Groom v Police

The Supreme Court of South Australia, Court of Appeal, heard an application for permission to appeal by Mr. Groom against a judgment of Justice Lovell. Justice Lovell had upheld a Magistrate's decision to dismiss Mr. Groom's application for the revocation of an intervention order. Mr. Groom contended that the intervention order, initially made in 2011, was invalid and that both the Magistrate and Justice Lovell erred in failing to recognise new and compelling evidence to this effect. This alleged new evidence related to the absence of a complaint in court records, suggesting the original order was made without lawful authority, and claims of interference and spoilation within the court file.

The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether Mr. Groom had established grounds for permission to appeal, specifically whether the Magistrate and Justice Lovell had erred in dismissing his application to revoke the intervention order. This involved considering Mr. Groom's arguments regarding the alleged invalidity of the original order due to a lack of evidence and purported file tampering, and whether these constituted new and compelling evidence warranting revocation. The Court also had to assess whether the repeated attempts by Mr. Groom to challenge the intervention order amounted to an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for permission to appeal, finding it to be fundamentally misconceived and an abuse of process. The Court noted the extensive history of litigation surrounding the intervention order, including previous appeals and applications that had been dismissed. It was observed that Mr. Groom's current application sought to relitigate matters that had already been finally determined by the courts. The Court concluded that the material before it demonstrated a persistent attempt to relitigate decided issues, and therefore, the time had come to consider the application of section 39 of the *Supreme Court Act 1935* (SA) concerning vexatious proceedings.

The Court ordered that the application for permission to appeal be dismissed. Furthermore, pursuant to section 39(2) of the *Supreme Court Act 1935* (SA), the matter was referred to the Attorney-General for consideration as to whether an application should be made under section 39(1) of the Act to prohibit Mr. Groom from instituting further proceedings without the permission of the court.