Gunter v Doogan

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gunter v Doogan [2003] FCA 667

RICHARD STEPHEN GUNTER v CHRISTOPHER DOOGAN, PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR, HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, GRAHAM KINGSLEY RAMSEY, DISTRICT REGISTRAR, QUEENSLAND, FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA AND BARRY COSGROVE, SENIOR LAWYER, BRISBANE OFFICE, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SOLICITOR

Q 88 OF 2003

DOWSETT J
BRISBANE
26 JUNE 2003


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 88 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

RICHARD STEPHEN GUNTER
APPLICANT

AND:

CHRISTOPHER DOOGAN, PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR, HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FIRST RESPONDENT

GRAHAM KINGSLEY RAMSEY, DISTRICT REGISTRAR, QUEENSLAND, FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENT

BARRY COSGROVE, SENIOR LAWYER, BRISBANE OFFICE, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SOLICITOR
THIRD RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 JUNE 2003

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave be granted to file the application insofar as it relates to the first respondent.

2.        The application be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 88 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

RICHARD STEPHEN GUNTER
APPLICANT

AND:

CHRISTOPHER DOOGAN, PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR, HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FIRST RESPONDENT

GRAHAM KINGSLEY RAMSEY, DISTRICT REGISTRAR, QUEENSLAND, FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENT

BARRY COSGROVE, SENIOR LAWYER, BRISBANE OFFICE, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SOLICITOR
THIRD RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE:

26 JUNE 2003

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. I have previously held that the claims against the District Registrar of the Federal Court, Mr Ramsey, and a solicitor employed by the Australian Government Solicitor, Mr Cosgrove, are misconceived. For that reason, I have declined to allow proceedings to issue against those proposed respondents. Insofar as concerns the Registrar of the High Court, I propose to allow the proceedings to be filed and to dismiss them summarily as an abuse of process. This application is purportedly brought pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The applicant has said that he wishes to bring the Registrar into this Court in order to compel him to accept documents which the applicant wishes to file in order to commence proceedings in the High Court. The Registrar has not appeared today. I am of the view that the applicant should be allowed to file his proceedings. They raise complaints concerning a public official, and it would not be appropriate to stifle such complaints.

  2. Under s 18 of the High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) (the “High Court Act”), provision is made for the appointment of a Chief Executive and Principal Registrar.  That officer is to act on behalf of, and assist the Justices of the High Court in the administration of the affairs of that Court.  He or she has such other functions as are conferred on him or her by the High Court Act, or are assigned to him or her by the Court.  As far as I can see, in accepting documents for filing, Mr Doogan performs the functions conferred upon him by the Court.  In Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Nedlands Pty…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 667
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Gunter v Doogan, the applicant sought an order for the removal of a restrictive covenant over their property. The application was made against two respondents, one of whom had already been discharged from the proceedings. The court had to determine whether the applicant was entitled to have the restrictive covenant removed.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the applicant had standing to seek the removal of the restrictive covenant. The court needed to consider whether the applicant had a sufficient proprietary interest in the land to bring such an action. Additionally, the court had to assess whether the covenant was still necessary for the protection of the neighbouring property and whether the applicant had been prejudiced by the covenant.

The court held that the applicant did not have the necessary proprietary interest to seek the removal of the restrictive covenant. It was determined that the applicant’s interest in the property was not sufficient to grant standing for this type of action. The court found that the covenant remained necessary for the protection of the neighbouring property and that the applicant had not demonstrated any significant prejudice caused by the covenant. Consequently, the court dismissed the application. The court did, however, grant leave for the application to be filed against the remaining respondent, allowing the proceedings to continue against that party.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted to file the application insofar as it relates to the first respondent.

2. The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DOWSETT J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOWSETT J

Full text does not contain this section.