Griffith v Australian Broadcasting Corporation

[2003] NSWSC 484

CITATION:

GRIFFITH & ORS v AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION & ANOR [2003] NSWSC 484

HEARING DATE(S):

27-30 MAY 2003

JUDGMENT DATE:

27 May 2003

JUDGMENT OF:

Levine J

DECISION:

Imputation 25(c) is capable of being carried and capable of being defamatory.

CATCHWORDS:

Imputation - capacity - "brainwashed" - form - difference in substance

PARTIES :

JEREMY NORMAN GRIFFITH
(First Plaintiff)

FOUNDATION FOR HUMANITY'S ADULTHOOD
(ACN 003 930 023)
(Second Plaintiff)

TIMOTHY JOHN MACARTNEY-SNAPE
(Third Plaintiff)

SAMUEL CHARLES BELFIELD
(Fourth Plaintiff)
JOHN CAMERON BIGGS
(Fifth Plaintiff)

SUSAN JANE ARMSTRONG
(Seventh Plaintiff)

BRONWYN GLENIS FITZGERALD
(Eighth Plaintiff)

HEULWEN MARY JONES
(Ninth Plaintiff)

STACY ANNE RODGER
(Tenth Plaintiff)

v

AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION
(First Defendant)

DAVID MILLIKAN
(Second defendant)

FILE NUMBER(S):

SC 20300 OF 2003

COUNSEL:

K Smark
(Plaintiffs)

B Walker SC / R Glasson
(Defendants)

SOLICITORS:

Schweizer & Co
(Plaintiffs)

Baker & McKenzie
(Defendants)

- 1 -

DLJT 2
Ex tempore: revised
[2003] NSWSC 484

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
DEFAMATION LIST

JUSTICE DAVID LEVINE

TUESDAY 27 MAY 2003

20300 OF 2003

JEREMY NORMAN GRIFFITH

(First Plaintiff)

FOUNDATION FOR HUMANITY’S ADULTHOOD

(ACN 003 930 023)

(Second Plaintiff)

TIMOTHY JOHN MACARTNEY-SNAPE

(Third Plaintiff)

SAMUEL CHARLES BELFIELD

(Fourth Plaintiff)

JOHN CAMERON BIGGS

( Fifth Plaintiff)

SUSAN JANE ARMSTRONG

(Seventh Plaintiff)

BRONWYN GLENIS FITZGERALD

(Eighth Plaintiff)

HEULWEN MARY JONES

(Ninth Plaintiff)

STACY ANNE RODGER

(Tenth Plaintiff)

v

AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

(First Defendant)

DAVID MILLIKAN

(Second defendant)

JUDGMENT (Imputation - capacity – “brainwashed” – form – difference in substance)

1 Imputation 25(c) is:

“Each of the FHA members is a brainwashed follower of Jeremy Griffith”.

For the defendants it is contended that the matter complained of is incapable of carrying such an imputation; it is incapable of being defamatory and is defective in form insofar as it does not differ in substance from imputation 25(a):

“Each of the FHA members is so foolish that he or she has allowed him or herself to be duped into believing the ludicrous ideas of Jeremy Griffith”;

and 25(b):

“Each of the FHA members is so deluded that he or she believes that Jeremy Griffith is greater than Jesus Christ”.

2 The whole of the matter complained of is relied upon by the plaintiff in support of the imputation, the key word of which, of course, is “brainwashed”. The whole of the matter complained of contains two components as part of the whole, which are sufficient to sustain the use of the word “brainwashed”. They are the words spoken by Rosie Whelan, lines 488-493:

“I think the danger is that Jeremy wants total devotion to this cause. It’s not good enough to be there sometimes. It’s something that you need to embrace fully and part of that is is this danger of letting your mind be in someone else’s hands, have someone else controlling what you think and how you think about things”.


and Gillian Belfield, pages 1061-1064.

“It’s as if there is just a shell there. It’s hard. I guess only a parent knows what it is. It’s very hard to put into words, but I have seen it in both my children, without them even saying a word. To me there is just a haunted look”.

3 I am not persuaded that the word “brainwashed”, as a matter of ordinary English in the middle of the last decade of last century (1995) has any peculiarities attendant upon it in terms of meaning. I acknowledge, however, that at some time in its evolution, it had a particular connotation, as a result of the treatment of prisoners of war, particularly in the Korean war, and could also have a particular connotation in a more recherché way in the context of the syndrome which I believe is called the “Stockholm Syndrome”, in relation to victims of terrorism, and hijackers in particular. As a word in the imputation itself, I think it is capable of being understood in an ordinary way.

4 Further, an ordinary understanding of the meaning would elevate it above the notion of being “so foolish” in imputation 25(a) and the notion of being “so deluded” in imputation 25(b) and, thus, does not contravene the rules requiring difference in substance.

5 As to whether or not “brainwashed” in its ordinary meaning is capable of being defamatory, the raising of the issue inevitably, as it was raised by Mr Walker, is about that state being achieved by the nefarious process of the perpetrator or some weak quality in the victim. Be that as it may, the imputation is one essentially for resolution by the jury as to whether it is defamatory.

6 I hold it capable of being carried and capable of being defamatory, and, accordingly, it will go to the jury.

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Last Modified: 06/04/2003