Graovac v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[1999] FCA 537
•30 APRIL 1999
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Graovac v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 537
IMMIGRATION – applications for Supported Dependent Visa - review of decisions of Minister’s delegate - error of law – misinterpretation of “dependent” – interpretation of “financial dependence” – departmental policy incorrect reflection of regulation
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 18A
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 31(5), 430(1)(b), 430(1)(c), 475(c), 476(1)(a), 476(1)(e)
Migration Regulations (Cth) regs 1.03, 2.01, 2.03, Sch 1 cl 1223, Sch 2 pt 430
Workers Compensation Act 1927 (Tas)Commissioner for Superannuation v Scott (1987) 13 FCR 404
Kauri Timber v Reeman (1973) 128 CLR 187
Jankovich v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 56 FCR 474JOVANKA GRAOVAC & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
NG 1111 OF 1999
NG 1112 OF 1999MADGWICK
30 APRIL 1999
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 1111 OF 1999
NG 1112 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
JOVANKA GRAOVAC
First ApplicantLAZAR GRAOVAC
Second ApplicantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RespondentJUDGE:
MADGWICK J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 APRIL 1999
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The decisions of the respondent by its delegate in relation to the applicants’ applications for Supported Dependent Visas are set aside.
2.The matter is referred to the respondent for redetermination by another delegate according to law.
3.The delegate is to afford the applicants a reasonable opportunity to provide any further information relevant to their applications.
4.The respondent is to pay the applicants’ costs.
5.Liberty is granted to either party to apply within four days as to the forms of relief hereby granted.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 1111 OF 1999
NG 1112 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
JOVANKA GRAOVAC
First ApplicantLAZAR GRAOVAC
Second ApplicantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
MADGWICK J
DATE:
30 APRIL 1999
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR:
Mr Lazar Graovac and his adult daughter Ms Jovanka Graovac (“the applicants”) have made separate applications to this Court seeking orders of review in relation to two decisions made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the respondent”). Such decisions are judicially reviewable by this Court under s 475(1)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 ("the Act"). Their cases raise virtually identical facts and questions of law.
The applicants were citizens of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”). On 25 September 1997 they lodged applications for Supported Dependent Visas at the Australian Embassy in Belgrade. The applications were based upon a nomination by Petar Graovac (“the supporter”), Ms Graovac’s brother and Mr Graovac’s son, who is an Australian permanent resident. On 16 February 1998 a delegate of the respondent refused the application. After a legal challenge to that decision on 24 September 1998 another delegate, upon reconsideration of the matter, again refused the applications. Subsequently, on
12 October 1998 the applicants applied to this Court for orders of review of these decisions on the grounds that they involved errors of law.
Factual background
The following account of the events that led to the applicants’ lodgement of applications for Supported Dependent Visas was prepared by their solicitors on 17 September 1997. The assertions made in this account were not in dispute at the hearing:
“The Applicants are former citizens of the Former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia of Serbian descent. As a result of the recent civil war in that country the applicants have been displaced from their home and are now stateless.
The applicants and the Supporter were born in the Dalmatian region of Zadar where the family owned a small farm, comprising a family dwelling and stock. The farm was the sole source of income and sustenance for the family. The farm was worked mainly by the Supporter and his sisters as their parents were elderly and were unable to endure the physical demands of farming.
The Supporter was married in 1987 but continued living in his parents’ house as the cultural and historical traditions of the region required the eldest son to take care of his parents. The Supporter, being the eldest son in the family, had the duty and responsibility to provide full financial and emotional support for his parents…
In January 1993 the Croatian troops advanced south and were nearing the applicants’ home. The applicants and the Supporter, fearing for their safety, fled their family home and, leaving all belongings, on 22 January 1993 moved to their older daughter’s house. The family has lost its income and was forced to survive on the limited savings they possessed. They were also registered as refugees by the Red Cross…
Upon the death of his mother, the Supporter and his family moved to Belgrade and subsequently migrated to Australia. He left all savings … to his father and younger sister but as this was insufficient even for basic needs, the Supporter continued to provide financial assistance to his family after his arrival to Australia.”
The applicants are currently living in a refugee camp operated by the Red Cross in Koviljaca (“the collective centre” or “the refugee centre”). Notes of an interview, conducted by staff at the Australian Embassy in Belgrade in relation to the decision made on 16 February 1998, state that:
“Mr Graovac advised that the following services are provided free of charge to all residents of the collective centre (which is funded and run by humanitarian organisations):
- accomodation (separate room for each family)
- meals three times a day (breakfast, lunch and dinner)
- emergency medical assistance, if required
- electricity, hot water, heating and other utilities
- access to free medical care-humanitarian aid such as food parcels, clothes etc. (not on regular bases)
Mr Graovac stated that it was possible to subsist at the centre due to the fact that basic living requirements are provided for, but added that the conditions at the centre were meagre. When asked why he did not move out of the centre, Mr Graovac stated that he had no option but to remain at the centre as he could not afford moving out to a private accommodation due to high rents…
Mr Graovac stated that the family had used all the savings during the period 1993-96 and when they arrived in FRY they had no savings left…
Mr Graovac advised that the funds received from Australia are used by the whole family, including his second daughter Jela and her family, to buy additional food supplies, fruit or clothes for children, or any other things not available or provided by the collective centre…
When asked to describe the nature of assistance provided by his son Petar, Mr Graovac replied it was mainly financial assistance “to help us buy things we do not have money to buy and which are not provided by the centre”…
Ms Graovac confirmed the details given by her father in relation to the services provided … by the collective accommodation – see above. She also stated that since coming to Serbia in September 1996 she has never worked full time. Occasionally she helps at the collective centre, but is not paid.
Ms Graovac advised that her father was always the recipient of the funds. Further, she stated that the funds received from Australia supplement the services provided by the centre. Ms Graovac stated that it was possible to subsist at the centre, but without the extra financial assistance from Australia she would not be able to provide more for the children. Ms Graovac added that living conditions at the collective centre were meagre."
Relevant legislation
The Supported Dependent (Temporary) (Class TW) Visa is a prescribed visa for the purposes of s 31 of the Act. Section 31(5) of the Act provides: “A visa is a visa of a
particular class if this Act or the regulations specify that it is a visa of that class.” The Migration Regulations (Cth) (“the Regulations”) at 2.01 provide:
“For the purposes of section 31 of the Act, the prescribed classes of visas are such classes (other than those created by the Act) as are set out in the respective items in Schedule 1.”
Schedule 1 of the Regulations, entitled “Classes of Visas”, at clause 1223 establishes the Supported Dependent Visa.
Regulation 2.03 provides that the prescribed criteria for the grant of any class of visa established by the Regulations are those set out in the relevant part of Schedule 2. The relevant part for determining whether to grant a Supported Dependent Visa is Part 430 (this Part was amended on 1 November 1997; however, as the visas were applied for on 26 September 1997, the application to this Court must be considered against the former version of the Part). Various criteria were established by Part 430, including criterion 430.222 which required that: “The applicant [be] a dependant of a person who is … an Australian permanent resident”. Upon reconsideration of the applicants’ visa applications, on 24 September 1998, the respondent determined that the applicants did not meet this criterion.
Although the Regulations offer no definition of the term “dependant”, Regulation 1.03 provides that “dependent” in relation to a person “means wholly or substantially dependent on another person for financial, psychological or physical support”.
The decision
In a “Record of Reconsideration of Decision” the delegate offered the following reasons for her decision that the applicants’ relationships with the supporter did not conform to that required by criterion 430.222:
"Since September 1996, Ms Graovac has been living in a collective accommodation centre for refugees, with her father and young son. She is provided with daily meals, housing, medical care, electricity, access to humanitarian clothing packages, and other utilities. No evidence has been presented that she is not free to remain in the centre as long as she chooses.
The Departmental Procedures Advice Manual gives the following advice on assessing dependence. “Dependence relates to ‘satisfying lower order needs’ that is, those that are required to be sustained, namely food, shelter and minimal clothing. Dependence does not encompass reliance on another person for luxuries and discretionary consumption goods or higher order needs.”…
I accept that Mr Petar Graovac has probably sent some money to his father and that this money would have been shared with the applicant, Ms Graovac. I do not accept that the funds transferred are more significant to the applicant than the support she receives from the Collective Accommodation Centre. The Centre in fact fulfils all her “lower order needs” as defined above. I find that the applicant is reliant to a far greater degree on the support provided by the Centre than she is on the support her brother may be providing.
I therefore am not satisfied that the applicant is “wholly or substantially dependent” on the sponsor for financial support…
As Ms Graovac does not meet the definition of dependency outlined in Regulation 1.03, she is unable to meet the requirements of criterion 430.222. Her application for a 430 Supported Dependent application is therefore refused.”
Counsel for the applicants submitted that this reasoning relied upon several legal errors.
The meaning of “dependent”
First, it was submitted by the applicants that the respondent ought not have applied the definition of the word “dependent”, found in regulation 1.03, to the requirement that the applicant be a “dependant”, contained in criterion 430.222. Attention was drawn to the fact that the adjective “dependent” is different both in spelling and as a figure of speech from the noun “dependant”. For this proposition the applicant relied upon the authority of Kauri Timber v Reeman (1973) 128 CLR 187 where at 187-188 Gibbs J, referring to the Workers’ Compensation Act 1927 (Tas), noted that “the word ‘dependent’ is not defined in the Act” and that “although there is a definition of ‘dependants’ [it] does not assist in deciding the present question.” In that case Gibbs J fell back upon the dictionary definition. Therefore, the applicant contended that an “ordinary language” approach ought to be adopted to interpret “dependent” in this case. In written submissions it was argued that:
"The correct construction of the noun ‘dependant’, being undefined by the Act or Regulations, is simply its ordinary dictionary definition ie ‘one who depends on or looks to another for support, favour etc’ (Macquarie Dictionary) ”
A “plain meaning” approach to interpreting “dependent”, such as that proposed above, would clearly have established a more liberal test than that which was applied by the respondent.
However, this submission must fail. First, the “ordinary language” approach suggested by the applicant is not decisive. The term “dependant” is alternatively defined by the Macquarie Dictionary (3rd ed) Macquarie Library, Australia, 1998 to mean “a person to whom one contributes all or a major amount of necessary financial support.” Therefore, the “plain language” approach does not necessarily allow for the application of the more generous test under criterion 430.222 as proposed by the applicant. In fact, this alternative “plain meaning” of dependant appears to be very similar to the meaning actually applied by the respondent under Regulation 1.03. Thus to urge a “plain meaning” approach is simply to beg a further question. Second, the concept of dependency for the purposes of a workers’ compensation statute, as determined by Gibbs J, may or may not be appropriate in the present immigration law context. The liberality of approach appropriate to a workers’ compensation statute may or may not be suitable to the more complex context of a statute aimed at regulating immigration. Third, s 18A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), states that:
“In any Act, unless the contrary intention appears, where a word or phrase is given a particular meaning, other parts of speech and grammatical forms of that word or phrase have corresponding meanings.”
It was not contended that the noun “dependant” was not a form of the adjective “dependent”, nor was it contended that in light of the context of the Regulations the term “dependant” should bear a different character from the term “dependent”, as defined. And s 18A was included when the Acts Interpretation Act was amended in 1976. Thus, the suggestion made by Gibbs J in the Kauri Timber Case in 1972, before the amendment, is of diminished relevance to this case.
Therefore the delegate’s reference to the definition of “dependent” offered in regulation 1.03 appears quite legitimate. Although there may, of course, be cases in which the statutory context of a derivative word indicates that the application of a defined related term is inappropriate, the onus of demonstrating this should be regarded as falling on the party making such an assertion – see Pearce and Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (4th ed) Butterworths, Australia, 1996 at 191. In order to satisfy criterion 430.222, therefore, the respondent needed to be satisfied that the applicants were “wholly or substantially dependent on another person for financial, psychological or physical support”. This was the appropriate test to be applied.
The meaning of “financial dependence”
The applicants claimed to be financially dependent upon their supporter. The delegate rejected this claim on the grounds that the material support received by the applicants from the refugee centre outweighed the financial support that the applicants received from their supporter. Two submissions were made with respect to supposed errors committed by the respondent’s delegate in assessing the financial dependence of the applicants.
Does “financial” include non-monetary contributions?
First, it was argued that a consideration of the applicants’ dependency “for financial support” ought not include a consideration of the “non-monetary” contributions available to the applicants from other sources. The applicants contended in their written submissions that:
"It is not a reasonable approach to construe financial dependency by assessing the value of the support provided by the refugee centre as being greater than any financial support provided by the Applicant’s son. The fact that a person is in receipt of non-financial charity that caters to their basic needs does not preclude a finding that they are financially dependent on another person. Indeed, the mere fact that charity has had to be resorted to suggests to the contrary.”
The applicants thus asserted a narrow definition of “financial” that included only money or something readily transmutable into money (“near money”). In this case the applicants received no money, nor anything which might be sold, from the refugee centre. In fact, the supporter, according to the asserted definition, was the only source of financial support because the supporter provided the applicants with their only source of money. Therefore, the applicants were totally “financially dependent” on the supporter. The delegate made an error of law, the applicants continued, by calculating a notional financial contribution provided by the refugee centre and weighing that against the actual financial contribution provided by the supporter.
However, such a narrow definition of “financial” contended by the applicants is, in my opinion, untenable. The legislation ought not be construed as being concerned with the mere liquidity of claimants. The humanitarian considerations plainly underlying the provisions of the Act in question are concerned with human needs. Read in the context of the alternative categories of dependence defined in regulation 1.03, namely physical and psychological, it becomes apparent that financial dependence ought also be seen as addressing fundamental human requirements. Thus “financial” ought not assume a narrow and specifically pecuniary meaning, but be read broadly to include non-pecuniary means of livelihood. By so understanding “financial”, a finding of “financial dependence” under the Act can provide assistance to those without sufficient access (but for the help of their Australian relatives) to material goods, but does not compel assistance to those merely suffering “cash flow” difficulties.
Moreover, were such a narrow definition of “financial” as was suggested by the applicants to be adopted, a relationship of dependence would be more easily established than Parliament is likely to have had in mind. The minimal requirement to be met, according to the applicants’ submissions, would be that claimants be “substantially dependent” on their supporter for the money in their pockets, regardless of an abundance of basic food, clothing and shelter that might be available to them. Such a test is incompatible with the policy requirements evident in the legislative scheme to limit migration to cases that reasonably demand a generous and humanitarian response.
Therefore the respondent’s consideration of the applicants’ non-monetary sources of income, namely the provision of food, clothing and shelter from the refugee centre, did not constitute an error of law. Rather the respondent’s consideration of the applicants’ means of livelihood at the refugee centre was highly material to any assessment to be made about their financial dependence upon their supporter.
Does financial include charitable contributions?
Second, it was argued that determination of the applicants’ “financial dependence” ought not include consideration of the charitable contributions available to the applicants from the refugee centre. Counsel for the applicants submitted that financial support could not include charitable contributions because of their gratuitous nature. Among other things, this made them unreliable, and therefore undependable, sources of financial support.
However, the distinction drawn between charitable and non-charitable support is, in my view, fallacious. As submitted by counsel for the respondent, the source of alternative channels of assistance to the applicants was irrelevant to a determination of the question of their dependence on the supporter. Although the nature of alternative support available to claimants is clearly a relevant consideration, it does not matter whether its source is governmental, private, familial or charitable. It is the question of dependence on the supporter that is of primary importance; any other relation of dependency is only important in so far as it may reveal the nature of the applicants’ reliance on that supporter.
The question of continuity of alternative sources of support to claimants may well be an important consideration for the Minister’s delegate in determining the dependence of the claimant on a supporter. If the provision of alternative support is temporary, precarious or otherwise artificial, then the claimant may depend more heavily upon the supporter. However, questions of continuity and unreliability are separate from questions as to the source of support. There is nothing inherently unreliable or precarious about charitable support as distinct from other forms of support. In this case the delegate did turn her mind to the question of continuity and stated in her reasons that: “No evidence has been presented that [they are] not free to remain in the centre as long as [they] choose.” There was no suggestion that the charitable arrangements here were precarious so that, viewed in a fair way, the applicants’ financial dependence upon the supporter would be greater than presently existing arrangements would suggest.
This interpretation of “financial dependence” is also supported by the fact that the legislation did not prevent applicants from making multiple applications. Should their circumstances have altered materially, they were free to make further applications based upon their new conditions.
The respondent’s consideration of such charity did not constitute an error of law.
The meaning of “substantially dependent”
The applicants claimed to be substantially, not wholly, dependent on the supporter. The delegate rejected this claim on the ground that, since the refugee camp provided for the majority of the applicants’ needs, they could not be “substantially” dependent upon the supporter.
Although the parties agreed that the appropriate meaning of “substantially” was “primarily, essentially, or in the main,” they disagreed as to the meaning of that formulation (which was espoused in Commissioner for Superannuation v Scott (1987) 13 FCR 404). The respondent argued that the word “essentially” in this formulation should be understood in the context of the other two phrases, “primarily” and “in the main”, which connote that, for a given element to be substantial, it must constitute the majority of a given quantity. The test, it was suggested, looks to predominance. Therefore, the delegate’s approach of weighing the financial support received from the supporter against the financial support of the refugee centre was sufficient to answer the relevant question of whether the applicants were substantially dependent.
The applicant, on the other hand, argued that dependence on a particular source may be “essential” (and therefore substantial) even if it is not the claimant’s predominant source of support. Indeed, the claimant may well be dependent on several sources of support. If this is the case, then the respondent’s finding that the contributions of the camp outweighed the contributions of the supporter was not determinative of the question of substantial contribution. It is conceivable, as was claimed by the applicants, that the money spent on “food supplies, fruit or clothes for the children” and provided by the supporter, whilst not constituting most of the applicants’ financial support was nonetheless essential and therefore substantial.
I do not believe that the notion of substantial dependency on an Australian permanent resident requires that such a resident provide a predominance of support for a visa applicant. Although often, and perhaps usually, that which is substantial will be predominant, this is not always the case. A simple example illustrates this: if A needs $20 per week for bare survival and gets $2 from B as well as $18 from C, it cannot, in my view, be denied that A is substantially dependent on B as well as on C. That is because, in some circumstances, it is appropriate to introduce the concept of essentiality, unconditioned by notions of predominance, to give reasonable meaning to the idea of substantial dependence. Indeed this analysis points, in my view, to the true nature of the test to be applied: whether a person is wholly or substantially dependent on another for financial support must be considered in all of the relevant circumstances. In some circumstances, predominance will be an adequate test of substantiality, in others not.
In this case, the level of support available from all sources to the applicants was evidently modest to the point of being meagre. It is not clear that the only conclusion to be reached, by investigating the application of the concept of essentiality of the applicants’ reliance on that portion of the support which came from the supporter, is that it was inessential to them. Thus a possible conclusion might be that they were substantially dependent on the supporter.
It follows that, in simply calculating the amount of financial support provided by the supporter and determining that this was “outweighed” by the pecuniary value of that provided by other sources, namely the refugee centre, the delegate impermissibly foreshortened her inquiry. It appears that the delegate did not ask whether the support provided by the supporter, in the form of money which was apparently necessary to supplement “food supplies” and to provide “fruit and clothes for the children”, was essential for the applicants’ support. The respondent, by the delegate, therefore misconceived the nature of the test to be applied by incorrectly interpreting the applicable law, thus committing a reviewable error of law under s 476(1)(e) of the Act.
Is the notion of dependence restricted to the “lower order needs of life”?
The respondent appears to have also dismissed the applicants’ claim on the grounds that the applicants could not have been dependent upon the supporter because all of the applicants’ barest necessities of life were met by the refugee centre. In her reasons, to repeat the passage, the respondent stated that:
"I do not accept that the funds transferred are more significant to the applicant than the support she receives from the Collective Accommodation Centre. The Centre in fact fulfils all her “lower order needs” as defined above. I find that the applicant is reliant to a far greater degree on the support provided by the Centre than she is on the support her brother may be providing.”
In making this decision the respondent makes clear reference to the departmental “advice” outlined in the Policy Advice Manual (PAM3, Issue 26). At division 1.2 the manual stated that:
“Dependence relates to ‘satisfying lower order needs’ that is, those that are required to be sustained, namely food, shelter and minimal clothing.
Dependence does not encompass reliance on another person for luxuries and discretionary consumption goods or higher order needs.”
The applicants submitted that if this was a policy it was not legislatively authorised and the respondent’s reliance on it was also legally mistaken. In any case, the substantial question is whether the “advice”, which the delegate plainly did rely on, evinces a correct approach to the interpretation of the Regulations.
The respondent submitted that the delegate’s reference to the existing policy did not in this case constitute reliance on the policy for the purposes of making her determination. Rather, the matter was disposed of, the respondent argued, by the finding that the supporter’s contribution was not substantial. Therefore, even if the policy itself was unauthorised, there had been no material error – Jankovich v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 56 FCR 474 at 477-479. However, the delegate’s reference to this advice shows that it was at the heart of her reasoning.
Counsel for the respondent defended the advice on the grounds that the test of dependence ought to be “objectively” based. The respondent relied for this proposition upon the restrictive nature of the migration policy clearly evident in the legislation. Further, it would be invidious that one Australian’s relatives in, say, Sweden, hard-up by the standards of that country should be able to establish the necessary relationship of dependence when another Australian’s deprived relatives in, say, Chad, for whom life, at the most, attenuated of Swedish standards, could not. A tin shanty might pass for modest comfort in N’djamena but mark real poverty in Stockholm.
Counsel for the applicants, on the other hand, argued that to restrict dependence to the necessities of life was to take an unnecessarily restrictive view of the Act and its Regulations. Although the legislation tightly controls immigration policy, the subject provisions nevertheless have humanitarian aims. To limit dependence to bare necessities could even frustrate the very legislative purpose of providing relief from anguish for Australians and their suffering relatives. A requirement on applicants to prove that they were dependent for their survival on someone else might well mean, given the time necessarily involved in making an application for a visa, that in many cases applicants would not even survive the
application process; counsel pointed out that the mills of embassy administration may in some cases grind slowly.
It is obvious that both counsel have been able to point to considerations that have force. However, in my opinion, the legislation is not satisfactorily understood either by reference solely, on the one hand, to concepts of the “objective” necessities of life or (what is much the same thing) “lower order needs” or, on the other, to entirely subjective matters such as the standard of living in the applicants’ present country of residence, or the applicants’ personal characteristics, including the lifestyle to which an applicant is accustomed, or any special needs of the applicant. On the contrary, as indicated above, it is necessary to look at all the relevant circumstances, which include those just mentioned. A broad, practical judgment is required, neither niggardly nor over-generous. The legislation is not a charter for raising the standard of living of all close relatives of Australian permanent residents to that prevailing in Australia by allowing them to come here. Neither is it intended to condemn such relatives to little more than the mere maintenance of life in circumstances which, viewed fairly and humanely, are miserable by the standards prevailing in their present countries of residence. It is erroneous to limit this process of evaluation by concentration merely on “lower order needs” or, as earlier indicated, the source of predominant means of support of the applicant. The delegate therefore erred in both respects.
Conclusion
The decision challenged will be set aside and the matter referred to the respondent for redetermination by another delegate according to law. That may involve further inquiry of the applicants and other relevant persons. The respondent is to pay the applicants' costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty six (36) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Madgwick. Associate:
Dated: 30 April 1999
Counsel for the Applicant: T Reilly Solicitor for the Applicant: Barlow & Co Counsel for the Respondent: N Williams Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Date of Hearing: 4 February 1999 Date of Judgment: 30 April 1999
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