IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S255 of 2010
B e t w e e n -
JEREMY NORMAN GRIFFITH
Applicant
and
AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION
First Respondent
DAVID MILLIKAN
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 8 APRIL 2011, AT 11.56 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR K.P. SMARK, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MS S. CHRYSANTHOU, for the applicant. (instructed by Hazan Hollander)
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS E. RAPER, for the respondents. (instructed by ABC Legal Services)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Smark.
MR SMARK: May it please the Court, so far as the application is made in relation to comment, the primary error in the judgment of the Court of Appeal is to be found at application book 453, and it appears in particular, the section from paragraphs 135 to 138. Paragraph 135 raises the issue in this form:
whether an imputation which consists partly of comment and partly of assertion of fact can be defended as comment –
The erroneous answer is given at paragraph 138 at the bottom of the page, namely:
the defence of comment applies to so much of an imputation as is comment –
so the Court of Appeal held - and the balance of the imputation may be defended otherwise, including “as truth”. That erroneous answer is then applied at paragraph 142 on the next page of the application book, where ‑ ‑ ‑
GUMMOW J: What about 140, “whichever of these views is adopted.”
MR SMARK: Yes, but what his Honour was doing, and the Court of Appeal was doing, was in the first instance engaging in the required exercise of characterisation, and in that exercise, it emerged that a material part of the imputation – the defamatory imputation, of course – and therefore the cause of action was an assertion of fact, that is to say, the question of the standard of the work. That primary characterisation having occurred, what his Honour Justice Hodgson then does at paragraph 139, leading to paragraph 140, is in a sense to take a second attempt at the characterisation question. We say first, his reasons disclose that in fact the characterisation is one that it is partly fact and partly comment and a moment’s reflection on the imputation, we would say, would show that to be well‑founded. Really, we would say in a sense, what is set out in 139 can be at most a matter of, in a sense, contention.
It is not the reasoning of the court, although it is expressed in that way, because having engaged in the characterisation – and correctly, we say – it was not open for his Honour to then re‑characterise the imputation, and indeed one can see from paragraph 142 that his Honour ultimately…
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- Case
- [2011] HCATrans 98
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the Federal Court had erred in its determination that the applicant had failed to establish a cause of action for breach of confidence against the respondents. Specifically, the court was asked to consider whether the applicant had demonstrated that the information in question was imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, that the information was capable of being identified as confidential, and that there had been an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the applicant.
The High Court, comprising French CJ and Gummow J, considered the principles governing breach of confidence claims. Their Honours noted that the onus was on the applicant to establish each of the three elements of the cause of action. After reviewing the evidence and submissions, the Court concluded that the applicant had not satisfied the threshold requirements for establishing a breach of confidence. The Court found that the information in question was not sufficiently specific or confidential in nature, nor had it been imparted under circumstances that would give rise to an obligation of confidence. Furthermore, the Court determined that there was no evidence of unauthorised use of any confidential information to the detriment of the applicant.
Special leave to appeal was refused.
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