Grass v Bradley Allen Love Lawyers

Link copied
Case Copied 26 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GRASS v BRADLEY ALLEN LOVE LAWYERS [2015] FCCA 2422
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Application to set aside bankruptcy notice – default judgment on the basis of which bankruptcy notice is issued based on a claim for the payment of legal fees – whether disclosure obligations under the Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) (LP Act) were complied with in relation to the legal fees in relation to which default judgment was recovered – whether such non-compliance relates to the entire amount of the legal fees on the basis of which default judgment was recovered – whether non-compliance with the LP Act in relation to only part of the legal fees gives rise to substantial reasons for questioning whether default judgment is based on a true debt – whether if substantial reasons are given for questioning only part of the default judgment is sufficient grounds for setting aside the default judgment – bankruptcy notice not set aside.

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966, s.41

Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT), ss.263, 266, 269, 269(1), 269(1)(d), 271(1), 276, 276(1), 277, 277(1), 277(2)

Grass v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 44

Grass v Minister for Immigration [2013] FMCA 74
Katter v Melhem(No 2) [2014] FCA 1176
Olivieri v Stafford (1989) 24 FCR 413
Re Riviere; Ex parte Original Mont de Piete Ltd [1919] NSWStRp 56; (1919) 20 SR (NSW) 77
Wren v Mahony [1972] HCA 5; (1972) 126 CLR 212

Applicant: JOHN GRASS
Respondent: BRADLEY ALLEN LOVE LAWYERS
File Number: SYG 1167 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis
Hearing date: 3 August 2015
Date of Last Submission: 31 July 2015
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 4 September 2015

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Simpkins
Solicitors for the Applicant: Sweeney Tiggemann Solicitors
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J Mack
Solicitors for the Respondent: Bradley Allen Love Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. The application filed on     28 April 2015 is dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1167 of 2015

JOHN GRASS

Applicant

And

BRADLEY ALLEN LOVE LAWYERS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant, Mr Grass, applies to set aside a bankruptcy notice that has been served on him.

  2. The bankruptcy notice demands payment of $17,629.27. That represents a default judgment for $17,486.74 (Judgment) the respondent, Williams Love & Nicol Lawyers Pty Limited (WLN), recovered against Mr Grass in the Magistrates Court of the Australian Capital Territory (Magistrates Court) on 18 February 2015, together with interest that has accrued on the Judgment. WLN recovered the Judgment on a claim for fees for legal services WLN provided to Mr Grass.

  3. Mr Grass claims the bankruptcy notice should be set aside because the Judgment on which it is based is a nullity and in any event does not represent a “real and true debt”. That is so because:

    a)the proceeding in relation to which WLN recovered the Judgment was one for the recovery…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Grass v Bradley Allen Love Lawyers and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] FCCA 2422
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Mr Grass to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by Williams Love & Nicol Lawyers Pty Limited (WLN). The bankruptcy notice was based on a default judgment WLN had obtained against Mr Grass in the Magistrates Court of the Australian Capital Territory for legal fees. Mr Grass contended that the judgment was a nullity and did not represent a genuine debt because WLN had failed to comply with section 269 of the *Legal Profession Act 2006* (ACT) by not disclosing certain matters regarding the legal costs, which consequently prohibited WLN from commencing the recovery proceedings under section 277(2) of the same Act.

The court was required to determine two principal issues. Firstly, whether Mr Grass had provided substantial reasons to question whether the judgment debt was, in truth and reality, a debt due to WLN, given his arguments regarding the alleged non-compliance with disclosure requirements under the *Legal Profession Act 2006* (ACT). Secondly, if substantial reasons were found, whether the bankruptcy notice should be set aside. The court acknowledged its power to "go behind" a judgment debt in bankruptcy proceedings to ascertain if it represents a true debt, a power not exercised as a matter of course but only when substantial grounds for doubt are presented.

The court noted that a bankruptcy court has the jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of a debt underlying a judgment, even though the debt may have merged with the judgment at general law. This power is exercised to ensure that the bankruptcy notice is based on a genuine debt. Mr Grass’s argument hinged on WLN’s alleged failure to provide the disclosures mandated by section 269 of the *Legal Profession Act 2006* (ACT) in relation to the legal costs for which judgment was obtained. He asserted that this failure rendered the judgment void and thus the debt unenforceable for the purpose of bankruptcy proceedings. The court indicated it would first consider the construction and scope of the relevant provisions of the *Legal Profession Act 2006* (ACT) before addressing the substantive issues raised by Mr Grass.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The bankruptcy notice demands payment of $17,629.27. That represents a default judgment for $17,486.74 (Judgment) the respondent, Williams Love & Nicol Lawyers Pty Limited (WLN), recovered against Mr Grass in the Magistrates Court of the Australian Capital Territory (Magistrates Court) on 18 February 2015, together with interest that has accrued on the Judgment. WLN recovered the Judgment on a claim for fees for legal services WLN provided to Mr Grass. Mr Grass claims the bankruptcy notice should be set aside because the Judgment on which it is based is a nullity and in any event does not represent a “real and true debt”. That is so because:a)the proceeding in relation to which WLN recovered the Judgment was one for the recovery of legal costs;b)under s.269 of the Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) (LP Act), WLN was required, but failed, to disclose to Mr Grass a number of matters in relation to those legal costs; andc)having failed to comply with s.269 of the LP Act, s.277(2) of the LP Act prohibited WLN from commencing the proceeding in which WLN recovered the Judgment. A judgment debt “is never conclusive in bankruptcy”; it “does not always represent itself as the relevant debt of the petitioning creditor, even though under the general law, the prior existing debt has merged in a judgment”.[1] A bankruptcy court, therefore, has power to inquire into whether a judgment on the basis of which a bankruptcy notice has been issued is itself based on a true debt; in other words, a bankruptcy court has the power to “go behind a judgment” on the basis of which a bankruptcy notice has been issued. If, as a result of such inquiry, the court concludes the judgment is not based on a true debt, the bankruptcy notice is liable to be set aside.[1] Wren v Mahony [1972] HCA 5; (1972) 126 CLR 212 at page 224 (Barwick CJ) A bankruptcy court, however, does not go behind a judgment as a matter of course. It will go behind a judgment only if “substantial reasons are given for questioning whether behind that judgment there was in truth and reality a debt due to the petitioner”.[2] Two issues, therefore, arise on Mr Grass’s application. The first is whether there are substantial reasons for questioning whether, for the reasons given by Mr Grass, the Judgment is based on a true debt. The second is, if there are substantial reasons for questioning whether the Judgment is based on a true debt, should the bankruptcy notice be set aside? [2] Wren v Mahony [1972] HCA 5; (1972) 126 CLR 212 at page 225 (Barwick CJ) Before I address these issues, it will be necessary to set out the relevant facts, and to consider the construction and scope of the relevant provisions of the LP Act on which Mr Grass relies for submitting the Judgment is not based on a true debt. On 21 May 2009 a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Minister) approved an application for citizenship made by Mr Grass’s wife.[3] All Mrs Grass needed to do after that approval to become a citizen was to take the pledge of commitment before a person authorised to take that pledge. The Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Department), however, misled Mrs Grass into believing there was a waiting list for the relevant ceremony, and that the Department would inform her of the date of the ceremony. The Department did not inform Mrs Grass of any ceremony because the Department was investigating whether it should cancel the delegate’s approval of Mrs Grass’s application for citizenship. In the event, on 5 July 2010 a delegate of the Minister cancelled the decision approving Mrs Grass’s application for citizenship.[3] I have taken the relevant background facts in relation to Mrs Grass’s attempts to obtain citizenship from the reasons for judgment of the Full Federal Court in Grass v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 44

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.