Groom v Police - [2021] SASCA 1

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Criminal)
GROOM v POLICE
[2021] SASCA 1
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable President Kelly, the Honourable Justice of Appeal Doyle and the Honourable Justice of Appeal Livesey)
22 January 2021

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM SUPREME COURT - BY LEAVE OF COURT - GENERALLY
PROCEDURE - STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY - VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS, PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED MATTERS
Application for permission to appeal against the judgment of Justice Lovell in the Supreme Court of South Australia in relation to the dismissal of an application for revocation of an intervention order.
Held per the Court:
1. The application for permission to appeal is dismissed.
2. The matter is referred to the Attorney-General for consideration as to whether an application under s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) should be made.
Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 39(1), (2), referred to.
Groom v Police [2020] SASC 167; Groom v Police; Groom v State of South Australia [2017] SASCFC 161; Groom v Police [2014] SASC 41, considered.

GROOM v POLICE
[2021] SASCA 1

COURT OF APPEAL: Kelly P, Doyle and Livesey JJA

THE COURT: The applicant has filed an application for permission to appeal from a judgment of Lovell J[1] upholding the decision of a Magistrate on 26 May 2020 to dismiss an application for revocation of an intervention order.
[1] Groom v Police [2020] SASC 167.
The applicant contends that the intervention order, which was made on 19 October 2011 and confirmed in the Magistrates Court on 10 December 2013, is invalid and should be revoked.
The applicant contends that both the Magistrate and Lovell J erred in failing to find that there was new and compelling evidence to demonstrate that the order is invalid and should be revoked.
The new and compelling evidence sought to be relied on by the applicant was said to be that the failure of the court records to reveal any complaint by the original complainant raises a question as to whether the Court acted with lawful authority when originally making the ex parte intervention order on 19 October 2011. The applicant contends that in previous hearings, and in particular, the hearing before the Full Court in December 2017,[2] the Court did not have the benefit of viewing the court file and thus ascertaining the true basis of the evidence within the file.
[2] Groom v Police; Groom v State of South Australia [2017] SASCFC 161.
The applicant also submits that ‘the court file shows evidence of interference and Spoilitation wthin [sic] the court file making it fatally flawed’.
The matter has an extensive history. Regrettably, it is necessary to set out some of that history, which demonstrates that the current application is fundamentally misconceived.
The most convenient summary of the history of this matter is contained in Groom v Police; Groom v State…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Groom v Police

Details

AGLC: Groom v Police [2021] SASCA 1
Case: [2021] SASCA 1
Decision Date: 22 January 2021

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of South Australia, Court of Appeal, heard an application for permission to appeal by Mr. Groom against a judgment of Justice Lovell. Justice Lovell had upheld a Magistrate's decision to dismiss Mr. Groom's application for the revocation of an intervention order. Mr. Groom contended that the intervention order, initially made in 2011, was invalid and that both the Magistrate and Justice Lovell erred in failing to recognise new and compelling evidence to this effect. This alleged new evidence related to the absence of a complaint in court records, suggesting the original order was made without lawful authority, and claims of interference and spoilation within the court file.

The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether Mr. Groom had established grounds for permission to appeal, specifically whether the Magistrate and Justice Lovell had erred in dismissing his application to revoke the intervention order. This involved considering Mr. Groom's arguments regarding the alleged invalidity of the original order due to a lack of evidence and purported file tampering, and whether these constituted new and compelling evidence warranting revocation. The Court also had to assess whether the repeated attempts by Mr. Groom to challenge the intervention order amounted to an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for permission to appeal, finding it to be fundamentally misconceived and an abuse of process. The Court noted the extensive history of litigation surrounding the intervention order, including previous appeals and applications that had been dismissed. It was observed that Mr. Groom's current application sought to relitigate matters that had already been finally determined by the courts. The Court concluded that the material before it demonstrated a persistent attempt to relitigate decided issues, and therefore, the time had come to consider the application of section 39 of the *Supreme Court Act 1935* (SA) concerning vexatious proceedings.

The Court ordered that the application for permission to appeal be dismissed. Furthermore, pursuant to section 39(2) of the *Supreme Court Act 1935* (SA), the matter was referred to the Attorney-General for consideration as to whether an application should be made under section 39(1) of the Act to prohibit Mr. Groom from instituting further proceedings without the permission of the court.

Orders