Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd (in liq) v Rafeletos

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd (in liq) v Rafeletos

[2012] FCA 1302

Citation: Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd (in liq) v Rafeletos [2012] FCA 1302
Appeal from: Rafeletos v Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1168
Parties: GREAT WALL RESOURCES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)  v GEORGE RAFELETOS
File number: NSD 1672 of 2012
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 12 November 2012
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 588F(1), 588FB, 588FC, 588FE(2) and (3)
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW)
Cases cited: Rafeletos v Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 1168 referred to
Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 applied
The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Mehta [1975] 1 WLR 1087 applied
Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 applied
Wilde v Australian Trade Equipment Co Pty Ltd (1981) 145 CLR 590 applied
Date of hearing: 12 November 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 22
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S D Robb QC
Solicitor for the Applicant: Swaab Attorneys
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R E Dubler SC with Mr R White
Solicitor for the Respondent: Thomas Booler & Co

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1672 of 2012

BETWEEN:

GREAT WALL RESOURCES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)
Applicant

AND:

GEORGE RAFELETOS
Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 NOVEMBER 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time filed on 29 October 2012 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application, excluding any work done on the preparation of the affidavits of Marcel Joukhador and of Darel Hughes, both sworn on 9 November 2012.  

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1672 of 2012

BETWEEN:

GREAT WALL RESOURCES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)
Applicant

AND:

GEORGE RAFELETOS
Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

12 NOVEMBER 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. This is an application for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge to refuse an application by the liquidator of Great Wall Resources Pty Limited (in liq) to set aside an order granting a stay of a judgment.  The stay was made conditional on Great Wall executing a mortgage securing any amount due under the judgment and interest in favour of George Rafeletos, the applicant below:  Rafeletos v Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 1168.

    PRINCIPLES

  2. An application for an extension of time in which to appeal or seek leave to appeal puts at risk a vested right of the respondent to the application.  That position is in contrast to the one position where an application for an extension of time merely concerns the doing of an act in respect of…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 1302
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd (in liquidation) sought an extension of time to appeal against a judgment entered in favour of Mr Rafeletos, who had sued the company for repudiation of a contract. The primary judge had imposed a condition upon the stay of the judgment, namely that Great Wall grant Mr Rafeletos a first mortgage over certain parts of a property in Yallah as security for the enforcement of the judgment. The company granted the mortgage on 8 March 2010, and it was subsequently registered under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). The court had to decide whether the grant of the mortgage was valid and if the primary judge's decision was correct. The court held that the primary judge's decision was correct. The court explained that once Great Wall granted the mortgage, it operated in its own terms and the conditional order for the stay did not compel the company to act. The court found that the argument that the imposition of the condition of the stay on 5 March 2010 created an order similar in effect to a final order for the grant of a mortgage had no substance. The court also noted that the validity of the registration of the mortgage was not dependent on the continued subsistence of the order extending time. Therefore, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time.

The court found that there was no basis to doubt the correctness of the primary judge's decision, nor was there any likelihood of substantial injustice flowing from his decision. The court held that any appeal that might be brought would be without merit. Therefore, the application for extension of time filed on 29 October 2012 must be dismissed with costs. The court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application, excluding any work done on the preparation of the affidavits of Marcel Joukhador and of Darel Hughes, both sworn on 9 November 2012.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time filed on 29 October 2012 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application, excluding any work done on the preparation of the affidavits of Marcel Joukhador and of Darel Hughes, both sworn on 9 November 2012.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

An applicant for leave to appeal must establish that the decision in question is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave and must also show that substantial injustice will result from a refusal of leave to appeal: Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 at 231 [29] per McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ.BACKGROUND The relevant circumstances were set out in detail in the reasons of the primary judge. It suffices to say that on 19 June 2009 his Honour gave provisional reasons for judgment after a substantive hearing. He found that Great Wall had repudiated its agreement with Mr Rafeletos on which he had sued for damages. The primary judge expressed a provisional view as to the damages to which Mr Rafeletos was entitled. He assessed this as the value of 20% of the issued shares in Great Wall as at the date of judgment, derived on the basis that the company’s only activity after the date of the agreement, had been to engage in the acquisition, development and sale of lots in a significant property in the Wollongong area, at Yallah. Initially, Mr Rafeletos’ evidence indicated that Great Wall had a liability in the order of $2.5 million. On 17 November 2009, his Honour ordered judgment against Great Wall in about that sum. At the same time, his Honour granted a stay up to 11 December 2009 so that the company would have an opportunity, if it was so inclined, to apply for leave to re-open its case in relation to the assessment of damages. That was because, up until then, it had not put on evidence to deal with damages, in breach of orders that his Honour had made earlier for that purpose. Subsequently, his Honour extended the stay on a number of occasions. When the matter came before his Honour on 18 December 2009, he imposed two conditions of the stay of the earlier judgment. One condition was that Great Wall grant Mr Rafeletos a first mortgage over identified parts of the Yallah property as security for the enforcement of any judgment or order in the proceeding. No such mortgage was then granted. The proceedings came before his Honour again on 5 February 2010. On that occasion he noted that the earlier stay had terminated, but he reimposed it without attaching the above condition. Critically, when the matter came before his Honour on 5 March 2010, his Honour extended the stay up to and including 26 March 2010 upon the condition that Great Wall grant to Mr Rafeletos, no later than 4 pm on 8 March 2010, a first mortgage in the form that his Honour initialled and dated. That form of mortgage was again over part of the Yallah property. It secured in favour of Mr Rafeletos the amount of any judgment together with interest in the proceeding. Great Wall executed the mortgage in that form on 8 March 2010. Subsequently the mortgage was registered under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). It was common ground before his Honour that Great Wall was insolvent as at both 5 and 8 March 2010. However, there was no suggestion that the company’s director or Mr Rafeletos was aware of that fact at the time. Great Wall was ordered to be wound up on 7 December 2010.GREAT WALL’S APPLICATIONS BELOW

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Great Wall asserted no independent right to set aside the grant of the mortgage or its registration under the provisions of the Real Property Act other than that this was a consequence, so it asserted, of the Court’s order. In my opinion, that argument has no substance for the reasons given by the primary judge and as demonstrated by in Wilde 145 CLR at 603-604.CONCLUSION The basis on which the extension of time is sought are as follows. His Honour delivered ex tempore reasons for judgment on 25 September 2012. The solicitor for the liquidator informed his client that he understood that the time for filing an appeal or application for leave to appeal did not begin to run until his Honour’s revised reasons had been provided to the parties. Great Wall concedes that that view was erroneous. Were that the only obstacle to the granting of an extension of time, I would have been minded to accede to the application. However, for the reasons above, there is no basis to doubt the correctness of the decision of the primary judge, nor is there any likelihood of substantial injustice flowing from his decision. Accordingly, any appeal that might be brought being without merit, no purpose would be served by granting an extension of time in which Great Wall could seek leave to appeal. The application for extension of time filed on 29 October 2012 must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In my opinion, that situation is akin to that in Wilde v Australian Trade Equipment Co Pty Ltd (1981) 145 CLR 590 at 603-604. There Stephen, Murphy and Wilson JJ discussed the effect of the Court setting aside an earlier order granting a creditor an extension of time in which to register a charge against a company. In that case, the relevant legislation did not provide that registration of the charge became void ab initio if an order extending the time in which it might be registered were made erroneously or set aside. When the order granting the extension of time was subsequently set aside, the charge had been registered. Their Honours said that:“… the consequence that will follow an order setting aside an earlier decision will vary from case to case. So long as the earlier decision stands, and no stay is operative, it is a lawful decision and the action taken in reliance upon it is lawful. It is true that from the moment it is set aside the order can no longer provide the lawful justification for further action, but whether what has been done can be undone will depend upon the availability of appropriate remedies, to bring about the appropriate relief. ...We are unable to escape the conclusion that the order extending time was beyond recall so soon as registration had been effected in reliance upon it, and once those steps were taken the operation of the order could not be undone retrospectively. It follows that the validity of the registration was not dependent on the continued subsistence of the order extending time, and consequently the order setting aside the extension of time could not affect the registration that had already been concluded.” (emphasis added) In my opinion, the reasoning of the primary judge is on all fours with that approach. Great Wall argued that in substance the imposition of the condition of the stay on 5 March 2010 created an order similar in effect to a final order for the grant of a mortgage. I reject that characterisation. The conditional order for a stay did nothing of the sort. That order gave Great Wall an indulgence under which, if it chose, it could obtain a stay of an enforceable order of the Court by granting the mortgage. Once Great Wall granted the mortgage the stay came into operation. The Court made no order that compelled Great Wall to act so as to grant the mortgage. Once Great Wall granted the mortgage, it operated in its own terms. Great Wall asserted no independent right to set aside the grant of the mortgage or its registration under the provisions of the Real Property Act other than that this was a consequence, so it asserted, of the Court’s order. In my opinion, that argument has no substance for the reasons given by the primary judge and as demonstrated by in Wilde 145 CLR at 603-604.CONCLUSION The basis on which the extension of time is sought are as follows. His Honour delivered ex tempore reasons for judgment on 25 September 2012. The solicitor for the liquidator informed his client that he understood that the time for filing an appeal or application for leave to appeal did not begin to run until his Honour’s revised reasons had been provided to the parties. Great Wall concedes that that view was erroneous. Were that the only obstacle to the granting of an extension of time, I would have been minded to accede to the application.