GRD v R

[2009] NSWCCA 149

New South Wales
Court of Criminal Appeal

CITATION:	GRD v R [2009] NSWCCA 149
HEARING DATE(S):	1 May 2009
JUDGMENT DATE:	22 May 2009
JUDGMENT OF:	McClellan CJatCL at 1; Grove J at 2; Buddin J at 3
DECISION:	1 Grant leave to appeal. 2 Allow the appeal. 3 Quash the sentences imposed in the District Court and substitute the following sentences: (a) In respect of count 1, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 12 months to commence on 17 August 2007 and to expire on 16 August 2008. (b) In respect of count 2, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 12 months to commence on 17 August 2007 and to expire on 16 August 2008. (c) In respect of count 3, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 18 months to commence on 17 August 2007 and to expire on 16 February 2009. (d) In respect of count 4, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of 18 months imprisonment to commence on 17 August 2007 and to expire on 16 February 2009. (e) In respect of count 5, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 12 months to commence on 17 February 2008 and to expire on 16 February 2009. (f) In respect of count 6, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 12 months to commence on 17 February 2008 and to expire on 16 February 2009. (g) In respect of count 7, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 18 months to commence on 17 February 2008 and to expire on 16 August 2009. (h) In respect of count 9, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 18 months to commence on 17 February 2008 and to expire on 16 August 2009. (i) In respect of count 8, the applicant is sentenced to a non-parole period of 18 months to commence on 17 February 2008 and to expire on 16 August 2009 and to a total term of imprisonment of 3 years 6 months to commence on 17 February 2008 and to expire on 16 August 2011. The effective non-parole period is thus 2 years and the total term of imprisonment is 4 years. The applicant will be eligible for release on parole on 16 August 2009.
CATCHWORDS:	Criminal law - sentencing - various counts of indecent assault and acts of indecency committed upon a child under 16 - offences committed about 30 years ago - need to impose sentences by reference to the pattern of sentencing that existed at time of offending
LEGISLATION CITED:	Crimes Act 1900 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 Parole of Prisoners Act 1966
CATEGORY:	Principal judgment
CASES CITED:	AJB v R (2007) 169 A Crim R 32 Bradbury v R [2008] NSWCCA 93 Featherstone v R [2008] NSWCCA 71 MJL v R [2007] NSWCCA 261 R v MJR (2002) 54 NSWLR 368 R v Thomas [2004] NSWCCA 291 R v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517
PARTIES:	GRD (Applicant) Regina (Respondent)
FILE NUMBER(S):	CCA 2007/8922
COUNSEL:	A Francis (Applicant) N Noman (Crown) (Respondent)
SOLICITORS:	S O'Connor (Solicitor for Legal Aid Commission) (Applicant) S Kavanagh (Solicitor for Public Prosecutions) (Respondent)
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:	District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):	07/51/0013
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:	Moore ADCJ
LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:	23/08/2007

2007/8922

McCLELLAN CJ at CL
GROVE J
BUDDIN J

FRIDAY 22 MAY 2009

GRD v R

Judgment

1 McCLELLAN CJ at CL: I agree with Buddin J.

2 GROVE J: I agree with Buddin J.

3 BUDDIN J: The applicant seeks leave to appeal against the severity of sentences imposed upon him in the District Court. The applicant pleaded guilty to an indictment containing nine counts which, in essence, alleged sexual misconduct on his part some 30 years ago. There were six counts of indecent assault upon a child under the age of 16. Each of those counts alleged a contravention of s 76 of the Crimes Act which has since been repealed. A maximum penalty of six years imprisonment was provided at the relevant time for such an offence. The other three counts each involved the commission of an act of indecency by the applicant with a child under the age of 16. Each of those counts alleged a contravention of s 76A of the Act which has also since been repealed. A maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment was provided at the relevant time for such an offence. Sentence was passed on 23 August 2007 and the overall effect of the various sentences which were imposed was to produce a non-parole period of 3 years with a total term of 6 years imprisonment to date from 17 August 2007. His Honour indicated that the applicant would be eligible for release to parole on 17 August 2010. I will refer to the individual sentences which were imposed in respect of the various counts when dealing with a specific ground of appeal which complains about the process by which those sentences were pronounced.

4 The sentence hearing proceeded by way of an agreed statement of facts. The offences occurred between January 1976 and December 1980. At the time of the offences the victim, who was the applicant’s step-daughter, was aged between 9 and 13 years. The applicant, who was born in August 1943, was 64 when he stood for sentence. He was aged between 35 and 39 at the time of the offences. The applicant voluntarily desisted from his criminal behaviour at the end of 1980 although he continued to live with the victim’s mother for about another five or six years after that time. In all, that relationship lasted for about 12 years.

5 The victim complained to her sister in either 1980 or 1981 and then in 1989 or 1990 she informed her mother about what had happened to her. In 1997 the victim telephoned the applicant and spoke to him about the abuse. He admitted his wrongdoing and offered her money. At the request of the victim, the applicant told his then wife about what he had done. In June 2005 the victim reported the matter to police. In December that year the victim made three calls to the applicant which were the subject of lawfully authorised intercepts. During those calls the applicant again admitted that he had sexually abused the victim. In August 2006 the applicant was interviewed by police and made admissions in respect of those matters which he said that he was able to recall. The details of the particular offences to which the applicant pleaded guilty are set out below:

Count 1: 1 January 1976 - 31 December 1977 - Indecent assault- victim 9

[the applicant placed the victim’s hand on his penis]

Count 2: 1 January 1977 - 31 December 1980 - Indecent assault- victim 9-13

[the applicant removed both his and the victim’s clothes, sat the victim on his lap, and rubbed his penis on her genitals while moving her up and down]

Count 3: 1 January 1977 - 31 December 1980 - Indecent assault- victim 9-13

[the applicant removed both his and the victim’s clothes and performed cunnilingus upon her]


Count 4: 1 January 1977 - 31 December 1980 - Indecent assault- victim 9-13

[the applicant digitally penetrated the victim]

Count 5: 1 January 1977 - 31 December 1980 - Act of indecency- victim 9-13

[the applicant placed the victim’s hand on his genitals]

Count 6: 1 January 1977 - 31 December 1980 - Act of indecency- victim 9-13

[the applicant placed the victim’s hand on his genitals]

Count 7: 1 January 1977 - 31 December 1980 - Act of indecency- victim 9-13

[the applicant made the victim fellate him]

Count 8: 1 January 1979 - 31 December 1980 - Indecent assault- victim 12-13

[the applicant digitally penetrated the victim]

Count 9: 1 January 1979 - 31 December 1980 - Indecent assault- victim 12-13

[the applicant removed the victim’s pants and lay on top of her with an erect penis. The victim thought he was going to penetrate her and said “no”]

6 The first offence occurred whilst the family was living in Ballina, offences 2-7 inclusive occurred whilst they were living at Fernleigh and the final two offences occurred after the family had returned to live in Ballina.

7 The sentencing judge was provided with a pre-sentence report as well as a psychiatric report which had been prepared on behalf of the applicant. His Honour also heard sworn evidence from the applicant. From that material it emerged that the applicant had experienced a turbulent and emotionally deprived childhood. He left home at 15 largely because of the difficult relationship that he had had with his mother. He was understandably very affected by the fact that she committed suicide when he was aged 19.

8 The sentencing judge made a number of findings, that were favourable to the applicant, which served to ameliorate the otherwise appropriate sentences. His Honour extended to the applicant a discount of 25% on account of his decision to plead guilty at an early stage and, in doing so, recognised that it had relieved the victim from the ordeal of having to give evidence. His Honour found that the applicant had what he described as a “palpable sense of remorse”. His Honour noted that the applicant had confessed before police had become involved.

9 The sentencing judge took into account the fact that the applicant had always been gainfully employed and referred, in that context, to a testimonial from his employer, who said that he was prepared to re-employ the applicant upon his release from custody. The applicant had no prior convictions and had led an otherwise blameless existence.

10 The author of the pre-sentence report reported that the applicant had been found, according to the static – 99 actuarial risk assessment, to present a “low risk” of recidivism. The sentencing judge also accepted the opinion of the psychiatrist that the applicant was unlikely to re-offend. The sentencing judge also acknowledged that there had been a substantial delay in bringing the matters to resolution during which time the applicant had completely rehabilitated. It was particularly apparent that the applicant had been left in a “state of uncertain suspense as to what [would] happen to him” from the time the victim first spoke to him in 1997 until his arrest in 2006: see generally R v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517 at 519.

11 The disclosure by the applicant to his wife about his offending conduct led to the breakdown of that marriage, which was the applicant’s second. The sentencing judge accepted the applicant’s evidence that following the breakdown of that marriage, he had not sought another relationship because of what the applicant regarded as the uncertainty surrounding his future. As a result of the disclosure of his offending behaviour, the applicant also decided to effectively cut himself off from the rest of his family. A further factor which the sentencing judge regarded as having some significance was the circumstance that the applicant was the carer of his 14 year old son to whom he was devoted. The applicant gave evidence, which the sentencing judge accepted, that although his ex-wife was able to look after their son in the short-term, the applicant had real concerns about whether that would remain the case for the entirety of his sentence given that the relationship between his ex-wife and his son was far from harmonious. His Honour took into account the interests of the applicant’s son in having their relationship restored at the earliest possible time, and the fact that this was the applicant’s first custodial sentence, as reasons which warranted a finding of “special circumstances”.

12 The following grounds of appeal were relied upon:

1 The sentence is manifestly excessive when regard is had to sentencing practice at the time of the offences;

(a) in respect of the non parole period;

(b) in respect of the head sentence.
2 His Honour erred in failing to impose a non parole period in respect of counts 3 and 4.

Ground 2

13 It is convenient to deal with this ground first. It is common ground that the pronouncement of the various sentences by the sentencing judge was attended with confusion and ambiguity. During the course of delivering his remarks on sentence, his Honour pronounced the following sentences:

In respect of each of counts 1 & 2: a sentence of imprisonment for 2 years;
In respect of each of counts 3 & 4: a sentence of imprisonment for 4 years to date from 17 August 2008 (which was expressed to be “partly cumulative as to 1 year” on the earlier sentences);
In respect of each of counts 5 & 6: a sentence of imprisonment for 2 years to date from 17 August 2008;
In respect of count 7: a sentence of imprisonment of 2½ years to date from 17 August 2008;
In respect of each of counts 8 & 9: a sentence of imprisonment of 4 years to date from 17 August 2009

14 As will be apparent, his Honour did not set a non-parole period for any of the sentences which he had pronounced. As I have said, his Honour specifically indicated that the overall sentence which he intended to impose was one which comprised a non-parole period of 3 years with an overall term of imprisonment for 6 years. Such a result could only have been achieved by nominating non-parole periods for the sentences which were imposed, in respect of counts 3, 4, 8 and 9. Complaint was made that the sentencing process had miscarried as a result of the uncertainty which had been created.

15 The Crown provided the court with documentation which showed that his Honour had made plain, in written form on the day that he passed sentence, the sentences which he had intended to impose. Customarily the sentencing judge endorses the back of the indictment with the details of the sentences which have been imposed. That procedure was not followed in the present case simply because, as I understand the situation, there was insufficient space on the back of the indictment to record all the relevant information. Accordingly, the relevant information was set out in a typed document which was annexed to the indictment and signed by the sentencing judge. That document records that the following sentences had been imposed:

In respect of count 1: a 2 year fixed term to commence on 17 August 2007 and to expire on 16 August 2009;

In respect of each of counts 4 years imprisonment with
2, 3 & 4: a non-parole period of 2 years to commence on 17 August 2008 and to expire on 16 August 2010;

In respect of counts 5 & 6: a 2 year fixed term to commence on 17 August 2008 and to expire on 16 August 2010;
In respect of count 7: a sentence of imprisonment of 2½ years with a non-parole period of 2 years to commence on 17 August 2008 and to expire on 16 August 2010;
In respect of counts 8 & 9: 4 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 1 year to commence on 17 August 2009 and to expire on 16 August 2010.

16 The matter was re-listed the following day. Pursuant to the “slip-rule”, which is contained in s 43 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, his Honour made the following corrections to the sentences which he had imposed.

In respect of each of counts 5 & 6: a fixed term of 1½ years imprisonment to commence on 17 August 2008 and to expire on 16 February 2010;
In respect of count 7: a fixed term of 2 years imprisonment to commence on 17 August 2008 and to expire on 16 August 2010

17 A further document was created upon which those corrections were recorded. The warrants of commitment which were issued, pursuant to s 62 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 on 23 and 24 August 2007 respectively, reflect what his Honour had recorded in the documents to which I have just referred.

18 I am satisfied that those documents, being the formal written record of the sentences, effectively remove any ambiguity about the individual sentences which his Honour had sought to impose. In R v Thomas [2004] NSWCCA 291, Handley JA, with whom other members of the court agreed, observed that:

The first ground relies upon errors in the Judge's remarks on sentence and the inconsistency between some of those remarks and the sentence finally pronounced.
…

There is no doubt that the Judge misstated the effect of his sentences on more than one occasion in the course of his remarks. This could be a serious matter in some circumstances, but in other circumstances it is open to a Court to find that the errors are mere slips of the tongue or errors of transcription.

In the present case, the Judge's intention is clear because of the formal written record he signed on 14 March, the same day as the oral sentences were pronounced.

This resolves any ambiguity that would otherwise arise and attracts what is known as the slip rule which enables a Court to give effect to its clear intention, and in doing so, to rectify any formal slips or errors.

The slips and errors are only in his Honour's oral reasons for imposing the sentences that he did, and the matter is made quite clear, as I have said, by the formal written record signed on 14 March.

I would reject the first ground. (paras 12, 18-22)

19 For the same reasons the ground of appeal which is relied upon in the present case, should be rejected.

Ground 1

20 It is now well established that a judge who is sentencing an offender in respect of historical offences, must do so by reference to the pattern of sentencing that existed at the time of the offending. Obviously that requirement extends to the imposition of an appropriate non-parole period: R v MJR (2002) 54 NSWLR 368; AJB v R (2007) 169 A Crim R 32; MJL v R [2007] NSWCCA 261; Featherstone v R [2008] NSWCCA 71; Bradbury v R [2008] NSWCCA 93. Each of the offences to which the applicant pleaded guilty occurred whilst the Parole of Prisoners Act 1966 was in operation. Unlike the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, that Act placed no restriction upon the setting of the non-parole period. In AJB (supra) [at 36-9] and in Bradbury (supra) [at 36] this Court observed that non-parole periods imposed under that legislative scheme were usually in the order of between one third and one half of the head sentence.

21 It was contended on the applicant’s behalf that a number of the individual sentences were on their face, manifestly excessive. It was submitted that in respect of counts 3, 4, 8 and 9 which, as I have said, each attracted a maximum penalty of 6 years imprisonment, the sentencing judge must have adopted a starting point of 5 years 6 months imprisonment before allowing the discount of 25% for the plea of guilty. It was submitted in respect of counts 5 and 6, that the starting point must have been the maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment before the discount for the plea of guilty was applied and in respect of count 7, it was submitted that it was plain that the sentencing judge had made no allowance whatsoever for the plea of guilty because he had imposed the maximum penalty. Sentences of that length, it was submitted, could only have been imposed for offences which fell into the worst category of case and there was simply no basis upon which his Honour had, or indeed could have, reached such a conclusion. In my view, the applicant’s submission should be accepted.

22 The applicant also placed considerable reliance upon the decisions of this court in AJB (supra) and Bradbury (supra). In AJB the offender was dealt with in respect of five counts of indecent assault and asked that four offences of a similar nature be taken into account. Howie J, with whom the other members of the court agreed, described the relevant factors in that case in the following terms:

The offences were committed over a period of three years from 1979 against the applicant’s stepdaughter. She was aged between six and a half and ten years at the time of the offending. Each of the offences was an indecent assault with a child under 16 years contrary to either s 76 of the Crimes Act , now repealed, or s 61E(1) of that Act. Each carried a maximum penalty of imprisonment for six years.

The victim complained to her mother about the applicant’s conduct in 1982. The applicant as a result sought treatment from a psychiatrist and the family remained together for another ten years without any further misconduct by the applicant toward the victim. The victim complained again to a police hotline in 1993 but there was no response. Ultimately she made a complaint in 2005 that resulted in the arrest of the applicant in July of that year. He initially denied the conduct. However, he pleaded guilty before the Local Court and was committed for sentence to the District Court. The Judge gave him the benefit of a discount of sentence of 25 per cent for the utilitarian benefit of the pleas of guilty.

The conduct that gave rise to four of the offences for which he was sentenced involved the applicant simulating sexual intercourse with the complainant by rubbing his erect penis between her legs and on her vagina while they were both naked from the waist down. On each occasion he ejaculated but once he was wearing a condom. The fifth offence related to an incident when the applicant fondled the complainant’s vagina beneath her panties while they were in the family vehicle. The offences on the Form 1 involved sexual assaults committed on different occasions and including simulated intercourse without ejaculation, fondling the complainant’s vagina, fondling her breasts, and requiring the complainant to rub cream on his penis. The final assault occurred after the complainant had made complaint to her mother. Throughout the period of the offences the applicant was married to the complainant’s mother and the complainant treated him as her father. After the initial complaint the applicant attended a psychiatrist, Dr Dignam, in 1982 for therapy. He diagnosed the applicant as having an anxiety neurosis and a personality disorder.

The applicant was aged 60 years at the date of sentence, having been born on 23 November 1946. He has no criminal record. He was living on the Sunshine Coast in Queensland with his wife and two children. This was his fourth long-term relationship and commenced in 1998. His wife suffers from Sjogrens Syndrome, an autoimmune disease. The applicant is a retired fireman. There was in evidence a pre-sentence report that set out his background. There was little of relevance other than that the applicant stated that his employment as a fireman led to traumatic incidents that resulted in his use of alcohol to cope with stress. This was particularly so after he attended the Luna Park fire in 1978. The applicant was in receipt of a pension and regular payments of compensation from the NSW Fire Service. The applicant expressed remorse for the offending to the officer preparing the report but was unable or unwilling to recall the details of the offences.

There was in evidence a report from Dr Westmore, a psychiatrist, dated February 2006. When asked about the offences, the applicant told Dr Westmore that he was drinking heavily at the time and having difficulties with his wife who was too concerned with the problems of her neighbours. He said that the victim would sit on his lap and it led him “to do these things”. The applicant acknowledged that the behaviour was wrong and would have damaged the victim. He said that he did not find her sexually attractive but it was a release for him. The applicant told the psychiatrist that he had been drinking alcohol heavily for about 10 years until he sought counselling and attended AA. He was drinking only lightly at the time of the interview. Dr Westmore diagnosed the applicant as suffering from chronic symptoms of depression at the time of the offending. He did not find him to be a paedophile. He thought his risks of re-offending were negligible to non-existent and his prognosis was generally good. (at paras 3-7)

23 A little later, his Honour observed:

However, it seems to me, notwithstanding due regard being paid to the discretion of the sentencing judge in a matter that presented no simple task, that such a starting point was manifestly excessive in what was an unusual case. It is not so much the fact that the offences occurred over 24 years ago that seems to place this case into a category of its own, because such delays while uncommon are not unknown, but rather the fact that, the offending having been brought to light, the applicant sought treatment and as a result and, most significantly, did not offend again. Over the period of time since offending the applicant had completely reformed and had moved onto other relationships without any suggestion of any similar conduct reoccurring. There is no error that I can discern in the sentencing remarks so far as the fixing of the overall head sentence is concerned. But it is one of those cases where my immediate reaction to the sentence was that it was too severe, given the delay and the applicant’s reform. Having considered the sentencing remarks in detail and the arguments of counsel before this Court, I am convinced that my immediate reaction was correct.
I think that what I said in Moon at [81] is perhaps even more appropriate in the somewhat unusual circumstances of this case:
... In a case such as this where there has been such a lengthy delay between offence and sentence and where the offender is rehabilitated, it is the fact of imprisonment rather than the length of the sentence which will be of greatest significance to punish the offender and denounce his conduct. Although general deterrence is important it can never be allowed to dictate a sentence which is not proportionate to the offence committed or appropriate to punish the particular offender before the court. [paras 29-30]

24 An overall sentence of 3 years with a non-parole period of 18 months was substituted by this court for the original sentence of 4 years with a non-parole period of 3 years.

25 In Bradbury (supra), Matthews AJ, with whom the other members of the court agreed, set out the details of that offender’s behaviour in the following terms:

The victim in relation to each offence was the offender’s youngest daughter. The offences took place when she was between 8 and 12 years old. Briefly, the activities covered by each of the four charges were as follows.

The first offence took place when the victim was about 8 years old. At that stage she would often have a bath while her mother was preparing dinner. Her father came into the bathroom, sat down beside the bath and touched her on the outside of her vagina with his fingers.

The second offence took place when the victim was 9 or 10 years old. She was called into the laundry by the applicant. He had his shorts open and his penis exposed. He took the victim’s hands and placed them around his penis and testicles. He then made her rub these areas with her hands.

The third offence took place when the victim was 11 or 12 years old. One day after she had returned home from school, the applicant approached her while she was in the lounge room alone watching television. He started to wrestle with her in a joking manner. During the course of this he put his hand into her underpants and touched her on the outside of her vagina with his fingers.

The fourth offence occurred during this same period. The victim was again approached by the applicant one afternoon after returning from school. He took off her underpants and performed cunnilingus with her. He was masturbating at the time. Her vagina was sore after this occasion. [paras 4-8]

26 This court then proceeded to resentence the applicant, who was aged 80, to a head sentence of 2 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 months. The original sentence had comprised a non-parole of 1 year 9 months with an additional term of nine months.

27 I should observe that the sentencing judge was provided with no assistance as to the principles which govern the sentencing of offenders for historical offences. Nor was his Honour made aware of the decision in AJB (supra). (The judgment in Bradbury was delivered after the applicant was sentenced). It is of course necessary to proceed with considerable caution when comparing one case with another. Obviously enough there are differences between the cases to which the Court was referred and the present one. The age of the applicant in Bradbury is one such point of distinction. Although it is not easy to now retrieve reliable data as to the appropriate range of sentences for offences of the present kind, the decisions to which I have referred nonetheless provide a useful guide as to that range. They also serve to confirm my own preliminary impression that the sentences which were imposed exceeded the legitimate range of the sentencing judge’s discretion.

28 In my view, it is necessary to proceed to resentence the applicant. Section 76 encompassed a wide range of conduct which now falls within the definition of “sexual intercourse” in s 61H of the Act. Some of the offences that the applicant committed such as fellatio, cunnilingus and digital penetration constituted serious examples of the type of offending that was within the reach of the section. Moreover, the offending conduct extended over a five year span and it was rendered more serious because of the relationship of trust that existed between the applicant and his step-daughter.

29 In resentencing, I have had regard to an affidavit affirmed by the applicant. In it he indicates that he is employed on a full-time basis in the trusted position of clerk for the Superintendant of Industries. The applicant also indicates that he remains concerned about his son who is said to be exhibiting behavioural problems.

30 There is one further matter which requires comment and it arises from the following paragraph which appears in the applicant’s affidavit:

I am on the waiting list to do the 24 week CORE program. I am happy to do this program and am just waiting for my name to come up. I have been advised that I can not get parole until I have completed this course.

31 As I understand the situation, that program is designed, inter alia, to address the all important objective of reducing the risk of recidivism amongst offenders who have been convicted of offences of sexual misconduct. As I have already said, the sentencing judge concluded that the applicant did not represent such a risk. Nor has the court’s attention been drawn to any other material which would suggest otherwise. I recognise that a decision about an offender’s entitlement to be released upon parole is properly a matter which is within the province of the Parole Board. Nevertheless, I can see no legitimate reason why it should be regarded as an impediment to the applicant being able to obtain parole, should it transpire that he has not completed the CORE program at the time that his eligibility for parole arises for consideration.

32 I would find “special circumstances” for the reasons identified by the sentencing judge.

33 I propose the following orders:

1 Grant leave to appeal.

2 Allow the appeal.

3 Quash the sentences imposed in the District Court and substitute the following sentences:

(a) In respect of count 1, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 12 months to commence on 17 August 2007 and to expire on 16 August 2008.

(b) In respect of count 2, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 12 months to commence on 17 August 2007 and to expire on 16 August 2008.

(c) In respect of count 3, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 18 months to commence on 17 August 2007 and to expire on 16 February 2009.

(d) In respect of count 4, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of 18 months imprisonment to commence on 17 August 2007 and to expire on 16 February 2009.

(e) In respect of count 5, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 12 months to commence on 17 February 2008 and to expire on 16 February 2009.

(f) In respect of count 6, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 12 months to commence on 17 February 2008 and to expire on 16 February 2009.

(g) In respect of count 7, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 18 months to commence on 17 February 2008 and to expire on 16 August 2009.

(h) In respect of count 9, the applicant is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 18 months to commence on 17 February 2008 and to expire on 16 August 2009.

(i) In respect of count 8, the applicant is sentenced to a non-parole period of 18 months to commence on 17 February 2008 and to expire on 16 August 2009 and to a total term of imprisonment of 3 years 6 months to commence on 17 February 2008 and to expire on 16 August 2011.

The effective non-parole period is thus 2 years and the total term of imprisonment is 4 years. The applicant will be eligible for release on parole on 16 August 2009.

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