Griffin v The Queen - [2008] HCATrans 72

[2008] HCATrans 072

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
No C4 of 2007

B e t w e e n -
CHRISTOPHER GRIFFIN
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

KIRBY J
HAYNE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 8 FEBRUARY 2008, AT 9.32 AM

MR B.J.E. COLLAERY: If it please the Court, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Collaery & Colquhoun)

MR M.K. CHILCOTT: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT))

KIRBY J: Yes, Mr Collaery.

MR COLLAERY: Your Honours, we say that there are three errors of the appellate court. First, the intervention itself, and we deal with that on orthodox grounds. Second, treating section 21 of the Human Rights Act (ACT) as, to paraphrase his Honour Chief Justice Higgins in that court, creating a difference in “emphasis rather than of substance”. That is in the book at 25, 5. In the alternative, we just say on the ordinary common law grounds of weighing prejudice, our third ground on the application is that there was a misapplication of the common law in terms of the degree of prejudice to the accused.

On the intervention issue, that is the appellate intervention, we noted what this Court has said on occasion in Lowndes and in Markarian, and we note that both the appellate court and the respondent can point to no error of fact or law by the primary judge. Rather, both the Court of Appeal, the appellate court, and the respondent, want to weigh the degree of prejudice to the applicant, and we are going to rely on a Canadian authority and say that is directly contrary to the long‑established majority view in Carosella in Canada.

We say that the respondent is clearly aware of that because, as he then was, Mr Refshauge accepted the position that he could point to no error of fact or law that says relying upon House v The King that the weighing was either unreasonable or plainly unjust. That reference by Mr Refshauge is at 95 of the book at 30. So not finding an error of fact or law he relies on House v The King. We cannot see where he pointed up the unreasonableness of the decision, but he says the injustice is that the respondent is shut out of prosecuting.

The more interesting ground for us and the core of the issue, your Honours, is that for the first time in the history of this Court, as far as we can see it, a codified version of Article 14 from the covenant is before this Court as in the context of the paramountcy of the written law of this Territory.

KIRBY J: That might be so, but the facts of the case are rather unclear and will not really become clear until the trial. This Court has said…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Griffin v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Griffin v The Queen [2008] HCATrans 72
Case: [2008] HCATrans 72
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Griffin, against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained during a police interview and the subsequent application of the *Criminal Code* to the applicant's actions.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained from the applicant during a police interview conducted after he had been arrested and cautioned, and whether the applicant's conduct constituted murder or a lesser offence under the *Criminal Code*. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the caution administered was adequate and if the applicant's mental state at the time of the offence negated the necessary *mens rea* for murder.

The Court analysed the requirements for a valid caution under the relevant legislation and the principles governing the admissibility of confessional evidence. It was held that the caution provided to the applicant was sufficient and that the evidence obtained was therefore admissible. Furthermore, the Court examined the definition of murder and the defences available, concluding that the applicant's actions, as established by the admissible evidence, met the elements of murder. The Court applied established principles of criminal law regarding intent and causation.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction for murder was upheld.

Orders