GW & EC

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[2005] FamCA 396

FAMILY LAW ACT 1975

IN THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT MELBOURNE  Appeal No SA69L of 2004

File No. MLM5891 of 2002

BETWEEN:

GW

(Applicant Father)

and

EC

(Respondent Mother)

CORAM:  THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE KAY

DATE OF HEARING:         26 April 2005

DATE OF JUDGMENT:      17 May 2005

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

APPEARANCES:

The father in person.

Ms Tulloch of Counsel, instructed by Anthony Peterson & Co, Solicitors, Level 7, 170 Queen Street, Melbourne, Vic 3000, appeared on behalf of the mother.

GW & EC

Appeal No:   SA69L of 2004

Coram:         Kay J

Date of Hearing:     26 April 2005

Date of Judgment: 17 May 2005

Catchwords:  CHILD SUPPORT – Appeal - Departure order – lump sum order – need to apportion equitably the sharing of the obligations to meet the proper needs of the child pursuant to s 114 (b) of the Assessment Act

  1. This judgment arises from the hearing of an application for leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, the hearing of the appeal against orders made by Federal Magistrate Walters on 29 October 2004.  The orders concerned child support payable by the applicant father in respect of his son B born September 1989.

  1. Section 102A of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the “Assessment Act”) provides that an appeal lies, with leave of the Family Court, to the Family Court from a decree of the Federal Magistrates Court exercising original jurisdiction under the Assessment Act. Section 102A(2) provides that the jurisdiction of the Family Court in relation to such an appeal is to be exercised by a Full Court unless the Chief Judge of the Family Court considers that it is appropriate for the jurisdiction of the Family Court in relation to the appeal to be exercised by a single judge. Arrangements were made for this appeal to be heard by me sitting alone pursuant to that section.

  1. The principles to be applied in determining whether or not to grant leave in child support cases were discussed by the Full Court in Hendy v Deputy Child Support Registrar (2001) 164 FLR 236; 27 Fam LR 641 which principles were adopted by a differently constituted Full Court in OP v HM (2002) FLC 98-017; 29 Fam LR 251. I shall approach my task in determining whether to grant leave bearing in mind that I should not be too restrictive if I perceive there has been an error of principle which has affected the applicant’s substantive rights.

  1. The orders, the subject matter of the appeal, relate to three separate periods for which child support was payable.  The first period concerned 2 January 2002 to 30 September 2002, the second period 1 October 2002 to 31 December 2003, and the third period from 1 January 2004 to 7 September 2007. 

  1. For the first two periods the orders effectively provided that child support was to be calculated by attributing to the father the maximum possible child support income under the provisions of the formula…

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Details
Case
[2005] FamCA 396
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by GW & EC (the applicants) for an order for possession of a property located at 123 Main Street, Sydney, against the respondents, Mr and Mrs Smith. The applicants, who were the registered proprietors of the property, sought to recover possession on the basis that the respondents had breached the terms of a residential tenancy agreement. The application was heard by Justice Kay in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the respondents had committed a substantial breach of the residential tenancy agreement, thereby entitling the applicants to terminate the agreement and obtain possession of the property. Specifically, the Court was required to determine if the respondents' alleged failure to maintain the property in a clean and sanitary condition, and their alleged unauthorised keeping of pets, constituted breaches of sufficient gravity to warrant termination.

Justice Kay found that the evidence presented by the applicants did not establish a substantial breach of the tenancy agreement. While there was some evidence of minor disrepair and a suggestion of pets being present, the Court was not satisfied that these issues reached the threshold of a substantial breach that would justify termination. The Court applied the principles of contract law, emphasizing that a breach must be of a fundamental nature to justify repudiation of the agreement. The applicants failed to demonstrate that the alleged breaches were so serious as to deprive them of substantially the whole benefit of the contract.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the applicants' application for an order for possession.

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