Guan (Migration)

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Guan (Migration) [2018] AATA 5105 (15 August 2018)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

APPLICANTS:  Mr Zhisen Guan
Miss Yongyin Guan

CASE NUMBER:  1702740

HOME AFFAIRS REFERENCE(S):           BCC2015/3725209

MEMBER:Antonio Dronjic

DATE:15 August 2018

PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne

DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision to cancel the first named applicant’s Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa.

The Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to the second named applicant.

Statement made on 15 August 2018 at 10:07am

CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – cancellation – subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled) visa – the period during which applicant ceased employment exceeded 90 consecutive days  – breach of condition 8107 – applicant has not found a new sponsor at the time of decision – second named applicant’s visa was automatically cancelled as a consequence of first named applicant’s cancellation  – no jurisdiction with respect to the second named applicant – decision for the first named applicant under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 48, 116, 348
Migration Regulations 1994, r 2.12

CASES
Alimi v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 1520
Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1429
Durzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1767
Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168
Moller v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 168
Sakhno v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1492
Visnumolakala v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 1209

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

  1. This is an application for review of a decision dated 10 February 2017 made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to cancel the first named applicant’s (the applicant) Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa under s.116 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).

  2. The delegate cancelled the visa under s.116 (1)(b) on the basis that the applicant breached condition 8107(3)(b) as the period during which the applicant ceased employment exceeded 90 consecutive days. The issue in the present case is whether that ground for cancellation is made out, and if so, whether the visa should be cancelled.

  3. For the purposes of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s.348 of the Act, the only decision that is before the Tribunal is the decision with respect to the first named applicant. The second named applicant’s visa was automatically cancelled as a consequence of that cancellation, not by a decision but by force of the operation of s.140(1) of the Act which made the cancellation of the second named applicant’s visa self-executing on the cancellation of the first named applicant’s visa: see Rani & Ors v MIMA (1997) 80 FCR 379 at 385, 393, 400; Tien & Ors v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80 at 96. As no decision was involved in the visa cancellation under s.140(1), the Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to the second named applicant.

    Background to the cancellation of the applicant’s visa

  4. The decision record of 10 February 2017 sets…

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Details
Case
[2018] AATA 5105
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned the review of a decision to cancel the Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa held by the first named applicant. The second named applicant's visa was automatically cancelled as a consequence of the first applicant's visa cancellation, and the Tribunal found it had no jurisdiction in relation to the second applicant. The first applicant had ceased employment with his sponsoring business on 1 July 2015, and a notice of intention to cancel his visa was issued on 20 January 2016. Despite the applicant's efforts to find a new sponsor, his visa was ultimately cancelled on 10 February 2017.

The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether the ground for cancellation under section 116(1)(b) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) was established, and if so, whether the discretion to cancel the visa should be exercised. Specifically, the Tribunal had to determine if the applicant had complied with condition 8107(3)(b) of his visa, which stipulated that the period during which a visa holder ceases employment must not exceed 90 consecutive days. The Tribunal also considered the applicant's submissions regarding his attempts to secure new employment and the financial information provided by a prospective employer.

The Tribunal reasoned that the applicant had indeed breached condition 8107(3)(b) as he ceased employment on 1 July 2015 and remained unemployed for a period exceeding 90 consecutive days before his visa was cancelled. The Tribunal found that the ground for cancellation was therefore established. In exercising its discretion, the Tribunal considered the applicant's circumstances, including his efforts to find new employment and the financial viability of a prospective employer. However, it concluded that the reasons for cancelling the visa outweighed the reasons for not cancelling it, noting that the applicant's visa would have expired on 16 September 2017 in any event and that he was not employed by an approved sponsor at the time of the decision.

Consequently, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to cancel the first named applicant's Subclass 457 visa. The Tribunal also reiterated that it had no jurisdiction with respect to the second named applicant, whose visa cancellation was a self-executing consequence of the first applicant's visa cancellation under section 140(1) of the Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the purposes of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s.348 of the Act, the only decision that is before the Tribunal is the decision with respect to the first named applicant. The second named applicant’s visa was automatically cancelled as a consequence of that cancellation, not by a decision but by force of the operation of s.140(1) of the Act which made the cancellation of the second named applicant’s visa self-executing on the cancellation of the first named applicant’s visa: see Rani & Ors v MIMA (1997) 80 FCR 379 at 385, 393, 400; Tien & Ors v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80 at 96. As no decision was involved in the visa cancellation under s.140(1), the Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to the second named applicant.Background to the cancellation of the applicant’s visa The decision record of 10 February 2017 sets out the reasons for the delegate’s decision to cancel the applicant’s visa. The Tribunal summarises those reasons and findings as follows:·On 16 September 2013, the applicant was granted a subclass 457 Business (Long Stay) visa to remain valid until 16 September 2017;·The standard business sponsor who nominated the applicant to work as a cook was H.K Chun Kong Pty Ltd;·On 1 July 2015 the applicant ceased his employment with the sponsoring business;·A notice of intention to consider cancellation (NOICC) was issued 20 January 2016;·On 22 January 2016, the applicant responded in writing to NOICC stating that he was aware that his sponsoring employer will close its business in July 2015; that he managed to find the new employer, Yau Shun Investments Pty Ltd, who lodged a nomination application on 4 August 2015, nominating him for the position in their business; that the nomination application was refused by the Department on 5 October 2015 and that the prospective employer applied for a merits review of this decision to this Tribunal.·On 10 February 2017, the delegate proceeded to cancel the applicant’s visa. The applicant applied to the Tribunal on 17 February 2017 for review of the visa cancellation and with his application submitted a copy of the primary decision record. On 15 June 2018, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant advising that it had considered all the material before it relating to the application but that it was unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone. The Tribunal invited the applicant to give oral evidence and present arguments at a hearing scheduled for 14 August 2018. On 7 August 2018, the applicant’s representative submitted:·A letter stating that the applicant will request the Tribunal to set aside the decision made by the Department and allows Shun Investments Pty Ltd to apply and become the applicant’s temporary working visa sponsor;·A copy of the applicant’s PAYG payment summary for the most recent financial year as evidence that the applicant’s gross payments for the 2017-2018 financial year were $44,650;·A copy of the applicant’s payslips from 7 May 2018 to 16 July 2018; evidencing the applicant’s weekly gross pay of $950.00;·A copy of the applicant’s Westpac Bank account statement for the period from January to July 2018; and·A copy of Yau Shun Investments Pty Ltd financial statements for the year ending 30 June 2017.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa should be affirmed.CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE Under s.116 of the Act, the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that certain grounds specified in that provision are made out. Relevantly, to this case, these include the ground set out in s.116(1)(b). If satisfied that the ground for cancellation is made out, the decision maker must proceed to consider whether the visa should be cancelled, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, which may include matters of government policy.Does the ground for cancellation exist? A visa may be cancelled under s.116(1)(b) if the Minister or the Tribunal is satisfied that the holder did not comply with a condition of their visa. In this instance condition 8107 attached to the applicant’s visa. This condition in 8107(3)(b) requires that if the holder ceases employment — the period during which the holder ceases employment must not exceed 90 consecutive days. In this instance condition 8107 was attached to the applicant’s visa, which was granted on 16 September 2013, and which, but for its cancellation, was valid to 16 September 2017. Based on the evidence before it, including the oral evidence from the applicant, the Tribunal finds that the applicant ceased employment with H.K Chun Kong Pty Ltd on 1 July 2015. The Tribunal further finds that the period during which the visa holder ceased employment exceeded 90 consecutive days. Accordingly the Tribunal finds that the review applicant did not comply with condition 8107(3)(b). For these reasons, the Tribunal is satisfied that the ground for cancellation in s.116(1)(b) exists. As that ground does not require mandatory cancellation under s.116(3), the Tribunal must proceed to consider whether the power to cancel the visa should be exercised.Consideration of discretion There are no matters specified in the Act or Regulations that must be considered in the exercise of this discretion. The Tribunal has had regard to the circumstances of this case, including matters raised by the applicant, and matters in the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3) ‘General visa cancellation powers’. The Tribunal acknowledges that, whilst it may be guided by policy, it is not bound to follow it.[1] Specifically, the Courts have held that the PAM3 guidelines constitute no more than an administrative advisory guide to decision makers in relation to the application of the Act and Regulations and that they are incapable of being elevated into legally necessary or relevant considerations. Indeed, there is judicial authority to the effect that the policy guidelines in PAM3 cannot go beyond the wording of the legislation, even where they are favourable to an applicant.[2] [1] See Brennan, J. in Re Drake (No. 2) (1978-1980) 2 ALD 634[2] See Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1429, Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168; Visnumolakala v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 1209 Alimi v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 1520; Durzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1767 at [49]; Moller v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 168 at [14]; and Sakhno v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship[2007] FMCA 1492 at [55]

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having regard to the findings above and the circumstances of the case as a whole, the Tribunal is satisfied that the reasons for cancelling the visa outweigh the reasons for not cancelling the visa. The Tribunal finds that cancelling the applicant’s visa is the correct and preferable decision.DECISION The Tribunal affirms the decision to cancel the first named applicant’s Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to the second named applicant.Antonio DronjicMember

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

For these reasons, the Tribunal is satisfied that the ground for cancellation in s.116(1)(b) exists. As that ground does not require mandatory cancellation under s.116(3), the Tribunal must proceed to consider whether the power to cancel the visa should be exercised.Consideration of discretion There are no matters specified in the Act or Regulations that must be considered in the exercise of this discretion. The Tribunal has had regard to the circumstances of this case, including matters raised by the applicant, and matters in the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3) ‘General visa cancellation powers’. The Tribunal acknowledges that, whilst it may be guided by policy, it is not bound to follow it.[1] Specifically, the Courts have held that the PAM3 guidelines constitute no more than an administrative advisory guide to decision makers in relation to the application of the Act and Regulations and that they are incapable of being elevated into legally necessary or relevant considerations. Indeed, there is judicial authority to the effect that the policy guidelines in PAM3 cannot go beyond the wording of the legislation, even where they are favourable to an applicant.[2] [1] See Brennan, J. in Re Drake (No. 2) (1978-1980) 2 ALD 634[2] See Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1429, Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168; Visnumolakala v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 1209 Alimi v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 1520; Durzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1767 at [49]; Moller v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 168 at [14]; and Sakhno v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship[2007] FMCA 1492 at [55] Nevertheless, the Tribunal considers that the policy guidelines in PAM3 provide a useful starting point in respect of the exercise of its discretion. In considering this matter, the Tribunal has also taken into account the submissions and evidence it received from the applicant.The purpose of the visa holder’s travel to and stay in Australia The subclass 457 visa is for skilled workers from outside Australia who have been sponsored and nominated by a business to work in Australia on a temporary basis. The Tribunal finds that the purpose of the applicant’s stay in Australia was to work as a dim sum cook/supervisor on a temporary basis. The applicant was unfortunate to lose his job in July 2015. The applicant decided to remain in Australia and try to find a new employer. He was unable to do so before his visa was cancelled by the Department on 10 February 2017. Despite receiving an offer of employment from Yau Shun Investments Pty Ltd in August 2015, the applicant did not commence employment at this business until August 2017. I accept that the applicant attempted to find another sponsoring employer. However, as of the day of my decision the applicant is not employed by an Australian company which is an approved standard business sponsor and which successfully nominated the applicant for a position within the business. Based on the evidence before me, I find that the applicant’s visa, but for the cancellation, would have ceased on 16 September 2017 in any case.