GREY v POLICE
Bollen AJ (Ex Tempore)
In this matter Mr Grey, the appellant, drove down a one way street. The policeman claimed to have seen it. The one way street had a notice, not very high off the ground, saying, in effect, that one could go only one way in the street. Mr Grey says that, at the time when it happened. There were a number of people standing in the way of the sign so that he could not see it. Photographs showed that the sign could be blocked perhaps even by one person. The photographs don’t tell us whether the sign was blocked by people at the relevant time. They do tell us that it can be blocked.
The officer gave his evidence. Mr Grey gave his evidence and he called the photographer who took the photograph which I have mentioned. Now, as the Justices of the Peace who heard the matter, say:
"The facts and dispute in this case are the signs were not visible because people were standing in front of it."
So, the issue before the court was whether or not the prosecution had proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the sign was clearly visible. Of course, Mr Grey drove down the street when the sign was not visible. He still drove down a one way street. Perhaps that would make him guilty of the offence charged but, if that were so, I think that s.15 of the Sentencing Act would come into play. That says:
"Where a court finds a person guilty of an offence, but finds the offence so trifling that it is inappropriate to impose any penalty, it may, without recording a conviction, dismiss the charge".
And some other alternatives are given. In my opinion, if the sign was blocked then, although an offence might have been created by driving the wrong way, it was so trifling that the court should, without recording a conviction, dismiss the charge.
There has been a lot of difficulty in the law about the use of the word "trifling." One thing we can say is that trifling does not mean trifling. But, it means, usually, in these sort of Acts of Parliament, something that is atypical, not typical of a breach of the obligation imposed by the section, something to which Parliament could not be expected to think anyone should be found guilty of, have a conviction recorded against him or her.
Well, the magistrates have the advantage, as pointed out to me by Ms Williams, of seeing and hearing the witnesses. That is a substantial advantage. But, the magistrates have never, as appears from the reasoning, really faced up to the vital issue and decided and stated clearly why they came to the conclusion that there must be a conviction. They spoke in terms about the police officer, to suggest, perhaps, they accepted his evidence. They do not say that in as many words.
They say the defendant gave his evidence. They do not say what they think of the credibility or reliability of him as a witness. They do say, at the top of p3 of their reasons this:
"We find the charge proved beyond reasonable doubt as there is no other evidence presented to us that would give us cause to have any other considered verdict. A conviction will be recorded."
It’s not clear what that is intended to convey. The reference to "no other evidence" does suggest that the magistrates have brushed aside the evidence of the defendant and not given proper consideration to it.
In these circumstances, I think the appeal should be allowed and that s.15 of the Sentencing Act should lead me to say that there should be no conviction and that the charge is dismissed without the recording of a conviction.
I go on to say that Mr Grey protests he was not given a fair trial because he was not allowed to ask a number of questions in cross-examination. I think that might be answered by the rules of evidence. I think perhaps at least some of his questions were not admissible. Perhaps it would have been wiser for the court to let that go, but I record that argument by Mr Grey. I do not act on it.
I act on the circumstances I have stated, namely, that the Justices do not appear to have given adequate proper weight to the evidence which Mr Grey himself gave. In those circumstances although Mr Grey was guilty of driving down a one way street, the offence is in the circumstances, where he could not have known it was a one way street, so trifling, that without recording a conviction this court sets aside the orders of the court at Port Adelaide and dismisses the charge. So that the appeal is allowed and the charge dismissed.
That calls into question what should happen now. Should there be a new trial? Should there not be a new trial? This was a very minor little incident on the road. Perhaps one’s eyebrows rise for a man being prosecuted for it. Mr Grey has been through the trial and the expense and the worry of the one trial. I do not think he should be called upon to face another trial. There will be no order for a new trial.
So you have succeeded Mr Grey. The appeal is allowed. You do not have the conviction the magistrates imposed upon you. You do not have to pay any penalties and there is no order for a new trial.
- AGLC
- Grey v Police No. Scgrg-97-1410 Judgment No. S6462 [1997] SASC 6462
- Case
- [1997] SASC 6462
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether the prosecution had proven, beyond reasonable doubt, that the one-way street sign was visible to Mr Grey at the time of the alleged offence. If the sign was indeed visible, Mr Grey's actions would have constituted a breach of the law. However, if the sign was obstructed, as Mr Grey claimed, the court had to consider whether the offence was of a trivial nature, warranting dismissal without a conviction under section 15 of the Sentencing Act. The court had to evaluate the evidence presented by both parties and determine whether the magistrate's decision was legally sound.
The court found that the magistrate's decision did not adequately address the key issue of the sign's visibility and whether the evidence presented by Mr Grey had been properly considered. The court held that if the sign was indeed obstructed, the offence would be considered trifling, and therefore, the charge should be dismissed without recording a conviction. The court emphasised that the magistrate's decision did not sufficiently explain why a conviction was necessary and appeared to have disregarded Mr Grey's evidence. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, dismissed the charge without recording a conviction, and set aside the magistrate's decision. The court also noted that a new trial would not be ordered, given the minor nature of the incident and the appellant's previous experience with the trial process.
The court's final order was that Mr Grey's appeal was allowed, the conviction imposed by the magistrates was set aside, and the charge was dismissed without recording a conviction. There would be no order for a new trial. Mr Grey was thus successful in his appeal, and he would not have to face any penalties or a new trial.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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