Grenville and Peyton and Anor

[2017] FamCA 1176

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GRENVILLE & PEYTON AND ANOR [2017] FamCA 1176

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Parenting – Interim – Where the second respondent father seeks a change from time supervised at a contact centre to time being supervised by his parents – Where there is no affidavit material from the proposed supervisors – Application dismissed.

Family Law Act (1975) Cth

APPLICANT: Ms Grenville

FIRST RESPONDENT: Mr Peyton

SECOND RESPONDENT: Mr Vergona

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Anthony Kingston

FILE NUMBER: BRC 10736 of 2013

DATE DELIVERED: 3 April 2017

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Forrest J

HEARING DATE: 3 April 2017

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

Mr Hall

Legal Aid Queensland

THE FIRST RESPONDENT: In Person

COUNSEL FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENT: Mr Sorensen

SOLICITOR FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENT:

John Davies & Co

Solicitors

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Mr Kingston

Norman & Kingston

Orders

1. The second respondent’s Application in a Case filed 29 March 2017 is dismissed.

2. The matter is adjourned to the Magellan Registrar at 3.00 pm on Tuesday, 25 July 2017 for the making of all such directions as might be necessary for the further progress of this matter, including, if considered appropriate, directions for final hearing of this matter, and that unless otherwise ordered by the Registrar, such hearing shall be conducted by telephone.

3. The Independent Children's Lawyer has liberty to apply to the Court for further directions on the giving on seven (7) days notice to the other parties.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Grenville & Peyton and Anor has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 10736 of 2013

Ms Grenville

Applicant

And

Mr Peyton

First Respondent

And

Mr Vergona

Second Respondent

And

Independent Children’s Lawyer

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. On 15 March 2017 these contested parenting proceedings were mentioned before me for directions to be made after the matter had been transferred to this Court from the Federal Circuit Court where it had been commenced sometime last year and after the matter was determined to be a matter appropriately to be listed in the Magellan List.  It was listed before me pursuant to the standard protocol and understanding in the Magellan List in this Court that when the matter comes to the Court and is first determined to be a Magellan matter, the Magellan Registrar lists it for a mention and any necessary directions to be made before me in my capacity as the Judge of the Trial Division of this Registry of this Court who handles the Magellan List in the first instance.

2. The parties in these proceedings are many.  The applicant is the mother of three girls who are 13, 11 and 3 years of age.  There are two respondents, there are interveners and the Independent Children’s Lawyer.  The first respondent is the undisputed father of the two older girls who are 13 and 11. The second respondent was the partner of the applicant mother for some years at the time that the youngest child, who is now three going on four, was conceived.  There is evidence before me that points to the possibility, as that is as high as I can put it at this stage, that indeed the first respondent could possibly be the biological father of the youngest child.  Though the second respondent, who has always considered himself and acted as if he was the biological father of the child, maintains at this point in time, paternity of that child. 

3. The mother, through her solicitor today, has informed the Court that she considers it indeed necessary and appropriate for parentage testing to be determined so that the question of the biological paternal parentage of her youngest daughter can be determined once and for all, one way or another. 

4. The first respondent’s parents, that is the undisputed paternal grandparents of the two eldest girls, have intervened in the proceedings through force of circumstance and in respect of the parentage issue, the female intervener deposes in her affidavit material being read today, to a number of matters that, if correct, certainly point in the direction of there being a possibility at least, to put it in a neutral sense, that her son, the first respondent, might be the parent of the youngest child, X.  In any event, I do not know as there has been no material filed by him, nor did I ask him, for his position in respect of the parentage issue; that being the first respondent who is the father of the two eldest children. 

5. When the matter came before me on 15 March 2017, this parentage issue having been raised front and centre in the proceedings at that point in time, I was quite prepared, with the consent of all the parties at the time, save for the first respondent who did not appear that day and had no representative appear for him, to make orders that provided for parentage testing to be undertaken by the relevant parties so that the question of the youngest child’s paternal parentage could be sorted once and for all.  Ultimately, the determination of that issue may make some difference to the way in which these proceedings progress towards resolution or determination after a trial.  Although, that can only be speculated upon at the moment.  I was informed that day that the parentage testing was something that was being organised and the relevant parties were going to participate in, but there was some question about the funding of it.  Nevertheless, I made the orders. 

6. On that day, I was aware that in December 2016, just a few months ago, that certain parenting orders were made in the Federal Circuit Court by his Honour Judge Lapthorn.  I have those orders in front of me now and I note they were made on 19 December 2016, and that they were made by consent between all of the parties who were also listed to be the same parties that I already outlined are the parties in the proceedings as they exist before me today.  Indeed on that day, on 19 December, his Honour Judge Lapthorn’s orders reflect there was also an appearance as a friend of the Court by Ms A, on behalf of the Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services, who from the notation of her appearance I now appreciate and understand was aware of the content of this consent order that was made that day until further order.  Indeed it was paragraph 13 of those orders that transferred the matter to this Court and recommended that it be considered for inclusion in this Court’s Magellan List, which subsequently occurred.

7. That was not the only order that his Honour Judge Lapthorn had made on an interim basis in respect of the parenting of the children.  He had previously made an order on 23 November 2016.  On that day, the only parties before his Honour in the matter were the applicant mother, the first respondent father of the two eldest girls, and the first respondent father’s parents (the paternal grandparents of the two eldest girls), as well as Mr Kingston, the Independent Children's Lawyer. 

8. On that particular day the orders that were made by consent were that the three girls all live with the interveners, the parents of the first respondent, father of the two eldest girls.  His Honour also made orders in respect of the time and communication that the girls were to have with the mother, specifically and expressly providing for the time that they were to spend with their mother to be supervised and take place at the Town C Children's Contact Centre, and in respect of the child X, at a place called the D Family Centre on Mondays and Wednesdays.

9. There were a number of other orders in respect of the time that the children were to spend with their respective fathers, in particular there was an order that the children only spend supervised time with their fathers at times that could be accommodated by the Town C Children's Contact Centre.  As I said though, at the time, the second respondent, the putative biological father of the third child was not a party to the proceedings.  As I was saying before, his Honour Judge Lapthorn had the matter back before him on 19 December 2016, only a few weeks later.  On that day, the putative biological father of the third child, namely the second respondent, was joined as a party to the proceedings.  The order that I previously referred to, being Judge Lapthorn’s order of 23 November 2016, specifically paragraph 5 that provided for supervised time with the fathers at the contact centre, was discharged and in its place other consent orders providing for the children’s time with the respective adults were made.

10. Indeed those orders provided for the two eldest girls to see their father, the first respondent, under the supervision of the Town C Children's Contact Centre for up to two hours each fortnight.  Those orders also provided for the youngest child, X, to spend time with her father, the second respondent, also supervised at the Town C Children's Contact Centre, for up to two hours each week, at his expense.  Those orders also made provision for other specific issue orders, but what I have set out are the relevant ones to today’s application, those being the existing orders in respect of the youngest child, X’s time with her putative biological father, the second respondent, currently in place pursuant to those orders that Judge Lapthorn made. 

11. On 15 March 2017, apart from making the parentage orders, I made some other directions, particularly pertaining to subpoena material and the inspection and copying of documents produced under subpoena, but most particularly those that had been produced by the Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services to the Court to that point in time.  Also, at the request of the Independent Children's Lawyer I listed the matter for hearing today at 2.15 pm.  I made a direction that any Applications in a Case that any of the parties wanted heard and determined be filed and served along with any supporting affidavit material by the close of business on Tuesday, 28 March.  I did that because Mr Kingston urged upon me the need for such a hearing because a family report commissioned by him from Ms E, a very experienced former family consultant and social worker known to the Court who has for years been preparing family reports, was in the process of being prepared, the interviews having taken place in January of this year.  There were also matters raised about the possibility for some potential changes in the schooling arrangements for the girls having regard to the location of where they live with the interveners, some 20kms approximately out of Town C. 

12. The matter came before me today with there being really only one application in a Case having been filed in the meantime, which I am being asked to consider.  The Independent Children's Lawyer in the meantime has caused a copy of the Family Report to be filed.  As I have said during exchanges between me and the Independent Children's Lawyer earlier in this hearing, I have read that Family Report, some 60 pages of detailed information provided by Ms E and respectfully consider it to be one of the most detailed and comprehensive Family Reports I have read in a long time.  I gained a great deal of insight into this family and its history in a relatively short space of time, insight that was not otherwise available to me, from simply reading the material that the parties read in today’s proceedings most particularly.  The report concluded, as so many family reports do these days, with a number of recommendations for the parties to consider.  Relevantly, explaining the reason why Mr Kingston or the interveners did not make any application for orders changing the schooling arrangements for the girls, Ms E made certain recommendations about that, principally that as far as may practicably be done, the girls continue to attend the schools they currently attend, particularly until the end of this year.  In respect of the second girl, as I understand it, who will be finished the primary school she is attending at the end of this year, a decision will have to be made about the high school she then goes to.

13. So the only Application in a Case that was actually filed and I was asked to determine today is an Application in a Case filed by the second respondent, the putative biological father of the youngest child, X.  His Application in a Case is in the context of the current order providing for him to spend time, two hours a week with X, supervised at the Town C Children's Contact Centre, at his expense.  He seeks a variation of, that order such that the child X spends a longer period of time with him outside of the supervision of the Town C Children's Contact Centre and namely in his care but under the supervision of his parents and for such time to commence at 9.00 am on a Sunday and conclude at 4.00 pm on a Sunday, with handover simply to continue to be effected at the Town C Children's Contact Centre. 

14. The second respondent read and relied upon an affidavit that he filed at the same time as his Application in a Case on 28 March.  The Application in a Case reads that it was filed on 29 March and the affidavit says it was filed on 28 March, that may be the case.  In any event, the affidavit is a relatively short affidavit of ten paragraphs, nine principal paragraphs about a page and a half long.  Relevantly the second respondent putative biological father of the youngest child X says he is living with his parents at the property in Town C that they own. 

15. He says they are retired pensioners.  A little further down he says his father is 73 and his mother is 69.  He says they are in good health and they are both active.  He points out that his dad worked with the Employer B for 32 years and his mother, through that period of time, was engaged in full time home duties and parenting, having raised to their credit, four girls and four boys, of whom the second respondent is but one of the boys.  The second respondent father says that his parents have spent time with the youngest child X since she was born over three years ago, and they got to know X very well.  He says that X was born in Town C and has lived in that city all of her life, albeit a relatively short life at this point in time.  He says that during the last 18 months of his relationship with X’s mother, the applicant mother in the case, X spent a lot of time with him at his parents’ house, as he and the child would go there to spend time with them when the applicant mother told him to get out of the house, which he says happened quite frequently. 

16. I add at this point in time that the evidence, including the report of Ms E, supports prima facie findings that the relationship between the applicant mother and the second respondent father was a relationship of volatility and violence.  There is dispute between the two parties as to the nature of the violence, particularly as to who was the perpetrator of it and who was the victim of it and what caused it, but there is little doubt on the evidence before me, including the reporting by Ms E of the interaction and conversations she had with the two older girls of the three, that indeed their lives in the household with their mother and the second respondent father, were lives in which they experienced a great deal of tumult and behaviour and conduct on the part of their mother and stepfather that children should not be exposed to.

17. The second respondent father goes on to assert that the child X calls his mother “Granny” and calls his father “Grandad”.  He makes the assertion that she is actually quite close to both of his parents.  He says that his parents are prepared to apply, which I understand to mean apply to this court, for the child to live with them as he is under a cloud at the moment due to the allegations that the eldest daughter, Y, has made against him which he hastens to say in the affidavit are utterly false. 

18. He attaches a medical certificate from a general practitioner to his affidavit in which the general practitioner tells the Court that the second respondent has been suffering from asthma and COPD (Chronic Obstructed Pulmonary Disease I understand that to be).  His current systems and lung function are excellent says the doctor and there is no evidence of limitation of activity of his daily activities and he is functionally fit.  The doctor says his urine drug and alcohol screen is negative but says nothing more about that.  There is also a letter that he attaches from a Ms F who is the Team Leader from K Group Town C, it looks like, to certify that the second respondent father has attended 18 sessions of a family violence program that began in October last year and up until 23 March 2017. 

19. As I pointed out to counsel who appears for the second respondent father today, it is normal for the Court to expect in an application like this, where the sorts of allegations that have been made in this case involving the second respondent have been made, which I will return to shortly, for affidavits of the proposed supervisors who are not professional but members of the parent’s family, such as in this case, his parents, to be filed.  In such affidavits, the Court is usually told something about the proposed supervisors, something about their relationship with their child who is the parent in the proceedings and their understanding of the nature of the allegations that have been made and their understanding of the onerous nature of the responsibility supervising in circumstances where such allegations are made.  Although I was told the second respondent’s parents are outside in the precincts of the Court, no explanation was offered as to why such affidavits have not been sworn and provided by them in advance to the other parties as is, as I said, normally expected in such circumstances.

20. The application comes not only in the context of the existing orders being for time to be supervised at the Town C Contact Centre, but in the context of the Family Report prepared by Ms E being as comprehensive as I described it and concluding with recommendations made only two weeks ago by Ms E that the youngest child X spend time and communicate with the second respondent putative biological father once a week at the Town C Contact Centre.  Ms E’s recommendation includes the recommendation that the second respondent’s parents who he proposes to be supervisors in today’s application, be at liberty to participate in the visits.

21. During his submissions to the Court, counsel who appeared for the second respondent father was, notwithstanding my request to take me to parts of Ms E’s report that assisted his application, unable to point to any aspect of it that took the matter any further in his client’s favour than the position reached as of the December orders made by Judge Lapthorn.  I say that with respect to counsel’s position, giving him full credit for the fact that he did not try to paint a picture of Ms E’s report as presenting something that it does not. 

22. Indeed, for the record’s sake, I also note the mother opposes the application; the father of the two eldest girls, the first respondent, opposes the application to the extent that his position is relevant; and importantly, the interveners with whom the child X is also living with her sisters at the moment pursuant to Judge Lapthorn’s orders, oppose the application.  Finally, and fairly critically, the Independent Children's Lawyer opposes the application and takes me to Ms E’ report pointing out a number of relevant paragraphs and does so in the context of pointing to Ms E’s recommendation, that I have just referred to before, that X’s time with her father should continue to be supervised at a contact centre. 

1. He took me to paragraph 203 of Ms E’s report where Ms E has referred to her interview with the second respondent father where she points out that she was aware that his preference was for X to live with him; where she was aware of his description of X as being a different child when she spends time with him and his parents, different from when she’s with her mother; and where she points out that the second respondent father asserted to her that he and his parents would ensure that X’s needs were well met. 

2. He also pointed out paragraph 239 of Ms E’s report which records some matters raised during Ms E’s interview with the child Y, that she undertook in part of the preparation of this family report.  She said that the child expressed a further level of concern for her younger sister X, explaining that the second respondent father is her father and expressing the view that she worries that the second respondent father could assault her “like he assaulted me”, but she went on to say that she hoped that he would not do that to his own daughter.  Ms E reports that the eldest child Y related that she did not want X to go through what the second respondent father had done to her.

3. Paragraph 240 has Ms E reporting that the child Y told her that she had spoken to the police about the second respondent father assaulting her but she did not feel comfortable to talk about it at all because they sent a male policeman.  Ms E does not set out anywhere what Y actually asserts was the nature of this alleged assault.

4. It is seemingly clear on my understanding of the evidence and the submissions that have been made to me, that there is an allegation made – principally made against the second respondent father by the interveners (whom I suspect have the support of their son, the first respondent father), that the eldest child Y, has made a disclosure to them, that her stepfather, the second respondent, somehow dealt with her in a sexually inappropriate way at some stage in the past.  I understand that the second respondent father appreciates and understands that such an allegation has been made against him, but denies it vehemently.  I understand that from what I have read of the Family Report that the mother does not support the allegation and I understand that from her assertions, reported to Ms E at least, that these allegations only arose once the children went to live with the interveners.  The suggestion being that it has just been manufactured to somehow harm her case and the case of the second respondent father.

5. I have heard that, and the evidence suggests, that the child Y was interviewed by the police at some stage last year with the reported information that I have mentioned that she gave to Ms E being offered in support of a notion that she was not able to or did not feel free or comfortable enough to fully disclose the details of the alleged assault to the police on that occasion.  I understand it to also be said by the interveners that she has since then made further disclosures to them with more particular detail.  I am unaware of the particulars and detail of those further disclosures, those not having been deposed to in an affidavit. But the interveners have made a further complaint to the Child Protection Investigation Unit of the Queensland Police Service based in Town C, that is yet to be further investigated some three and a half weeks after this latest complaint was made, the reasons for such delay not being known, understood or appreciated by the interveners or the solicitors who act for them. 

6. In pressing his client’s interests and his client’s Application in a Case, Mr Sorensen took me to a document that was a document said to be authored by the child Y herself sometime late last year which was attached as an exhibit to an affidavit of the female intervener filed on 25 October 2016.  It was a lengthy document in which the child was said to have recorded her thoughts, having been asked to do so by her grandmother, the female intervener.  There was one passage in there that Mr Sorensen took me to where the child made a reference to the second respondent asserting something to the effect of, the mother said he had hurt the girls but that he had never done so.

7. If that was authored by the child as is said, and I do not have any real reason to doubt that, it certainly creates an inconsistency between expressions of her beliefs that day and any subsequent ones where she is said to have disclosed having been sexually assaulted by the second respondent father.  It is inconsistent also with that which is reported the child had said to Ms E in Ms E’s report, the details of which I have already given.

8. Ultimately this court is required to make such parenting orders as it considers proper with the best interests of the subject children being the paramount concern.  On an interim basis, that is, when an Application in a Case like this is being heard, the obligation is no different from that which exists at the end of a long hearing where there has been days and days of cross-examination and exploration of the evidence in great detail. 

9. The difficulty that the Court faces and parties to parenting litigation in this court face when applications are being made, heard and determined on an interim basis, is that the Court proceeds effectively on the papers alone, that is the written evidence that is before it without any chance for cross-examination and more in depth analysis and consideration of the evidence.  This is relevant in this particular case as the possible explanations for the inconsistent positions apparently adopted by the child Y are not able to be explored with any degree of forensic certainty. 

10. Often the Court can act on the evidence that is agreed between the parties and undisputed.  But where there is significant dispute between the parties about factual matters of extreme relevance, such as particularly in respect to the physical and emotional safety of children in the care of one or more of any particular adults, no factual determinations are readily and easily made in the context of such highly contested, disputed facts. 

11. In this particular case I am conscious of the inconsistency, I am conscious of the fact that the father might feel aggrieved given that there is some evidence that the child wrote that he has not hurt her, in circumstances where interim orders are in place and might remain in place for a lengthy period of time whilst this matter is prepared for trial, listed for trial and ultimately heard and determined.

12. Nevertheless, the Court is mindful in determining proper parenting orders that are in the children’s best interests on an interim basis of the need to ensure that children are protected as well as balancing that with the need for them to maintain meaningful relationships with their parents. Of course, the father would know, no doubt having been advised by Mr Sorenson, that where there is a conflict between the obligation or the need to ensure that a child maintains a meaningful relationship with a parent and the need for that child to be protected from emotional and physical and even sexual harm, then the need to protect the child takes priority pursuant to those more recent amendments to the provisions of s 60CC(1) of the Family Law Act.  In this particular case, ultimately, I am not in a position to determine that the proposed supervisors, the parents of the second respondent, are indeed appropriate as supervisors in such a case.  There is simply no evidence from them before the Court. 

13. In these circumstances, where there is an existing order for supervised time that was put in place by consent only about three months ago, and where since that order was made a very comprehensively written family report ultimately makes numerous recommendations which include a recommendation that the second respondent father’s time with X continue to take place in the supervised setting at the Town C Contact Centre on a weekly basis, in circumstances where he can take his parents along if he wishes, I am persuaded that the child X’s best interests and indeed the best interests of all three of these children in the circumstances, are best served at this point in time by maintaining that arrangement that is currently in place.

14. Satisfied of same, I dismiss the father’s application in a Case recently filed.

15. Mr Kingston, the Independent Children's Lawyer, has also pointed out to me that he has made arrangements with Dr G, who is a psychiatrist known to the Court, who has for many years been preparing psychiatric reports for parties for this Court, to see the mother in this particular case on 15 June 2017.  He has done that as I understand it, following the recommendation of Ms E in her report that an independent psychiatric assessment be conducted for the mother and that relevant subpoenaed material be made available to the assessing psychiatrist. 

16. However, Mr Kingston tells me that that is not the end of it.  In order to be able to obtain the report from Dr G he would be relying completely on a decision of Legal Aid Queensland to fund such a report and as such, he informs the Court that he is not confident of simply being able to rely on Ms E’s recommendation.  In these times of heightened constraint, the Legal Aid Office’s resources having been trimmed rather significantly over the last couple of years, the Legal Aid Office is loath to simply grant aid to fund psychiatric reports unless they are considered to be absolutely necessary. 

17. Mr Kingston says all that to the Court in support of a submission that the Court should make a direction, an indication or an intimation that it requires or would appreciate the assistance of Dr G in the preparation of such a report that might influence Legal Aid Queensland to fund that report. 

18. I accept his submission.  As we are often told, this Court only deals with around about, give or take a few percent, ten percent of the matters that are filed pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred on this Court and the Federal Circuit Court by the Family Law Act in this registry.  It follows from that alone, but also in my experience, that those parenting cases that come to this Court, particularly transferred from the FCC, to this Court, as this one was, that fit into that ten percent of the total filings that this court actually undertakes, are regarded, and generally in my experience always are, the real difficult pointy end of the parenting disputes that these courts see. 

19. One only has to look at this case, there being an applicant, two respondent fathers, an Independent Children's Lawyer and some interveners.  The number of parties in this case I think ranks only second behind the case that I heard that has the most number of parties in this.  I think we need only one more party Mr Kingston for it to equal that.  The allegations that are made in this case, the evidence that I have seen so far against and about and for all the parties, is significant.  That the department has been involved to the extent that they have in the lives of these three girls is indicative of the difficult parenting context within which these girls have so far grown. 

20. There is a significant body of evidence that I have already read that points fairly and squarely at the difficulties that the mother has had in her life, across a number of fronts.  The evidence suggests prima facie that she has had over the years great difficulties dealing with alcohol and coping with alcohol use and abuse.  The evidence also suggests that over the years she has had equal difficulties dealing with illicit drugs and their use and abuse.  The evidence also points prima facie to her having had great difficulties in respect of her choice of partners in that she has chosen to partner with men who have also had significant difficulties with alcohol and illicit drugs and she has partnered with men in relationships that have one way or another produced significant amounts of violence. 

21. I am not yet in a position to be able to say with any great degree of accuracy that the violence was all perpetrated against the mother by these two men, because in fairness, at least one of the men, the second respondent father, makes pretty strong assertions that the violence was principally levelled at him by the mother and that he was the victim of her violence and her manipulation of the system such that he ended up in jail as a consequence.  However I do understand from the evidence that both these men have spent time in jail as a consequence of being found guilty by courts of the State of Queensland of having contravened family violence orders made against them in protection of the mother in this case. 

22. Whatever the second respondent father says about who was responsible for it in this court, one cannot go behind a judgment of a magistrate who convicted him and sent him to jail for contravention of family protection orders.  There is also evidence to suggest that the mother indeed has been admitted to a mental health ward in a hospital on some occasion.  There is evidence to prima facie support the notion that the girls, particularly the two older girls, have reported that they suffered significant violence at the hands of their mother and having regard to the evidence that the mother denies that, serious questions are raised for determination by the Court.  The mother is effectively asking the Court to find that her daughters are substantial liars, and at the same time asking for them to be put back in her care. 

23. Having read carefully the report of Ms E, I am quite satisfied that there are serious questions raised that need to be considered and hopefully answered in respect of the mother’s mental health and/or indeed if not her mental health, then her personality characteristics and vulnerabilities.  It is those issues that the Court usually gets great assistance with from reports by psychiatrists such as Dr G.  In this case I have no hesitation in saying to the Independent Children's Lawyer to the extent that it supports his application for funding for a report that this is one of those cases at the pointy end in which the court would get a great deal of assistance from a report prepared by Dr G.

I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Forrest delivered on 3 April 2017.

Associate: 

Date:  14 January 2019