Grant v Commissioner of Patents

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2005] FCA 1100

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – patents – whether a method for structuring a financial transaction designed to protect an individual’s assets against the lawful claims of the individual’s creditors is capable of being the subject of a patent – principles which govern the application of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies.

Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18(1A)

Advanced Building Systems Pty Limited v Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Limited (1998) 194 CLR 171 referred to
Attorney‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia v The Adelaide Steamship Company Limited [1913] AC 781 referred to
International Business Machines Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1991) 33 FCR 218 cited
National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 applied
Re Innovation Patent No 2004100848 in the name of Peter Szabo and Associates Pty Ltd [2005] APO 24 referred to
Welcome Real‑Time SA v Catuity Inc (2001) 51 IPR 327 cited

STEVEN JOHN GRANT v COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

NSD 930 of 2004

BRANSON J
12 AUGUST 2005
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 930 of 2004

BETWEEN:

STEVEN JOHN GRANT
APPLICANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 AUGUST 2005

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal from the decision of the respondent revoking the Patent be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 930 of 2004

BETWEEN:

STEVEN JOHN GRANT
APPLICANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE:

12 AUGUST 2005

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The issue to be determined on this appeal under s 101F(4) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (‘the Act’) is whether a method for structuring a financial transaction, the purported effect of which is to protect an individual’s assets (presumably against the lawful claims of the individual’s creditors), is capable of being the subject of a patent.

  2. The applicant has appealed from a decision of the respondent made by her delegate (‘the Delegate’) that the invention the subject matter of Innovation Patent No 2003100074 as proposed to be amended (‘the Patent’) is not a ‘manner of manufacture within the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies’ (see s 18(1A)(a) of the Act). Claim 1 of the Patent is as follows:

    ‘1.an asset protection method for protecting an asset owned by an owner, the method comprising the steps of:

    (a)establishing a trust having a trustee,

    (b)the owner making a gift of a sum of money to the trust,

    (c)the trustee making a loan of said sum of money from the trust to the owner, and

    (d)the trustee securing the loan by taking a charge for said sum of money over the asset.’

  3. This appeal was argued on the basis that if claim 1 is not the proper subject of a patent, claims 2‑5 will similarly not be proper subjects of…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 1100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Grant v Commissioner of Patents involved the applicant challenging the revocation of a patent granted for a method of using Australian law to manage assets. The dispute was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the primary judge upheld the decision of the Commissioner of Patents to revoke the patent. The applicant argued that the invention was patentable because it involved a method of creating an artificial state of affairs with economic utility, drawing on a High Court decision from National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents. The Commissioner, however, contended that the invention was not a manner of manufacture as defined by the Statute of Monopolies, and that granting a patent over an aspect of Australian law was not appropriate.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the invention constituted a manner of manufacture within the meaning of the Statute of Monopolies. This required the court to consider the principles developed by the High Court in NRDC, while also acknowledging that defining 'manufacture' too narrowly would be unproductive. The court had to balance the economic utility of the invention against the fundamental nature of Australian law as a public resource, not subject to private monopolies.

In reaching its decision, the court found that while the invention did have economic utility, it did not create an artificially created state of affairs in the manner contemplated by the High Court in NRDC. The court emphasised that Australian law is a creation of Parliament and the courts, meant to govern the populace at large, and not something that could be subject to a private monopoly. Therefore, the Commissioner's decision to revoke the patent was upheld as the invention did not meet the statutory criteria for patentability.

As a result of the court's decision, the appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs. The Federal Court's ruling reinforced the principle that Australian law, as a public good, cannot be the subject of a patent, safeguarding the law's role in governing society as a whole.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal from the decision of the respondent revoking the Patent be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

BRANSON J
For the reasons set out below I have concluded that the decision of the Delegate is correct and the appeal should be dismissed.DECISION OF THE DELEGATE The Delegate observed that the invention the subject of the Patent raised directly the question of whether a patent can be granted in respect of an invention that involves no discovery of a law of nature and no application of technology. It was argued before the Delegate that the invention was patentable because it concerned a method to create an artificial state of affairs and had economic utility in practical affairs. This argument was founded on an observation made by the High Court in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 (‘NRDC’). In NRDC the High Court gave consideration to a new method of ridding crops of weeds by applying chemicals not formerly known to be useful for this kind of purpose. At 277 the High Court stated:‘… the method the subject of the relevant claims has as its end result an artificial effect falling squarely within the true concept of what must be produced by a process if it is to be held patentable … It is a “product” because it consists in an artificially created state of affairs, discernible by observing over a period the growth of weeds and crops respectively on sown land on which the method has been put into practice. And the significance of the product is economic; for it provides a remarkable advantage … for one of the most elemental activities by which man has served his material needs, the cultivation of the soil for the production of its fruits.’ The Delegate noted that the concept of manner of manufacture has consistently involved either the discovery of laws of nature or the application of technology based on the laws of nature. He characterised the invention as being, by contrast, ‘a discovery in relation to the laws of Australia, useful in the affairs of the populace’. The Delegate was satisfied that the invention had economic utility because many professional advisers are charged with looking after their clients’ assets by making full use of the law. However, he concluded that the invention did not result in an ‘artificially created state of affairs’ in the sense discussed in NRDC. He observed:‘The invention resides in the law of Australia. That law is the creation of Parliament, and of the courts through common law. At one level one could say that all laws are “artificial” in that … they are the creation of Parliament or of the courts. Beyond that, the law must be taken as being a deliberate intention of the legislature to provide governance of the population at large. I think it must be taken that the legislature has enacted the law in full knowledge of all its consequences, and in particular the interaction with other laws of the Commonwealth, including the common law.…Furthermore, the law is the foundation upon which our society is built … I do not believe that it is open (or proper) for the Commissioner of Patents to grant monopoly rights over certain aspects of Australian law. The law is for the populace at large; it is not for the use of one individual to the exclusion of all others who desire to follow the law.’ (original emphasis)CONSIDERATION

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BRANSON J

The Delegate was satisfied that the invention had economic utility because many professional advisers are charged with looking after their clients’ assets by making full use of the law. However, he concluded that the invention did not result in an ‘artificially created state of affairs’ in the sense discussed in NRDC. He observed:‘The invention resides in the law of Australia. That law is the creation of Parliament, and of the courts through common law. At one level one could say that all laws are “artificial” in that … they are the creation of Parliament or of the courts. Beyond that, the law must be taken as being a deliberate intention of the legislature to provide governance of the population at large. I think it must be taken that the legislature has enacted the law in full knowledge of all its consequences, and in particular the interaction with other laws of the Commonwealth, including the common law.…Furthermore, the law is the foundation upon which our society is built … I do not believe that it is open (or proper) for the Commissioner of Patents to grant monopoly rights over certain aspects of Australian law. The law is for the populace at large; it is not for the use of one individual to the exclusion of all others who desire to follow the law.’ (original emphasis)CONSIDERATION Although the language of s 18(1A) of the Act calls for consideration of whether the invention, so far as claimed in any claim, ‘is a manner of manufacture within the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies’, the High Court in NRDC at 269 made it clear that the true question to be answered is:‘Is this a proper subject of letters patent according to the principles which have been developed for the application of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies?’ In seeking to identify the principles which have been developed for the application of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies it is not to be overlooked that the High Court in NRDC at 271 also said that ‘any attempt to state the ambit of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies by precisely defining “manufacture” is bound to fail’. It would therefore be wrong to see NRDC itself as intending to define a manner of manufacture as, or as including, a method that has as its end result an artificially created state of affairs of economic significance (see [6] above). The language used by the High Court in NRDC is to be understood in the context of the subject matter under consideration in that case. Before turning to the principles which have been developed for the application of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, it is pertinent to recall that the principal purpose of the Statute of Monopolies was to declare grants of monopolies void. Certain letters patent and grants of privilege giving monopoly rights were excluded from the operation of the statute. The most significant of these were identified in s 6 which relevantly provided:‘Provided also, and be it declared and enacted, that any declaration, before‑mentioned, shall not extend to any letters patent and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years, or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures within this realm, to the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufacturers, which others at the time of making of such letters patent and grants shall not use, so as also they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient.’