Grey v City of Marion

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)

GREY v CITY OF MARION

Reasons for Decision of The Honourable Justice Debelle

11 January 2006

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL

Magistrates appeal – appeal 18 months out of time – whether leave should be granted to bring appeal – appellant found guilty of offence under Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 – appellant unrepresented at trial – some irregularities at trial – whether magistrate conducted trial fairly – whether magistrate biased – whether miscarriage of justice – held, no reason to extend time to appeal – application for leave dismissed – substantial merits of appeal considered – held, appellant properly convicted.

Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 s 43, s 86; Magistrates Court Act 1991 s 20; Magistrates Court Rules 1992 r 10, referred to.
Gallo v Dawson (1990) 98 ALR 479; Pezos v Police [2005] SASC 500, applied.
Chapman v Rogers [1984] 1 Qd R 542; Clay v Karlson (1997) 17 WAR 493; Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Harvey [1980] VR 669; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 196; Gikas v Police (1999) 202 LSJS 301; Hughes v National Trustees Executor & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1978] VR 257; Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516; Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512; McPherson v Groeneveld (unreported, Supreme Court of SA, 21 February 1997, judgment no S6052); R v Gidley [1984] 3 NSWLR 168; R v Secretary for Home Department; Ex parte Mehta [1975] 1 WLR 1087; R v Secretary of State for India in Council; Ex parte Ezekiel [1941] 2 KB 169; R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91; Sheahan v Northern Australia Land & Agency Co Pty Ltd (1994) 176 LSJS 257, considered.

GREY v CITY OF MARION
[2006] SASC 3

Magistrates Appeals:  Criminal

  1. DEBELLE J.        The appellant was charged with the offence of being the owner or being responsible for a dog, namely a German Shepherd Cross which had harassed a person contrary to s 43 of the Dog and Cat Management Act 1995. The offence was alleged to have occurred on 18 April 2002. The appellant pleaded not guilty.  He was convicted on 1 September 2003, after a hearing in the Adelaide Magistrates Court.  He appeals against that conviction.

  2. The appeal was not instituted within 14 days as prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules 1987.  Although dated 3 March 2005, the notice of appeal was not filed until 12 April 2005, more than 18 months out of time.

  3. The court has a discretion whether to grant an extension of time within which to appeal.  That discretion exists for the sole purpose of doing justice between the parties: Hughes v National Trustees Executor & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd

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Details
Case
[2006] SASC 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Grey v City of Marion involved an appeal against the conviction of the appellant under the Dog and Cat Management Act 1995. The appellant, who was unrepresented at the trial, argued that there were irregularities and potential biases in the trial process which led to a miscarriage of justice. The court was required to decide whether the appeal, lodged 18 months out of time, should be heard and if the appellant's conviction was just and fair.

The court examined the grounds of appeal, considering whether the magistrate had failed to advise the appellant adequately on various procedural aspects of the trial. The court assessed if these failures led to a miscarriage of justice. It considered points such as the admissibility of evidence, the relevance of the appellant's video evidence, and the magistrate's duty to inform the appellant about the process for issuing summonses. Despite some procedural errors, the court found that these did not prejudice the appellant's case or result in a miscarriage of justice.

After a thorough examination of the evidence and submissions, the court concluded that the appellant was properly convicted. The court found no merit in the appellant's claims of bias or procedural unfairness by the magistrate. The substantial merits of the appeal were considered, but the court upheld the conviction. The application for leave to appeal out of time was dismissed.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the application for leave to appeal out of time and to affirm the conviction of the appellant.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

With the principles expressed in Pezos v Police in mind, I deal with each of the instances where it is contended that the magistrate has failed to advise the appellant. I deal with them in the order listed in the appellant’s outline of submissions. (The submission is in bold typeface.)1.The magistrate should have advised the appellant that he could object to evidence that was not relevant or inadmissible. This relates to the evidence of Mrs Sievers concerning the behaviour of the dogs in the presence of the Council inspectors, very shortly after the incident. As already mentioned this evidence was plainly admissible.2.The magistrate should have advised the appellant as to the means by which he could adduce the evidence of his video‑tape of past inter‑action between his dogs and Mrs Sievers and the children. This evidence is plainly irrelevant. As already mentioned, dogs may behave differently on different days. The only relevant question was the behaviour of the dogs on the occasion the subject of the complaint.3.The magistrate failed to draw the appellant’s attention to documents which had been marked for identification which were not exhibits. This is essentially a recapitulation of the ground that the magistrate had not permitted the appellant to tender certain documents. To the extent that the submission goes further, none of the documents marked for identification were relevant to the issues.4.In the course of the hearing the magistrate had informed the appellant that if he wanted to make submissions about the evidence of witnesses he should do that at a later stage but the magistrate did not remind the appellant to do so. At that point the magistrate was preventing the appellant from making comments about the evidence of Mrs Sievers. It was contended that the magistrate should have advised the appellant when he had the opportunity to make submissions. The appellant is not without experience in court proceedings. He has a good deal of such experience. He would have known full well that the opportunity to make submissions was at the close of evidence. In any event, after the evidence had closed (at p 244 of the transcript), the magistrate clearly informed both parties that she would then hear submissions from them. Both counsel for the complainant and the appellant made brief submissions. The magistrate was entitled to assume that the appellant would address on those matters he believed were helpful to his case. There is no substance in this ground.5.The learned magistrate erred in advising the appellant as to how he might subpoena the transcript of the Residential Tenancies Tribunal. The magistrate said that that was a matter that he should take up with the Tribunal and was not a matter over which she had any control. The magistrate erred. She had a discretion to make an order for a summons to witness to produce documents. However, this error on the part of the magistrate has no consequence. The transcript of the Residential Tenancies Tribunal would not, for the reasons already given, have been relevant to the issues the subject of this complaint. There was, therefore, no miscarriage of justice in consequence of the magistrate’s error.6.The magistrate said (at p 35 of the transcript) that she would give consideration to an issue raised by the appellant but did not later do so. The question concerned the calling of witnesses who were to be the subject of the summons to witness which the appellant sought. The matter was later dealt with. The magistrate refused the appellant’s application. There is no substance in this point.7.At this same point in the hearing, the magistrate referred to the video‑tape and audio‑tape which the defendant wished to tender of the behaviour of his dogs towards children. It is contended that the magistrate did not explain to the appellant how he might tender the evidence. There is no substance in this point. Even if the magistrate did not give a satisfactory explanation, the evidence was irrelevant. There was no miscarriage of justice.8.The magistrate did not give the appellant adequate assistance when seeking to cross‑examine Mrs Sievers about a prior inconsistent statement. The fact is that the appellant did, in effect, cross‑examine about prior inconsistent statements. That cross‑examination might not have complied with s 28 or s 29 of the Evidence Act 1929 but the appellant was able to make his point. Significantly, Mr Mancini had not demonstrated how any miscarriage of justice resulted. There is no substance in this ground.9.The magistrate informed the appellant (at p 45 of the transcript) that he may wish to make a submission about the evidentiary topic then being discussed. It is contended that the magistrate had a duty to remind the appellant of that topic when he made his closing submissions. This submission must be rejected. As already mentioned, at p 244 the magistrate reminded the parties that this was the occasion to make their submissions. It was not for her to dictate the content of the appellant’s address. She was entitled to assume that the appellant would have noted what he sought to put to her in the closing address. No miscarriage of justice was demonstrated.10.The magistrate had a duty to advise the appellant about the process for issuing a summons to witness. There is no substance in this ground. As mentioned earlier in these reasons, the appellant sought to subpoena witnesses whose evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible. In the circumstances there can be no miscarriage of justice.11.The magistrate had a duty to advise the appellant as to the implications of s 86 of the Dog and Cat Management Act. Section 86 provides:It is a defence to a charge of an offence against this Act if it is proved –(a) That the offence was not committed intentionally and did not result from any failure on the part of the defendant to take reasonable care to avoid the commission of the offence; or(b) if the offence involves a dog – that the dog was at the time of the alleged offence in the possession or control of another person without the defendant’s consent.Paragraph (b) does not apply in the circumstances of this case because the dog was with the appellant, its owner. Paragraph (a) would be relevant if the appellant had taken reasonable cause to avoid committing the offence. One obvious means of taking care was for the appellant to have the dogs on a lead. His dogs were not on a lead. For that reason the appellant would not be able to establish that he had taken reasonable care. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the magistrate was obliged to advise the appellant on the substance of his defence. If she did so, she might have jeopardised her independence. However, even if it is assumed that she should have informed the appellant of the defences under s 86, her failure did not, for these reasons, result in any miscarriage of justice.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DEBELLE J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DEBELLE J

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