Gregory Anthony Briggs v The Queen

[2014] HCASL 39

GREGORY ANTHONY BRIGGS

v

THE QUEEN

[2014] HCASL 39
B40/2013

1. On 3 September 2012, following a trial by jury in the District Court of Queensland, the applicant was convicted of two counts of unlawful stalking.  On 4 September 2012, the trial judge (Devereaux DCJ) sentenced the applicant to 15 months' imprisonment on the first count and 9 months imprisonment on the second count.  Both sentences were fully suspended.

2. The prosecution case was, inter alia, that the applicant sent certain text messages to the complainant.  During his closing address to the jury, the applicant's counsel submitted that the applicant could not have sent one said message because, at the time it was allegedly sent, the applicant was not in Australia.  Subsequently, this submission was demonstrated to be false: a Department of Immigration record indicated that the applicant was still in Australia at the time of the alleged call.

3. The error of the applicant's counsel was brought to the attention of the jury, which was then readdressed by the prosecution and defence before retiring to consider its verdict.  The trial judge refused the applicant's request for the jury to be discharged because his counsel's error might cause the jury to approach other submissions made by his counsel with unwarranted circumspection.

4. On 14 May 2013 the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Holmes and Gotterson JJA and Daubney J) unanimously dismissed the applicant's appeal against conviction on the basis that the damaging effect of the mistaken submission was not so prejudicial as to render the failure to discharge the jury a miscarriage of justice.  The Court of Appeal further concluded that the prosecution's case was so overwhelmingly strong that the mistaken submission did not deprive the appellant of a real chance of acquittal.  

5. The applicant seeks special leave to appeal to this Court on the ground that a miscarriage of justice occurred when Devereaux DCJ refused to discharge the jury following defence counsel's closing address.  The application does not raise any issue of principle.  Nor are the interests of the proper administration of justice engaged.  The applicant does not enjoy sufficient prospects of success to warrant a grant of special leave to appeal.  Special leave should be refused.

6. Pursuant to r 41.11.1 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.  

S.M. Kiefel
6 March 2014 P.A. Keane