Grierson v The Queen

[2019] NSWDC 669

District Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:	Grierson v R [2019] NSWDC 669
Hearing dates:	28 October 2019
Date of orders:	08 November 2019
Decision date:	08 November 2019
Jurisdiction:	Criminal
Before:	Abadee DCJ
Decision:	See paragraph 78
Catchwords:	CRIMINAL – conviction appeal – possession of identification information to commit, facilitate, commission fraud – unauthorised possession of a prohibited firearm – circumstantial evidence – credit of witnesses.
Legislation Cited:	Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 192I, 192K Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), ss 4, 4A, 4D Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW), s 11
Cases Cited:	Charara v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 39 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 The Queen v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Director of Public Prosecutions Mr A Grierson
Representation:	Counsel: Ms Kim for the Director of Public Prosecutions Mr A Hallas     Solicitors: Solicitor for the Director of Public Prosecutions Tran Solicitors
File Number(s):	2017/288633
Publication restriction:	Nil

Judgment

Introduction

1. This is an appeal against conviction of the appellant of two offences by the Burwood Local Court on 25 February 2019.

2. The offences of which the appellant was convicted were:

1. Possession of identification information to commit, facilitate commission of an indictable offence, namely, fraud, pursuant to s 192K of the Crimes Act.

2. Unauthorised possession of a prohibited firearm, pursuant to s 7 of the Firearms Act 1996.

3. The appeal to this Court is pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW). The nature of the appeal is that it is one by rehearing, on the basis of the Local Court transcripts, supplemented by the exhibits tendered in the Local Court. There was no application before me for leave to adduce fresh evidence.

4. It is well understood that in this Court’s appellate function, the Court must give the judgment which it thinks should have been given in the first instance. But it must observe the natural limitations which exist in an appellate court proceeding wholly based on the record. These include the disadvantage that the Court has when compared with the Local Court magistrate in respect of the evaluation of witnesses’ credibility and the ‘feeling’ of a case which the Court, reading the transcript cannot fully share[1] .

   1. Charara v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 39 at [19], applying Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [23]

Factual background

5. I shall start with the uncontroversial facts.

6. In early September 2017, the property in Newtown was owned by a woman. The Newtown property was a two-storey terrace house, typical of that suburb: on the lower floor, there was a kitchen and lounge room; upstairs there were two bedrooms. The owner was overseas and decided to allow the property to be occupied by means of the service ‘Airbnb’. The property was rented to a person named Troy McDonald for a week. In the owner’s absence, her mother, Ms Judith Deacon assisted her, by providing and retrieving keys to the lessee and generally keeping a watchful eye over the premises.

7. On 8 September 2017, Ms Deacon met with the man, the appellant, who she understood to be Troy McDonald; and supplied him with the keys to the property. The appellant falsely represented himself to be Troy McDonald. He said that this was a ‘white lie’ intended only to ease the process of his obtaining the key.

8. Ms Deacon thought that the property was to be let only for a week. She also understood that it was only let out to Troy McDonald. Ms Deacon travelled to the Northern Territory during the week between 8 and 15 September 2017 and returned the following Tuesday (19 September 2017 – though she thought the date was otherwise) to the property; expecting it to be vacant. It was not. She encountered the man who she understood, again, was Troy McDonald. He did not correct the representation made on 8 September identifying himself as Troy McDonald. The man told her that the reservation had been extended for another week.

9. On 22 September 2017, she came to the property, relevantly, for a third time. At the time of the arrival, the property was unoccupied. She ventured indoors and found that the place was a mess. She went upstairs. In the backroom upstairs, she found a dark bag (either navy or black) with paperwork spilling out of it. She was curious that it included (amongst other documents) copies of bank statements, American Express card and SIM card. She took some photos (apparently on her mobile phone) of what she saw. Had she looked further, she would have noticed that, in fact, there was a range of documentation which contained names other than Troy McDonald. A recurring name on the documentation was that of Mr Paul Ingram.

10. The appellant returned to the property and was surprised to see Ms Deacon. She appeared to him to be shaken, if not uncomfortable, which surprised the appellant because of his belief that he had previously been polite to her. She went into the other (front) bedroom upstairs. There she saw a “gun in a holster”. She took it, concealed it under her clothes and left.

11. Alarmed by these discoveries, Ms Deacon took the gun and drove to Newtown Police Station to report what she saw and found.

12. Later that day, the Police attended the Newtown property. They expected that they might be invited in by Troy McDonald. They were met at the front door by the appellant, Alexander Grierson. They had a conversation, whose terms were disputed to some degree, but it was clear enough from the evidence of the search that:

• Initially, the appellant falsely indicated that he was Troy McDonald;

• This false representation as to his identity was only corrected when the police officers sighted the appellant’s passport (in his back pocket)

• The police officers indicated that they were inquiring or investigating a particular firearm, which the appellant promptly identified, it turns out accurately, as a ‘lighter’.

• The appellant had two mobile phones on his person. The appellant had used both (but in the case of one of them, he gave evidence it was not his and he had used it only once).

• The dark bag that was searched contained a laptop and some documents the copies of which had been shown to the police by Ms Deacon.

The statutory provisions and the issues in dispute

The identity information offence

13. Section 192K of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides that:

“A person who possesses identification information with the intention of committing, or of facilitating the commission of, an indictable offence is guilty of an offence.”

14. In this appeal, Counsel for the appellant accepted that the information was in the ‘possession’ of documents, for the purposes of this provision.

15. The other elements that the Crown needed to establish are that:

1. The information in the documents in the appellant’s admitted possession constituted ‘identification information’ for the purposes of s 192I of the Crimes Act; and

2. Information was possessed with the appellant’s intention[2] of committing an indictable offence which, in this case, was particularised as fraud.

   2. This is an offence of specific intent: Crimes Act, s 428B.

16. ‘Identification information’, for the purposes of s 192I is defined broadly. It generally means any information relating to a person (living, or dead, real or fictitious, of an individual or body corporate) that is capable of being used (whether alone or in conjunction with other information) to identify or purportedly identify the person and includes a range of categories, including: a name or address, a date or place of birth, marital status, a driver licence, a credit or debit card, a financial account number.

17. Exhibit 5 at the trial in the Local Court featured many of these forms of identification. There was a credit card (in the name of JJ Bale), CBA account statement and credit statements (in the name of PR Ingram). In this appeal, Counsel for the appellant did not suggest that the documents which were admitted to be in the appellant’s possession did not satisfy the definition of ‘identification information’. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that this particular element was satisfied.

18. This left the remaining element in issue on the appeal being whether the information was possessed by the appellant with the intention of committing fraud.

The firearm offence

19. Section 7 of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) provides that:

“A person must not possess or use a pistol or prohibited firearm unless the person is authorised to do so by a licence or permit.”

20. The offence under s 7 is one of strict liability. There was no suggestion that the appellant was licensed or permitted to possess the firearm in question.

21. Section 4A of the Firearms Act provides an extended definition of “possession” for the purposes of this offence. The provision states that:

“Without restricting the meaning of the word “possession”, for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act, a firearm is taken to be in the possession of a person so long as it is in or on any premises owned, leased, or occupied by, or in the care, control or management of, the person, unless the Court is satisfied that:

the firearm was placed in or on, or brought into or on to, the premises[3] by or on behalf of a person who was lawfully authorised by or under this Act to possess the firearm,

the person did not know and could not reasonably be expected to have known that the firearm was in or on the premises, or

on the evidence before it, the person was not in possession of the firearm.

3. The word ‘premises’ is itself defined as meaning any ‘place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft’: Firearms Act, s 4A(2).

22. ‘Firearm’ is defined (by s 4) for the purpose of this offence, as a gun or other weapon that is (or at any time was) capable of propelling a projectile by means of an explosive, and includes a blank fire firearm, or an air gun. But the word carries an extended definition by reason of s 4D to encompass an ‘imitation firearm’, which is essentially defined (s 4D(3)) as an object which substantially duplicates in appearance a firearm but which is not a firearm.

23. There is no issue that the imitation gun in evidence satisfies the extended definition of firearm.

24. There is no doubt that the firearm in this case was in the property at Newtown. That was where it was sighted by Ms Deacon. But there were other issues.

25. The first is whether the Newtown property was “owned, leased or occupied by, or in the care, control or management of” the appellant. There is no doubt that the appellant did not own or lease the Newtown property. The issue is whether it was occupied by him, or under his care, control or management.

26. If that issue is established in the Crown’s favour, then the second issue is whether any of the provisos in the extended definition of ‘possession’ in s 4A applied, namely, whether:

1. the firearm was in, or brought it into or on the property on behalf of some person (other than the appellant) authorised to possess it;

2. the appellant did not know and could not reasonably have expected to have known that the firearm was in or on the premises.

3. on the evidence before it, the appellant was not in possession of it.

27. As to alternative (a), there was evidence that another person, Mr Sebastian Slater placed the firearm in the property. There was no evidence of his lawful authority to possess it. At first glance, alternative (c) appears to be a circular definition. It means that it is alternative (b) which is material.

28. In summary, the issues for this offence are:

1. Whether, at the time that the firearm was located in it, the Newtown property was occupied by, or under the care, control or management of the appellant; and

2. Whether the appellant did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to have known that the firearm was on the premises.

The identity information offence

The evidence relied upon by the Crown

29. There was evidence from officers (LSC Kempton, Constable Sultani and Constable Midi) locating the subject documents in a dark (navy or black coloured) bag. Their evidence was that when the appellant was confronted by the officers, the appellant would not let go of the bag. What the Crown said was explicable by the appellant’s concern about what was in the bag, being the incriminating papers. The appellant had admitted that the dark bag was his [4] . Ms Judith Deacon had seen it in the back bedroom [5] that the accused had said he had used.

    4. T 23.20 (25/2/19)

    5. T 42 (16/11/18)

30. The Crown relied upon the content of text messages on a mobile phone found on the appellant’s person. Materially, at least one message referred to the name “P Ingram,” the name appearing in the identity information. The appellant had denied that it was his phone, but admitted using it, at least, on one occasion. The Crown relied upon a co-incidence of subject matter between events that were occurring, as the appellant had described them, and the content of some of the text messages on that phone. This included the appellant’s reference to cleaning the property, his intention to have a girlfriend over on one of the nights; as well as the extension of the duration of the stay [6] . The evidence of the text messages could sustain a finding that if the phone was not actually his, he had used it with much greater frequency than he had indicated.

    6. T 25 (25/2/19)

The evidence relied upon by the appellant

31. The appellant firstly, relied upon his prior good character, at least as evidenced by an absence of convictions for dishonesty or offences of that type. That being so, it was said, the conduct of which he is accused would not only be out of character, but the good character would give the trier of fact confidence in his credit as a witness.

32. The appellant said that he was only a visitor to the premises, on two occasions: the first was when he tried to arrange for his girlfriend to come over; the second was when he, as part of a music group, were preparing to perform a gig in a public place in Newtown.

33. He called evidence from Mr Matthew Howlett, who also testified about the use of the place in advance of the gig and noted an occasion, on a Monday, where there were multiple people at the property. Howlett had noticed a man using the coffee table at the premises with a laptop. A laptop had been discovered with other items in the accused’s bag that was searched by the police.

34. The appellant also called Sebastian Slater. He also had no prior record of offences for dishonesty. He also corroborated the appellant’s evidence about staying over at the property on two occasions during the 8 day period; but indicated that they were not the days co-inciding with his own stay at the property.

CONSIDERATION

The appellant’s submissions

35. The appellant’s principal point is that acceptance of the Crown’s case, being circumstantial in nature, required the Crown to dispel beyond reasonable doubt inferences other than guilt.

Identity information offence

36. On the identity information count, Counsel for the appellant accepts that he was in attendance in the premises (though only as a visitor, on two occasions) and that he was in possession of documents placed (along with other belongings) in the appellant’s bag. But he said that he was in the process of cleaning up, and was only carrying the paperwork (oblivious to its content) for another person.

37. Accepting, though, that the documents were in the appellant’s bag, this did not mean that: (a) he knew what was contained in the documents or (b) knew that they were used for the purpose of committing fraud.

38. The appellant says he was only aware of the content of one document in his bag – an Optus phone bill and a starter pack.

39. As to some of the items of documentary evidence, the appellant says he had no connection to the laptop. He says that aside from one instance whereby he had the mobile phone (containing what be thought of as incriminating text messages, including one containing the name ‘Paul Ingram’) there was no other evidence that the phone was in his possession and, when confronted with certain text messages under cross-examination, he denied that he sent the messages and there was no evidence to prove that he did.

Firearm possession offence

40. In relation to the firearm possession offence, Counsel for the appellant referred to evidence by Sebastian Slater, who claimed the gun as his own and who said that he was responsible for taking it to the property. Counsel acknowledges Mr Slater’s evidence that he told the appellant about the gun, but submitted that this was only in the context of discussion that it could be used by the musical group (whose numbers included the appellant and Mr Slater) as a ‘prop’ in a video/film clip. The appellant says he did not know that it was on the property.

41. Counsel for the appellant said that the gun was located in the front bedroom; whereas the appellant had only used (he said, on the night of 21 September 2017) the back bedroom. He said that it was Sebastian Slater who occupied the front room. He gave evidence that he had stayed in the premises for 8 days; although he was not there at the time of the appellant’s asserted ‘visits’. Mr Slater, Counsel noted, had said that there were other visitors to the premises, including one Matthew Howlett, the other witness called for the appellant.

42. Counsel for the appellant noted that the Crown did not contest what was, in effect, good character evidence; that the appellant had had no prior convictions for fraud-related matters or firearm offences.

The Crown’s submissions

Identity information offence

43. As to the identification documents, the Crown emphasised that there was no issue that documents (which it says were ‘identification documents’ for the purpose of the offence) were found in the bag. But there was dispute as to when the police first noticed the bag. The appellant’s position was that documents had been placed on a coffee table. But Ms Deacon identified them as being in the same back bedroom which the appellant had said he had been in (the night before).

44. The Crown’s position, through evidence of the three police officers, was that when they were at the front door [7] they saw the appellant clutching the bag; and they all considered he was reluctant to let go of the bag. Implicitly, the Crown suggests that having heard the witnesses, the evidence of the police officers, and Ms Deacon, should be preferred over the appellant.

    7. T 7.20, 27.36, 32.31 & 34.22 (16/11/18)

45. The Crown says that there was no issue, for this particular offence, that the appellant was in “possession”, for the purposes of the s 192K Crimes Act count.

46. It also submitted that should it be found that the mobile phone was the appellant’s phone (or that it had been used by him), then this would strengthen the Crown case.

Firearms offence

47. On the firearms count, the Crown said that Sebastian Slater’s evidence did not corroborate the appellant’s evidence, as intended.

48. The Crown says that the appellant was not consistent in his evidence as to which bedroom he stayed in: it referred to evidence of the appellant in which he had said he slept in the front bedroom on 18 September and in the backroom on 21 September. If that was correct, and if Ms Deacon’s evidence about the gun being in the front room was accepted, it was clearly possible that the appellant was acutely aware of its presence in the Newtown property.

Appellant’s submissions in reply

49. These were directed only to the identity possession case. Counsel emphasised that the documents which Ms Deacon said she copied or showed to the Police were not produced to the Court. He submitted that if her evidence – that she took them out of the bag and copied them – was accepted, this was, or at least might be, consistent with the appellant’s case. If the order in which they were taken out was such that the Optus bill was on top, that would be consistent with this case. It was said that the appellant had no particular reason to inspect the documents underneath the pile. Counsel noted that the Police did not take any film of the inspection of the bag.

DETERMINATION

Circumstantial case

50. The Crown’s case on the disputed elements being substantially circumstantial, it is necessary for it to exclude all reasonable hypotheses consistent with the appellant’s innocence[8] . It is not incumbent on the appellant to establish that some inference other than guilt should be drawn from the evidence: this proposition reflects the fundamental principle that the Crown has to prove the charge(s) beyond reasonable doubt[9] .

    8. The Queen v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308 at [46]

    9. Ibid at [62]

Credit of witnesses

51. I noted earlier that the learned magistrate had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and forming assessments of demeanour which are essentially unassailable in this Court. Without any comparable ‘feel’ to the trial, it is patently apparent from the transcript that there are problems in accepting the evidence of at least the appellant and Sebastian Slater.

52. As to the appellant, there was repeated evidence of his making false statements. He falsely represented to Ms Deacon that he was Troy McDonald and engaged in further misleading conduct when failing to correct that misrepresentation, knowing that it was untrue, when she subsequently returned to the property.

53. Whatever subtle difference there may have been in the accounts of what the appellant said to the police officers when they arrived at the property, it was clear that, again, he initially falsely represented that he was Troy McDonald. The disclosure of his true identity was made at or about the time when the Police would have soon worked it out for themselves anyway – it was not long before he produced his passport.

54. This was not just any ‘white lie’, but lies consistent with a predisposition in the appellant to conceal his identity. Constable Sultani performed an identity check of the name ‘Troy McDonald’, which yielded no results [10] . That name was, in other words a fictitious name. This is, co-incidentally, the essence of the identification information charge against the appellant – his alleged willingness to use fake identification for nefarious purposes.

    10. T 30 (16/11/18)

55. In my view, the making of these representations (that he was Troy McDonald) substantially, if not fatally, undermines the appellant’s general credit and reliability. That being so, it is open to reject, out of hand, the appellant’s explanation that he was simply carrying the papers as a favour for ‘one of Troy McDonald’s mates’. If, as I have found, Troy McDonald was merely a fictitious name, the appellant’s credibility would be further undermined.

56. Mr Slater’s position was even worse, from the appellant’s perspective. He was a self-confessed ice addict. He admitted he was smoking ice when he was at the premises and affected by ice over the period he was at the premises. It is open to me to find from the transcript, even without hearing him give evidence myself, that no faith can be placed upon his reliability. As to the substance of some of his evidence, he even gave damaging evidence for the appellant to the effect that the appellant had checked in as Troy McDonald [11] . Further, it appears that his evidence that the appellant stayed only two of the eight nights was based upon what the appellant had told him and was therefore hearsay.

    11. T 34 (25/2/19)

57. There was no credibility attack on the evidence of the three police officers. That was unsurprising, in view of the similarity of their evidence (it not being proven that such evidence was the result of collaboration between them). That being so, it would not surprise if the learned Magistrate accepted their evidence that the appellant appeared reluctant to hand over the bag; and otherwise appeared to be ‘nervous’ or in a ‘sweat’.

58. There was also no real challenge to the credit of Ms Deacon.

The evidence

59. The evidence to sustain the charges was linked.

The identification information count

60. The inference is strongly available that the incriminating documentation was not simply placed in the appellant’s bag without his having had any regard to its content. His reluctance to yield the bag to the police was most obviously explicable by a concern as to what the police might find within the documentation in the bag. The appellant said that aside from the papers, he had some other personal belongings in the bag, but did not give evidence, specifically, as to what they were. If they were in the nature of anything embarrassing, it would have been expected that the appellant would have indicated what they were in his evidence. He did not. It is open to infer that his concern about what was in the bag was the documentation and, more specifically, its content.

61. The circumstance that the appellant relies upon, that there were a number of other people who had used the Newtown property throughout the period, does not assist him. His specific case was that he was a courier to take the documents for a fictitious person’s mates. It is not that he was, inadvertently, picking up any person’s documents from a coffee table as part of a general clean up. If that was his case, it is doubtful that he would have been as reluctant to allow the police to inspect the documentation in his bag as the police said he was.

62. As I have earlier found, once it is accepted that the documents constituted identity information, capable of being used to perpetrate a fraud and that the appellant was aware of the opportunity to use the documents in this way, then it is a short step to conclude that he intended to use them for the purpose of fraud. The appellant’s narrow case, as I have said, was that he was a courier for what I have found was a fictitious person’s mate, of the documents without knowledge of their content. But once the appellant’s explanation of being a courier is rejected and once it has been established, as I consider it has been (on the basis of the messages on the phone in his possession), that he was aware of the reference to P Ingham, there was no other rational explanation for the usage of the documentation other than as an instrument for the commission of fraud. It was unnecessary to establish that he knew of other names referred to in the documentation besides ‘P Ingram’, but the reference to other persons in the documentation, including ‘JJ Bales’ and ‘Timka Tremouille’ strengthens the inference that a range of fake identification documents were in the appellant’s possession which were available at his disposal.

63. I am satisfied that the Prosecution has made out the element that the identification information was being used in the commission of fraud.

64. That being so, the Prosecution has made out its case on this offence.

The firearm offence

65. Although it appears that she might have got her dates wrong as to when she went around to the property on the second occasion, Ms Deacon’s evidence of seeing the documents in what was in the appellant’s bag accorded with the evidence of the police officers. She went around to the property on at least three occasions. It was not a mere co-incidence that each time that she went to the property she saw, or encountered, the appellant on each occasion [12] .

    12. T 41.14 – 41.18 (16/11/18), T 43.6- 43.45 (16/11/18)

66. I find that the appellant was the one who did the booking: not ‘Troy McDonald’. So much was said by the appellant’s witness, Sebastian Slater [13] . The content of one of the messages (message 683) on the phone in the appellant’s possession indicated that it was the appellant who had had referred to the extension of the period of the rental. That would co-incide with the circumstance that it was he who had the conversation with Ms Deacon about such extension. There was no evidence of anyone else discussing an extension of the booking with Ms Deacon. If the appellant had the authority to make extensions, then absent any contrary indication, it is logical that he had the authority to make the booking to begin with. This is particularly so where it appears that the appellant’s evidence that Troy McDonald did the booking is demonstrably false – that name was fictitious.

    13. T 34.33 (25/2/19)

67. This being so, in my view the element of the appellant having leased (albeit in another person’s name) or, alternatively, having had the occupation, care and management of the Newtown property, was established beyond reasonable doubt.

68. The remaining issue is whether the exception to the definition in s 4A(1) in sub-paragraph (b) is made out. That is, the appellant did not know and could not reasonably be expected to have known that the firearm was in the Newtown property.

69. The appellant denied ever seeing the firearm, although he admitted knowing that it existed. He said he understood it was going to be used as a prop for his music group. Ms Deacon’s evidence was that she had seen it in the front bedroom (upstairs). Those statements are not inconsistent, since it was the appellant’s evidence that he stayed in the back bedroom. However, the appellant said that he had also slept in Sebastian Slater’s bedroom [14] , the front bedroom where the gun was located by Ms Deacon. It is possible that he saw it in that bedroom.

    14. T 13.10 (25/2/19)

70. As the exception in sub-paragraph (b) of s 4A indicates, it is insufficient for the Crown to ultimately disprove the appellant’s denial that he actually knew of the firearm being in the Newtown property. The appellant bore an additional evidential onus that he could not reasonably be expected to have known that the firearm was in the property.

71. This he tried to do (in part) by establishing that he only stayed at the Newtown property on two occasions; and in different bedrooms on either occasion.

72. But what is virtually fatal to that case is the evidence of Sebastian Slater who said that the appellant was aware of the gun being placed in the premises [15] . Although I have generally not accepted Mr Slater’s credibility, this evidence, damaging as it is to the appellant, Mr Slater’s friend, is probative.

    15. T34.8 – 34.11 (25/2/19)

73. What is also probative is the evidence of the police officers that when they approached the Newtown property, their initial exchange with the appellant –whatever words were precisely used – clearly evinced his appreciation that the police were concerned with investigating the presence of a gun on the premises: it matters not, for the purpose of this offence, what type of gun (real or imitation) it was. For reasons already noted, in any conflict between the evidence of the police officers [16] and the appellant, and reiterating the learned Magistrate’s advantages in assessing the demeanour of these witnesses, the evidence of the police officers is be preferred.

    16. T 5 (16/11/18), T 28 (16/11/18) and T 34 (16/11/18)

74. I reiterate, again, however, that it is not necessary to form a view as to precisely what was said (or the tone of what was said) about the firearm in that initial encounter that the appellant had with the police officers.

75. In the context in which the conversation occurred, in my opinion, what the appellant said was not simply an admission that he knew of the existence of the imitation gun in question, but evinced his awareness that the police were questioning him about its location in the Newtown property when the property was occupied by him or was under his care and management.

76. That being so, I reject the applicability of the exception in sub-paragraph (b) of s 4A of the Firearms Act. I find that the Prosecution has satisfied me to the requisite standard that the elements of this offence are made out.

77. The Crown has made out both offences.

78. Accordingly, I order that the appeal be dismissed.

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Endnotes

Decision last updated: 18 November 2019