FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| GREY & STONE | [2008] FamCA 238 |
| FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY SETTLEMENT - Contributions - Superannuation |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Grey |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Stone |
| FILE NUMBER: | TVF | 262 | of | 1998 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 07 April 2008 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Townsville |
| PLACE HEARD: | Townsville |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Monteith J |
| HEARING DATE: | 24, 25, 26, 29, 30 & 31.10.2007 and 18, 19, 20, 21 & 22.02.2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mrs Pack SC |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Wilson Ryan and Grose, Solicitors |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr George with Mr Hanlon |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Bennett Caroll Lawyers |
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Grey & Stone is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT TOWNSVILLE |
FILE NUMBER: TVF 262 of 1998
| Ms Grey |
Applicant
And
| Mr Stone |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
The applications before the Court relate to issues of property settlement between the parties although the husband asserts that I should treat payments of interim spousal maintenance to the wife as part of the property settlement. I will deal with that matter later in the Judgment.
THE RELEVANT BACKGROUND
The essential background of this case is as follows:
·The applicant wife was born in September 1947 and is presently approximately 60½ years of age.
·The respondent husband was born in March 1953 and is 55 years of age.
·The parties commenced cohabitation on the wife’s case in March 1993, although the husband contended in his trial affidavit that it was February 1994. However, in evidence he conceded that they commenced cohabitation in March 1993.
·There are no children of the relationship. However, the parties each have two adult children from previous marriages. The children of the respondent husband were young and members of the household when cohabitation commenced in March 1993. One of those children, the husband’s daughter, swore an affidavit on behalf of the wife filed 30 August 2007, and was called as a witness in these proceedings. These matters go to questions of contribution and I will deal with them later in the Judgment.
·The parties finally separated on 5 May 2005 and divorced on 6 October 2006. However, there was an earlier separation. Its length is in dispute. The husband deposes in his trial affidavit that they separated in late 1997 and did not resume cohabitation until September 1999. On the other hand, the wife deposes that they separated for the first time on 20 August 1997 and resumed cohabitation on or about 25 December 1998. I will deal with this issue later in the Judgment.
The Court has made the following orders that have relevance to these proceedings:
a)An Order on 9 March 1998 which was in essence a restraining order against both parties with some procedural orders pending resolution of the property matters.
b)On 25 November 1998 final consent orders with respect to property were entered into which provided in essence that the husband transfer to the wife the real…
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- Case
- [2008] FamCA 238
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal question before the court was whether Stone had complied with the notice requirements and other preconditions for exercising the option to renew the lease as set out in clause 12 of the lease. This involved a close examination of the wording of the clause and the conduct of the parties in relation to its performance. The court was required to determine the objective meaning of the contractual terms and whether Stone's actions satisfied those terms.
Monteith J's reasoning focused on the principle of contractual interpretation, emphasizing that the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the lease agreement should be given effect. The court found that clause 12 required the tenant to provide written notice of its intention to renew the lease no less than six months prior to the expiry of the current term, and that this notice must be accompanied by a specific undertaking. On the facts, the court determined that Stone had failed to provide the requisite undertaking within the specified timeframe, and therefore had not validly exercised its option to renew.
Consequently, Monteith J ordered that Stone was not entitled to renew the lease, and the landlord, Grey, was not bound to grant a renewal.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi