GST v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   GST -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASCA 56

CORAM:   PULLIN JA

BUSS JA

HEARD:   5 FEBRUARY 2009

DELIVERED          :   3 MARCH 2009

FILE NO/S:   CACR 92 of 2008

BETWEEN:   GST

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :WHEELER JA

File No  :CACR 92 of 2008

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :SIMMONDS J

File No  :IND 1031 of 2007

Catchwords:

Criminal law and procedure - Appeal - Reasonable prospect of success - Review of judge's decision to refuse leave

Criminal law and procedure - Palmer direction

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Application dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr S B Watters

Respondent:     No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Thames Legal

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Gassy v The Queen [2008] HCA 18; (2008) 82 ALJR 838

Keating v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 98; (2007) 35 WAR 1

Palmer v The Queen [1998] HCA 2; (1998) 193 CLR 1

R v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450

  1. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: This is an application by the appellant pursuant to s 61(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) seeking an order setting aside the decision of Wheeler JA refusing leave to appeal on the single ground of appeal advanced against the convictions recorded against the appellant. The convictions were on five counts of indecent dealing, one charge of attempted indecent dealing and three counts of sexual penetration without consent. The convictions were recorded by Simmonds J after a trial before a jury.

  2. An application under s 61(3) is by way of rehearing, but it is not a hearing de novo and error on the part of the single judge of appeal whose decision is under review must be shown: Keating v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 98; (2007) 35 WAR 1 [21]. Wheeler JA decided that the single ground of appeal had no reasonable prospect of succeeding. Whether an individual ground does or does not have a reasonable prospect of succeeding is one on which reasonable minds may differ, but the test is an objective one. Consequently, if, on reviewing the decision of the single judge of appeal, the Court of Appeal assesses the ground differently than the single judge, finding that there is a reasonable prospect of success, the likelihood is that the court will conclude that there was an implied error, even if no express error is found, and that would entitle the court to set aside or vary the decision of the single judge. See Keating [23].

  3. The charges all involved the appellant's natural daughter, who was about 13 or 14‑years‑old at the time of the offences.  (The complainant's evidence was given via two video‑recorded interviews with prosecuting authorities and her cross‑examination was pre‑recorded on video.…

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Details
Case
[2009] WASCA 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, GST, sought to appeal a decision by Wheeler JA who had refused leave to appeal against his convictions for multiple sexual offences. The convictions were recorded by Simmonds J after a trial before a jury. GST applied under s 61(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) to set aside the decision of Wheeler JA. The appeal was assessed on the single ground that the appeal had a reasonable prospect of success. The Court of Appeal had to determine whether the ground of appeal had a reasonable prospect of success and if there was an implied error in the decision of the single judge of appeal.

The Court of Appeal noted that the decision on whether a ground of appeal has a reasonable prospect of success is an objective one, and reasonable minds may differ. The Court found that the single judge's decision to refuse leave to appeal was not an implied error and there was no reasonable prospect of success on the ground of appeal. The Court concluded that the trial judge had adequately directed the jury on the evaluation of the evidence and the legal principles relevant to the charges. The Court also noted that the appellant did not give or adduce any evidence in his defence, and the video-recorded evidence tendered by the prosecution contained both inculpatory and exculpatory material.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application by the appellant to set aside the decision of Wheeler JA. The Court found that the single judge's decision to refuse leave to appeal was not an implied error and there was no reasonable prospect of success on the ground of appeal. The Court found that the trial judge had adequately directed the jury on the evaluation of the evidence and the legal principles relevant to the charges. The Court also noted that the appellant did not give or adduce any evidence in his defence, and the video-recorded evidence tendered by the prosecution contained both inculpatory and exculpatory material.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: This is an application by the appellant pursuant to s 61(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) seeking an order setting aside the decision of Wheeler JA refusing leave to appeal on the single ground of appeal advanced against the convictions recorded against the appellant. The convictions were on five counts of indecent dealing, one charge of attempted indecent dealing and three counts of sexual penetration without consent. The convictions were recorded by Simmonds J after a trial before a jury. An application under s 61(3) is by way of rehearing, but it is not a hearing de novo and error on the part of the single judge of appeal whose decision is under review must be shown: Keating v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 98; (2007) 35 WAR 1 [21]. Wheeler JA decided that the single ground of appeal had no reasonable prospect of succeeding. Whether an individual ground does or does not have a reasonable prospect of succeeding is one on which reasonable minds may differ, but the test is an objective one. Consequently, if, on reviewing the decision of the single judge of appeal, the Court of Appeal assesses the ground differently than the single judge, finding that there is a reasonable prospect of success, the likelihood is that the court will conclude that there was an implied error, even if no express error is found, and that would entitle the court to set aside or vary the decision of the single judge. See Keating [23]. The charges all involved the appellant's natural daughter, who was about 13 or 14‑years‑old at the time of the offences. (The complainant's evidence was given via two video‑recorded interviews with prosecuting authorities and her cross‑examination was pre‑recorded on video. So too was the evidence of two other young witnesses. The appellant did not give, or adduce, any evidence in his defence, but two video records of interview of the appellant were tendered at trial by the prosecution. These contained inculpatory and exculpatory material.) In summing up, the trial judge referred to the prosecution evidence and the video‑recorded evidence. The trial judge explained to the jury the different roles of the judge and jury and explained that it was for the jury to evaluate the evidence; gave some observations about the process of evaluation and some things to which they should have regard; said that the jury must take a calm, dispassionate, analytical approach to the evidence; discussed the significance of demeanour and that they could accept some, all or none of a witness's evidence; explained that they could consider the extent to which it 'jelled' with other evidence and to assess whether the story the witness was telling was believable and credible in itself; discussed the evidence of the complainant; and gave directions about the burden and standard of proof. In what his Honour called part 2 of the summing up, directions were given in relation to the content of the charges and about the legal meaning of the words used in them, along with directions about accident, attempt and circumstantial evidence. Having completed part 2, his Honour then said (AB 114; ts 295):I have concluded part 2 and you will be relieved to know the bulk of my remarks to you in my summing up. I now turn to some comments on the evidence and I remind you that these comments are to assist, if they do assist only. They are in exactly the same category as the comments of both counsel. I'm not directing you here, although I will remind you of some directions and I will indicate to you when I am doing it.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established