Gray v Sullivan

[2017] QCATA 22

CITATION: Gray v Sullivan [2017] QCATA 22

PARTIES:	Gordon Gray (Applicant/Appellant)
v
Sarah Jane Sullivan (Respondent)

APPLICATION NUMBER: APL327 -16

MATTER TYPE: Appeals

HEARING DATE: On the papers

HEARD AT: Brisbane

DECISION OF: Senior Member Stilgoe OAM

DELIVERED ON: 17 February 2017

DELIVERED AT: Brisbane

ORDERS MADE: 1.    Leave to appeal refused.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – LEAVE TO APPEAL – ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – POWERS AND FUNCTIONS – where mediation agreement – where term of agreement that, in default, party entitled to ask for decision – where default – where tribunal entered decision – whether grounds for leave to appeal

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 89(2)(c)

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act).

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. In September 2015, Gordon Gray collided with Sarah Sullivan’s car, causing damage. At mediation conducted by the tribunal, the parties agreed that Mr Gray would pay Ms Sullivan $6,000 by fortnightly instalments of $100. The parties also agreed that, if Mr Gray defaulted in a payment, Ms Sullivan could ask the tribunal for a decision that the balance was immediately due.

2. Ms Sullivan did apply for such an order, swearing an affidavit on 11 August 2016 that Mr Gray had defaulted in his payments. On 23 August 2016, the tribunal ordered that Mr Gray pay the balance due under the agreement within 14 days. I note that, even if the parties had not agreed that, in default, Ms Sullivan could apply for a decision the tribunal had that power.[1]

   [1]Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 89(2)(c).

3. Mr Gray wants to appeal that decision. Because this is an appeal from a decision of the tribunal in its minor civil disputes jurisdiction, leave is necessary.[2] Leave to appeal will usually be granted where there is a reasonable argument that the decision is attended by error, and an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice to the applicant caused by that error.[3]

   [2]QCAT Act, s 142(3)(a)(i).

   [3]Pickering v McArthur [2005] QCA 294 at [3].

4. Mr Gray says that he did not miss a payment. In support of his application for leave to appeal, Mr Gray provided copies of his bank statements showing, he says, the regular payments to Ms Sullivan.

5. In fact, Mr Gray’s bank statements support Ms Sullivan’s view of the facts. He was due to make a payment on 8 July 2016. There is no payment on that date, or any date near it.

6. Mr Gray also says that he has no assets, the implication being that he cannot afford a lump sum. That is an issue of enforcement, not an issue of whether Ms Sullivan was entitled to the order in the first place or whether the tribunal erred in making the order.

7. There is no error by the tribunal. Ms Sullivan was entitled to obtain a decision because of Mr Gray’s default in payment.