Grant and Attard

[2016] FamCA 885

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GRANT & ATTARD [2016] FamCA 885

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Parenting – interim order – where change of residence has been ordered but contact to be determined.  Where husband and Independent Children’s Lawyer submit even supervised contact should not be ordered until wife gets psychiatric assessment and treatment.  Where it is found such orders are not in child’s best interests taking into account issues of unacceptable risk.  Orders for supervised time made.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Donaghey and Donaghey [2011] FamCA 13
Goode and Goode [2006] FamCA 1346; (2006) FLC 93-286
M v M [1998] HCA 68; (1998) 166 CLR 69

APPLICANT: Mr Grant

RESPONDENT: Ms Attard

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

FILE NUMBER: MLC 10298 of 2015

DATE DELIVERED: 20 October 2016

PLACE DELIVERED: Melbourne

PLACE HEARD: Melbourne

JUDGMENT OF: Cronin J

HEARING DATE: 19 October 2016

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Fronistas

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Kyron Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ms Carter

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Robinson Gill

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Mr Lethlean

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Clark Family Lawyers

Orders

1. Until further order, all paragraphs of extant parenting orders relating to B born … 2007 insofar as they relate to the wife having time or communication are suspended.

2. Until further order, the child live with the husband.

3. Until further order, the wife and all of her family members are restrained by injunction from spending time with or communicating with the child or from being in the vicinity of his school or home other than as otherwise provided by these orders.

4. That the husband provide a copy of these orders to:

   (a)      B’s school principal;

   (b)      Dr C; and

   (c)any person or agency who may require it for the purposes of the implementation of these orders.

5. Until further order, the child spend supervised time with the mother at the Suburb D Children’s Contact Service at times nominated by the service but not to commence before 5 November 2016 and preferably on a fortnightly basis thereafter.

6. All costs of the contact centre be paid equally by the mother and father.

7. The mother and the father forthwith do all things necessary to complete the relevant intake requirements of the contact centre and follow all lawful directions of the manager and appointed supervisor of the centre.

8. That the Independent Children’s Lawyer provide to the contact centre an unanonymised version of the reasons for judgment this day along with a comprehensive and clear set of instructions as to what is appropriate behaviour of the mother consistent with the reasons for judgment.

9. The costs of both parties are reserved to the trial judge.

10. That pursuant to s.65DA(2) and s.62B, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto and these particulars are included in these orders.

11. All interim applications are otherwise dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Grant & Attard has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: MLC 10298  of 2015

Mr Grant

Applicant

And

Ms Attard

Respondent

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. The principle issue in this application is whether until further order, the child should spend no time with his mother or alternatively, whether there should be some time under restricted and controlled conditions.  There are two ancillary questions.  First, should the Court permit (if not direct) an alteration to the place of schooling of the child?  Secondly, should a family report be immediately ordered?

2. The proceedings are between the child’s parents Mr Grant (“the father”) and Ms Attard (“the mother”). 

3. B is aged eight years.  His interests were forcefully put to the Court by an Independent Children’s Lawyer.

4. It is unnecessary to recite an extensive background but important to highlight that there are controversial facts in dispute which the Court cannot determine in this interim hearing.  Suffice to say, the matters that follow have been taken from documents relied upon by the parties.

5. The parties married in 2008 and separated in 2014.  On the mother’s account of the history, the father was violent to her and to the child.  That is strenuously denied by the father.

6. For his part, the father asserts that the mother has had psychiatric problems and he was a significant carer of the child.  The mother denies his allegations.

7. Proceedings began in the Federal Circuit Court and a cursory reading of the affidavit material was largely unhelpful.  Thus, much of what the Court has to assist it in determining the immediate question comes from the evidence of a psychiatrist (presented both in written and oral form), the agreed evidence of what a psychologist acting as a therapist opined and finally, the helpful (albeit difficult) submissions of the parties’ counsel.

8. It is also sufficient to commence these reasons with an indication that late last week, the current applications were before the Senior Registrar.  He had the opportunity to hear from, and permit limited cross-examination of, psychiatrist Dr E.  That evidence is heavily relied upon by me today.

9. The Senior Registrar made orders on Thursday that it was in the child’s best interests that he be removed from the mother’s care immediately and be placed with the father.  The mother (who was present in court and represented by counsel) not only did not comply, she sought to involve the State Police Sexual Abuse Investigation Unit.  In that process, she evaded the pursuit of both the father and the Independent Children’s Lawyer of a handover of the child.  However, so concerned were the relevant police that they:

   (a)      retained the child and refused to return him to her; and

   (b)sought and ultimately obtained, an intervention order against the mother relating to the child.

10. The actions just mentioned (albeit the Court was not appraised of all of the detail) led to the Senior Registrar making further orders last Friday to ensure that the child went into the care of the father.  Lest it be misunderstood, on the Thursday, the Senior Registrar was so concerned about the child’s safety that the orders I have already mentioned were made but the future and further time between the mother and the child was adjourned to me to determine some days later.

11. Counsel for mother properly conceded that there would be no immediate challenge to the residential situation.  The issue was (and is) the time and the circumstances of the mother’s relationship with the child.  That concession, along with what underpins the mother’s position, is that she needs to seek psychiatric help and will do so now with the assistance of her lawyers. 

12. The position of the Independent Children’s Lawyer supported by the father, is that when the mother takes those steps and provides evidence of both a diagnosis and a prognosis, the mother could then seek some form of relationship with the child through the courts.  In my view, that is not satisfactory or proper on the evidence and accordingly, not in the child’s best interests for the reasons that follow.

13. The focus in determining the primary question, notwithstanding the mother’s concession, is whether any order of the nature pursued by the mother, places the child in a situation of unacceptable risk of harm.

14. The responsibility of the Court under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) is to make orders in the best interests of children which means that protection of children is a priority.

15. Victoria’s Department of Health and Human Services is aware of the case and has earlier in 2016, declined to intervene in the proceedings or the parties’ lives and, it would seem, has again chosen to leave the issue for this Court’s determination on the basis that any protective issue forming part of their mandate, would be contemplated.  It is sufficient to refer to the fact that, early in 2016, a Notice of Risk document was brought to the attention of the Department of Health and Human Services and there has been a response filed to that Notice which is now in evidence.  Additionally, a Notification of Risk was made last week along with advice provided to the Department by Victoria Police and again, no intervention has occurred.

16. I have already mentioned the stark and polarised positions of the parties and the Independent Children’s Lawyer but it is important to contemplate the details.

17. The applicant is the father.  He immediately seeks that there be no contact between the mother and the child for an undefined period of time.  It is difficult to know if and when any contact would therefore occur under the father’s proposal because he maintains that the onus of producing evidence falls to the mother to show that there is no longer an unacceptable risk of harm to the child.

18. The father also seeks sole parental responsibility so that he can implement a change of school for the child on the assumption there is unlikely to be a change of care arrangements in the foreseeable future.  The change would also be more convenient for the father.  That order is not supported by the Independent Children’s Lawyer.  I agree with the Independent Children’s Lawyer because the inconvenience of and to the father is of little importance immediately;  the stability for the child is the issue.  The father does not seem to be employed so the alteration of schooling ought not be a major issue and the distance required to travel is not so great.  Additionally, the stability of the child is important and a change of school may not help that.

19. The Independent Children’s Lawyer sought orders that the mother attend upon a forensic psychiatrist and upon evidence being available, the future contact relationship be addressed by the Court as a matter of urgency.  In my view, an order for the attendance of the mother upon a psychiatrist is unnecessary, it being obvious that the current psychiatrist, Dr E, having given evidence, the mother will need to provide evidence that things are not as the Senior Registrar thought them to be or that significant change has occurred such that any risk to the child is minimised.

20. In respect of future contact, an order excluding any effective relationship between the child and the mother could only be proper if no alternative protective order could be implemented.  I remain unconvinced that the protective issues cannot be dealt with by the order I propose.  If I am wrong, there is ample opportunity for them to be reviewed.

21. The mother’s position was twofold.  First, contact should occur under supervision at a contact centre which her counsel said has immediate capacity.  Secondly, a family report should be ordered so that the Court could have evidence about the most critical question which is the impact of the absence of the mother on the child or, the impact of any type of relationship of a face to face nature on the child.

22. One of the least controversial matters is that after separation, the father did have time with the child in circumstances where the mother was clearly the person primarily caring for him.  She unilaterally stopped the father’s contact because, in her mind (or indeed it may be true) the child said that the father had a gun (or something of that appearance) and had indicated he would use it to shoot the mother.  That is all denied by the father.  This incident however led to a long period of no contact by the father. 

23. In January 2016, family consultant Dr F wrote a memo for the Federal Circuit Court that said:

    The co-parenting relationship appears to have deteriorated since separation.  The parties currently have no direct contact or communication.  (The father) describes (the mother) as a “no contact mother” and reported that the nature and number of her complaints and allegations against him were escalating over time in desperation to sever his relationship with [the child].  (The mother) perceives (the father) to be a danger to herself and that of [the child].  She avoids any communication with (the father) and has taken active steps to prevent any such contact or communication.

24. Dr F then wrote of the child:

    [The child] reported, “everything’s going bad in my life”.  He described misbehaving, getting in trouble and losing privileges (eg, not being allowed to play video games).  [The child] described getting “so stressed” and feeling “bad and mad”.  He was unable to articulate what contributed to these feelings.  [The child] was not sure why his parents had separated, guessing maybe his father had spoken badly about his mother.  When asked what it was like when he lived with his father, [the child] reported, “He was very awesome and I liked it very well”.  He did not know why he was not currently seeing his father and described the last visit (5 December 2015).  His description contained no references to misconduct by his father, as alleged by the mother.

25. The family consultant went on to say that the interview with the child contained no information to support the mother’s allegations of family violence during the relationship or post-separation.

26. It is important to observe that the mother alleges significant family violence in this case including towards the child.  Thus, the statement of the child would not necessarily be of probative value unless he was probed about the specific incidents described by the mother in her affidavit material.  That affidavit material reports not just physical violence but what might be described as unreasonable discipline of a child.  The truth of those matters needs to be examined.  Thus, in January 2016, the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court did not resolve. 

27. By September 2016, the mother’s position as articulated to psychiatrist [Dr E] was that there should be no contact between the father and the child until he was 16 years of age.  That view has caused significant disquiet for the psychiatrist whose evidence I turn to in a moment. Before doing so, the approach to these quandaries is clear from both the legislation and authorities. 

28. In Goode and Goode [2006] FamCA 1346; (2006) FLC 93-286, the Full Court observed about the legislative intent [72-73] that it favoured substantial involvement of both parents in their children’s lives and relevantly here, as to the time spent with children but subject to the need to protect children from harm and provided it was in their best interests and reasonably practical.

29. The Full Court in departing from previous authority which strongly favoured not altering a status quo said:

    [73]That is not to say that stability derived from a well-settled arrangement may not ultimately be what the court finds to be in the child’s best interests, particularly where there is no ability to test controversial evidence but that decision would be arrived at after a consideration of the matters contained in s 60CC, particularly s 60CC(3)(d) and s 60CC(3)(m) and, if appropriate, s 60CC(4) and s 60CC(4A).

30. As will be evident, some of those particular provisions as set out by the Full Court have been altered but the sentiment remains strong.

31. Section 61DA requires the Court to apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of a child that the parents have equal shared parental responsibility.  However, s 61DA(3) should apply in this case because there are so many contentious facts about both of the provisions that would otherwise remove the presumption.  In addition, there are few pending decisions for the child requiring a sharing of the usual parental responsibilities.  Whilst some focus was on the educational issue, my view is that that is not pressing as the child is currently in a school where he is stable and has peers.  In addition, there is only one term left in the year.  Importantly, there has been no communication between the parties for a long time and it would be unlikely that there would be such communication at present because of the mother’s mental health questions.  Thus, on an interim basis, there is no need to make a determination about long term responsibility. 

32. Even if education was an issue, it will most likely be resolved by a pragmatic approach dictated by how long the child is going to remain with his father.

33. Turning then to the issue of unacceptable risk.  Before analysing the evidence, it is helpful to define what the Court is looking for.  Here, the mother alleges sexual abuse of the child by the father as well as physical abuse.  The father in turn, relying upon the evidence of Dr E and psychologist Dr C, says that serious physical harm may come to the child (Dr E refers to filicide) and there is the somewhat unclear evidence that any contact with the child may be psychologically disturbing (Dr C).

34. Section 60CC(1) provides that in determining what is in the child’s best interests, the Court must consider the matters set out in sub-sections (2) and (3).

35. Section 60CC(2) provides that the primary considerations are the benefit of the child having a meaningful relationship with both parents and secondly, the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence. 

36. In respect of the second of those considerations, all aspects are in play.

37. Section 60CC(2A) however goes on to say that if there is a conflict between the two primary considerations, the Court is to give greater weight to the need to protect the child. 

38. There are then additional considerations which are also those referred to in Goode (supra) but having regard to the controversial nature of the evidence, it is impossible to make determinations through findings of fact.

39. In respect of the allegation of sexual abuse, the Court is guided by the decision of M v M [1998] HCA 68; (1998) 166 CLR 69 where at [76] the High Court of Australia said:

    …the resolution of an allegation of sexual abuse against a person is subservient and ancillary to the court’s determination of what is in the best interests of the child.  The Family Court’s consideration of the paramount issue which it is enjoined to decide cannot be diverted by the supposed need to arrive at a definitive conclusion on the allegation of sexual abuse…

40. Any allegation of sexual abuse has to be cautiously approached but along with other allegations, the focus of the court must be on what is best for the child.  Thus in this case, criticisms of the mother for her conduct last week in what appears to be defiance of court orders along with her apparent recalcitrance in relation to attending upon appointments made for her to see Dr C and also the father’s inconvenience of having to get the child to his current schooling are all important but they are distractions from the real issue of the best interests of the child.  In this case, the court was asked to focus on the discrete issue of what sort of relationship the mother would have with the child into the foreseeable future and that is where the unacceptable risk test becomes important.

41. In M v M (supra), the High Court went on to point out that in deciding what order it should make, very great weight will be given to the importance of maintaining parental ties:

    Not so much because parents have a right to custody or access, but because it is prima facie in a child’s best interests to maintain the filial relationship with both parents.   

    That statement has not altered as a result of amendments to the Act but the emphasis as I have observed, is on the protection of the child while endeavouring to maintain the filial relationship.

1. As for unacceptable risk, the determination is made so much more difficult in circumstances where the evidence cannot be tested.  The court must take a conservative approach but at the same time rely upon the evidence that it has, albeit untested.  That requires the court to make a judgment as to what the risk is and then decide whether it is unacceptable or not to take it (see Donaghey and Donaghey [2011] FamCA 13).

2. I turn then to the evidence.

3. Dr E is a psychiatrist whose expertise was not challenged.  He was directed by court order, to do a psychiatric assessment of both parents.  In respect of the father, having taken a history but being cognisant of the allegations of the mother, Dr E diagnosed that there were mild depressive symptoms which he thought were an apparent response to the stressful family law matters and the lack of time with the child.  Dr E thought that the father did not demonstrate any major cognitive deficits or signs of psychiatric illness.  He opined however, if the mother’s version of events was found to be accurate,:

   It would necessarily follow that (the father) has suffered from a severe personality disorder and significant erratic and unpredictable personality traits which have impacted significantly upon his marriage and the care of his son.  In turn, it would then follow that there are concerns regarding his ability to provide a reasonable level of positive parenting without episodic anger.  From a psychiatric perspective, he would not be deemed as being suited to spend time with his son unsupervised, until such time that he had engaged in appropriate long-term counselling and developed an appreciation of the effects of his behaviour.

4. Those qualifications to the evidence of Dr E cannot be overlooked.  Whilst the evidence at the moment looks overwhelming bleak in respect of the mother’s personality situation and health, I cannot ignore the fact that she had the major caring role of the child and was observed to have a strong attachment.  The evidence remains untested, albeit superficially the capacity of the mother to care for the child looks extremely limited.  Dr E’s caution however needs to be taken into account in relation to what contact the mother has with the child just in case there is a need to return him to the mother’s care in the foreseeable future.

5. In respect of the mother, Dr E undertook an examination on two occasions in August and September 2016 but he also reviewed the available records and had the opportunity to read a variety of documents that were provided by the solicitors for both parties.  He spoke to the mother’s treating practitioner as well as the Independent Children’s Lawyer and Dr C.

6. In writing his report on 3 October 2016, Dr E said it was not possible to arrive at a definitive psychiatric diagnosis because of the complex history and context of the mother’s psychiatric symptomatology.

7. Dr E thought that to overcome that problem of a diagnosis, the mother would have to engage in regular consultations with a treating psychiatrist.  He did not doubt that the mother suffered from significant anxiety and depression and had “apparently” been traumatised by her own sexual abuse in childhood and had been exposed to marital problems in her own parents’ relationship.  Dr E thought that there was underreporting of the residual and ongoing psychiatric symptoms which were manifesting themselves in her preoccupation with the perceptions of the child and the grave risk that the mother thought there was to the child in having time with the father.  Hence, the reservation I earlier made about the mother’s position of the father not seeing the child until the child turned 16 years of age.

8. In concluding his report, Dr E said that if the father’s evidence was found to be accurate then the mother had had a severe psychiatric illness which had not improved to the point that her anxiety was founded upon misperceptions and possibly even delusional thinking.  He thought she therefore would need long term engagement with a consultant psychiatrist.  He then said:

   If (the father’s) version of the events appear to be more accurate than (the mother’s), it would necessarily follow that, from a psychiatric perspective, she would be suited for supervised time between herself and her son, but that unsupervised time would risk significant emotional and psychological harm to [the child].

9. I pause there because it would be obvious from those statements that if accepted, there could be little doubt that the decision made by the Senior Registrar to remove the child from the mother was appropriate but on the same point, the ongoing relationship between the mother and the child should continue under supervision because of the emotional and psychological harm to the child.  There was no reference in the report to any physical harm.  That situation changed radically when Dr E gave viva voce evidence.

10. Dr E told the court that having thought about the matter, there were three things of concern:

    (a)the focus of the mother’s delusional thinking was on the child or in other words there was a psychotic view about the child;

    (b)there had been a deterioration (and that is certainly supported by the concession by counsel for the mother that the police expressed concern and initiated an intervention order against the mother); and

    (c)the only way to obtain a confident diagnosis and management was for the mother to engage with a psychiatrist.

11. It was at that point in the evidence that Dr E referred to his experience as an experienced mental health psychiatrist particularly working with incarcerated women.  He then raised the question of filicide.  He said that the issue of “altruistic filicide” came up because of the “cocktail of features and circumstances” that were “a ripe kind of situation” for the mother to be in if she were to lose her child.  That is significant bearing in mind my earlier observation that he was effectively recommending a change of residence immediately.

12. The Senior Registrar gave counsel for the parties a very limited opportunity late in that day to cross-examine Dr E but there was no change in his opinion.  Importantly, Dr E did not suggest that there be no contact between the child and the mother.

13. Senior Registrar FitzGibbon relied heavily upon the evidence of Dr E.

14. At the hearing before me, the parties asked for some time because the father and the child were meeting with Dr C.  Dr C was appointed by an order of the court to which the parties had consented to undertake therapeutic work presumably for the purposes of reintroducing the father into the child’s life at a time where he had been otherwise excluded.  It was common ground between counsel that Dr C opined that she was pleasantly surprised about the relationship between father and child and that the child had responded well to her. 

15. Dr C said that there should not be any contact at all because the child needed a chance to feel settled and establish a routine in the father’s household without interruption of the mother.  As to how all that should be implemented, Dr C said it was a matter for the court but she had no confidence that the mother was child-focussed and she needed to understand that requirement.

16. I have already set out the positions of the parties.  The risk to which I earlier referred has to be looked at in the physical sense as well as the emotional and psychological sense.  To the extent that the evidence of Dr E suggests some form of physical harm even in its most fatal description, that problem can be resolved by strict supervision. 

17. Both Dr E and Dr C have expressed concerns about the emotional impact of the behaviour of the mother upon the child and the question is whether or not there is a likelihood of some event occurring instigated by the mother even under supervision which might disturb the child.  As I indicated in discussion however, that same problem could arise by the absence of the mother as indeed, it could arise if the child asked questions of his father as to the whereabouts of the mother and they were not handled appropriately.  There is no simple solution to the problem.  However, it seems to me that if the contact centre is appropriately appointed and instructed about the physical protection of the child as well as about what the mother might say, there is still the dilemma of the very contact disturbing the child because of his attachment as previously described.  That problem will have to be faced one way or the other. 

18. Dr C suggested that there should be no contact to allow the child to settle into a routine.  Bearing in mind the uncertainties for the child which have apparently quickly been overcome in a matter of days, I have concluded that the father has the capacity to settle him quickly and appropriately.  In those circumstances, even if the child was disturbed by the reintroduction to his mother, he would most likely overcome it albeit with some distress relatively quickly.  Accordingly, the bad consequences of a reintroduction seem largely unknown but the good consequences are that the otherwise good relationship between the child and the mother may be continued. 

19. Counsel for the father urged me to take into account the behaviour of the mother after the orders of the Senior Registrar last Thursday but, as I observed, she was either malevolent or unable to clearly determine what to do because of her psychiatric illness.  Those are matters for trial.

20. In my view, because of the prospect of an ongoing relationship in the future and the absence of any strong evidence as to the psychological damage that might be done if the child was completely excluded from his mother’s life, there should be some time ordered but after the child has been given an opportunity to settle.  There is no evidence as to how long that should be but in my view, two weeks should give the child that opportunity.  In the meantime, he will otherwise continue his life at school and be cared for by his father. 

21. Any supervision will need to be carefully explained to the contact centre.  They will need to be aware of the mother’s uncertain psychiatric diagnosis.  The parties should have liberty to apply in the event that the contact centre determines that the mother is incapable of restraining herself from distressing the child or alternatively, there is strong evidence to show that the father cannot settle the child as a result of any such reintroduction program. 

22. As I earlier observed, there is so much controversial evidence in this case and very little expert evidence to guide the court.  As such, a cautious and protective order is necessary which also fits the mandate of the legislation to enable the child to maintain filial relationships with his mother.  Having considered all of the matters that are open to inference and particularly those required as described in Goode (supra), I am satisfied that it is in the best interests of the child that the orders that I have set out at the start of these reasons should be made.

23. In respect of the issue of schooling, I have made my position clear.  It is not appropriate that there be any alteration to the parental responsibility situation dictated by law.

24. In relation to the question of a family report, starting afresh would mean the child being interviewed again.  He has seen Dr C and been spoken to by police.  Dr C has developed a good relationship with him and she knows the history and the parties.  In those circumstances, she should give any advice that the parties now seek in relation to the progress of the supervised time that I anticipate under these orders.  To the extent that Dr C indicates that there is a problem with that supervised time from her observations with the child, all parties have liberty to apply to make urgent applications for an alteration of the existing orders. 

25. I must also observe that the mother’s counsel quite properly put her instructions that a family report should be ordered other than through Dr C for two main reasons.  First, the mother has lost confidence in Dr C and as I observed, that is a matter that can be determined at trial through the testing of the evidence in relation to her objectivity.  Secondly, the order made by the court previously related to a therapeutic role and Dr C did not seem troubled about telling the court her views so I have concluded that she is not compromised at this stage.

I certify that the preceding Sixty Six (66) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Cronin delivered on 20 October 2016.

Associate: 

Date:  20 October 2016