Gray v Lavan (A Firm) - [2025] HCATrans 56

[2025] HCATrans 056

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Perth No P7 of 2025

B e t w e e n -
BRUCE NATHANIEL GRAY
Appellant
and
LAVAN (A FIRM)
Respondent

GAGELER CJ
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
JAGOT J
BEECH‑JONES J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT PERTH ON WEDNESDAY, 13 AUGUST 2025, AT 10.01 AM

MR J.P. MOORE, KC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MS F.J. MAHER and MR J.A.G. McCOMISH for the appellant.
(instructed by Williams + Hughes)

MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my friends MR S.G. STEWART and MR A.M. KHADRA for the respondent.
(instructed by Popperwell & Co)

GAGELER CJ: Thank you, Mr Walker. Mr Moore.

MR MOORE: Thank you, your Honour. Your Honours, can we start with a general observation, and it is this: for centuries, courts have observed a supervisory jurisdiction inherent and then later statutory over solicitors as officers of the court. That supervisory jurisdiction has always included a review of costs charged to clients by solicitors and their assessment for fairness and reasonableness.

The general question at issue in this appeal is whether the purpose of that jurisdiction, being to ensure that solicitors as officers of the court are remunerated properly and no more, requires solicitors found to have charged more than is proper refund the excess to the client with interest so as to account for the time between the client’s payment and the solicitor’s refund.

GAGELER CJ: I thought your case was a common law case?

MR MOORE: It is, and it is put in the context of the jurisdiction in this case having been engaged to assess costs. The common law claim for ‑ ‑ ‑

GAGELER CJ: The claim could be brought in a court of lower jurisdiction, depending on the quantum.

MR MOORE: Yes, and nothing I have said is intended to cut across the common law nature of the claim, it is just to place the claim in the context of what courts have done for a very long time.

GAGELER CJ: You will be taking us to the contract and the statute?

MR MOORE: Yes.

GAGELER CJ: Good.

MR MOORE: Yes. The first issue I wish to address – and I will divide my time into three issues: the first is the construction of the settlement agreement that gave rise to a refund of costs to my client, Dr Gray; the second is the availability of alternative claims to recover overpaid legal costs, and it is in that context I will take the Court to the contract between Lavan Legal and Dr Gray; and the third is the availability of interest in a restitutionary claim at common law.

Can I turn first, then, to the settlement deed to seek to make good the proposition that the deed of settlement put Dr Gray and Lavan Legal in precisely the same position that they would have been…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Gray v Lavan (A Firm)

Details

AGLC: Gray v Lavan (A Firm) [2025] HCATrans 56
Case: [2025] HCATrans 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Gray, the applicant, brought proceedings against Lavan, a law firm, alleging that the firm had breached its duty of care to him. The dispute concerned the firm's conduct in relation to a settlement agreement and subsequent court orders made in proceedings brought by Gray against a third party. Gray contended that Lavan's actions had caused him to suffer loss. The High Court of Australia heard the matter on appeal.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the firm, Lavan, owed a duty of care to Gray in relation to its conduct in advising and acting for him in the context of the settlement of his claim against a third party, and the subsequent court orders. Specifically, the court had to consider the scope of that duty and whether it extended to protecting Gray from the economic consequences that flowed from the settlement and the orders made.

The High Court held that a solicitor owes a duty of care to their client to exercise reasonable skill and care in the conduct of the client's affairs. This duty extends to advising the client on the legal consequences of a proposed course of action and taking reasonable steps to protect the client from foreseeable harm. In this instance, the court found that Lavan had acted within the scope of its retainer and had not breached its duty of care to Gray. The settlement and the subsequent orders were found to be the result of Gray's own informed decisions, and the firm's conduct did not fall below the standard of reasonable care expected of a solicitor.

The High Court dismissed the appeal.

Orders