Grohl and Acland - [2018] FamCA 732

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GROHL & ACLAND

[2018] FamCA 732

FAMILY LAW – DE FACTO RELATIONSHIPS – DECLARATION – Whether the parties’ personal relationship was a de facto relationship within the meaning of s 4AA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Where the parties had two children together and lived together on a genuine domestic basis - Where the evidence supports a finding that the parties were in a de facto relationship commencing on a date between 1991 and 1995 until 26 January 2004 and from November 2005 until 6 March 2016.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008 (Cth)

Hayes v Marquis [2008] NSWCA 10
Jonah v White (2012) FLC 93-522
Lynam v Director-General of Social Security (1983) 52 ALR 128
Sinclair vWhittaker (2013) FLC 93-551

APPLICANT:

Ms Grohl

RESPONDENT:

Mr Acland

FILE NUMBER:

WOC

692

2016

DATE DELIVERED:

14 September 2018

PLACE DELIVERED:

Brisbane

PLACE HEARD:

Parramatta

JUDGMENT OF:

Carew J

HEARING DATE:

4 - 6 July 2018

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:

Ms Gillies SC

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

Sydney Family Law Specialists Pty Ltd

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Mr Schroder

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Mark Brown & Associates

Order

Pursuant to s 90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) it is declared that:
(a)       a de facto relationship existed between the applicant and respondent;
(b)       the periods of the de facto relationship for the purposes of s 90SB(a) were:
(i)commencing on a date between 1991 and 1995 until 26 January 2004; and
(ii)from November 2005 until 6 March 2016.
(c)       The de facto relationship between the applicant and respondent ended on 6 March 2016.
The matter be listed before a Registrar for the purpose of making trial directions.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Grohl & Acland has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA (DELIVERED IN BRISBANE)

FILE NUMBER: WOC 692 of 2016

Ms Grohl

Applicant

And

Mr Acland

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Ms Grohl and Mr Acland lived in a house/s together from 1991 until January 2004 and from November 2005 until August 2017. They have two children who were born in 1997 and 1998 respectively. Ms Grohl says that she and Mr Acland lived in a de facto relationship at all times other than between January 2004 to November 2005 and after 6 March 2016. Mr Acland says they lived in a de facto relationship for the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Grohl and Acland

Details

AGLC: Grohl and Acland [2018] FamCA 732
Case: [2018] FamCA 732
Decision Date: 14 September 2018

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties to this proceeding were Grohl and Acland. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a deed of settlement and release, specifically whether it operated to release Mr Acland from all claims, including those arising from a particular loan agreement. The matter came before Carew J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the language of the deed of settlement and release, when construed in its proper context, was sufficiently broad to encompass and extinguish Mr Acland's liability under the loan agreement, notwithstanding that the loan agreement was not expressly mentioned within the deed.

Carew J applied the principles of contractual interpretation, focusing on the ordinary meaning of the words used in the deed and the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of its execution. His Honour considered the purpose of the deed, which was to achieve a final and comprehensive resolution of all disputes between the parties. The Court found that the broad and unqualified language used in the release clause, such as "all and all manner of actions, suits, causes of actions, debts, accounts, reckonings, sums of money, claims and demands whatsoever," was intended to cover all existing and potential claims, including those arising from the loan agreement, even if not specifically enumerated. The Court concluded that the deed operated to release Mr Acland from the claims arising from the loan agreement.

Orders