[2013] TASCCA 7
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL)
CITATION: Groenewege v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 7
PARTIES: GROENEWEGE, Adam Robert
v
TASMANIA (STATE OF)
FILE NO: 837/2012
DELIVERED ON: 26 July 2013
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE: 18 February 2013
JUDGMENT OF: Tennent, Porter and Wood JJ
CATCHWORDS:
Criminal Law – Appeal and new trial – Appeal against sentence – Grounds for interference – Sentence manifestly excessive or inadequate – Global sentence of 4½ years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years 9 months for arson and assault – Assaulted estranged wife and intentionally burnt down former matrimonial home – Wife and four young children left homeless – Weight to be attributed to appellant's psychiatric condition – Head sentence not manifestly excessive but minimum non-parole period ought to have been ordered.
R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398; R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102, applied.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [ 3521]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: E Hughes and F Cangelosi
Respondent: J Hartnett and A Shand
Solicitors:
Appellant: Rae & Partners Lawyers
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions
Judgment Number: [2013] TASCCA 7
Number of paragraphs: 62
Serial No 7/2013
File No 837/2012
ADAM ROBERT GROENEWEGE v STATE OF TASMANIA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
TENNENT J
PORTER J
WOOD J
26 July 2013
Orders of the Court
Appeal allowed to the extent it relates to the order under s17(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act.
Set aside that order and in lieu, order that the appellant not be eligible for parole until he has served one half of the sentence.
Serial No 7/2013
File No 837/2012
ADAM ROBERT GROENEWEGE v STATE OF TASMANIA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
TENNENT J
26 July 2013
I have had the opportunity of reading in draft form the reasons of Porter J. I agree with those reasons and the outcome he proposes.
File No 837/2012
ADAM ROBERT GROENEWEGE v STATE OF TASMANIA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
PORTER J
26 July 2013
Introduction
This is an appeal against sentence. The appellant pleaded guilty before a magistrate to a charge of arson and was committed to the Supreme Court for sentence. When the matter came before Blow J (as he then was), his Honour agreed, pursuant to s385A of the Criminal Code, to deal with a summary charge of common assault under the Police Offences Act 1935, to which the appellant then pleaded guilty. The arson charge concerned the almost total destruction of a dwelling house which was the home of the appellant and his wife and four children (boys) aged between 7 years and 3 years. The complainant in the assault matter was the appellant's wife, Kristen Groenewege; the particulars of the charge were that the appellant placed his hands around her throat and applied pressure.
On 14 September 2012, by way of a global sentence, the appellant was sentenced to four years and six months' imprisonment to take effect from 18 July…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania was whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, particularly the non-parole period. The court was required to consider the weight to be attributed to the appellant's psychiatric condition in determining the appropriate sentence and non-parole period.
The Full Court reasoned that while the head sentence of four and a half years was not manifestly excessive given the gravity of the offences and their impact on the victims, the non-parole period of two years and nine months was too high. The court determined that the non-parole period ought to have been ordered at one half of the sentence.
Consequently, the appeal was allowed to the extent that the order for the non-parole period was set aside. In lieu, the court ordered that the appellant not be eligible for parole until he had served one half of his sentence, which equates to two years and three months.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed to the extent it relates to the order under s17(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act.
2. Set aside that order and in lieu, order that the appellant not be eligible for parole until he has served one half of the sentence.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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