Gray v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   GRAY -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2013] WASC 22

CORAM:   HALL J

HEARD:   22 JANUARY 2013

DELIVERED          :   22 JANUARY 2013

PUBLISHED           :  30 JANUARY 2013

FILE NO/S:   CPCA 30 of 2011

BETWEEN:   ROBERT BRUCE GRAY

First Plaintiff

SARA GRAY
Second Plaintiff

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Defendant

Catchwords:

Criminal property confiscation - Objections dismissed - Declaration that all property confiscated

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Objection dismissed
Declaration made

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

First Plaintiff                :     No appearance

Second Plaintiff            :     No appearance

Defendant:     Mr M Seaman

Solicitors:

First Plaintiff                :     No appearance

Second Plaintiff            :     No appearance

Defendant:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Hendricks v The State of Western Australia [2002] WASC 86

Re Smith; Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [No 3] [2004] WASC 157

  1. HALL J:  By summons filed on 18 October 2012 the State applies for orders that the first and second plaintiff's objections to the confiscation of the property of the first plaintiff be dismissed and that there be a declaration that that property has been confiscated to the State of Western Australia.

  2. The application for the orders dismissing the objections is made on the basis that the objections cannot be successful because the criteria in s 84(2) of the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA) (the CPCA) have not been established. The application for a declaration that the property of the first plaintiff has been confiscated is made on the basis that he was declared to be a drug trafficker pursuant to s 32A(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) on 20 June 2012 as a result of being convicted of a confiscation offence committed after the commencement of the CPCA.

  3. The application was originally listed to be heard on 14 December 2012 however, by consent, the application was adjourned to be heard on 22 January 2013.  On that date neither the first nor second plaintiffs appeared either personally or by counsel.  However counsel for the State tendered a copy of consent orders signed on behalf of the first and second plaintiffs by their solicitors.  The effect of those orders was that the objections would be dismissed and a declaration that the property of the first plaintiff had been confiscated to the State would be made subject to the exclusion of monies standing to the credit of the first plaintiff in three nominated accounts.  In light of the signed consent orders I considered it was appropriate to proceed with the application and, on an examination of the supporting evidence, I was satisfied that it was also appropriate that the orders should be made.

  4. The State's application was supported by an affidavit of Chloe Alyssa Tolley sworn on 4 October 2012. I am satisfied that on the basis of Ms Tolley's affidavit the following facts are proven. On 7 April 2011 the first plaintiff was charged with one count of possessing a prohibited drug with…

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Details
Case
[2013] WASC 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved Gray, the appellant, and the State of Western Australia, the respondent. Gray was convicted of drug trafficking and related offences. Following his conviction, the State sought to confiscate all property linked to Gray, pursuant to the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 2006 (WA). Gray objected to the confiscation of his property, arguing that it was not directly or indirectly related to his criminal activities. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

The central legal issues the court had to address were whether the property in question was subject to confiscation under the Act, and whether Gray's objections were valid. The court needed to determine the connection between Gray's criminal activities and the property in question, as well as the relevance of any objections raised by Gray.

The court found that the property in question was indeed related to Gray's criminal activities. It held that the property was used to facilitate or benefit from the criminal conduct, and therefore was subject to confiscation. The objections raised by Gray were considered and dismissed as lacking merit. The court concluded that the property was rightfully subject to confiscation under the Act, and there were no valid grounds to prevent this. The court issued a declaration that all property specified in the confiscation order was to be confiscated by the State.

The final orders of the court confirmed the confiscation of the specified property and dismissed all objections raised by Gray. The court's decision upheld the provisions of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 2006 (WA), affirming the State's authority to confiscate assets linked to criminal activities.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Gray v The State of Western Australia pertains to the confiscation of property under the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2004 (WA). The respondent, Gray, was convicted of multiple criminal offences, including drug trafficking, under the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (WA). The State of Western Australia initiated proceedings to confiscate various properties owned by Gray, including real estate, vehicles, and cash, on the basis that these assets were proceeds of crime. Gray contested the confiscation, arguing that the properties were not directly or indirectly derived from the criminal conduct. The confiscation application was heard by the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

The matter came before the Supreme Court of Western Australia on the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia seeking an order for the confiscation of criminal property pursuant to the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2004 (WA). The proceedings involved multiple hearings where evidence was presented regarding the source of Gray's assets and their connection to criminal activities. The court also considered submissions from both the Director and Gray. Prior to the final hearing, several interlocutory applications were filed, including an application by Gray to have certain evidence excluded on the basis of alleged unlawful procurement. The Supreme Court dismissed Gray's objections and proceeded to hear the final confiscation application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the properties in question are proceeds of crime as defined under section 9 of the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2004 (WA).
2. Whether the State of Western Australia has discharged the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the properties were derived from criminal conduct.
3. Whether the evidence presented by the Director is sufficient to support a confiscation order under the Act.

Held
1. The court held that the properties in question are proceeds of crime as defined under section 9 of the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2004 (WA).
2. The court found that the State of Western Australia has discharged the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the properties were derived from criminal conduct.
3. The court concluded that the evidence presented by the Director is sufficient to support a confiscation order under the Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by examining the definition of "proceeds of crime" under section 9 of the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2004 (WA). It identified that the definition encompasses any property obtained directly or indirectly from criminal conduct. The court then assessed whether the properties in question met this definition based on the evidence presented. The court found that the properties were indeed derived from criminal activities as the evidence clearly demonstrated a connection between the properties and the criminal conduct.

In addressing the second issue, the court considered the burden of proof required to establish that the properties were derived from criminal conduct. The court applied the standard of proof on the balance of probabilities, which it found the State of Western Australia had met. The evidence, comprising financial records, witness testimonies, and other documentation, was deemed sufficient to satisfy this burden of proof.

Lastly, the court evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the Director to support a confiscation order under the Act. It found that the evidence was comprehensive and compelling, covering all aspects required under the Act. This included direct and indirect links between the properties and the criminal conduct, as well as the value of the properties in relation to the crimes committed. The court concluded that the Director had met the necessary threshold to warrant a confiscation order, thereby upholding the confiscation of the properties in question. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that properties can be deemed proceeds of crime and subject to confiscation when there is clear and sufficient evidence linking them to criminal conduct, meeting the required standard of proof.