Groom v Attorney-General - [2023] SASCA 83

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Civil)
GROOM v ATTORNEY-GENERAL
[2023] SASCA 83
Judgment of the Court of Appeal (ex tempore)
(The Honourable Justice Lovell and the Honourable Justice Bleby)
1 August 2023
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM SUPREME COURT - GENERALLY
PROCEDURE - STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY - VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS, PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED MATTERS
A domestic violence restraining order was imposed against the appellant in 2011. On 10 February 2023, pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act, Justice Blue ordered that Mr Groom be prohibited, without the prior leave of this Court, from instituting proceedings in a prescribed court in relation to the domestic violence restraining order.
The appellant appeals that decision, as well as Justice Blue's dismissal of the appellant's interlocutory application seeking a stay of the s 39 proceedings.
Held, per the Court, refusing leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal:
1. The appellant was unable to point to any error in Justice Blue's reasons. The grounds of appeal have no merit.
2. The appellant is to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to be agreed or taxed.
Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 39(1), referred to.
Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18, considered.

GROOM v ATTORNEY-GENERAL
[2023] SASCA 83
Court of Appeal – Civil: Lovell and Bleby JJA

THE COURT: In 2011, a domestic violence restraining order was imposed against the appellant, Mr Groom, in the Magistrates Court (the intervention order). The gravamen of Mr Groom’s complaints flow from that decision. He has sedulously sought to overturn that decision but has been unsuccessful despite numerous proceedings and appeals.
The Attorney-General commenced proceedings pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act1935 (SA) (the Act) seeking to declare Mr Groom a vexatious litigant. The Attorney-General identified at least eight proceedings in connection with the intervention order since 2011, that were instituted by Mr Groom without reasonable grounds.
On 10 February 2023, after hearing the application, Blue J ordered that pursuant to s 39 of the Act, Mr Groom be prohibited, without the prior leave of this Court, from instituting proceedings in a prescribed court in relation to the intervention order. Mr Groom appeals against that decision, as well as the dismissal of his interlocutory application seeking a stay of the vexatious litigant proceedings.
Background and procedural history
The background and procedural history are set out in judgment of Blue J.[1] Relevant to this appeal is that, following a referral from the Court of Appeal, the Attorney-General commenced the vexatious litigant proceedings on 23 September 2021 pursuant to s 39(1) of the Act.
[1] Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18.
On 3 March 2022, Mr Groom filed an interlocutory application seeking a stay of the vexatious litigant proceedings and a series of declarations in relation to the asserted invalidity of the intervention order.
On 26 May 2022, Kourakis CJ directed…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Groom v Attorney-General

Details

AGLC: Groom v Attorney-General [2023] SASCA 83
Case: [2023] SASCA 83
Decision Date: 1 August 2023

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned Mr Groom's challenge to orders made by Blue J in the Supreme Court of South Australia. These orders included a prohibition, pursuant to s 39 of the relevant Act, on Mr Groom instituting proceedings in a prescribed court without prior leave, and the dismissal of his interlocutory application seeking a stay of vexatious litigant proceedings. Mr Groom also appealed a decision by Kourakis CJ directing that his interlocutory application be heard concurrently with the trial of the vexatious litigant application.

The legal issues before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia included whether the intervention order made against Mr Groom was invalid, whether Mr Groom had persistently instituted vexatious proceedings without reasonable grounds, and whether it was appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion to declare him a vexatious litigant. Further issues arose from Mr Groom's grounds of appeal, which alleged denials of natural justice by both Kourakis CJ and Blue J, errors of law regarding the court in which proceedings were heard, and failures by Blue J to adhere to statutory requirements and properly consider evidence concerning the validity of an intervention order and the integrity of court files.

Lovell and Bleby JJ considered the findings of Blue J, who had determined that the intervention order was not invalid, that Mr Groom had instituted 11 vexatious proceedings between 2014 and 2020, and that it was appropriate to make an order declaring him a vexatious litigant. The Court noted that Blue J had dismissed the application for a stay on the basis that it lacked foundation, given his findings on the vexatious litigant application. The grounds of appeal raised by Mr Groom were examined in light of these findings and the relevant legal principles concerning vexatious litigants and procedural fairness.

The Full Court dismissed the appeal. It found no error in the decision of Blue J to make an order under s 39 of the Act declaring Mr Groom a vexatious litigant, nor in his dismissal of the application for a stay. The Court also dismissed the appeal against the directions made by Kourakis CJ.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

On 10 February 2023, after hearing the application, Blue J ordered that pursuant to s 39 of the Act, Mr Groom be prohibited, without the prior leave of this Court, from instituting proceedings in a prescribed court in relation to the intervention order. Mr Groom appeals against that decision, as well as the dismissal of his interlocutory application seeking a stay of the vexatious litigant proceedings. Background and procedural history The background and procedural history are set out in judgment of Blue J.[1] Relevant to this appeal is that, following a referral from the Court of Appeal, the Attorney-General commenced the vexatious litigant proceedings on 23 September 2021 pursuant to s 39(1) of the Act.[1] Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18. On 3 March 2022, Mr Groom filed an interlocutory application seeking a stay of the vexatious litigant proceedings and a series of declarations in relation to the asserted invalidity of the intervention order. On 26 May 2022, Kourakis CJ directed that the interlocutory application be heard together with the trial of the vexatious litigant application. Mr Groom also appeals that decision. On 28 November 2022, following the hearing of submissions, Blue J gave ex tempore reasons for dismissing the stay sought by the appellant. In his reasons, Blue J identified that the appellant would need to demonstrate that he was bound to succeed on his arguments that the intervention order was invalid before it could follow that a stay should be granted. Blue J ordered, by consent, that the declarations sought by the appellant in his interlocutory application be treated as a cross-action.[2] Blue J proceeded to hear the application to declare Mr Groom a vexatious litigant. [2] Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18 at [74] (Blue J). On 10 February 2023, Blue J published his reasons for judgment and made the orders the subject of this appeal. In summary, Blue J held:·The intervention order first made on 19 October 2011 was not invalid by reason of any of the matters raised by the appellant.[3]·Mr Groom persistently instituted 11 vexatious proceedings between 2014 and 2020 and each was without reasonable grounds.[4]·It was appropriate to exercise the Court’s discretion to make an order pursuant to s 39 of the Act as sought by the Attorney-General.[5][3] Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18 at [147] (Blue J).[4] Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18 at [273] and [276] (Blue J).[5] Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18 at [280] (Blue J). It followed that the application for a stay had no basis.Appeal grounds The appellant’s grounds of appeal are as follows:1.The judicial officer HH Chief Justice Kourakis in failing to address the Urgent Interlocutory application placed before the court on the 3rd March 2022, and addressing it on the 26th May 2022 at a Directions hearing where he made Orders that the interlocutory be heard together with the Trial for the Vexatious litigant order denied the respondent natural Justice by way of allowing no time for a defence or further action to be taken upon the outcome of the interlocutory, had placed the respondent in a position of disadvantage and denied him natural justice. 2.The Chief Justice HH Chris Kourakis made an error of law in stating that the hearing of a interlocutory related to the criminal section of the court was heard in the civil section of the court.3.HH Justice Blue Made a error in failing to Adhere to the Magistrate court Act Statutory requirements in upholding that the Magistrates court is a "Court of record" in making his assumptions as to evidence contained or not contained in the court file, The Record shows no sealed complaint and that No trial occurred at the first return and that there is no reason adequate or otherwise for the Adjournment to a PTC some 7 weeks in advance. These assertions amount to a denial of natural Justice for the respondent, and placed the respondent in a position of disadvantage.4.HH justice Blue made an error at law by failing to address the interference of the court file and evidence therein making the court file "Fatally flawed" and reported in the second affidavit of the respondent attached to the interlocutory application. 5.HH Justice Blue erred in failing to request evidence of the viewing of the court file by a Lawyer Casey Isaacs who viewed the court file in 2018 and reported That he could find "no reason for the placing of the order in the first instance" 6.HH Justice Blue erred in failing to correctly interpret the word adequate in section 9 (5) (b) of the DV ACT 1994 and the statutory interpretation of S 9(6) (a) (b) of the DV Act 1994 the matter of the dismissing of the court file if not confirmed 7.HH Justice Blue erred in failing to give weight to the lack of evidentiary material proffered by the CSO in response to the interference of the court file and proof that any sealed complaint existed or reasons for its disappearance from the court file, (ie notes or written records of support) as no evidence was forthcoming then the matter should have been settled in the respondents favour.8.HH Justice Blue erred in making a Judgement when, following verbal statements had been made from the bar table by the respondent questioning(a) Who was responsible for the Missing evidence from the court file and its effect on any decision forthcoming, (b) that within the court file and discussed in the court there are records of indictable offences (the PPs 2nd Affidavit and that of her Co-worker Perjury) the failure of police to answer court ordered subpoenas (contempt) and interference of the court file by a person or persons unknown (interference with evidence) and(c) the position of the police and CSO in perusing the rebuttle of the applications to revoke and the appeals in regard to their Positions as Premier litigants and agents of the court in the knowledge that the for-mentioned indictable offences had occurred. Can it be assumed that the respondent could ever receive a fair hearing, and natural justice, and were the actions of the Police and CSO malicious?

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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