| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
No. 5447 of 2004
| MATTHEW PATRICK GUBBINS | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| WYNDHAM CITY COUNCIL | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | Hansen J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 6 May 2004 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 2 July 2004 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Gubbins v Wyndham City Council | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2004] VSC 238 | FIRST REVISION: 19 July 2004 |
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Judicial review – Dog - Seized by Council after chasing and attacking horses with riders – Domestic (Feral and Nuisance) Animals Act 1994 – Charges in Magistrates’ Court including under s 29(1AA) – Plea of guilty - Decision of Council to destroy dog under s 80(4)(b) – Whether decision ultra vires because made prior to finding of guilt in Magistrates’ Court – Conditional decision – Whether decision to destroy open – Procedural fairness – Whether a hearing should have been afforded – Appeal to appeals panel appointed by Council – Further decision to destroy – Whether decision on appeal ultra vires, not open or failure to afford procedural fairness.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr S J Maiden | Lorraine A Bauer |
| For the Defendant | Mr B Stafford | Macquarie Lawyers and Strategists |
HIS HONOUR:
Application for judicial review of the decision of the defendant, the Wyndham City Council, that an American Pit Bull Terrier called Jock, owned by the plaintiff, be destroyed.
In determining that Jock be destroyed the Council acted under the power contained in s 80(4)(b) of the Domestic (Feral and Nuisance) Animals Act 1994 (“the Act”). The power to destroy was attracted in the following circumstances.
(a)On 1 January 2004 Jock escaped from the plaintiff’s property in the defendant’s municipal district, and chased four horses with riders for about 1.2 kilometres in the course of which he jumped at and bit three of the horses.
(b)Under s 29(1AA) of the Act an offence is committed if a dog that is not a dangerous dog attacks or bites any person or animal. Being the owner of Jock, which was not a “dangerous dog” as defined in s 3(1), the plaintiff was liable for the offence as well as for any damage caused by the dog (sub-sections (1AA) and (3)).
(c)Under s 77(1)(d)(ii) an authorised officer of a Council may seize a dog in the municipal district of that Council if the officer reasonably suspects that the owner is guilty of an offence under s 28 or s 29 of the Act with respect to that dog.
(d)On 5 January 2004 officers of the defendant seized Jock under s 77. Their authority to do so is not challenged. Nor is it suggested that it was not reasonably suspected that the plaintiff was guilty of an offence under s 29.
(e)Section 80(3) requires that if a dog has been seized under s 77(1)(c)(ii), (ca)(ii) or (d)(ii), the Council must commence prosecution for the offence believed to have been committed by the owner, as soon as possible after the seizure and…
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- Case
- [2004] VSC 238
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the Council’s initial decision to destroy the dog was ultra vires, not open, or whether the Council had failed to afford procedural fairness by not holding a hearing. The court was also required to decide whether the decision of the appeals panel was ultra vires, not open, or whether the Council had failed to afford procedural fairness by not holding a hearing before making the decision.
The court held that the Council’s initial decision to destroy the dog was not ultra vires because the power to make the decision was not dependent on the outcome of the criminal proceedings. The court held that the decision to destroy the dog was not conditional, and that the decision to destroy the dog was not open because the Council was required to consider the interests of public safety and welfare. The court held that the Council was not required to hold a hearing before making the decision to destroy the dog because the decision was not a critical or significant decision that required a hearing. The court held that the decision of the appeals panel was also not ultra vires, not open, or a failure to afford procedural fairness.
The court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for judicial review and affirmed the decisions of the Council and the appeals panel to destroy the dog.
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