lee Steere and Lee Steere (1985) FLC 91-626).
Finally, the Court has to evaluate the financial resources, means and needs of the parties and the other matters set out in section 75(2), so far as they are relevant (Pastrikos and Pastrikos (1980) FLC 90-897). When determining what order it should make, the Court must be satisfied that in all the circumstances it is just and equitable to do so (section 75(2)).
There are two separate approaches to be taken in determining property matters, the global approach, as referred to in Norbis and Norbis (1986) FLC 91-712, or the asset by asset approach. The global approach is the more common, although a particular case may suggest that an asset by asset approach is more likely to provide a fairer outcome.
The net property of the parties
Mr Bates, for the wife, submitted that the assessment by the Court of the matrimonial assets would involve a different process from that which the Court would normally adopt. Instead of looking at the assets at the date of the hearing, he submitted that in the unusual circumstances of this case the Court should look at the assets as they were in 1995, when the decision was made that the marriage was to come to an end.
The reason for this view, it is submitted, is that this is the only way the Court can make a realistic assessment, in mathematical terms, of the contribution by each of the parties to those assets. The submission goes that there was a house worth $110,000.00, cars worth $19,000.00, superannuation disability insurance of $89,400 odd, in round figures, $218,414, which should be rounded off to $218,500 in terms of gross assets. From this figure should be deducted the mortgage debt of $49,740.00, leaving a net asset total of approximately $168,500.00.
Mr Bates submitted that the evidence would show an equal contribution by the husband and wife from 1986 up to 1992, when the wife became ill, and then there was a large injection of cash, over $84,000.00, from the wife’s superannuation. The submission continues:
“At that point there would have been a contribution of some 75 per cent from the wife if one simply were to look at the cold hard cash, and…on that basis that half of that money, half of that $168,000.00, came from the moneys from the superannuation and disability fund of $84,000.00, it’s exactly half, and then there was certainly an equal contribution relating to the remainder of it, which would entitle the wife to a further 25 per cent.”[ii]
Mr Peters, for the husband, submitted that the superannuation should not be treated in any different way from other contributions:
“There is no presumption that a compensation payment is to be seen as the property of that party, and clearly in this case, the moneys have been intermingled.”[iii]
He relied on the authority of the decision in Williams and Williams (1985) FLC 90-628. This decision is also relevant to the case where there has been a substantial contribution by one party to the care of the child of the marriage after separation, which is a section 79(4)(c) contribution.
In this case, I am satisfied that the parties effectively separated on 15th August 1996, when the husband commenced living with his de facto partner. It would seem to follow that from that date onwards the husband was effectively intermingling his moneys with her, and that it would be inappropriate for the assets to be valued at the date of the hearing. In the husband’s own evidence, he indicates that he resigned as Financial Manager for the wife in July 1999, as he had made the decision to finalise the financial affairs between them, and he felt it was inappropriate to continue to act as her Financial Manager in those circumstances.[iv]
I am not satisfied that the wife’s superannuation payout, which appears to have amounted to $83,995.15, should be regarded in some other way than as a contribution by the wife. It certainly is a substantial contribution by her, which arose because of her medical condition. It was paid on 13th April 1993, and a significant proportion of it was expended on necessary purposes for the parties and the child. I am satisfied that the payments off the mortgage totalling $35,000.00 were appropriate, and the purchase of the Nissan Patrol was justified on the basis that a large vehicle of that type was necessary to transport the child in a safety capsule and the wife with her wheelchair.
The evidence makes it difficult to estimate the precise figures at the time, but a value of $110,000.00 for the matrimonial home would appear to be relatively accurate. I also accept that the mortgage debt should be considered to be $14,740.00, after repayments.
I find the value of the assets at the relevant time to be:
a)the house at 70 A ‘sRoad, R T $110,000.
b)Nissan Patrol motor vehicle (approximately) $35,000
c)moneys remaining from superannuation $30,500
TOTAL $175,000
Less amount owing to the N Building Society (app.) $14,740
NET TOTAL $160,260
The contributions by the parties
There is no issue as to the fact that the parties worked up to the birth of the child, J, and that the contributions by the parties up to the time the wife became ill in July 1992 should be regarded as equal. The wife’s superannuation and disability payout of $83,995.15 should be regarded as a large contribution on her behalf. Against this should be set the fact that the husband has had the responsibility of supporting the child, which continues to this day. This should be seen as a section 79(4) contribution by him.
Whilst Mr Bates submitted that the wife should be regarded as having made a 75% contribution to the assets, I am more of the view that the husband’s care of the child should be given considerable weight. I find that the contribution by the parties should be considered as 40% by the husband and 60% by the wife.
Section 75(2) factors
Section 75(2) of the Family Law Act sets out a list of some 16 factors to be taken into account by the Court. Not all of these are relevant in every case, but I have considered their applicability in this case.
Under subsection 75(2)(a), the Court must consider the age and state of health of the parties
The husband was born on 7th March 1964. He is 38 years of age. There is no evidence that he is in other than good health. The wife was born on 23rd June 1965. She is 37 years of age. She is not in good health at all. She is confined to a wheelchair; she has not been able to live at home since December 1992. She is not capable of employment. She resides in a nursing home and requires constant care. I am satisfied that there should be an adjustment in favour of the wife under this subsection.
Under subsection 75(2)(b), the Court must consider the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties
The husband, in his Financial Statement filed on 6th September 2001, stated that he had a gross weekly income of $1059.00. He should be able to work until he is 65 years of age, at least. He retains the Nissan Patrol motor vehicle, which he estimates to be worth $16,000.00, and he has had the use of it since it was purchased. The wife, to be fair, is not capable of driving a motor car. He resides in a home owned by his partner, J C. He has some shares in his employer’s company, worth $1832.00. He also received the sum of $5000.00 as a partial property distribution.
As to financial resources, he has interests in two superannuation funds. His interest in the John Fairfax Retirement Fund was valued at $10,967.00 as at 30th June 2000. It is likely to have increased in value by now, but no updated information was provided. The husband also has an interest in an AMP Retirement Savings Account valued at $8,440.49 on 1st August 2001. He will not be able to access those funds until he retires from the workforce, which is likely to be at least 20 years away.
By comparison, the wife’s income, property and financial resources are much more modest. Her only income is a Disability Pension paid by Centrelink in the sum of $196.00 per week. She had at the date of hearing only $248.00 in the N Permanent Building Society. She has no superannuation; it has already been paid out.
There should be an adjustment in favour of the wife under this subsection.
Subsection 75(2)(c) requires the Court to consider whether either party has the care and control of any children of the marriage
The child J resides with the husband, and has done so since he was a baby. He is now aged ten years and six months. He was born on 22nd January 1992. He can be expected to attend school until he completes his high school education, which would mean that the husband would be required to support him for at least another seven years. The wife is not in a financial position to support him. There should be an adjustment in favour of the husband under this subsection.
Subsection 75(2)(d) requires the Court to consider the parties’ commitments to support themselves and other children
The husband has become the father of a child called K, who was born in August 2000. His de facto partner was expecting to give birth to their second child in May 2002. The wife has no other child to support. There should be a slight adjustment in favour of the husband under this subsection.
Subsection 75(2)(e) requires the Court to consider the parties’ responsibility to support any other person
The husband now resides with J C, aged 34 years. She now has the care of two young children and can therefore be regarded as requiring support from the husband. The wife does not have any requirement to support any other person. There should be a slight adjustment in favour of the husband under this subsection.
Subsection 75(2)(f) requires the Court to consider the eligibility of either party to receive a pension, allowance or benefit
The husband is not entitled to any pension, allowance or benefit. The wife receives a Disability Support Pension, although this is income-tested and cannot be taken into account [section 75(3)].
Subsection 75(2)(g) requires the Court to take into account the question of a reasonable standard of living
The husband resides with Ms C and the children in Ms C’s home. His standard of living is relatively unchanged. On the other hand, the wife is now obliged to reside in a nursing home, which costs her $158.00 per week, according to her financial statement. She requires physiotherapy and podiatry. Her standard of living is lower than that of the husband, but it was necessarily so during the marriage. I make no adjustment pursuant to this subsection.
Maintenance [subsection 75(2)(h)].
There is no maintenance sought, nor are there any relevant factors under subsection 75(2)(j).
Subsection 75(2)(k) requires the Court to consider the duration of the marriage
The parties were married on 20th September 1986. I have previously found that the parties were separated in August 1996. There is no specific adjustment, to my mind, required by this subsection.
Subsection 75(2)(l) contemplates the protection of a party’s role as a parent
Whilst the parties are both parents, the wife is unable to play a significant role due to her disability. There is no specific adjustment called for by this subsection, in my opinion.
Subsection 75(2)(m) requires the Court to take into account whether either party resides with another person
The wife lives in a nursing home. The husband resides with J C in a de facto relationship. I believe that I have already considered the effect of this fact, and I do not consider that any further adjustment is required.
Subsection 75(2)(n) requires the Court to consider the effect of any order to be made pursuant to section 79
The order to be made effectively required the division between the parties of a sum of money held on trust for them both, being the balance of the proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home. The issue is what percentage should be paid to each party.
Subsection 75(2)(na) requires the Court to consider relevant child support matters
The husband has the care of the child, and the situation is unlikely to change. The wife is on a disability pension, and is not in a position to make child support payments. This situation is also unlikely to change. Although I have taken some account of the general situation, I am satisfied that I should consider a small adjustment in favour of the husband.
Other facts and circumstances relevant under the provisions of subsection 75(2)(o)
There are not, to my knowledge, any other relevant matters to be considered by the Court.
Taking all these matters into consideration, it appears that it is a difficult matter for the discretion of the Court in weighing up the competing factors. After some reflection, I have arrived at the conclusion that, on balance, the section 75(2) factors favour the husband, but only slightly. Accordingly, I consider that the section 75(2) factors, properly considered, call for an adjustment of 2.5% in favour of the husband.
Conclusions
The factors which have been considered in the above paragraphs lead me to the conclusion that a just and equitable division of the property between the parties, taking the relevant section 75(2) factors into account, means that the wife should receive 57.5% of the property and the husband should receive 42.5%.
The situation is now that the superannuation moneys have already been expended. The husband retains the Nissan Patrol, which the wife is unable to drive, and which he requires, not only for the child and his new family, but to transport the wife on various occasions. It has depreciated to $16,000.00, and it should be considered at that value in the husband’s hands. Each of the parties has received a preliminary distribution of $5,000. Whilst the final amount of the moneys held in trust, some $90,000.00 odd, varies from day to day, I consider that the appropriate way to deal with the property is to have regard to the sum of $5,000.00 already received and the motor vehicle in the husband’s possession and order that the husband should receive the sum of $28,300.00 out of the moneys held on trust. The wife should be paid the residue of the current balance.
It is for these reasons that I make the Orders on the attached schedule.
I certify that the preceding eighty (80) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Scarlett FM
Associate: A. Coutman
Date: 7 August 2002
[i] Transcript 16th April 2002, page 6
[ii] Transcript, page 72
[iii] Transcript, page 70
[iv] Husband’s affidavit sworn 4th September 2001, paragraph 91
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