GSX18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
[2025] FedCFamC2G 579
•23 April 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
GSX18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 579
File number(s): MLG 3946 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE J YOUNG Date of judgment: 23 April 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review – where the first applicant and her husband, GTL18, had their applications for review heard by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal at the same time – where the Tribunal affirmed decision of the first respondent that the applicants were not persons in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 – if jurisdictional error is found in relation to GTL18, then such error would be transposed into the Tribunal’s decision as to the applicants in the present matter – no jurisdictional error found in relation to GTL18 – no jurisdictional error established in relation to the applicants – application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J(1)(a), 5J(4)(b),5J(4)(c), 5K, 36(2A), 36(2), 474, 476 Cases cited: Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
GTL18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 578
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors [1996] HCA 6
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 7
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 51 Date of hearing: 3 March 2025 Place: Melbourne Solicitor for the First and Second Applicants: Mr Karunadasa of TAI Lawyers Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms Liddy of Sparke Helmore Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 3946 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: GSX18
First Applicant
GTH18
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE J YOUNG
DATE OF ORDER:
23 APRIL 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the First Respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”.
2.The name of the Second Respondent be amended to “Administrative Review Tribunal”.
3.The Amended Application filed on 28 January 2025 is dismissed.
4.The First Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs in an amount to be fixed, if not agreed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE J YOUNG
With leave of the Court, before it is an Amended Application filed on 28 January 2025, in which the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) dated 30 November 2018. By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse to grant the applicants a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (Visa).
CONTEXT
The applicants are citizens of Malaysia. The first applicant (GSX18) is the mother of the second applicant (GTH18) and the wife of the applicant in MLG3947/2018 (GTL18).
On 14 November 2015, the applicants entered Australia on Tourist (subclass 601) visas.
On 16 March 2016, GSX18 applied for the Visa and included GTH18 as a member of GSX18’s family unit. The applicants’ claims were set out in a written statement of the first applicant which was annexed to the Visa application. Relevantly, the applicants claimed that:
(1)on 9 July 2011, GSX18, who was pregnant with GTH18 at the time, and GTL18 were involved in a car accident whereby a Singaporean man died. GTL18 was subsequently imprisoned for two weeks and banned from entering Singapore;
(2)GSX18 returned to Johor Bahru in Malaysia where the family lived together. Following this return, the family were visited by a group of Malays who appeared to be relatives of the Singaporean man who died in the accident. The group threatened to kill GTL18 if he did not pay them 300,000 Singapore dollars;
(3)a few days later, GSX18 and her family moved back to their hometown, Kuantan Pahang. GTL18 subsequently disappeared, and GSX18 was unable to contact him for a few weeks. GTL18 then contacted GSX18 and told her that he had been taken back to Johor Bahru by a group from Singapore but that he managed to escape. GTL18 confirmed he was safe but did not indicate where he was staying. GSX18 continued to receive phone calls from GTL18 everyday;
(4)approximately seven months later, two men from Singapore attended on GSX18’s residence in search of GTL18. GSX18 stated to the men that she did not know GTL18’s whereabouts and the men said they would continue to return. GSX18 was scared and made a police report, but the police did not take any action;
(5)approximately three months later, three men from Singapore attended GSX18 at her residence, again searching for GTL18. The men asked GSX18 of GTL18’s whereabouts, however, she maintained she did not know. The men threatened to kidnap GTH18 if GSX18 did not tell them where her husband was. The men left when she ran inside and locked the door; and
(6)a few days later, GSX18 received a telephone call from an individual who asked where GTL18 was. GSX18 again told the person calling that she did not know his whereabouts, to which the person then threatened to rape her. On that same evening, GSX18 received a telephone call from GTL18 where he informed her that he was in Australia and he told her and GTH18 to come to Australia.
On 18 April 2016, the Delegate refused to grant the applicants the Visa.
On 21 April 2016, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate’s decision.
On 5 June 2018, the Tribunal invited the applicants to attend a rescheduled hearing on 8 August 2018 at 10.30am to give evidence and present arguments.
On 6 August 2018, the applicants provided a number of identity documents, various articles providing country information and a letter of support from the Shepparton Salvation Army to support the review application before the Tribunal.
On 8 August 2018, the applicants appeared before the Tribunal and gave evidence with the assistance of an interpreter in the Tamil and English languages. The review hearing for GTL18 was held consecutively.
On 16 August 2018, the Tribunal emailed the applicants requesting that any additional information or submissions they wished to make be provided to the Tribunal by 8 September 2018. On 6 September 2018, the applicants submitted additional information, including several media articles, to the Tribunal in support of their case (Post-Hearing Evidence).
On 30 November 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate not to grant the applicants the Visa. On that same date, the Tribunal sent a copy of its decision and reasons to the first applicant’s email address.
TRIBUNAL DECISION
The Tribunal issued its statement of decision and reasons on 30 November 2018 (Tribunal Decision).
At paragraphs [11] – [12] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal summarised the applicants’ claims.
At paragraphs [14] – [15] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal listed the information provided by the applicants and GTL18 in support of their applications, including the Post-Hearing Evidence provided on 6 September 2018.
At paragraphs [18] – [21] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found that the harm the applicants feared was serious harm as is required by s 5J(4)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) and the persecution they feared involved systematic and discriminatory conduct as required by s 5J(4)(c) of the Act. Noting the operation of s 5K of the Act, the Tribunal found that the applicants were targeted because they are members of a particular social group of family members related to the first applicant’s husband, GTL18. However, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicants had a well-founded fear of persecution pursuant to s 5J(1)(a) because the reason behind the threats could reasonably be considered to be the result of a personal dispute stemming from the car accident in 2011.
At paragraphs [22] – [25] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal considered the applicants claim that the police or Malaysian authorities failed to protect them because of their ethnicity and religion. Based on country information and the “general and speculative nature” of the claims, the Tribunal did not accept that the police or Malaysian authorities had or would refuse the applicants protection for one or more of the reasons in s 5J(1).
At paragraphs [26] – [27] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found that the applicants’ persecutors wanted money or revenge for a personal loss and that none of the reasons in s 5J(1) were the essential and significant reason for the persecution feared by the applicants. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that the applicants did not have a well-founded fear and did not satisfy s 36(2)(a).
At paragraphs [28] – [45] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal considered whether the applicants met the complementary protection criteria required by s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The Tribunal accepted that the harm feared by the Applicants constituted serious harm pursuant to s 36(2)(a) and significant harm pursuant to s 36(2A).
At paragraphs [30] – [35] of the Tribunal Decision, based on the material before it, the Tribunal accepted a number of claims including but not limited to:
(1)the first applicant’s husband was the driver of a vehicle involved in a car accident on 9 July 2011 in which there was a fatality and as a result, the first applicant’s husband was found guilty of causing death of another person and sentenced in December of 2012;
(2)the first applicant, her husband and son have been targeted by individuals related to the Singaporean man who was killed in the car accident and that these individuals physically assaulted the first applicant’s husband and demanded the family pay 300,000 Singapore dollars as compensation;
(3)the applicants moved back to Kuantan Pahang from Johor Bahru to seek safety;
(4)the people who threatened them were the family, friends or associates of the victim but the Tribunal did not accept that they were members of any particular gang in or outside of Malaysia; and
(5)the first applicant’s husband went into hiding following an attempted abduction in August 2014 and did not inform the applicants of his location and ceased contact for approximately four months.
At paragraph [34] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal considered two untranslated police reports dated 20 August 2015 and 6 November 2015 which were purported to be about the incidents whereby the first applicant was approached by strangers demanding to know where her husband was. The Tribunal accepted the first applicant’s evidence about the approaches and threats. The Tribunal also accepted that the applicants were threatened by the victim’s relatives or associates who were looking for the first applicant’s husband and that they were intent on harming her husband and threatened the applicants to achieve that goal. At paragraph [35] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal accepted that the same men had also gone to the first applicant’s mother’s home in 2018 and threatened her and that she was very unwell.
At paragraphs [36] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal was satisfied that the first applicant feared that she, her husband and her children would be assaulted, extorted, killed or abducted by people related to the victim of the car accident or their associates and that the attackers may still be looking for the applicant and her family to cause them harm or to demand money. The Tribunal found that there was a real risk that the applicant and her family would suffer significant harm if they returned to reside in either Johor Bahru or Kuantan Pahang. However, the Tribunal accepted that if the applicants returned to Malaysia, they would choose to reside in another location throughout Malaysia.
At paragraphs [37] – [42] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal considered whether the applicants would face a real risk of significant harm if they returned to Malaysia and resided in a location other than Johor Bahru or Kuantan Pahang. The Tribunal did not accept that the first applicant’s persecutors would have the means to locate and trace her if she was to relocate to a part of Malaysia outside her former home areas, nor did it accept the police had been corrupted or would be corrupted to assist her persecutors to locate her. With reference to relocation advice provided in the ‘Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Country Information Report, Malaysia 19 April 2018’ (DFAT Report) and the information and news articles provided by the applicants, the Tribunal did not accept that crime was rampant and unhindered by effective police or that the applicants’ ethnicity and religion placed them at any increased risk of significant or any harm in Malaysia. The Tribunal considered the evidence before it and did not accept that the family had a profile of any particular or heightened risk of harm when compared to other members of Malaysian society if they were to return to Malaysia and live outside of their former residential areas. The Tribunal ultimately found that based on the information before it, the real risk of significant harm is localised in the applicants’ prior residential areas and that the risk they would suffer significant harm outside Johor Bahru or Kuantan Pahang by their attackers or for any other reason was remote.
At paragraphs [43] – [44] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal considered whether it would be reasonable for the first applicant and her family to relocate to another part of the country where there would not be a real risk that she would suffer significant harm. The Tribunal found that the first applicant’s husband’s proven ability to be resilient and resourceful, coupled with the support of her family would assist in re-establishing themselves in Malaysia and was subsequently satisfied that the first applicant could reasonably relocate in Malaysia with her family without the real risk of significant harm. The Tribunal noted that there was no evidence or information before it that would indicate that any conditions relating to housing, employment or schooling would make relocation unreasonable.
Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicants were people in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act. Further, the Tribunal found that the applicants did not satisfy s 36(2) of the Act on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfied s 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who held a protection visa.
At paragraph [48] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate not to grant the applicants the protection visa.
APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The applicants applied for judicial review of the Tribunal Decision on 28 December 2018. With the leave of the Court, the applicants rely on the Amended Application filed on 28 January 2025.
The Amended Application contains the following four grounds for judicial review (without amendment):
The Applicant contends that the Second Respondent’s decision to refuse his application on the basis that he does not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a) or s.36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is invalid on several jurisdictional grounds. The Applicant further submits that the Tribunal has committed jurisdictional errors in assessing his matter by not giving adequate weightage to materials submitted, irrelevant consideration of Country Information Reports and dealing with illogical considerations. Finally, the Applicant raises issues that he has been denied procedural fairness due to the nature of the review conducted by the learned Tribunal member.
1.GROUND 1 – INADEQUATE WEIGHTAGE TO MATERIALS SUBMITTED
Particulars
A.The Tribunal member failed to give due weightage to the evidence submitted by the Applicant to establish the risk of persecution and harm in his home country. The below mentioned findings of facts by the Tribunal member should note the Applicant’s advantage:
(a)In reference to paragraphs 16 and 17 of the decision record, the applicant submitted materials in support of his claims included statement recorded under Singapore Criminal Procedure Code 2010, photographs showing injuries to applicant, death certificate of Mrs. Devadu Bangariah (mother-in-law of the applicant), articles and reports on child abduction, links between gangs, corruption in government and corruption within Malaysian police.
(b)In analysis, Despite accepting the materials submitted, the tribunal member failed to given adequate weightage to them in determining the well-founded fear of persecution. In paragraph 42 of the decision record, the member explicitly states that “Based on these findings of facts, I am satisfied that the applicant fears that he, his wife, and his children will be assaulted, extorted, killed or abducted by people related to the victim (or their associates) killed in a car accident in July 2011”. However, in paragraphs 46, 48 and 49 of the decision record, contradicting her findings, the member did conclude that the Applicant and his family would not suffer significant harm or persecution if returned to their home country.
(c)Furthermore, the Tribunal member failed to consider and provide weight to the applicant’s evidence of attempts to relocate other parts of Malaysia and being found by his attackers (reference to paragraphs 45 and 46 of the decision record). The member placed minimum or no weight on this evidence in determining the possibilities of relocation by the applicant and concluded that the applicant and his family could relocate to other parts of Malaysia, except Johor Baharu (referring to paragraphs 48,49, and 50).
(d)Accordingly, the Tribunal member failed to consider and give due weightage to the facts and materials submitted by the applicant as a whole and logically in establishing his well-founded fear of persecution. Instead, the member merely exaggerated her speculations without convincing evidence that caused a disadvantage to the applicant.
2.GROUND 2 – IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATION OF COUNTRY REPORT INFORMATION
Particulars
A.The Tribunal member considered the country information contained in reports by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) about police protection, Indian ethnicity, Christian faith, and freedom of internal movement (Paragraphs 28,29 and 44). These reports are general and non-specific and do not reference similar cases to the applicants’
B.The member also erred in his country report comparison as she failed to answer the critical question of how similar the cases in the country information reports are being compared. In Appellant S395/2002 v MIMA, McHugh and Kirby JJ explained that: “It is a mistake to assume that because members of a group are or are not persecuted, as the applicant is a member of that group, the applicant will or will not be persecuted. The central question is always whether this individual applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of…membership of a particular social group”.
C.The applicant’s matter is distinct, subjective, and anomalous. The DFAT reports considered by the Tribunal member are entirely irrelevant to the applicant’s case, and the decision based on this finding is wrong in ab-initio.
3. GROUND 3 – ILLOGICAL AND IRRATIONAL CONSIDERATION
Particulars
A.The possibilities of safe relocation to areas other than Applicant’s locality were decided by the Tribunal member based on illogical and irrational considerations, as noted below:
(a)“So far applicant has only been located in his home in Johor Bahru and in the place of his birth and there is only a speculative or remote risk that the persecutors would locate him with the assistance of the Malaysian police by bribing them” (paragraph 40).
(b)“While hiding in Kuala Lumpur the applicant was not located by his attackers and therefore Kuala Lumpur is a possible place of relocation” (paragraph 46).
(c)“Bearing in mind the size of Kuala Lumpur, I consider the fact that he was not located there is a reasonable indicator that there is no real risk that he would be located by his persecutors” (paragraph 46).
(d)“Kuala Lumpur or Penang have no links with the applicant, being far from any part of the country in which he has lived in its past” (paragraph 48).
B.The above statements of the learned Tribunal member clearly indicates that she has ascertained the possibilities of safe relocation only based on distance, population and the size of the cities, but not with logical, plausible and convincing evidence. Hence, this finding is entirely vague and the decision is wholly irrational and illogical, amounting to a jurisdictional error.
4. GROUND 4 – DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
Particulars
A.Denial of procedural fairness can be linked to the ‘legitimate expectation’ which was used by Haoucher v Minister for Immigration & Ethic Affairs (1990) and indicates “that an interest less than a right may nevertheless warrant the protection of rules of natural justice or, as it now more commonly called, procedural fairness”. The applicant had a legitimate expectation that his expectation that his application would be considered in accordance with laws of procedural fairness, however due to the reasons mentioned above the applicant was denied procedural fairness.
B.Based on the aforementioned four grounds and particularly Ground 1 and 2, of not giving adequate weightage to materials submitted and considering irrelevant country report information, the Tribunal member has erred in following procedural fairness. As a result, the decision is arbitrary in omnibus.
Based on the first, second, third and fourth grounds, the Tribunal did not provide adequate weightage to material submitted, based its findings on irrelevant considerations, dealt illogically and subsequently made errors of law. For these reasons, the applicant appeal to the Honourable Court for a fair review and relief to be provided by means of orders sought.
Those grounds are contained in the Amended Application filed in relation to GTL18 and are relied upon in respect of this Application.
The applicants also filed the following material:
(1)an affidavit filed on 28 December 2018 which annexed the Tribunal Decision;
(2)further affidavits filed on 3 February and 25 February 2025; and
(3)written submissions filed on 4 February 2025.
For the reason given at the hearing, leave was not granted for the applicants to rely upon the affidavits filed in February 2025.
The Minister filed a Response on 22 February 2019. The Response contained the following grounds:
The first respondent relies upon the following grounds and particulars in defence of the application:
1.The application for judicial review does not provide any particulars.
2.The application for judicial review does not establish jurisdictional error in the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 30 November 2018.
3.The application for judicial review does not raise an arguable case for the relief claimed and should accordingly be dismissed pursuant to Rule 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001.
The Minister also filed written submissions on 17 February 2025.
The Hearing
The hearing took place on 3 March 2025.
As set out above, GSX18 is the wife of GTL18 and the mother of GTH18. The applicants and GTL18 lodged separate applications for judicial review.
The application for judicial review in MLG3947/2018 was heard immediately before the present Application.
The applicants relied upon the submissions made in relation to the proceedings in MLG3947/2018. The written submissions filed by the applicants are the same in both matters (and refer to paragraphs within the Tribunal’s decision in relation to GTL18), save for one additional matter raised in the present matter in relation to Ground 2 (Additional Ground 2 Submission).
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A “privative clause decision” as defined at section 474 of the Act is final and not amenable to judicial review in any Court. Absent identification of jurisdictional error, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant relief in respect of the Tribunal’s decision: section 476 of the Act; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at [76].
The task on judicial review is not to undertake a general review of the decision or to substitute it with a decision which the Court may consider ought to have been made. The jurisdiction, being supervisory, allows for a decision to be quashed on established grounds, the most important of which is jurisdictional error, and, where appropriate, to order that the matter be remitted and reconsidered according to law: Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at [175].
CONSIDERATION
Grounds 1 – 4
For the reasons set out in GTL18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 578, none of Grounds 1 – 4 contained in the Amended Application establish jurisdictional error. It is to be noted that the paragraph numbers in the Tribunal decisions for GTL18 and GSX18 and GTH18 differ slightly, although the content remains substantially the same. Set out in Annexure A to this decision are the corresponding paragraph numbers of the Tribunal’s decision in GSX18 and GTH18 which are referred to in my reasons in relation to GTL18. This decision ought be read as if reference to a paragraph number in the Tribunal’s decision referred to in my decision in relation to GTL18 is a reference to the corresponding paragraph number in the Tribunal’s decision in this matter.
Additional Ground 2 Submission
In relation to the Additional Ground 2 Submission, in their written submissions the applicants relied upon the case of S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 7 (S395/2002) in relation to membership of a particular social group and submitted that the Tribunal failed to consider “these critical aspects”.
For the following reasons, I accept the Minister’s submission that S395/2022 does not assist the applicants.
At paragraph [19] of its decision, the Tribunal found that a family is capable of constituting a particular social group for the purposes of s 5J(1) of the Act. However, as also correctly found by the Tribunal, this is subject to s 5K which provides that, in determining whether a person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of membership of a particular social group that consists of a person’s family, the Tribunal must disregard:
(a)any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in s.5J(1)(a); and
(b)any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that the applicant or any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of persecution mentioned in (a) above had never existed.
At paragraphs [20] – [21] the Tribunal said:
Therefore, a person who is pursued because he or she is a relative of a person targeted for a reason other than those specified in s.5J(1)(a) (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion) will not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted within the meaning of s.5J.
The reason the applicant fears harm is because of a personal vendetta related to a car accident in which a person was killed where her husband was the driver. The applicant does not fear harm because of her religion, race, nationality or political opinion. Although the reason behind the threats they face can reasonably be considered to be the result of a personal dispute, the applicant and her son are only being targeted because they are members of the particular social group of family members related to her husband.
Accordingly, the Tribunal considered whether a family is capable of constituting a particular social group for the purposes of s 5J(1) of the Act and correctly applied s 5K of the Act.
I discern no error in the Tribunal’s approach to, or consideration of, this issue.
The Additional Ground 2 Submission does not disclose any jurisdictional error on the Tribunal’s behalf.
Additional matters
Children
The applicants submitted that the first applicant’s two youngest children ought be included in the review application. For the reasons set out in GTL18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 578 I reject that submission.
Relocation
In oral submissions, the applicants submitted that there are practical difficulties with relocating within Malaysia and further submitted that once a vehicle was used for work, the family would be located via their identity cards. The applicants conceded that these claims were not before the Tribunal. Accordingly, no error can arise as a result of the Tribunal not considering material that was not before it. Further, by this submission the applicants effectively seek impermissible merits review: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 at [272] per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
None of the additional matters raised by the applicants disclose jurisdictional error.
DISPOSITION
For the above reasons, the Amended Application must be dismissed.
The Minister seeks that the first applicant pay its costs. I shall order that the first applicant pay the Minister’s costs in an amount to be fixed, if not agreed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-one (51) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge J Young. Associate:
Dated: 23 April 2025
ANNEXURE A
MLG3946/2018 – Tribunal Decision MLG3947/2018 – Tribunal Decision [35] The applicants’ evidence is that she fears that, she and her family will be traced throughout Malaysia by her husband's attackers, and that these men will bribe the police and track them wherever they go. The applicant's mother has a brain tumour and is in hospital and they believe that her illness has been caused by the stress of what was happening to her daughter. The men went to her home prior to her hospitalisation in 2018 to ask where the applicant and her husband. They told her that they will kill them. Subsequently, the applicant's mother’s health has severely deteriorated and they consider that is because of the threats made to the applicant. I observed the distress with which this information was relayed at hearing by the applicant and also by her husband and I accept that this threat occurred, and that the applicant's mother in law is very unwell. [41] The applicant's mother-in-law has a brain tumour and is in hospital and they believe that her illness has been caused by the stress of what was happening to her daughter. The men went to her home prior to her hospitalisation in 2018 to ask where the applicant and his wife were. They told her that they will kill him and his wife. Subsequently, the applicant's mother in law's health has severely deteriorated and they consider that is because of the threats made to her daughter. I observed the distress with which this information was relayed at hearing by the applicant and also by his wife and I accept that this threat occurred, and that the applicant's mother in law is very unwell. [36] … I find that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicants being removed from Australia to Malaysia, there is a real risk that they will suffer significant harm, if they were to return to reside in either of Johor Bahru or Kuantan Pahang. [42] … I find that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicants being removed from Australia to Malaysia, there is a real risk that they will suffer significant harm, if they were to return to reside in either of Johor Bahru or Kuantan Pahang. [38] According to DFAT’s 19 April 2018 Country Information Report:
5.18 Malaysia's Constitution provides for freedom of internal movement, but the eastern states of Sabah and Sarawak have autonomy over their own immigration. Non-Sabah or Sarawak residents, whether Malaysian citizens or foreigners, must present national identity cards (or passports for foreigners) to gain entry and can visit for a maximum period of three months. The federal government can overrule immigration decisions made by Sabah or Sarawak in limited circumstances, including for national security reasons.
5.19 Sabah and Sarawak both issue working visas to non-residents (including other Malaysians), but these can be difficult to obtain. Both states limit purchase of land by non-residents. Far more people migrate from Sarawak and Sabah to peninsula Malaysia than in the other direction, due to better work opportunities and higher salaries.
5.20 In recent years, Sabah and Sarawak have denied entry to a small number of individuals. The Official Secrets Act contains the list of individuals banned from entering, and is not available to the public. During the Sarawak state election in May 2016, opposition leaders including PKR's Vice President Nurul Izzah Anwar, Selangor Chief Minister Azmin Ali, and DAP's Liew Chin Tong were denied entry on arrival in Sarawak. In March 2016, Tony Pua, Selangor state DAP Chief was refused entry into Sarawak. In 2015, Teresa Kok, a Chinese Malaysian and vice-Chairman of the DAP, was prevented from entering Sabah and the Hindu Rights Action Force chairman P Waythamoorthy was denied entry into Sarawak. DFAT is not aware of any instances of authorities denying an individual's exit from Sabah or Sarawak.
5.21 DFAT assesses that, subject to the restrictions outlined above in relation to Sabah and Sarawak, Malaysians can and do freely relocate internally. Individuals likely to attract official attention under state sharia-based law, including transgender individuals, women escaping domestic violence or Muslims wishing to marry a non-Muslim, often move to large urban centres to avoid attention. People also move to different parts of Malaysia, generally larger urban areas in peninsula Malaysia, for economic reasons.[44] According to DFAT’s 19 April 2018 Country Information Report:
5.18 Malaysia's Constitution provides for freedom of internal movement, but the eastern states of Sabah and Sarawak have autonomy over their own immigration. Non-Sabah or Sarawak residents, whether Malaysian citizens or foreigners, must present national identity cards (or passports for foreigners) to gain entry and can visit for a maximum period of three months. The federal government can overrule immigration decisions made by Sabah or Sarawak in limited circumstances, including for national security reasons.
5.19 Sabah and Sarawak both issue working visas to non-residents (including other Malaysians), but these can be difficult to obtain. Both states limit purchase of land by non-residents. Far more people migrate from Sarawak and Sabah to peninsula Malaysia than in the other direction, due to better work opportunities and higher salaries.
5.20 In recent years, Sabah and Sarawak have denied entry to a small number of individuals. The Official Secrets Act contains the list of individuals banned from entering, and is not available to the public. During the Sarawak state election in May 2016, opposition leaders including PKR's Vice President Nurul Izzah Anwar, Selangor Chief Minister Azmin Ali, and DAP's Liew Chin Tong were denied entry on arrival in Sarawak. In March 2016, Tony Pua, Selangor state DAP Chief was refused entry into Sarawak. In 2015, Teresa Kok, a Chinese Malaysian and vice-Chairman of the DAP, was prevented from entering Sabah and the Hindu Rights Action Force chairman P Waythamoorthy was denied entry into Sarawak. DFAT is not aware of any instances of authorities denying an individual's exit from Sabah or Sarawak.
5.21 DFAT assesses that, subject to the restrictions outlined above in relation to Sabah and Sarawak, Malaysians can and do freely relocate internally. Individuals likely to attract official attention under state sharia-based law, including transgender individuals, women escaping domestic violence or Muslims wishing to marry a non-Muslim, often move to large urban centres to avoid attention. People also move to different parts of Malaysia, generally larger urban areas in peninsula Malaysia, for economic reasons.[39] I discussed with the applicant the possibility that she could relocate within Malaysia without facing significant harm and the relocation advice given by DFAT above. Her response was that they had tried to relocate and had been found already — and that she believed that wherever they went, they would be unable to avoid being located as his persecutors appear determined to find them. [45] I discussed with the applicant the possibility that he could relocate within Malaysia to an area where he would not be at risk of significant harm, and the relocation advice given by DFAT above. His response was that he had tried to relocate and had been found already — he believed that wherever he went, he would be unable to avoid being located as his persecutors appear determined to find him. They also contacted his wife twice after he had left and threatened her and his son with harm if she did not reveal his whereabouts, and later, they contacted his mother in law. [40] I have taken into account the fact that the applicants were located in Kuantan Pahang, and that their persecutors have tried to locate her husband by threatening the health and safety of the applicant and their young son after he had fled. I do not consider that locating the applicant (and her husband) at their only known addresses indicates any great capacity in their attackers to find them ‘throughout the country’. I note that they were trying to locate the applicant's husband through her mother (at the same address where she was living before coming to Australia) as late as 2018, but, on the applicant's evidence, they have not contacted other members of their respective families. I have also taken into account her evidence that her husband was not located by his attackers after he fled. I note that her husband's stay in Kuala Lumpur was a short stay only, but nonetheless, and bearing in mind the size of Kuala Lumpur, I consider that the fact that he was not located there is a reasonable indicator that there is not a real risk that the applicant would be located by her persecutors if she was to return to Malaysia and relocate there. After all, their persecutors clearly had not even ascertained that he had departed the country by 2018, which suggests that his attackers have no capacity to ascertain his whereabouts using ‘official’ or corrupt official links. I have found that the applicant has not provided evidence capable of establishing that the Malaysian police might be or have been corrupted or would assist her persecutors to locate her, or that there are any ‘gang’ links between the attackers and other gangs in or outside Malaysia which might facilitate her being ‘traced’. [46] I have taken into account the fact that he was located in Pahang, and that his persecutors have subsequently tried to locate him through his wife and have threatened to harm her after he had fled. I do not consider that locating the applicant (and his wife) at his only known addresses indicates any great capacity in his attackers to find him ‘throughout the country’. I note that they were trying to locate the applicant through his wife's mother (at the same address where his wife was living before coming to Australia) as late as 2018, but, on the
applicant's evidence, they have not contacted other members of their respective families. I have also taken into account his evidence that whilst hiding in Kuala Lumpur he was not located by his attackers and that the applicant himself believed that he would be able to return and relocate to another part of the country after a short stay in Australia. I note that
his stay in Kuala Lumpur was a short stay only, but nonetheless, and bearing in mind the size of Kuala Lumpur, I consider that the fact that he was not located there is a reasonable indicator that there is not a real risk that he would be located by his persecutors there. After all, his persecutors clearly had not even ascertained that he had departed the country by 2018, which suggests that his attackers have no capacity to ascertain his whereabouts using ‘official’ or corrupt official links. I have found that the applicant has not provided evidence capable of establishing that the Malaysian police might be or have been corrupted or would assist his persecutors to locate him, or that there are any ‘gang’ links between his attackers and other gangs in or outside Malaysia which might facilitate his being ‘traced’.[41] In considering the risk of significant harm to the applicant in other parts of Malaysia, I have considered the information and articles provided by the applicant in support of her case. I accept that crime takes place in Malaysia just as it does in every country, and that the applicant and her husband are fearful for their safety and that of their children. However I do consider that the extent of their fear of general violence is not justified by reference to the articles they provided. I do not accept that crime (particularly murder and kidnapping) is ‘rampant’ and unhindered by effective police, which was the applicant's submission at hearing. I do not accept that the victims of the kidnapping and murder crimes referred to in the articles provided by the applicants have any particular racial or religious profile. They appear to be from all groups within society, and many indeed were of Muslim Malay ethnicity. I also note in many of the articles, the person abducted was recovered safely, and that kidnappers and murderers were actually apprehended and charged by police, which mitigates against the applicant's argument that the police would ignore or be unable to action their reports of threats and would fail to act to protect them. I do accept that the applicant holds a perception that citizens of Indian ethnicity might be subjected to abuse by police. However, in the applicant's husband's only interaction with police reported to me, he was not abused by police. Neither was the applicant when she reported the threats to police. In the circumstances of this case, I do not accept that the applicant's ethnicity and religion (and that of her husband and children) places her at any increased risk of harm outside her home areas (or even within them). I do not accept that the news articles provided establish that the applicant and her family have a profile such that they are at any particular or heightened risk of harm (significant or otherwise) when compared to other members of Malaysian society, if they were to return to Malaysia and live outside of their former residential areas. [47] In considering the risk of significant harm to the applicant in other parts of Malaysia, I have also considered the information and articles provided by the applicant in support of his case. The news articles are of a general nature about various incidents of violent crime over many years. I accept that crime takes place in Malaysia just as it does in every country, and that the applicant and his wife are fearful for their safety and that of their children. However I consider that the extent of his stated fear of general violence in the form of child abduction and murder is not justified by reference to the articles he provided. I do not accept that crime (particularly murder and kidnapping) is ‘rampant’ and unhindered by effective police, which was the applicant's submission at hearing. I do not accept that the victims of the kidnapping and murder crimes referred to in the articles provided by the applicants have any particular racial or religious profile. They appear to be from all groups within society, and many indeed were of Muslim Malay ethnicity. I also note in many of the articles, the person abducted was recovered safely, and that kidnappers and murderers were frequently apprehended and charged by police, which demonstrates a willingness and ability on the part of the authorities to protect citizens from that type of offence. The applicant holds a perception that citizens of Indian ethnicity might be subjected to abuse by police throughout the country. In support of this perception, as noted above, he provided an article about police mistreatment of Tamil/Indian citizens in the period 1998 to 2009. According to that information, there were 19 incidents over 11 years. I do not accept that this is evidence tending to show an endemic or even widespread problem, when compared to the size of the Malaysian population and noting that the incidents referred to in the article were in the period up to 2009. I also note that, in the applicant's only interaction with police reported to me, he was not abused by police. Neither was his wife when she reported the threats to police. In the circumstances of this case, I do not accept that the applicant's ethnicity and religion (and that of his wife and children) places him at any increased risk of significant or any harm in Malaysia in any of the areas to which the applicant would be likely to return (that is, outside of Johor Bahru and Kuantan Pahang.) I do not accept that the news articles provided establish that the
applicant and his family have a profile where they would be at any particular or heightened risk of harm (significant or otherwise) when compared to other members of Malaysian society, if they were to return to Malaysia and live in a part of Malaysia outside of their
former residential areas.[44] The applicant's husband has work experience as a port/truck driver in the Singaporean port in 2011 and later in the Johor Bahru port. He had been doing that work for several years. He lived in Johor Bahru and travelled to work in Singapore. The applicant worked at Singapore Airport prior to giving birth to her first child. Their children are young but in good health. Although the applicant's surviving family (and that of her husband) are located in Kuantan Pahang, the applicant and her husband have a history of living independently from their families, with extended periods of residence in Johor Bahru, Singapore and now Australia. The applicant did not raise any specific personal characteristics for herself or her husband which would impact on their capacity to relocate and re-establish themselves throughout Malaysia, apart from her fear that they would be located and face significant harm from their persecutors, a risk that I have determined is remote outside his home areas of Johor Bahru and Kuantan Pahang. The applicant's husband has worked in Australia, the applicant and her husband have contributed to the community here and proven to be resilient and resourceful. I consider that these qualities, along with the support of their family including of course her husband and young family, would stand the family in good stead in terms of re-establishing themselves in Malaysia. There is no information or evidence before me which suggests that conditions relating to housing, employment, schooling in Kuala Lumpur or other parts of Malaysia would render relocation unreasonable. I find that the applicant (and her family) could reasonably relocate within Malaysia where they would not face a real risk of significant (or any other) harm. [50] The applicant has work experience as a port worker and driver. His wife has experience working at Singapore Airport. Their children are young but there are no reported health concerns. Although the applicant's surviving family (and that of his wife) are located in Kuantan Pahang, they have a history of living independently from their families, with extended periods of residence in Johor Bahru, Singapore and now Australia. The applicant did not raise any specific personal characteristics which would impact on his or his wife's capacity to relocate and re-establish themselves throughout Malaysia, apart from his fear that they would be located and face significant harm from his persecutors; a risk that I have determined is remote outside his home areas of Johor Bahru and Kuantan Pahang. The evidence before me does not suggest or establish that the applicant and his family would
face any other harms (significant or lesser harms) in other parts of the country. The
applicant has worked in Australia, has participated in the community here and has proven to be resilient and resourceful. I consider that these qualities, along with the support of his family including of course his wife and young family, would stand him in good stead in terms of re-establishing himself in Malaysia. There is no information or evidence before me which suggests that conditions relating to housing, employment, schooling in Kuala Lumpur or other parts of Malaysia would render relocation unreasonable. I find that the applicant (and his family) could reasonably relocate to an area of Malaysia where they would not face a real risk of significant (or any other) harm.
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