IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S311 of 2013
B e t w e e n -
RHIANNON GRAY BY HER TUTOR KATHLEEN ANNE GRAY
Applicant
and
COREY RICHARDS
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
FRENCH CJ
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 16 MAY 2014, AT 10.24 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR A.S. MORRISON, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR I.J. McGILLICUDDY, for the applicant. (instructed by Beilby Poulden Costello)
MR P.J. DEAKIN, QC: I appear for the respondent in that matter with MR B.A.P. KELLEHER. (instructed by TL Lawyers)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Morrison. Mr Morrison, I presume that the substantive ground on which you are seeking special leave is that set out in ground 2 in the draft notice at 172. The other two seem to me to be argumentative and not to add anything. Is that right?
MR MORRISON: Yes.
FRENCH CJ: Yes, all right.
MR MORRISON: There are two issues, really, which are raised by the application and by the prospective appeal. The first is whether the cost of managing damages awarded for fund management are something to which the plaintiff is entitled, and the second is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the cost of managing the income which the fund will earn over her lifetime.
FRENCH CJ: There is this spectre of an infinite regression here.
MR MORRISON: Which spectre was rejected by the two experts who had no difficulty in agreeing as to what the costs would be, and her Honour at first instance found no difficulty, and his Honour the Chief Justice, whilst he later talks about uncertainty, refers to the fact that there was agreement that with a trivial amount in rounding off, as Justice Basten put it, there is no difficulty about doing the calculation.
FRENCH CJ: You say that – is it an accepted fact that absent the additional component, there will be a shortfall in terms of availability of the fund for the projected lifetime of the ‑ ‑ ‑
MR MORRISON: Yes. Both parties’ experts were agreed there would be a shortfall, and that is the fundamental point. As stated by her Honour at first instance, the amounts paid for fund management are not treated separately. They cannot be separated off in some way. They are required by law to be managed, and the cost of that management is unavoidable.
Neither at first instance nor in the Court of Appeal did the respondent suggest that cost was avoidable. Nor did the court raise that issue, though it emerges in the judgment of the Chief Justice. It follows, therefore, as night follows day, that the cost of managing the allowance for fund management absent an award will lead to a shortfall which will be borne out of the estate of the brain‑injured person who is incapable of managing their…
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- Case
- [2014] HCATrans 109
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, whether the respondent owed a duty of care to the appellant at the time the medical treatment was provided. Secondly, if a duty of care was owed, whether the respondent's conduct in providing that treatment fell below the standard of care expected of a reasonably competent medical practitioner in the circumstances. These questions were central to establishing liability for the alleged negligence.
The Court's reasoning focused on the established principles of negligence, particularly the foreseeability of harm and the proximity between the parties. It considered the nature of the medical relationship and the potential consequences of any departure from accepted medical practice. The Court applied the principles articulated in *Donoghue v Stevenson* and subsequent authorities on the duty of care, as well as the test for breach of duty as outlined in *Wyong Shire Council v Shirt*. The Court ultimately found that a duty of care was owed and that the respondent's actions did not meet the required standard.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia and remitting the matter to the Supreme Court for determination of the assessment of damages.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi