TRADE MARKS ACT 1955
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Group 4 Securitas N. V. to registration of trade mark application 609693(42) - SECURITY GROUP III and device- lodged in the name of Stonepack Pty Limited.
Background
As provided for in the transitional provisions of Part 22 of the Trade Marks Act 1995, the provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1955 continue to govern this opposition. Accordingly, unless otherwise specified, any reference to the Act in this decision is a reference to the Trade Marks Act 1955.
Stonepack Pty Limited (the applicant) lodged the above numbered application on 20 August 1993 in respect of 'provision of security services' in class 42. The trade mark, depicted below, was accepted for registration on a first examination report with the endorsement: 'Registration gives no right to the exclusive use of the word GROUP and the Roman numeral III'. Acceptance of the application was advertised in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks of 2 February 1995.
Group 4 Securitas N. V. (the opponent) lodged a notice of opposition to this acceptance on 1 May 1995. The notice set out grounds under ss.24-26, s.40, s.33 and s.28 of the Act and also raised an allegation that use by the applicant would be contrary to the provisions of the Trade Practices Act, 1974. The opponent served and lodged part of the evidence in support of its opposition on 10 March 1997 and the balance on 3 June 1999. The applicant submitted no evidence in the matter.
During the evidence in support phase, the opponent informed the Trade Marks Office that it had become aware of a change in the status of the applicant. This involved the appointment of an Administrator for the applicant company. From that time onward, this Office had no success in locating the applicant, for service of standard notices or letters containing information relevant to this opposition matter, until 29 November 1999. At this time, the address of the Administrator of the applicant company was obtained and a letter was dispatched from a Senior Examiner from the Hearings Section with details of the date and venue of the hearing on the opposition matter. The Administrator indicated in response to that letter that the applicant was in the process of selling its assets and would not be represented at the hearing.
The matter came before me in Sydney on 14 March 2000. Ms Annabel Reader of the Sydney firm of Baldwin Shelston Waters represented the opponent. The applicant was not represented. Ms Reader chose to rely on written submissions in the matter, which she handed up at the hearing. The only verbal submission made by Ms Reader was in respect of costs.
The Evidence
The total evidence in support consists of four declarations. These are as follows:
| Declarant | Status | Date | Attachments | Hereafter |
| David Michael Felix Dufton | Group Legal Counsel (U.K.) for opponent | 26/02/1997 | 'A' to 'C' | Dufton declaration |
| Annabel Jane Reader | Attorney (Aust.)… |
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- Case
- [2000] ATMO 59
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the contract for security services had been frustrated by events that occurred after its formation. Specifically, the court had to determine if the supervening events were of such a nature as to fundamentally alter the obligation assumed by the defendant, thereby discharging both parties from their future obligations under the contract.
Justice Nancarrow's reasoning focused on the established principles of frustration in contract law. His Honour considered the nature of the contract, the events that transpired, and the impact of those events on the performance of the contractual obligations. The court applied the test for frustration, which requires that the supervening event must be unforeseen and not the fault of either party, and that it must render performance radically different from that which was contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was made. After analysing the evidence, the court found that the events in question did not meet the high threshold required to establish frustration.
The court therefore found in favour of the plaintiff, holding that the contract had not been frustrated and that the defendant remained liable for the outstanding payments. The plaintiff was awarded judgment for the amount claimed, together with interest and costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Group 4 Securitas provided extensive evidence of its worldwide and Australian use of the "group 4" mark since 1993 in relation to security services, prison management and transportation, and other services. Stonepack did not provide any evidence in response. The opponent argued that the marks were deceptively similar under section 33 and that registration of Stonepack's mark would be likely to cause deception or confusion under section 28. The Hearing Officer found the marks deceptively similar due to the common word "group" and numeral, which would lead consumers to assume a common source. However, the Officer found that Stonepack's mark was not sufficiently well-known by 20 August 1993 to meet the requirements of section 28. The Officer upheld the opposition under section 33 and refused registration of Stonepack's trade mark application. Stonepack was ordered to pay Group 4 Securitas' costs.
Group 4 Securitas N.V. opposed the registration of the trade mark application 609693(42) "SECURITY GROUP III" filed by Stonepack Pty Limited, which sought to register the mark for services in class 42. Group 4 relied on grounds under sections 24-26, 33, 28, 40 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 and also raised a claim under the Trade Practices Act 1974. The matter came before a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, Don Nancarrow, for a hearing on 14 March 2000. Stonepack was not represented and Group 4 was represented by Ms Annabel Reader. The delegate found that the opposition under sections 24-26, 40 and the Trade Practices Act were not supported and therefore unsuccessful. The opposition under section 33 was successful as the delegate found the marks to be deceptively similar and the services claimed in the application related to those in Group 4's registrations. The opposition under section 28 was unsuccessful as Group 4 failed to show sufficient recognition of their mark at the time the application was lodged. The delegate therefore refused to register the trade mark application.
Key procedural steps included Group 4 lodging a notice of opposition on 1 May 1995, serving evidence in support on 10 March 1997 and 3 June 1999, and Stonepack failing to submit any evidence. The matter was heard on 14 March 2000 with Group 4 represented by Ms Reader who relied on written submissions. The delegate issued a decision on 20 June 2000 finding the opposition under section 33 successful and refusing registration of the trade mark application.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the applicant's trade mark is substantially identical or deceptively similar to the opponent's registered trade marks under s.33(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1955.
2. Whether the applicant's trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion under s.28(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1955.
3. Whether the applicant's trade mark comprises or contains scandalous matter under s.28(c) of the Trade Marks Act 1955.
4. Whether the applicant's trade mark would otherwise be not entitled to protection in a court of justice under s.28(d) of the Trade Marks Act 1955.
Held
1. The court found that the applicant's trade mark is deceptively similar to the opponent's registered trade marks under s.33(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1955. As a result, the opposition under s.33 was successful in respect of the opponent's registered trade marks numbered 448780 and 582794.
2. The court found that the opponent did not establish that the applicant's trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion under s.28(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1955. Therefore, the opposition under s.28(a) was not successful.
3. The court did not address the issue of whether the applicant's trade mark comprises or contains scandalous matter under s.28(c) of the Trade Marks Act 1955.
4. The court did not address the issue of whether the applicant's trade mark would otherwise be not entitled to protection in a court of justice under s.28(d) of the Trade Marks Act 1955.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In determining whether the applicant's trade mark was substantially identical or deceptively similar to the opponent's registered trade marks, the court applied the test set out in section 33(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1955. The court found that while the marks were not visually similar, they were deceptively similar due to the aural comparison and the potential for contextual confusion. The court relied on the case of Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v F. S. Walton & Co. Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 641, which established the principle that the effect of spoken description must be considered in determining whether marks are deceptively similar. The court found that the common elements in the spoken descriptions of the marks would likely lead to the assumption of a common trade source, causing deception or confusion. The court also considered the requirement that the services claimed in the application must be the same as, or of the same description as, the services in the opponent's registrations. The court found that the opponent's registrations 448780 and 582794 fulfilled this requirement and constituted barriers to the registration of the present application.
In determining whether the applicant's trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion, the court applied the test set out in section 28(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1955. The court found that the opponent had not established the requisite recognition of its own mark as at the date of lodgement of the present application. The court relied on the case of Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v. Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592, which established the principle that the relevant date for assessing the likelihood of deception or confusion is the date of lodgement of the present application. The court found that the evidence did not show that the purchasing public would recognize a part of the company name as being use of a trade mark, and that two months of use by an authorized user was an extremely short time to produce market awareness for a trade mark. The court found that the opposition ground taken under s.28 was not successful because the opponent had not established the requisite recognition in its own mark as at the date of lodgement of the present application.
In determining whether the applicant's trade mark comprised or contained scandalous matter, the court applied the test set out in section 28(c) of the Trade Marks Act 1955. The court found that the opponent had not established that the use of the applicant's mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion, and therefore did not need to consider this ground further.
In determining whether the applicant's trade mark would otherwise be not entitled to protection in a court of justice, the court applied the test set out in section 28(d) of the Trade Marks Act 1955. The court found that the opponent had not established any grounds for this opposition, and therefore did not need to consider this ground further.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the opposition succeeds under s.33 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 in respect of the opponent's registered trade marks, numbered 448780 and 582794. The court distinguished the case of New South Wales Dairy Corp v Murray Goulburn Co-operative Co Ltd 38 IPR 385, which had previously required a finding of blameworthy conduct on the part of the applicant in order for the opponent to succeed under s.28(a). The court followed the decision of the Full Federal Court in Nettlefold Advertising Pty Ltd v NettlefoldSigns Pty Ltd 45 IPR 393, which established the principle that a disjunctive reading of s.28 was the correct approach when deciding oppositions to registration. The court departed from the previous interpretation of s.28(a) which had required a finding of both deception or confusion and blameworthy conduct on the part of the applicant.