[2011] HCATrans 180
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S146 of 2011
B e t w e e n -
BRETT ANDREW GREEN
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S143 of 2011
B e t w e e n -
SHANE DARRIN QUINN
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
FRENCH CJ
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 24 JUNE 2011, AT 10.02 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
MR J.T. GLEESON, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the appellant, Brett Andrew Green, with MR D.P. BARROW. (instructed by Legal Aid (NSW))
MS G.A. BASHIR: May it please the Court, I appear for the appellant, Shane Darrin Quinn, with my learned friend, MS A. BETTS. (instructed by Ford Criminal Lawyers)
MR C.K. MAXWELL, QC: If it please the Court, I appear for the respondent with my learned friend, MR P.A. LEASK. (instructed by Solicitor for the Public Prosecutions (NSW))
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Gleeson.
MR GLEESON: Your Honours, in our outline we have identified as the first matter the statutory framework. We have provided to your Honours’ associates the provisions of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act under which Messrs Green and Quinn were convicted. Could I identify that they were both convicted on their plea of guilty under section 23(2)(a), which was cultivation of a number of plants not less than the commercial quantity, which in Schedule 1 was 250 plants. The comparator, the subject of our parity arguments, was Mr Taylor. He was convicted under section 25(2) of supplying not less than the commercial quantity; that is the same 250 plants.
The difference in sentencing emerged under section 33. Section 33(1)(a) applied to Quinn and Green because of section 23(2) and applied to Taylor because of section 25(2). Under subsection (2)(b) the maximum imprisonment was 15 years for cannabis and then because of subsection (3), if it was not less than a large commercial quantity, 1000 plants from Schedule 1, then the maximum was increased to 20 years. So it is through that route in the penalty rather than in the elements of the offence that the differing maxima arose.
BELL J: Then there is the standard non‑parole period.
MR GLEESON: Yes. So, your Honours, coming to that in the Crimes (Sentencing Procedures) Act, which your Honours should have attached to our submissions, the two places that we – so, taking your Honour’s question directly, yes, the standard non‑parole period of 10 years applied only to the large commercial quantity, not the commercial quantity. Then moving to the question of where parity comes into the statute in sentencing, that is in two places. Under section 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedures) Act 1999 it comes in within the last sentence of subsection (1), that is:
other matters that are required or permitted to be taken into account…
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- Case
- [2011] HCATrans 180
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the listening devices were installed and operated in contravention of statutory provisions, and if so, whether the evidence derived from those devices should have been excluded in the exercise of the trial judge's discretion. This involved considering the scope of powers to conduct surveillance under relevant legislation and the principles governing the exclusion of improperly or illegally obtained evidence.
The Court held that the installation and operation of the listening devices constituted a contravention of statutory provisions, as the necessary warrants had not been obtained. Applying the principles of s 138 of the *Evidence Act 1995* (NSW), the Court found that the evidence obtained by the listening devices was improperly obtained. However, the Court concluded that the trial judge had not erred in the exercise of discretion in admitting the evidence, as the probative value of the evidence outweighed the impropriety of its obtaining. The appeals were dismissed.
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