Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen

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[2011] HCATrans 100

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S18 of 2011

B e t w e e n -

BRETT ANDREW GREEN

Applicant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S61 of 2011

B e t w e e n -

SHANE DARRIN QUINN

Applicant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Applications for special leave to appeal

FRENCH CJ
CRENNAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 8 APRIL 2011, AT 12.37 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

MR T.A. GAME, SC:   If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant, Green, with my learned friend, MR D.P. BARROW.  (instructed by Legal Aid NSW)

MS G.A. BASHIR:   If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant, Quinn.  (instructed by Ford Criminal Lawyers)

MR I.D. TEMBY, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent in both matters.  (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW))

FRENCH CJ:   Yes, Mr Game.

MR GAME:   If the Court pleases.  There are essentially two subjects, one relating to parity and the other relating to the standard non‑parole period, although the second brings in a question about the correct application of this Court’s decision in Markarian.  If I could take the Court directly to the minority’s decision in the Court of Criminal Appeal at application book 38, after considering the decisions in McIvor and Borkowski, and showing briefly but succinctly why creating a disparity on a Crown appeal is different than correcting one on an offender’s application, the court observed at paragraph 10 that none of the cases relied upon by Justice Hulme in his judgment actually addressed the essential question considered in McIvor, and that the dichotomy, as it were, referred to and in the centrepiece of his Honour Justice Hulme’s judgment -their Honours deal with that at paragraph 11 saying that essentially such a dichotomy does not exist having regard to the nature of the appeal.  Then we see at paragraph 23 the two reasons why the court would dismiss the appeal, the minority.

Now, if we go then to Justice Hulme’s judgment at paragraph 101, first of all we would see why at paragraph 100 an acceptance, as did Justices Allsop and McCallum, that parity did apply in this case, and his Honour Justice Hulme accepted at paragraph 100, page 63, that it applied particularly in the case of Green.  His Honour then considered the decisions in McIvor, Borkowski at 65, and Cvitan, each of which were statements of principle against the position taken by Justice Hulme.  So too was a decision in the case of Bavin in the Court of Criminal Appeal.

Having considered those his Honour then turned to a series of cases, all of which were decided, except for the first on page 68 called Guthrie, but Guthrie really did not consider the question of principle at all.  Then his Honour recited a series of cases,…

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Case
[2011] HCATrans 100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

These appeals concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained by police in circumstances where the applicants, Green and Quinn, were detained and questioned without legal representation. The applicants were convicted of serious offences, and their appeals to the High Court of Australia arose from the admission of evidence obtained during their respective periods of detention.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the evidence obtained from the applicants during their unlawful detention should have been excluded. This required the Court to consider the principles governing the admissibility of evidence obtained in contravention of an accused's rights, particularly the right to legal advice and the privilege against self-incrimination, and the discretion of the trial judge to exclude such evidence.

The Court, comprising French CJ and Crennan J, affirmed the principle that evidence obtained in contravention of an accused's rights may be excluded in the exercise of a judicial discretion. This discretion is informed by considerations of fairness to the accused and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. The Court held that the admission of the evidence in both cases was an error, as the circumstances of the detention and questioning rendered the subsequent admissions unreliable and unfair to the applicants. The Court allowed the appeals, quashed the convictions, and ordered new trials.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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