Griffin v Bartier Perry Pty Limited
[2025] FedCFamC2G 442
•26 March 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Griffin v Bartier Perry Pty Limited [2025] FedCFamC2G 442
File number(s): SYG 312 of 2025 Judgment of: JUDGE DOUST Date of judgment: 26 March 2025 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for suppression and non-publication orders –where matter referred to a mediation yet to occur – whether disclosure of pleadings might imperil mediation – whether suppression and non-publication orders necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice – material suppressed until seven days after the termination of the Court ordered mediation process – application allowed Legislation: Fair Work Act2009 (Cth)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 229, 230, 230(1)(b)(iv), 231, 231(1)(a), pt 7 div 2
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AE, 37AF, 37AG, pt VAA div 2
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 2.32, 2.32(1)(b), 2.32(2)
Cases cited: John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court (2005) 62 NSWLR 512; [2005] NSWCA 101
Patterson v Westpac Banking Corporation [2024] FCA 629
Ryan v Transurban Limited [2024] FCA 994
Saw v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd (2024) 305 FCR 340; [2024] FCA 1210
The Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) (2020) 275 FCR 377; [2020] FCAFC 44
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 47 Date of hearing: 21 March 2025 Place: Sydney Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr R Aslanian, Connect Legal Counsel for the Respondents: Mr B Rauf Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr L Zisis, Wotton Kearney Solicitor for the Access Applicant: Ms L Alick, Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd ORDERS
SYG 312 of 2025 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: CLEMENTINE GRIFFIN
Applicant
AND: BARTIER PERRY PTY LIMITED
First Respondent
RIANA STEYN
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE DOUST
DATE OF ORDER:
26 MARCH 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to s 231(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit
Courtand Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFCOA Act), in order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the following material be suppressed until fourteen days after the termination of the Court ordered mediation process:(a)the Application – Dismissal from employment in contravention of general protection: Form 2 filed on 4 February 2025.
2.Pursuant to s 230(1)(b)(iv) of the FCFCOA Act, in order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the Court prohibits the publication or other disclosure of the following material until fourteen days after the termination of the Court ordered mediation process:
(a)the Application – Dismissal from employment in contravention of general protection: Form 2 filed on 4 February 2025.
3.Until seven days after the termination of the Court ordered mediation process, where further material is to be filed in these proceedings (including the applicant’s statement of claim, the first and second respondents’ defence/s, and the applicant’s reply to be filed):
(a)the parties must confer before the filing of that material to determine whether such material should be the subject of Orders 1 and 2; and
(b)either party may apply to the Court for Orders 1 and 2 to be extended to such material on an urgent basis.
4.Upon termination of the mediation process, the Registrar is to advise the non-party access applicants of its termination within 3 days.
5.The application in a proceeding filed on 7 March 2025, is otherwise dismissed.
6.The parties have liberty to apply on short notice.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.These orders have been amended pursuant to r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE DOUST:
INTRODUCTION
Both the applicant and respondent in this proceeding, which is brought under the Fair Work Act2009 (Cth) (FW Act), ask the Court to make suppression and non-publication orders in respect of the documents initiating the proceeding, pending the conduct of a mediation between the parties. The application is opposed by Ms Alick, appearing for “Fairfax,” which I take to mean Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (Fairfax), which was also the party for whom Ms Alick appeared in Patterson v Westpac Banking Corporation [2024] FCA 629 (Patterson) (discussed below).
BACKGROUND
The applicant commenced proceedings in the Fair Work Division of the Court on 4 February 2025 by the filing of an application accompanied by a Form 2 (the initiating documents).
On 7 February 2025, a journalist from the Australian Financial Review, which is published by Fairfax, which is not a party to the proceeding, made an application for access, pursuant to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (GFL Rules), in respect of the two documents filed with the Court (the Fairfax access application). Two other non-party access applications were made in respect of the documents filed in the matter (collectively, the access applications).
Determination of the access applications was deferred until the parties were given a chance to be heard on the applications. The matter was listed for a directions hearing on 28 February 2025, at which the parties were given an opportunity to be heard against the non-parties being given access to the initiating documents. The parties indicated their opposition to a grant of access. The Court directed the parties to file any application in a proceeding seeking suppression or confidentiality orders on or before 7 March 2025, with any such application to be made returnable on 21 March 2025. The Court also made orders for the parties to complete the pleadings, and for the matter to be referred to mediation on a date after 6 June 2025.
Application in a Proceeding
The respondents filed an application in a proceeding on 7 March 2025 (application in a proceeding). The application in a proceeding sought a suppression order in respect of documents in the proceeding and an order prohibiting publication of details of the proceeding. The application in a proceeding was supported by an affidavit of Liam Alexander Zisis affirmed on 7 March 2025 (Zisis affidavit).
Mr Zisis narrated the communications between the parties’ solicitors concerning the access application. Those communications culminated in their consensus that access to documents in the proceeding should not be given until the close of alternative dispute resolution. Mr Zisis averred as to the respondents’ concern that non-party access to documents may jeopardise the parties’ ability to reach a settlement at mediation, noting that the matter had been referred for mediation and the respondents intended to meaningfully engage in that process (Zisis affidavit at [16]). Mr Zisis also averred as to the respondents’ concern that if non-parties were granted access to documents and published information arising from the documents before the mediation was closed, key elements of settlement agreements, including confidentiality and non-disparagement may become futile and cause the parties difficulties in reaching settlement.
Hearing of the Application in a Proceeding
The application in a proceeding was heard by the Court on 21 March 2025.
At the hearing, Mr Rauf, the respondents’ counsel, handed up an outline of submissions, and an amended minute of the orders the respondents sought. The application in a proceeding was supported by the applicant.
The orders sought by the respondents were as follows:
1. Pursuant to s 231(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (FCFCOA Act), in order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the following material be suppressed until 7 days after the termination of the Court ordered mediation process:
a. the Application – Fair Work Division (filed with Form 2) filed on 4 February 2025; and
b. the Application – Dismissal from employment in contravention of general protection filed on 4 February 2025.
2. Pursuant to s 230(1)(b)(iv) of the FCFCOA Act, in order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the Court prohibits the publication or other disclosure of the following material until 7 days after the termination of the Court ordered mediation process:
a. the Application – Fair Work Division (filed with Form 2) filed on 4 February 2025; and
b. the Application – Dismissal from employment in contravention of general protection filed on 4 February 2025.
3. Until 7 days after the termination of the Court ordered mediation process, where further material is to be filed in these proceedings (including the Applicant’s Statement of Claim, the First and Second Respondents’ Defence, and the Applicant’s Reply to be filed):
a. the parties must confer before the filing of that material to determine whether such material should be the subject of Orders 1 and 2; and
b. either party may apply to the Court for Orders 1 and 2 to be extended to such material on an urgent basis.
4. Upon termination of the mediation process, the Registrar to advise the non-party access applicants of its termination.
5. The parties have liberty to apply on short notice.
The respondent also provided a copy of orders made by Perram J in the Federal Court of Australia following the decision in Saw v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd (2024) 305 FCR 340; [2024] FCA 1210 (Saw). In that matter, his Honour’s orders were not published along with his Honour’s reasons; rather, the parties were directed to prepare short minutes of order reflecting his Honour’s reasons, and orders were issued on 29 October 2024, 11 days following the publication of reasons.
It was apparent, upon reviewing those orders, that the respondent had crafted its proposed orders to reflect those made by Perram J in the Saw matter.
At the hearing of the application in a proceeding, Ms Alick appeared for Fairfax. She opposed the orders sought by the parties, and made oral submissions, which are rehearsed below. In the alternative, she proposed a different form of orders to those proposed by the parties.
The orders Ms Alick advanced in the alternative to her principal argument were as follows (with typographical errors corrected):
1.Pursuant to s 230(1)(b)(iv) of the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 and on the ground in s 231(1)(a) that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, until 7 days after the termination of the Court ordered mediation process, it is prohibited to publish:
a. paragraphs of the Application - Fair Work Division (filed with Form 2) filed on 4 February 2025; and
b. paragraphs of the Application - Dismissal from employment in contravention of general protection filed on 4 February 2025.
2.The Applicant must file redacted versions of the Applications and serve them upon the Respondents and the intervening news publisher, within 3 business days after the non publication order is made.
3. Until 7 days after the termination of the Court ordered mediation process. where further material is to be filed in these proceedings (including the Statement of Claim, Defence and Reply):
a. the parties and the news publisher must confer before the filing of that material to determine whether such material should, for the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Judge Doust dated (XX) March 2025, be the subject of the nonpublication order; and
b. either party may apply to the Court for the non-publication order to be extended to such material on an urgent basis.
4. If a party applies to the Court to:
a. vary the scope of the non-publication order to add further material;
b. vary the duration of the non-publication order to continue longer than 7 days after the termination of the Court ordered mediation process; or
c. make any new non-publication order or suppression order in this proceeding, that party must:
i. provide copies of all correspondence with the Court/chambers regarding their application to the news publisher;
ii.serve their interlocutory application, supporting affidavit and written submissions upon the news publisher; and
iii. notify the news publisher of any listing for hearing, at least 24 hours in advance.
5. The parties have liberty to apply.
The essential differences in the orders were:
(a)Fairfax proposed that the Court should examine the content of the initiating documents and determine on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis which parts of the document should be the subject of the order and then require the parties to serve on Fairfax a redacted version of the documents;
(b)Fairfax proposed an order for the parties to confer with it prior to filing any further material with a view to determining whether that material should also be the subject of the non-publication order;
(c)Fairfax proposed that it be kept informed about any application to vary or extend the scope of the order.
SUPPRESSION AND NON-PUBLICATION ORDERS
Suppression and non-publication orders are dealt with in div 2 of pt 7 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (the FCFCOA Act). That division is relevantly identical to div 2 of pt VAA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act). Accordingly, the principles articulated by the Federal Court of Australia in respect of the analogue provisions of the FCA Act are applicable in the present matter.
The starting point in the consideration of the application before the Court is s 229 of the FCFCOA Act. It provides that in deciding whether to make a suppression or non-publication order, the Court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice. That provision mirrors s 37AE of the FCA Act.
The Court is empowered to make suppression and non-publication orders by s 230 of the FCFCOA Act. That section provides as follows:
230 Power to make orders
(1)The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) may, by making a suppression order or non‑publication order on grounds permitted by this Part, prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure of:
(a)information tending to reveal the identity of or otherwise concerning any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court or any person who is related to or otherwise associated with any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court; or
(b) information that relates to a proceeding before the Court and is:
(i)information that comprises evidence or information about evidence; or
(ii) information obtained by the process of discovery; or
(iii) information produced under a subpoena; or
(iv) information lodged with or filed in the Court.
(2)The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) may make such orders as it thinks appropriate to give effect to an order under subsection (1).
Section 230 of the FCFCOA Act is relevantly identical to s 37AF of the FCA Act.
Section 231 of the FCFCOA Act then sets out the grounds upon which a suppression or non-publication order may be made:
231 Grounds for making an order
(1)The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) may make a suppression order or non‑publication order on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice;
(b)the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the interests of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory in relation to national or international security;
(c) the order is necessary to protect the safety of any person;
(d)the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a party to or witness in a criminal proceeding involving an offence of a sexual nature (including an act of indecency).
(2)A suppression order or non‑publication order must specify the ground or grounds on which the order is made.
Section 231 of the FCFCOA Act is relevantly identical to s 37AG of the FCA Act.
The only ground that might conceivably justify the making of an order in the present matter is that in s 231(1)(a) of the FCFCOA Act, namely, that “the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”.
In The Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) (2020) 275 FCR 377; [2020] FCAFC 44 (Country Care) at [8], the Full Court considered that suppression orders should only be made in exceptional circumstances. That conclusion follows because the ground in s 37AG of the FCA (the analogue of s 231(1)(a) of the FCFCOA) is conditioned by the language of necessity and because s 37AE renders the safeguarding of the public interest in open justice a primary objective of the administration of justice. That is, an order will only be justified where necessity compels departure from the principle of open justice. The latter principle is considered further below. It is significant that the extent of the principle of open justice was not the subject of consideration in that judgment. The Court in that matter was considering whether to make an order in respect of paragraphs of a judgment because there was a risk that jury deliberations would be prejudiced if the judgment was published.
In Patterson (referred to above), Raper J, referring to the principle articulated in Country Care that a suppression order should only issue in exceptional circumstances, observed (at [20]) that the Courts have recognised that exceptional circumstances may arise in the context of resolution of proceedings. Her Honour stated that there is undoubtedly a very significant public interest in the settlement of proceedings, particularly at an early stage (an outcome the Court strives for), with confidentiality around both the negotiations for, and terms of, settlement, often critical to the resolution of proceedings. Her Honour concluded (at [21]) that in determining the necessity of preventing prejudice to the proper administration of justice, account may be taken of the fact that lack of access (by non-parties to documents in the proceeding) may enhance the prospects of the parties’ negotiations. Her Honour noted that suppression orders may be made in respect of both the categories of documents identified in r 2.32(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FC Rules) as able to be inspected by non-parties, as well as other documents.
In Patterson, both parties submitted that the provision of access to documents would impede the mediation. Her Honour rejected a submission by Fairfax that there was any need for the parties to provide specific evidence of their view that disclosure would impede the mediation, as such a requirement would defeat the purpose of the application.
Her Honour was satisfied (at [30]) that in order to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice it was appropriate to make an order that the documents the subject of the application remain confidential. The order sought by the parties in that matter extended no further than necessity demanded, as the order was sought to operate until the exhaustion of the mediation process, which was at the time of her Honour’s judgment already underway, and estimated to continue for only a few days further ([24]). Her Honour made orders that a number of documents remain confidential, within the meaning of r 2.32(1)(b) of the FC Rules, until the mediation process was terminated.
In Saw, Perram J made somewhat different orders in respect of the subject documents reaching the same conclusion; namely that it was necessary to do so to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.
His Honour noted that the business of the Court was the quelling of disputes, and that disputes are quelled by settlement, that the Court’s resources are finite, and that the Court encourages parties to settle their litigation. His Honour also noted that where proceedings have been settled, the Court had made non-publication or suppression orders over documents in the Court file, and parts of pleadings, to ensure settled proceedings remain confidential.
His Honour reasoned (at [9]) that the policy considerations that support the making of such orders following settlement also support the making of such orders before a mediation, “at least where the mediation is imminent and one party believes keeping the matter confidential will increase the chances of settlement”. His Honour referred, with approval, to the reasons of Raper J in Patterson at [20] – [21], referred to above.
His Honour noted that the proceeding was in its infancy and the pleading contained allegations about the workplace at the Seven Network which were sensitive and referred to the conduct of persons not party to the litigation. Whilst his Honour treated the prospect of embarrassment to the Seven Network as immaterial (at [13]), there was a real risk that publication of the pleading would deleteriously affect the prospects of the mediation proceeding, as it would take the bargaining chip of the continued maintenance of confidentiality off the table ([14]).
That effect, his Honour concluded, would be prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.
His Honour took into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice, but considered that the reference in s 37AE of the FCA Act to “open justice” is a reference to the common law principle of open justice, which does not require that access be given to documents until such time as a document has been used in open court. Accordingly, his Honour concluded (at [21]), that the principle has no work to do in the matter because the pleadings had not been used in open court.
His Honour was satisfied (at [22]) that the disclosure, at that stage, of the pleadings and materials filed in respect of the application for suppression orders, would be prejudicial to the administration of justice as it could imperil the success of the mediation. Accordingly, his Honour was satisfied that suppression and non-publication orders should be made in respect of those documents.
His Honour left open the possibility that the Court may be empowered to make an order pursuant to r 2.32 of the FC Rules even if the Court was not persuaded that it was “necessary to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice”, but did not determine the question as it did not arise.
His Honour also declined to make any order in respect of the defence and reply as the documents had not yet been filed by the parties.
CONSIDERATION
The same considerations that arose in each of Patterson and Saw operate in the present matter and militate in favour of the making of suppression and non-publication orders in the present matter. The matter is in its infancy, and the initiating Form 2 document contains allegations about matters that might reasonably be regarded as sensitive, including matters involving persons who are not party to the proceedings. This matter will proceed to a mediation in the coming months. Precisely when the mediation occurs will depend upon the availability of a registrar of the Court to conduct the mediation, but it may reasonably be assumed that the Court will give the applicants the next available date at the time of allocation.
The respondents, through Mr Zisis, have expressed concern that granting access to documents and the publishing of information arising from the documents before the mediation is closed may cause the parties difficulty in reaching a settlement as it may defeat the capacity for the parties to implement key elements of settlement agreements, including confidentiality and non-disparagement. The respondents also made submissions to that effect. Although the applicant did not also file evidence to that effect, I take from the applicant’s support of the orders sought that she takes a similar view. I accept that evidence and that submission, so far as it concerns the Form 2 document, which contains the allegations made by the applicant in the matter. I do not accept it in respect of the “Application – Fair Work Division” that was filed with the Form 2, given the content of that document. In those circumstances I am satisfied that disclosure of the Form 2 will have a detrimental impact on the prospects of the parties reaching settlement and that it is necessary, to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, to make orders of the type sought by the respondent concerning the Form 2.
Ms Alick sought to distinguish the present matter from Saw and Patterson on the basis that as yet, a mediation date has not been appointed, whereas in Patterson the mediation process was already underway and estimated to conclude in a few days and in Saw the mediation was to take place in the following month.
In each of those matters the period of the order was shorter than that sought in the present matter. However, that distinction does not sound in any relevant difference. In Patterson and Saw, the consideration militating in favour of the making of orders was the fact that there was a mediation process between the parties which was either in train or about to commence which process had the prospect of being productive of a resolution of the dispute. As a resolution of those matters would have been in the interests of the administration of justice, but might have been hindered by the disclosure and/or publication of the documents, disclosure of the documents would have been, in each case, prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. In each instance, orders were made until (at least) the conclusion of the mediation process, with the orders made by Perram J in Saw continuing for a period of seven days after the termination of the mediation process. The orders were directed to ensuring that the mediation process could take place without the prejudice to that process that might be caused by publication of documents.
Although in Saw, Perram J referred to the fact that the mediation was imminent (at [9]) as a circumstance that justified the making of an order, I do not understand his Honour’s comment there to have been intended to confine the circumstances in which an order might be justified to those where the mediation is only a very short time into the future. The same rationale for the making of an order is present, even where a mediation may not occur until a few months hence, as is the case here; that is to prevent disclosure from deleteriously affecting the administration of justice by the conduct of a Court ordered and Court facilitated mediation process. Given the finite resources of the Courts and their busy lists, the resolution of matters such as the present application should not be dictated by the vagaries of the available mediation dates. There was no suggestion by Fairfax that there has been any delay on the part of the parties that might warrant taking a different view.
Ms Alick submitted that if the parties simply proceeding to mediation would result in a suppression order that would become the standard practice of the Court. She stated that there were four other matters where courts had made orders on a similar basis. That submission was not supported by any judgments in those matters; if it had been, those judgments may have simply added to the weight of authority in support of the approach taken in Patterson and Saw. The submission does not, in any event, assist the Court to answer the question whether the orders sought are necessary to avoid prejudice to the administration of justice.
Fundamental to Ms Alick’s submission was the contention that open justice militated in favour of the disclosure of the initiating documents. In Saw, Perram J concluded that the principle of open justice which is referred to in the analogue provision in the FCA Act is the common law concept of open justice discussed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court (2005) 62 NSWLR 512; [2005] NSWCA 101. In that matter, Spigelman CJ, with whom Mason P and Beazley JA agreed, eschewed (at [27] – [32]), the notion that there is a general right of access to court documents and characterised “open justice” as a principle, not a right. Spigelman CJ concluded (at [65]) that the principle is not engaged at the time of filing proceedings, but is only engaged when material is deployed in open court.
In Saw, Perram J (at [20] – [21]) rejected the view of Rangiah J in Ryan v Transurban Limited [2024] FCA 994, that the concept must be understood in light of the operation of r 2.32 of the FC Rules. I respectfully agree with that analysis.
The initiating documents in the present matter have not been deployed in open court. The principle of open justice does not at this stage militate in favour of access and against the making of the orders sought by the parties. In any event, I am satisfied that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice to make the orders sought for the finite period until the termination of the mediation process.
I am not minded to make an order concerning the “Application – Fair Work Division” that was filed with the Form 2. As to the Form 2, I have not been persuaded by Fairfax’s submissions that the Court should make orders for the partial release of those parts or paragraphs of that document, the release of which would not result in any prejudice to the administration of justice. That submission is an invitation to second guess the interests of the parties in the confidentiality of the contents of the Form 2. It is implicit in the reasoning of both Perram J and Raper J that the prospect of maintaining confidentiality is to be regarded as having a value in the mediation process; its maintenance pending exhaustion of that process is therefore necessary to avoid a deleterious impact to the prospects of the mediation succeeding. The prospects of resolution of the proceeding rest entirely in the hands of the parties at the mediation stage, and may be affected by considerations which are not apparent to the outside observer.
Nor have I been persuaded by Fairfax that it is not necessary to make both the first order (suppression) and the second order (non-publication) sought by the respondent. The former I regard as directed to preventing release of the documents from the Court’s file, the latter to preventing publication. Fairfax’s submission that I should not make both orders was not supported by any authority.
In Saw, his Honour’s orders extended to a date seven days after the termination of the mediation process. In the present matter, so that any further application may be dealt with in a sensible and efficient way, I am minded to make the order effective for 14 days after the termination of the mediation. There was no dissent from the parties when that approach was flagged at hearing, but equally that approach is not an invitation to delay approaching the Court following termination of the mediation if further orders are to be sought. Such delay may be relevant to any prayer for interim orders.
As occurred in Saw and Patterson, I will order that the registrar advise the non-party access applicants upon the termination of the mediation.
I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Doust. Associate:
Dated: 26 March 2025
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