| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
S CI 2017 01975
| James Gray | Applicant |
| v | |
| Jeanette McCrae | First Respondent |
| Yarra Ranges Shire Council | Second Respondent |
| Melbourne Water | Third Respondent |
| Country Fire Authority | Fourth Respondent |
| Minister for Energy, Environment & Climate Change | Fifth Respondent |
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JUDGE: | Osborn JA |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 6 May 2019 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 20 May 2019 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Gray v McRae & Ors |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2019] VSC 329 |
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Town planning – Application for leave to appeal pursuant to section 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 – No real prospect of success – Application refused
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Mr J Gray (in person) | Self-represented |
| For the Fourth Respondent For the Fifth Respondent | Mr I Munt Mr R Appudurai | In house counsel, CFA Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office |
HIS HONOUR:
The applicant Mr Gray seeks leave to appeal against a decision of the administrative division of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in the Planning and Environment List (‘the Tribunal’). On 28 April 2017 the Tribunal allowed an application to review the decision to grant a planning permit to Mr Gray for the use of land at Myers Creek Road, Healesville for the purposes of a dwelling and for associated buildings, works and vegetation removal.
When Mr Gray first lodged his application for a permit Ms McCrae objected to the proposal on two grounds:
(a) Adverse impact on the vegetation, biodiversity and environmental sensitivity of the site and surrounding locality;
(b) Failure to protect and enhance remnant vegetation.
The responsible authority determined to grant a planning permit for the proposal but Ms McCrae then applied to review the responsible authority’s decision pursuant to s 82 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (‘P&E Act’).
In response to the application for review Mr Gray challenged Ms McCrae’s standing before the Tribunal by way of an application pursuant to s 75 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (‘VCAT Act’) for summary dismissal. Section 75(1) provides:
(1)At any time, the Tribunal may make an order summarily dismissing or striking out all, or any part, of a proceeding that, in its opinion—
(a)is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; or
(b) is otherwise an abuse of process.
The summary dismissal application was heard pursuant to s 75(3) on 4 November 2015 by Deputy President Dwyer who is a legal member of the Tribunal.
Mr Gray submitted that the postal address on Ms McCrae’s documentation was a post office box in Woori Yallock, a location too remote from the review site for Ms McCrae to be a person who ‘may be affected’ by the grant of the proposed permit in terms of s 57(1) of the P&E Act. Nor it was submitted was she a person affected by the decision of the responsible authority in terms of s 82B(1) of the P&E Act. More particularly Mr Gray submitted that…
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- AGLC
- Gray v McRae [2019] VSC 329
- Case
- [2019] VSC 329
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether Gray had a real prospect of success if the appeal were to proceed. This question necessitated an examination of the merits of Gray's arguments and the likelihood of these arguments prevailing in an appellate court. The court had to consider whether the errors alleged by Gray were substantial enough to warrant an appeal. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether the decision of VCAT was so palpably wrong that it would be just and convenient to allow an appeal.
The Supreme Court determined that Gray did not have a real prospect of success on appeal. The court was of the view that the arguments advanced by Gray were not compelling enough to suggest that VCAT had erred in a manner that would be reversible on appeal. The court found that VCAT had adequately considered the relevant planning principles and evidence. Given this, the court concluded that there was no substantial miscarriage of justice that would justify granting leave to appeal. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, aligning with the statutory requirements of section 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998.
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