Gristwood & Gristwood

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Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia

(DIVISION 1)

Gristwood & Gristwood [2022] FedCFamC1F 725

File number(s): BRC 4166 of 2017
Judgment of: HOWARD J
Date of judgment: 27 September 2022
Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – 17 year marriage – 19 years of cohabitation – where the parties built up a substantial property pool – where the valuation of business entities and the valuation of a Call Option were in dispute – adversarial witness evidence – assessment of contributions – future needs – a consideration of “double counting” or “double dipping”  – justice and equity.
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 4, 66L, 75, 79

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rule 7.06, 7.18

Cases cited:

Baghti & Baghti and Ors [2015] FamCAFC 71

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

C & C [2005] FamCA 159

Clauson & Clauson (1995) FLC 92-595

Eagle & Scarlett (No 2) [2020] FamCAFC 291

Fields & Smith (2015) FLC 93-638

GBT & BJT [2005] FamCA 683

Gollings & Scott (2007) FLC 93-319

Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Company Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378

Hurst v Weber (2009) 233 FLR 337

Johanson & Johanson [2022] FedCFamC1A 74

McFMcF & McF [2004] FamCA 1309

Rodgers & Rodgers No 2 (2016) FLC 93-712

Rosati v Rosati (1998) FLC 92-804

S & S [2000] FamCA 262

Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108

Trevi & Trevi [2019] FamCAFC 51

Whisprun v Dixon Pty Ltd (2003) 200 ALR 447

Division: Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs: 146
Date of hearing: 26, 27, 28 & 29 April 2022
Date of last submission/s: 8 July 2022
Delivered at: Brisbane
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Kirk QC
Solicitor for the Applicant: Hopgood Ganim Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Dickson QC
Solicitor for the Respondent: Barry.Nilsson Lawyers

ORDERS

BRC4166 of 2017

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:

MS GRISTWOOD

Applicant

AND:

MR GRISTWOOD

Respondent

order made by:

HOWARD J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 September 2022

THE COURT ORDERS:

1.That by no later than 4:00pm on 21 October 2022, the Applicant shall provide a copy of a proposed Final Order (reflecting the Reasons for Judgment) to the Respondent and a copy of the same to the Court at …@fcfcoa.gov.au.

2.That by no later than 4:00pm on 28 October 2022, the Respondent shall provide any reply to the proposed Final Order to the Applicant and a copy of the same to the Court at …@fcfcoa.gov.au.

3.That the parties shall attempt to reach an agreed position in relation to the wording of the Final Order (reflecting the Reasons for Judgment) and shall send a copy of same to the Court by no later than 4:00pm on 11 November 2022.

4.That in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreed position in relation to the wording of the Final Order (and send a copy of same to…

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Details
Case
[2022] FedCFamC1F 725
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Gristwood & Gristwood, the parties, Ms. Gristwood and Mr. Gristwood, were engaged in a protracted legal battle regarding the division of their substantial property pool following their 17-year marriage and 19 years of cohabitation. The central disputes centered around the valuation of business entities and a Call Option, contentious areas that led to adversarial witness testimonies. The court had to navigate complex issues of assessing contributions, future needs, and the consideration of "double counting" or "double dipping" in their division of assets.

The legal issues before the court encompassed the appropriate method for valuing and distributing the contested assets, particularly in light of the established guideline that where an asset's value is contentious or the market is volatile, the court should order its sale rather than a lump sum payment. This guideline was reinforced by the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in various precedents, indicating that a departure from such guidelines without sufficient reason could be grounds for finding that the exercise of discretion had miscarried.

The court's reasoning in this matter was heavily influenced by the established principle that, in the absence of special considerations, the sale of contentious assets is preferable to a lump sum division. The judge meticulously adjusted the valuations to account for potential sale costs and adopted the "realisable auction value" for certain assets. This approach was consistent with the precedent that highlighted the uncertainties in the ultimate sale price of matrimonial property. Ultimately, the court determined that the husband's post-separation expenditures should not be "added back" into the asset pool for division, aligning with the Full Court's stance that such expenditures should not be scrutinized unless there is evidence of misuse or waste.

The court's final orders mandated that the parties collaborate on drafting a final order reflecting the court's reasons for judgment, with deadlines set for submissions and a mention scheduled if an agreement could not be reached. This case underscores the importance of adhering to established guidelines in property division disputes and the court's role in ensuring equitable outcomes.

Orders

Orders of the court

BRC4166 of 2017

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:

MS GRISTWOOD

Applicant

AND:

MR GRISTWOOD

Respondent

order made by:

HOWARD J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 September 2022

THE COURT ORDERS:

1. That by no later than 4:00pm on 21 October 2022, the Applicant shall provide a copy of a proposed Final Order (reflecting the Reasons for Judgment) to the Respondent and a copy of the same to the Court at …@fcfcoa.gov.au.

2. That by no later than 4:00pm on 28 October 2022, the Respondent shall provide any reply to the proposed Final Order to the Applicant and a copy of the same to the Court at …@fcfcoa.gov.au.

3. That the parties shall attempt to reach an agreed position in relation to the wording of the Final Order (reflecting the Reasons for Judgment) and shall send a copy of same to the Court by no later than 4:00pm on 11 November 2022.

4. That in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreed position in relation to the wording of the Final Order (and send a copy of same to the Court) within the time frame stated in paragraph 3 above herein – the matter shall be listed for Mention and each party shall attend personally along with their legal representative (if any) on a date to be fixed by the Court.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In S & S [2000] FamCA 262 (‘S ’) the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia noted from paragraph 108:“108.A long line of authority in this Court (Waters and Waters (1981) FLC 91-019 at 76,208; Williams and Williams (1988) FLC 91-959 at 76,940; Docters van Leeuwen and Docters van Leeuwen (1990) FLC 92-148 at 78,024; Little and Little (1990) FLC 92-147 at 78,020; Smith and Smith (1991) FLC 92-261 at 78,759; and Bell and Bell (1993) FLC 92-347 at 79,683) establishes as a clear guideline for the exercise of discretion under s.79 of the Act, that, absent some special consideration (such as a desire by one spouse to retain a particular piece of property, in specie), and particularly where the value of an asset is contentious, or even where it is not but the market for the property is volatile, or there is likely to be a significant time lapse between judgment and sale, and where the value of the asset is to be divided between the parties, the Court should order its sale and the apportionment of the proceeds between the parties rather than order one party to pay to the other a fixed sum representing a notional proportion of its assessed value.109.Moreover, in Docters van Leeuwin (supra) at 78,025, the Full Court (Fogarty, Nygh & Rowlands JJ), after citing a passage from the judgment of Mason and Deane JJ in Norbis v Norbis (1986) FLC 91-712 at 75,165-6, said this:-“In our view the time has come to regard a departure from a long-standing guideline, such as the one given in Waters, without adequate explanation as a ground for finding that the exercise of discretion has miscarried.”110.In Bell and Bell (supra) at 79,763, the Full Court (Ellis, Baker & Purvis JJ), after referring to the earlier decisions in Docters van Leeuwin, Little, and Waters (all supra) said this:-“We see no reason to depart from the line of authority referred to above. There is always uncertainty in relation to the amount which will ultimately be obtained in respect of the sale of matrimonial property and, in particular, matrimonial real estate.…Although the order which the trial judge made was essentially discretionary in nature, in our opinion the authorities above referred to clearly establish that where a sale of property is necessary to satisfy a lump sum order for settlement of property and the calculation of any lump sum payable arises from a finding as to the value of the property to be sold, then the amount to be paid to one or other of the parties following any such sale should be expressed in percentage terms, rather than by way of lump sum payment, unless good and sufficient reasons are given for doing so.The trial judge gave no reasons for departing from the above principle and, given the facts of the case, we are unable to perceive that there was any justification in law for doing so. For this reason therefore, we consider the trial judge has erred in the proper exercise of his discretion and we would allow the appeal to this extent.”It is clear from his Honour's judgment (at AB p36-37) that he appreciated that his orders would necessitate the sale of Kia-Ora, and in assessing the value of the trust, for the purposes of his calculations, he accordingly deducted the estimated realisation costs in respect of the sale of the property, the plant and equipment, and the livestock, and he also adopted the “realisable auction value” for the plant and equipment rather than the “going concern” value. The effect of those two adjustments was to deduct $131,039 from the value of the trust for which the wife had contended based, inter alia, upon Mr Knight’s valuation. Never-the-less, the underlying assumption of his adoption of the figure of $1,394,816 for the trust was that Kia-Ora would sell for the $1.77 million (gross) at which it was valued by Mr Knight.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I note that the husband no longer presses for an add back in respect of item 9 in the JBS. This related to payments made to the wife since separation totalling $260,539. It is said (on behalf of the husband) that the effect of that concession is that the husband "has at all times since separation met his maintenance obligations". The husband has put quite a spin on the submission. It is the case that (effectively) he has paid maintenance at the rate agreed in an Order of 26 November 2018. But he has made lump sum payments on the way – indeed, on many occasions. There comes with that a certain unfairness to the wife – in that she was required to wait while the husband got his act together. In any event, for present purposes, the husband seeks no add back in respect of the entry listed in item 9 of the JBS. I also agree with the submission made on behalf of the husband at paragraph 6.3.9 of the HWS. The fact that the husband said in cross-examination that a certain figure should be added back (in particular relating to item 8 in the JBS) – is not evidence that he actually knew what an add back is. I note what was said by the Full Court in Gollings & Scott (2007) FLC 93-319 especially at paragraph 68 where the Court stated (inter alia):-“68.As a general rule once the parties have separated, subject to obligations of maintenance and support, and subject to the type of considerations described in Kowaliw (1981) FLC ¶91-092 relating to waste, each party is entitled to get on with his or her life independent of the other. The husband would be free to go about spending money he earned post-separation in the furtherance of his relationship with Ms Y if he chose to do so providing that at the same time he properly met his obligations towards his wife and children for their due support. It would not normally be appropriate some years after separation to require each of the parties to account for any monies they had spent post-separation so as to determine whether or not that expenditure was reasonably necessary for their own self-support, and to the extent that it was not, to determine whether it would be proper to add it back into the pool of assets available for division between the parties…” I agree with the submission made on behalf of the husband that Gollings & Scott is an authority which supports the husband's argument that withdrawals made by him during the five years since separation should not be "added back” – simply because the husband is not able to explain in detail what he did with the money. The effect of the husband's current position (late as it is) in relation to item 9 of the JBS is enough (in my view) to convince the Court of the correctness of the husband's argument in relation to Gollings & Scott and item 8 of the JBS. There should be no adding back in respect of the sum of $230,897 (currently contained in item 8 of the JBS and sought as an add back by the wife). In relation to item 16 in the JBS – there are three components to this item. As to the tax payable on the sale of the Suburb VV property and the tax relevant to the Suburb VV sale (being the tax on the sale of units by the AB Trust) – both parties concede those amounts should be included as a liability for the husband. I note paragraph 6.4.1 of the HWS and I note paragraph 3.2.1 of the WWS in this regard.