Guss v Johnstone

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M107 of 1997

B e t w e e n -

JOSEPH GUSS

Applicant

and

RAYMOND JOHNSTONE

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

KIRBY J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 14 MAY 1999, AT 11.42 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR F.G.A. BEAUMONT, QC:   If your Honour pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR L.F.M. WATTS, on behalf of the applicant.  (instructed by J. Guss) 

I understand there is no appearance on behalf of the respondent, your Honour.

KIRBY J:   Yes, very well.

MR BEAUMONT:   Your Honours, this is an appeal where, in essence ‑ ‑ ‑

KIRBY J:   We can be satisfied that the respondent was served and knows of the proceedings?

MR BEAUMONT:   Yes, your Honour.  The respondent, in fact, your Honour, has put in - - -

KIRBY J:   Yes, I have seen the written submissions.  Perhaps we should call the respondent outside the Court.  Call Raymond Johnstone.

MR BEAUMONT:   He is a member of counsel, in fact, your Honour, and I can tell your Honour he has not been - - -

KIRBY J:   He is still entitled to be heard.

COURT ATTENDANT:   No appearance, your Honour.

KIRBY J:   Yes.  So, there is no appearance for Mr Johnstone, and there is a supplementary submission which I assume that you have, Mr Beaumont, dated 11 May 1999, which I had not seen which says that he would not be present at the Court but would rely on his written submissions.

MR BEAUMONT:   I had not seen that, your Honour.

KIRBY J:   Yes.  Well, we are in the same boat.  Press on.

MR BEAUMONT:   Your Honour, this is an application for special leave to appeal against a decision of the Full Federal Court on the basis that the Full Federal Court, in effect, refused to act as a court of appeal because it thought there was no utility in doing so.  That appears at page 37, line 18 of the application book.  The reason for that, your Honour, is that in this matter there was a bankruptcy notice dated 14 September 1996; there was an affidavit filed in accordance with section 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act within the required 14 days.  In those days it had to be filed with the registrar.  There was no application necessary.  The application then came on for hearing before Mr Justice Sundberg who, on 30 May 1997, decided that he was not satisfied of the existence of a counterclaim or set-off of the requisite kind.

On that very day, your Honour, an oral application was made to his Honour by Mr Paterson, of counsel, to seek a stay of that so as to stop time from running.  His Honour refused to hear the oral application and then made a statement that, without prejudice, we could make an application upon notice.  That application upon notice came on for hearing on…

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Details
Case
[1999] HCATrans 129
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Guss v Johnstone* concerned a dispute between the appellant, Guss, and the respondent, Johnstone, before the High Court of Australia. The central issue revolved around the interpretation and application of section 139 of the *Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999* (NSW) (the Act), which deals with the recovery of damages for economic loss in motor accident claims. Guss sought to recover damages for economic loss, but Johnstone argued that Guss was precluded from doing so by the operation of section 139.

The High Court was required to determine whether section 139 of the Act operated to prevent Guss from recovering damages for economic loss, notwithstanding that Guss had not made an election under section 138 of the Act. Specifically, the Court had to consider the relationship between section 138, which provides for an election to claim damages for economic loss, and section 139, which sets out the consequences of such an election. The core legal question was whether section 139 imposed a condition precedent to the recovery of economic loss damages, or whether it merely prescribed the method of calculation and recovery once an election had been made.

Kirby and Callinan JJ, in separate judgments, both found in favour of Guss. Their Honours held that section 139 did not impose an election requirement as a prerequisite to claiming economic loss. Instead, they reasoned that section 139 was concerned with the *method* of calculating and recovering economic loss damages, and that the election provided for in section 138 was a mechanism for choosing between different heads of damage, not a barrier to recovery itself. The Court concluded that Guss was entitled to pursue his claim for economic loss.

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