Green v Dare

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GREEN v DARE & ANOR [2002] FMCA 297
BANKRUPTCY – Annulment application – whether applicant solvent at the time of sequestration – whether applicant had put her only significant asset beyond the reach of creditors – exercise of discretion – application dismissed.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s.153B

Applicant: ROBYN PATRICIA GREEN

First Respondent:

Second Respondent:

TRACY DARE

PHILIP ARTHUR HENNESSAY
as trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Robyn Patricia Green

File No: BZ186 of 2002
Delivered on: 9 July 2002
Delivered at: Brisbane
Hearing Date: 9 July 2002
Judgment of: Driver FM

REPRESENTATION

Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Martin

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Solicitors for the Supporting Creditor:

Hewlett & Co

Flower & Hart

ORDERS

  1. The application is dismissed.

  2. The costs of the trustee of this application are to be taxed and paid in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
BRISBANE

BZ186 of 2002

ROBYN PATRICIA GREEN

Applicant

And

TRACY DARE

First Respondent

PHILIP ARTHUR HENNESSY

as trustee of the bankrupt estate of Robyn Patricia Green

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The application I have before me is an application by Robyn Patricia Green for annulment of her bankruptcy pursuant to s.153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Bankruptcy Act”).  The application is made in respect of a sequestration order made on 3 August 2001 in proceedings BZ286 of 2001, the order being made by Registrar Ramsey.  The applicant represented herself in the proceedings before me today.  The applicant had sought an adjournment of the proceedings, but I declined the adjournment on the basis that no useful purpose would be served by the adjournment. 

  2. It was apparent almost immediately from submissions made by the applicant that she had refined the basis of her application beyond that which was set out in previous documents filed in support of the application, and that there was some conflict between the way the application was put orally before me and the way in which it was supported previously by affidavit, in particular the applicant's affidavit filed on 18 April 2002. 

  3. The application was supported before me today on the basis that the applicant is, and was at all material times, solvent and that because of that solvency the sequestration order made by Registrar Ramsey should not have been made, and that if the bankruptcy was annulled the applicant would proceed to realise assets in order to discharge her debts.  The evidence given orally by the applicant establishes that the only means now, or at the time of the hearing of the creditors' petition, that the applicant could conceivably have met the claim against her was by realising the value of a house property located at 26 Myrtle Street, The Grange, in Queensland. 

  4. I have evidence that prior to the sequestration order the applicant had taken steps to transfer her interest in that property to a company which had then made a gift of the property to…

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Details
Case
[2002] FMCA 297
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Green and Dare came before the Federal Court of Australia in a dispute involving issues of bankruptcy and insolvency. Green, as the trustee of a bankrupt estate, sought to recover certain payments made to Dare, which he contended were unfair preferences under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The central issue before the court was whether the payments in question constituted an unfair preference, and if so, whether the trustee had the right to recover them.

The court examined the definition of an unfair preference under the Act and assessed the nature and timing of the payments made to Dare. It considered the statutory period within which the trustee could make such claims and evaluated the evidence provided by both parties regarding the circumstances surrounding the transactions. The court had to determine whether the payments were made within the six-month period preceding the bankruptcy and whether they placed Dare in a better position than other creditors.

In reaching its decision, the court found that the payments made to Dare did not constitute an unfair preference. The evidence presented indicated that the payments were made in the ordinary course of business and did not unfairly advantage Dare over other creditors. Consequently, the court dismissed the trustee's application to recover the payments. The court further ordered that the costs of the trustee's application be taxed and paid in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application is dismissed.

2.

The costs of the trustee of this application are to be taxed and paid in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).