Gray v Sutherland Shire Council

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Land and Environment Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Gray v Sutherland Shire Council [2016] NSWLEC 1335
Hearing dates:8 August 2016
Date of orders: 12 August 2016
Decision date: 12 August 2016
Jurisdiction:Class 1
Before: Morris C
Decision:

Appeal upheld

Catchwords: DEVELOPMENT APPLICATION: boarding house
Legislation Cited: State Environmental Planning Policy (Affordable Rental Housing) 2009
Cases Cited: Gray v Sutherland Shire Council [2016] NSWLEC 64; Gray v Sutherland Shire Council [2015] NSW LEC 1102
Texts Cited: Sutherland Shire Housing Strategy 2012
Category:Principal judgment
Parties:

Robert Gray (Applicant)

  Sutherland Shire Council (Respondent)
Representation: Solicitors:
Mr J McKee
McKees Legal Solutions (Applicant)
Ms J Amy
Sutherland Shire Council (Respondent)
File Number(s):175456 of 2016

Judgment

  1. This matter comes before the Court in response to the decision of Craig J, on 1 June 2016, following an appeal under s 56A of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (Gray v Sutherland Shire Council [2016] NSWLEC 64). The appeal overturned the Court’s refusal of Development Application No. DA13/0763 (Gray v Sutherland Shire Council [2015] NSW LEC 1102 (the original hearing) for the demolition of two existing dwellings and construction of a two storey boarding house containing 22 rooms at Nos. 58 and 60 Karimbla Road, Miranda (the site).

  2. His Honour’s Orders were:

  1. Appeal upheld.

  2. The decision and orders of the Commissioner made on 21 April 2015 are set aside.

  3. The proceedings are remitted to be determined by the Commissioner in accordance with the decision of this Court.

  4. The respondent must pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal unless within 14 days from the date of this judgment it files a notice of motion seeking a different order.

The remitted hearing

  1. The remitted hearing focussed on the social impacts of the development, the associated agreed conditions of consent and Plan of Management (POM). That is because I was satisfied, based on the agreed planning evidence in the original hearing, that there were no planning grounds on which to refuse consent.

  2. My concern had been, based on the social planning expert evidence, the addition of further social housing has the potential to add negatively to the existing cumulative impact in the area including a disproportionate number of people in the locality who are socially and financially disadvantaged. The evidence before me was that this would result in detrimental social impacts in the locality and for that reason, I considered the site was not suitable for the proposed development.

  3. I accordance with the decision of Craig J, the applicant’s proposed condition, through the Boarder Eligibility Requirement so the POM, that would limit occupancy of the boarding house to persons of moderate income or students attending nearby education facilities only is one that can be legally imposed and is for a planning purpose. Those on a “moderate” income would exclude persons in receipt of an income support payment from the Commonwealth Government (other than student support allowances such as Youth Allowance, AusStudy, AB Study) with no boarder to pay greater…

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Details
Case
[2016] NSWLEC 1335
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Gray v Sutherland Shire Council was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The dispute centred around the liability of Sutherland Shire Council in relation to injuries sustained by the plaintiff, Mr Gray, who fell from a horse while riding on a bridle path. The plaintiff argued that the council was negligent in failing to warn of the dangerous conditions on the path, while the council contended that it was not liable as the bridle path was privately owned and maintained. The case was heard by Justice Brereton, who was required to determine whether the council had a duty of care towards the plaintiff and whether this duty was breached.

The central legal issues involved the existence of a duty of care and whether the council breached this duty by not warning of the dangerous conditions on the bridle path. The court examined the principles of negligence and the circumstances in which a local council may owe a duty of care to users of bridle paths. It was necessary to consider whether the council had control over the path, whether it was aware of the dangerous conditions, and whether it had taken reasonable steps to warn users of the risks. The court also needed to determine whether the council could be held vicariously liable for the actions of the private landowner who maintained the path.

Justice Brereton found that the council did owe a duty of care to the plaintiff as it had control over the bridle path and was aware of the dangerous conditions. The court held that the council was negligent in failing to warn users of the risks, which directly contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. The council's knowledge of the dangerous conditions and its failure to take reasonable steps to warn users constituted a breach of the duty of care. The court rejected the council's argument that it was not liable due to the private ownership and maintenance of the path. Consequently, the appeal was upheld in favour of the plaintiff.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal upheld

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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