Green v Bolton
[1999] QCA 268
•20/07/1999
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 99.268 SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND Appeal No. 2826 of 1999
Brisbane
[Green v Bolton & Ors]
BETWEEN:
BARRY GREEN and ERICA MAUD GREEN
(Applicants) Appellants
AND:
HARRY MACKAY BOLTON and VALERIE GLENDA BOLTON as trustees for the BOLTON FAMILY TRUST, BINBEX PTY LTD (ACN 010 744 395) as trustee for the BINBEX UNIT TRUST, TRILBY HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 010 014 856) as trustee for the TRILBY HOLDINGS TRUST, TARYN PJH PTY LTD (ACN 009 773 577) as trustee for the PAUL HAURITZ DISCRETIONARY TRUST
(Respondents) Respondents de Jersey CJ
Pincus JA
Thomas JA
Judgment delivered 20 July 1999
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made.
APPEAL DISMISSED, SAVE THAT PARAGRAPH (a) OF THE DECLARATION MADE
BELOW ON 10 MARCH 1999 BE VARIED BY ADDING, AFTER THE WORDS
"SHAREHOLDER ENTITLEMENTS", THE WORDS "(SAVE FOR THE $25, 000
DIVIDEND PAYMENT INSTALMENT DUE ON 1 JULY 1999)".
APPELLANTS TO PAY RESPONDENTS' COSTS OF AND INCIDENTAL TO THE
APPEAL TO BE TAXED.CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS - contract for sale of shares - provision that sale complete upon payment of share purchase price and employee and shareholder entitlements - provision for adjustment of such entitlements - whether contemplated adjustments of temporary or permanent nature - whether relevant clause should be read down.
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing
Rights Association Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 99 Counsel: Mr H B Fraser QC, for the appellants
Mr R J Douglas SC, with him Mr. PE Hack, for the respondentsSolicitors: M F Lyons & Associates for the appellants
Bowdens Lawyers for the respondentsHearing Date: 9 June 1999 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 2826 of 1999
Brisbane
Before de Jersey CJ
Pincus JA
Thomas JA[Green v. Bolton & Ors]
BETWEEN:
BARRY GREEN and ERICA MAUD GREEN
(Applicants) Appellants
AND:
HARRY MACKAY BOLTON and VALERIE GLENDA BOLTON as trustees for the BOLTON FAMILY TRUST, BINBEX PTY LTD (ACN 010 744 395) as trustee for the BINBEX UNIT TRUST, TRILBY HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 010 014 856) as trustee for the TRILBY HOLDINGS TRUST, TARYN PJH PTY LTD (ACN 009 773 577) as trustee for the PAUL HAURITZ DISCRETIONARY TRUST
(Respondents) Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - de JERSEY CJ
Judgment delivered 20 July 1999
1 The appellants, Mr and Mrs Green, entered into an (undated) agreement in writing to sell
their shares in the company Automatic Control Company Pty Ltd to a number of natural persons and
corporations. The purchasers are the respondents to this appeal. The agreement provided also for
Mr and Mrs Green’s relinquishing control of the company to the respondents. The parties disagreed
as to the proper construction of those parts of the agreement which determined the amount payable
by the respondents, and Mr and Mrs Green brought a construction summons before a chamber
judge. They now appeal against the declarations made by that learned judge.
2 It is a comprehensive agreement comprising 16 foolscap size typed pages of terms, together
with five schedules and a number of attachments. Mr and Mrs Green agreed to sell their two shares
(clause 1.1), being the only issued shares in the company, for “the purchase price” set out in clause
1.2. Clause 1.2 provided that the completion of the sale should occur “upon payment ... of the
balance of the share purchase price and of the employee entitlements and of the shareholder
entitlements”. Each of Mr and Mrs Green was to be paid $42,500 for his or her share - by the
payment of a total of $80,000 on or before 30 June 1996 and $5,000 on or before 1 July 1999.
30 June 1996 was termed as the “commencement date”. On that date, in exchange for that
aggregate sum of $80,000, Mr and Mrs Green were to secure the appointment of four more
directors, but with Mrs Green retiring; and the articles of association of the company were to be
amended to ensure that neither Mr nor Mrs Green could be governing director.
3 The “completion date” was defined (clause 21.1) as 1 July 1999 or any earlier date by which
Mr and Mrs Green may have been paid “the whole of the share purchase price, the employee
entitlements and the shareholder entitlements”. Title to the shares was to be transferred on the
completion date.
4 The issue in the case principally concerns employee entitlements and shareholder
entitlements. Part 2 of the agreement, which includes clauses 5 and 6, covers the latter. It records
an acknowledgement of a debt owed by the company to Mr and Mrs Green in the amount of
$123,772, to be paid in three instalments by, respectively, 31 August 1996, 30 June 1997 and 30
June 1998. Further, the company was to pay dividends “from available profits” totalling $176,228,
by quarterly instalments during the year ending 30 June 1998, and the year ending 1 July 1999.
5 The employee entitlements are provided for by Part 3, which includes clauses 7 and 8. The
company was to continue to employ Mr and Mrs Green, paying salary and superannuation
contributions. Mr Green was to be paid retirement benefits totalling $627,800, in four instalments
by, respectively, 31 March 1997, 30 June 1997, 30 June 1998 and 30 June 1999.
6 Part 4 is headed “Funding of Entitlements ...”. Clause 9.1 obliges the purchasers jointly to
contribute, by way of loan to the company, the moneys necessary to allow the company to pay Mr
and Mrs Green their shareholder entitlements and employee entitlements. There was an entitlement
in the Greens to terminate should the purchasers default in their obligation to make such
contributions, in which event there was provision for retransfer of the shares as necessary.
7 Part 5 confirms that Mr and Mrs Green’s entitlements “by way of share purchase price,
shareholder entitlements and employee entitlements” are those set out in schedule 2 to the agreement.
Schedule 2 contains a summary of the amounts payable by reference to dates, chronologically. By
clause 11.2, Mr and Mrs Green acknowledge that upon payment of the share sale price, the
shareholder entitlements and the employee entitlements, they would have no further claim against the
company.
8 Mr Fraser QC, who appeared for the appellants, emphasised the apparently absolute terms
in which those entitlements are, to this point in the agreement, accorded. The issue between the
parties is created by Part 5, especially clauses 12.1 and 12.2, which should be set out in full:
“PART 5 - ADJUSTMENTS IF REDUCTION IN PROFITABILITY, LOSS OF
ACUTHERM DISTRIBUTORSHIP12 Adjustments if reduction in profitability
12.1
In the event that the profits of the Company (calculated adopting the same accounting policies as have been used in the Accounts, and subject to that according to accepted accounting principles and making all proper provisions and adjusting for abnormal and extraordinary items, but before deducting as an expense any of the Employee Entitlements provided for in Part 3 and any additional costs
incurred by reason of the sale and purchase provided for in this Agreement including premiums on the life policy for Mr Green) in any of the three years ending 30 June 1997, 30 June 1998 or 30 June 1999, fall below $250,000.00, then the amount payable by the Company to Mr Green and Mrs Green on account of the Shareholder Entitlements provided in Part 2 (and if necessary the Employee Entitlements provided in Part 3) shall be reduced, so that the total of the Shareholder Entitlements and the Employee Entitlements payable in that year shall not exceed the amount of the adjusted profit figure for that year.
12.2 If any reduction is made in any year pursuant to clause 12.1 above, then the amount of the reduction shall be payable in the next year, or the year after that, to the extent that the profits in that next year or that year after exceed $250,000.00” 9 To understand the significance of those provisions, one should first note that all parties
agreed to use their best endeavours to maintain the profitability of the company until completion
(clauses 15.1 and 15.4). The issue between the parties arising from clause 12 is, essentially, whether
the contemplated adjustments were of temporary application, regulating the extent of the obligation
to pay “on account” of the entitlements, in the years up to the completion date of 1 July 1999,
subject always however to an overriding obligation to pay out the full amount of the entitlements by
that date; or whether alternatively, and as found by the learned judge, they could operate to reduce,
permanently, the amount payable to Mr and Mrs Green in respect of these entitlements. The judge
considered that clause 12 should be treated “as having a general overriding or qualifying operation”
on the earlier clauses which, taken alone, would have accorded an absolute entitlement to the
specified amounts, without reduction. Hence the declarations the judge made:
“That on the proper construction of the agreement referred to in the summons -
(a) the moneys payable on the completion date in respect of Employee Entitlements and Shareholder Entitlements may be varied by operation of clauses 12.1 and 12.2;
(b) clause 11.2 of that agreement does not operate to prevent the applicants from claiming or recovering after the completing (sic) date any part of the Shareholder Entitlements or the Employee Entitlements which may become payable after the completion date by operation of clauses 12.1 and 12.2 of the said agreement.
(c) the completion date of the agreement is 1 July 1999
10 For ease of reference, Schedule 2 to the agreement follows:
“ SCHEDULE 2
Summary of payments to Mr Green and Mrs Green, year by year
Date Nature of Payment Amount $ Amount $ (not later than) (in period)
1.7.96 Deposit upon shares $80,000.00 by 1.7.96 $80,000.00 31.8.96 Repayment of loan account $50,000.00 31.3.97 Long service leave payment, Mr Green $100,000.00 Monthly from Superannuation contributions for Mrs Green $67,200.00 1.7.96 to 1.2.97 of $8,400.00 30.6.97 Retirement benefit for Mr Green and Mrs $67,800.00 Green ($135,000.00 - $67,200.00 super) 30.6.97 Repayment of loan account $50,000.00 year ending $335,000.00 30.6.97 30.6.98 Repayment of loan account (balance) $23,772.00 ($123,772.00 - $50,000.00 - $50,000.00) quarterly year Dividend payment ($200,000.00 - $76,228.00 ending 30.6.98 $123,772.00) 30.6.98 Retirement benefit for Mr Green (in lieu of $140,000.00 superannuation) 30.6.98 Retirement benefit for Mr Green $85,000.00 (year ending $325,000.00 30.6.98) 30.6.99 Retirement benefit for Mr Green $85,000.00 30.6.99 Retirement benefit for Mr Green (in lieu of $150,000.00 (year ending $235,000.00 superannuation) 30.6.99) Quarterly year Dividend payment $100,000.00 ending 1.7.99 Balance of payment for shares $5,000.00 (by 1.7.99) $105,000.00 TOTAL $1,080,000.
00"11 It will be seen that clause 12.1, taken alone, contemplates the possibility of lesser amounts
than those specified in the schedule being paid, in any of the three years to 30 June 1999, if the
company’s annual profitability should fall below $250,000. As Mr Fraser stressed, the amount
payable in the particular year “on account of” the requisite entitlement would then be reduced. This
fitted well, he submitted, with the clear and absolute terms in which the agreement earlier confirms
those entitlements.
12 The difficulty in his argument is created by clause 12.2, which contemplates that should a
reduced amount be payable in, say, the year ended 30 June 1999, then “the amount of the reduction
(should) be payable in (the year ended 30 June 2000) ... to the extent that the profits in that ... year
... exceed $250,000". Does this imply that if the extent of the reduction cannot thereby be
“recouped”, in practical terms, Mr and Mrs Green’s entitlements are to be taken effectively to have
been permanently reduced? Emphasising the specified “completion date” of 1 July 1999, Mr Fraser
submitted that clause 12.2 should be read down, making it subject to an overriding obligation to
complete on 1 July 1999 and not later, and to pay by then the full shareholder and employee
entitlements referred to in Schedule 2 without reduction. In a situation where the company’s
profitability in the year ended 30 June 1999 fell below $250,000, Mr Fraser submitted, as the only
operation of clause 12 upon the obligation to pay, ultimately, the full amount of the specified
entitlements, a deferment to 1 July 1999 (being the specified completion date).
13 One must read the agreement as a whole, seeking to discern the parties’ intent, where
possible rendering the provisions “all harmonious one with another” (Australian Broadcasting
Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1973) 129 C.L.R. 99, 109).
It is possible to do that here, by reading Part 5 as providing for the possible reduction in the
entitlements elsewhere expressed. That was of course the approach of the learned chamber judge.
14 Mr Fraser’s submission cannot readily accommodate the need, in the event of profits of less
than $250,000 in the year ended 30 June 1999, to look to profitability in the year ended 30 June
2000 to determine whether the amount of the reduction might then be recouped. To overcome that
hurdle, he sought, as he put it, to “read down” clause 12. But the necessary modification to the
clause would do it too much violence. His emphasis on 1 July 1999 as an immutable completion
date sits uncomfortably with the point just made, as it does with other provisions of the agreement
which contemplate a continued life beyond that date - for example, clause 9.2.4 which provides for
the possible retransfer of shares back to Mr and Mrs Green. The commercial explanation for the
scheme appears to be the parties’ reliance on continued profitability of the company to the specified
level for the three years preceding the specified completion date, with the parties being obliged “to
use their best endeavours” to that end (clause 15), there being a mechanism then under clause 12
effectively to reduce the vendor’s entitlements appropriately in the event that expectations as to
profitability are not fulfilled.
15 In one respect His Honour’s declaration should nevertheless be varied. Clause 6.1 obliges
the company to pay dividends aggregating $100,000 “by equal quarterly instalments during the year
ending 1 July 1999". That means that an instalment of $25,000 will fall due on 1 July 1999. The
amount of $25,000 is not payable in the year ended 30 June 1999 to which clause 12.1 refers, and
there is therefore no prospect of reduction in the liability to pay that amount. This point was not
raised before His Honour. His declaration might be read as allowing for variation in the amount to
be paid in respect of that particular obligation. It should therefore be varied clearly to exclude that
amount.
16 The appeal should be dismissed, save that paragraph (a) of the declaration made by the
learned chamber judge on 10 March 1999 should be varied by adding, after the words “shareholder
entitlements”, the words “(save for the $25,000 dividend payment instalment due on 1 July 1999)”.
The appellants should pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the appeal to be taxed.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 2826 of 1999
Brisbane
Before de Jersey CJ
Pincus JA
Thomas JA[Green v Bolton & Ors]
BETWEEN:
BARRY GREEN and ERICA MAUD GREEN
(Applicants) Appellants
AND:
HARRY MACKAY BOLTON and VALERIE GLENDA BOLTON as trustees for the BOLTON FAMILY TRUST, BINBEX PTY LTD (ACN 010 744 395) as trustee for the BINBEX UNIT TRUST, TRILBY HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 010 014 856) as trustee for the TRILBY HOLDINGS TRUST, TARYN PJH PTY LTD (ACN 009 773 577) as trustee for the PAUL HAURITZ DISCRETIONARY TRUST
(Respondents) Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - PINCUS JA
Judgment delivered 20 July 1999
I have read the reasons prepared by the Chief Justice and agree with them. It is puzzling
that the clauses of the agreement providing for payment to the appellants make no reference to cl
12 and this gives rise to a suspicion that the parties might have intended cl 12 to have a lesser
operation than its terms indicate. The appellants argued that one should read cl 12 down, so as to
make the reductions it requires merely temporary ones, not affecting the sums payable on 1 July
1999. But the language in which cl 12 is expressed is inconsistent with that construction. I agree
that the orders proposed by the Chief Justice should be made.IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 2826 of 1999
Brisbane
Before de Jersey CJ
Pincus JA
Thomas JA[Green v Bolton & Ors]
BETWEEN:
BARRY GREEN and ERICA MAUD GREEN
(Applicants) Appellants
AND:
HARRY MACKAY BOLTON and VALERIE GLENDA BOLTON as trustees for the BOLTON FAMILY TRUST, BINBEX PTY LTD (ACN 010 744 395) as trustee for the BINBEX UNIT TRUST, TRILBY HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 010 014 856) as trustee for the TRILBY HOLDINGS TRUST, TARYN PJH PTY LTD (ACN 009 773 577) as trustee for the PAUL HAURITZ DISCRETIONARY TRUST
(Respondents) Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THOMAS JA
Judgment delivered 20 July 1999
The relevant parts of the agreement are sufficiently referred to in the reasons of the Chief
Justice with which I agree.
The ultimate submission of the appellants was that clause 12 should be read as subsidiary to the overall "Entitlements" of the appellant vendor mentioned in clause 11. The respondents' submission is that clause 12 merely provides for part payment out of profits during the three years
leading up to settlement, and that any balance under clause 11 must then be paid by the respondents
on completion.
In my view clause 12 cannot be sensibly read down to play the subsidiary role for which
the appellants contend. Such a submission virtually robs clauses 12.1 and 12.2 of practical effect,
in that, on the appellants' construction, clause 12.2 does no more than defer the date of payment
by one day in the event that the contemplated profits over the period in question fell short of the
amount contemplated by clause 11. If one contemplates a short fall in the third year it is difficult to
see how on this construction it could be "payable in the next year ... to the extent that the profits in
that next year ... exceed $250,000".
The purchase price contemplated by clause 11 consisted of three components namely share
sale price, shareholder entitlements and employee entitlements. The question is whether the
shareholder entitlements stated in the scheduled clause 11.1 are qualified by clauses 12.1 and 12.2.
It seems to me that the agreement gives no clear statement of minimum price or of any fixed
entitlement to a particular sum for shareholder entitlements. If it had been intended that the payment
of the profits of the company over the three years in question were to be mere instalments or
payments on account, one would have expected a clear indication that they bore such a character,
or some mention of a balance to be payable on settlement. It seems to me that reading the
agreement as a whole it does not make the shareholder entitlements figures in Schedule 2 a fixed
component of the purchase price. Rather the intention seems to have been that the amount payable
to the appellants "shall be reduced" in accordance with the scheme set out in clauses 12.1 and 12.2,
which allows for adjustments beyond settlement date.
5 Further indications which go against the existence of a fixed sale price are contained in Part
5 (clauses 12 and 13) each of which provides for particular reductions according to events that might
occur after the making of the agreement. These events were reduction in profitability (clause 12) and
loss of the Acutherm distributorship (clause 13).
6 I appreciate, as did the learned judge below, that some possible combinations of fact might
produce odd or curious results according to the interpretation that his Honour adopted. Such results
however would be no more odd or curious than the one day extension that the appellants submit is
the effect of clause 12.2. Whilst neither interpretation is entirely satisfactory, the agreement as a
whole does not in my view contemplate a fixed purchase price in respect of the shareholder
entitlements under clause 11.2. That clause provides for provisional entitlements to be adjusted
according to events that might happen under Part 5. Other parts of the agreement including clause
9 support the view that there is life in the agreement and the prospect of adjustment after settlement
date.
7 It is unnecessary to canvass further the many points raised by counsel for the respective
parties in favour of one view or the other. In my view, subject only to the minor adjustment
proposed by the Chief Justice, the construction expressed by the learned chamber judge and his
reasons for preferring that construction were correct.
8 I agree with the orders proposed by the Chief Justice.
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