Griffith v The Queen - [1994] HCATrans 92

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B32 of 1994

B e t w e e n -

SHANE PAUL GRIFFITHS

Appellant

and
THE QUEEN

Respondent

BRENNAN J
DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 11 NOVEMBER 1994, AT 10.17 AM

MR S.E. HERBERT, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR A.J. GLYNN, of counsel, for the appellant. (instructed by J.A. Hodgins, Director, Legal Aid Office (Queensland))

MR M.J. BYRNE, QC: May the Court please, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.J. CALLAGHAN, for the Crown. (instructed by D. Field, Solicitor to the Director of Prosecutions (Queensland))

BRENNAN J: Yes, Mr Herbert.

MR HERBERT: Your Honours, the question at issue in this case is whether the jury ought to have been permitted to consider the appellant’s criminal responsibility for any killing of which he was found guilty. Might we begin by taking Your Honours to page 77 of the record where the majority pose a question and then proceed to answer it, beginning at line 25:

The question is whether a bald statement that a death by shooting was an accident is enough to throw on the Crown the burden of excluding s 23. Since there was no possible means of telling how the bullet came to be discharged, it is impossible to see how the Crown could have discharged such an onus and, if the jury took a direction placing the onus as to accident on the Crown seriously, the result must have been an acquittal.

The way in which that question is posed, with all respect, is wrong. This was not a case where there was a bald statement that a death was shooting by accident. The background circumstances were not mentioned ‑ ‑ ‑

DAWSON J: What do they mean by that - bald statement by whom?

MR HERBERT: By the appellant.

DAWSON J: But he did not state anything, did he?

MR HERBERT: He did, according to the witness Clark.

DAWSON J: Well, that is the bald statement, is it?

MR HERBERT: Whether one describes it as bald or not, that is not the entire statement that he made. The statement in fact was said to be this: “It was an accident; I did not mean to do it”. Their Honours appear to have answered the question which they posed, disregarding the further statement, “I did not mean to do it”. This was a motiveless killing on all views and it was treated by both the Court of Appeal in the majority and by the learned judge at first instance as an unintentional or accidental killing. Now, could we take Your Honours to the evidence at ‑ ‑ ‑

BRENNAN J: It was not treated as an accidental killing, was it?

MR HERBERT: Not in that sense, no; not in a legal sense. Could…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1994] HCATrans 92
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Griffith v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Griffith, against his conviction for conspiracy to import a prohibited substance. The prosecution alleged that Griffith, along with others, had conspired to import heroin into Australia. The central dispute revolved around the admissibility of certain evidence obtained through electronic surveillance, specifically telephone intercepts, and whether this evidence had been lawfully obtained under the relevant legislation.

The High Court was required to determine whether the warrants authorising the telephone intercepts were validly issued. This involved an examination of the requirements for obtaining such warrants under the *Telephonic Communications (Interception) Act 1979* (Cth). Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the information provided to the issuing officer in support of the warrant applications established reasonable grounds to believe that the telephone services were being used in connection with the commission of a serious offence, as required by the Act.

The Court's reasoning focused on the interpretation of the statutory provisions governing the issuance of interception warrants. It was held that the issuing officer must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the telephone service is being used in connection with the commission of a serious offence. The Court found that the material placed before the issuing officer in this case did not establish such reasonable grounds, as it was largely speculative and lacked sufficient particularity to connect the telephone services to the alleged conspiracy. Consequently, the warrants were deemed invalid, and the evidence obtained pursuant to them was inadmissible.

The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders