Grange & Grange
[2021] FamCA 401
•18 June 2021
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Grange & Grange [2021] FamCA 401
File number(s): ROC 580 of 2011 Judgment of: HOWARD J Date of judgment: 18 June 2021 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE – where the applicant husband failed to prove that he is unable to support himself adequately – where the applicant husband failed to prove that the wife is reasonably able to maintain the husband – application dismissed. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975(Cth) ss 72, 74, 75, 79
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) Part 3.3
Cases cited: Grange & Grange and Ors [2019] FamCAFC 205
Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447
In the Marriage of Bevan (1993) 19 Fam LR 35
Weir & Weir (1992) 110 FLR 403
Number of paragraphs: 55 Date of last submission/s: 7 May 2021 Date of hearing: 7 May 2021 Place: Brisbane Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Foley Solicitor for the Applicant: Ryan Murdoch O’Regan Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Fisher (on a direct brief from the Respondent, Mr. Grange) ORDERS
ROC 580 of 2011 BETWEEN: MS GRANGE
Applicant
AND: MR GRANGE
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
HOWARD J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 JUNE 2021
THE COURT ORDERS ON A FINAL BASIS:
1.That the Application for spousal maintenance contained in the Amended Response filed 10 February 2020 be dismissed.
2.That in the event that either party intends filing an application for costs – such application shall be filed and served within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Grange & Grange has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HOWARD J:
Background
In this case, the only issue for determination relates to the husband's application for spousal maintenance. The orders sought by the husband are contained in his Amended Response filed 10 February 2020. The wife had originally sought a property adjustment under s.79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). The husband seeks $40,000 “representing arrears of spousal maintenance from 14 November 2011 to the date of this order.” The husband seeks a further order under section 74 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) that the wife pay spousal maintenance to him in the sum of $300 per week. He puts no limit as to how long this amount should be paid to him by the wife. The husband also seeks costs.
The wife seeks that the husband's application for spousal maintenance be dismissed. The wife also seeks costs.
For the reasons that follow – I agree with the wife. The husband’s application for spousal maintenance should be dismissed.
These parties have a long history of family law litigation.
The husband was born in 1959.
The wife was born in 1960.
The parties married in 1978 and they are the parents of seven children. Those children are now all adults and they are as follows:-
(a)Mr J, born in 1978;
(b)Ms P, born in 1980;
(c)Ms H, born in 1983;
(d)Ms A, born in 1988;
(e)Ms Q, born in 1992;
(f)Mr M, born in 1995; and
(g)Ms R, born in 1998.
All of the above adults live independently of their parents. The parties separated in 2009.
The wife filed her Application for property settlement on 14 November 2011.
The trial in respect of the property settlement proceedings occurred over an eight day period commencing in November 2015 and finalising in September 2017 before another Judge of this Court.
The first Judge delivered judgment on 30 January 2018. His Honour found that the only item of property that belonged to the husband and the wife was the proceeds of sale of a commercial licence. These were the net sale proceeds of “Sales Permit No. …”. The “Sales Permit” was an agreement that had been entered into in September 2000 between G (QLD) Pty Ltd ("the company") and the State of Queensland. The agreement was for the purchase of raw materials. The husband and the wife owned and controlled the company.
There are two adjoining allotments of land on C Street, D Town connected to this family. The factory (which is now no longer in use) sits upon an allotment known as "the S Property". That land is owned by a company called G Pty Ltd. I note that this is a separate company. It was owned and controlled by the parents of the husband – Mr A and Ms B Grange. During the marriage the parties conducted a business from the S Property.
The adjoining allotment is known as “the D Property” – and comprises some seven acres and is now owned by a daughter of the parties – Ms A Grange. Ms A Grange gave evidence at the hearing of the spousal maintenance application. I will return to her evidence later in these reasons.
Ms B Grange had received the net proceeds of sale of the “Sales Permit” (in the amount of $1,024,600) pursuant to a document which both the husband and the wife had signed on 8 November 2008 directing that the net proceeds of sale of the “Sales Permit” – which would otherwise have been payable to the company (controlled by the husband and the wife) be paid directly to Mrs Grange senior.
The first Judge concluded that the net proceeds of sale were held by Ms B Grange “on trust for the husband and the wife”. His Honour made a declaration in those terms. In making a property adjustment order under section 79, His Honour then ordered that the property be divided equally between the wife and the husband.
The husband appealed to the Full Court and in a decision delivered 7 November 2019 (Grange & Grange and Ors [2019] FamCAFC 205) – the Full Court overturned the first Judge’s decision and concluded there was no constructive trust. Primarily this was because the Full Court said there was not sufficient evidence for a finding of unconscionability (Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583). The Full Court found that there was no other basis on which a constructive trust could be imposed – such as where the person involved (the wife) was under a special disadvantage (Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447).
At paragraph 53 of the Full Court's decision – the Court noted a finding made by His Honour (at paragraph 169 of the primary judgment) where the following evidence was referred to and accepted by the first Judge:-
53. In addition to the above, the primary judge also made the following findings:-
….
169. In a conversation as early after the sale of the Sales Permit as 20 May 2009, the wife makes specific reference to the money “Nana” got from the allocation and that those funds would be “quite sufficient” to pay for a house for each of the remaining children.
The Full Court noted the admission made by the wife “that she intended or, at least, accepted that Ms B Grange was to receive the proceeds of sale of the sales permit…” (Note paragraph 54 of the Full Court's decision).
The Full Court concluded:-
73…the only possible construction that can be given to the documents and the above facts, is that there has been a completed gift of the proceeds of sale of the Sales Permit to [Ms B] (Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540). We accept that this was not the outcome contended for at the hearing by the husband but it is the inevitable legal effect. It follows that this ground succeeds and the relevant order should be set aside.
74. The failure of the wife’s case has the effect that [Ms B] will retain the proceeds of sale of the Sales Permit. As it was the only property that the primary judge found to be held by the parties, it follows that there is no property to be divided. Thus, the inevitable consequence is that the proceedings for property division under s 79 of the Act must be dismissed.
The trial Judge had not dealt with the husband’s spousal maintenance application. The matter was remitted to the trial division for the hearing of the spousal maintenance application.
The Husband’s Application for spousal maintenance
Section 72(1) of the Act provides:-
(1) A party to a marriage is liable to maintain the other party, to the extent that the first-mentioned party is reasonably able to do so, if, and only if, that other party is unable to support herself or himself adequately whether:
(a) by reason of having the care and control of a child of the marriage who has not attained the age of 18 years;
(b) by reason of age or physical or mental incapacity for appropriate gainful employment; or
(c) for any other adequate reason;
having regard to any relevant matter referred to in subsection 75(2).
(Emphasis added).
I have come to the conclusion that the husband has not been able to prove that he is “unable to support himself” adequately. He lives on the property which is (effectively) owned by his 85-year-old mother. The 85-year-old mother lives in PP Town. That property comprises seven acres and as mentioned earlier – is referred to as the “S Property”. The next door property (the D Property) is owned by his daughter Ms A Grange. There are five head of cattle and a camel which graze on both properties. The husband and Ms A Grange maintain that the primary purpose for keeping the cattle is to keep the grass at a reasonable level. The conclusion I have reached is that the husband and Ms A Grange own the cows and the camel. It is apparent from the evidence that the husband is able to perform physical work. He gave evidence that he helps his daughter raise the cattle. He said that he checks to see if they're still in the paddock and he also “sprays some flies”. Crucially, he gave evidence (page 80 of the transcript line 37) that he “might have to put up some fences”. I had the distinct impression that the husband was understating his ability to perform manual labour. The husband provided no further details in relation to how much fence he has erected on the two properties. The inference that is open to the Court and the inference that I draw is that the husband is, at the very least, acting as a caretaker for these two properties and (as will be seen later in these reasons) it is more likely that he is in fact the manager of the two properties. This is particularly so because his 85-year-old mother lives off site – in PP Town. Furthermore, Ms A Grange works on a fly in fly out basis and is away every second week (or so).
There is a significant flaw in the husband’s case. He has not put on any medical evidence whatsoever. The husband has come to the Court seeking an order for spousal maintenance but he has failed to produce evidence of any medical condition or ailment that might be preventing him from working. Indeed the evidence (as noted) indicates that the husband can perform manual labour.
It is said (on behalf of the husband) that he is in receipt of a disability support pension. That is not, in my view, proof that the husband is unable to adequately support himself. There was no evidence of the reason why or the basis upon which he has been (apparently) approved to receive a disability support pension. He had attempted to provide evidence in an affidavit filed 9 March 2021 that he was suffering, “from permanent back and neck injury”. Unsurprisingly, there was an objection taken to this evidence. It is opinion evidence. The husband is not an expert. He has no qualifications to provide evidence in relation to whether or not he has any form of “permanent” injury (note Part 3.3 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)). I considered the objection and made a ruling on this striking out the evidence and gave reasons for that ruling on 7 May 2021. There is not even a letter from the husband's general practitioner. No medical evidence whatsoever. This much was conceded by the husband’s counsel, Mr Fisher.
It was also argued (on behalf the husband) that because his daughter (Ms A Grange) assists him financially – this is proof that he is unable to support himself adequately. It proves no such thing. If Ms A Grange chooses to make certain funds available for her father – that is a matter for her.
Part of Ms A Grange's evidence is contained in an affidavit filed 26 October 2020. In that affidavit (paragraph 10) Ms A Grange maintains that she purchased a shipping container for her father in the amount of $3,000. She also says that the delivery of that container cost $700. At the beginning of paragraph 10 of that affidavit Ms A Grange uses the words "further expenses". The evidence is clearly intended to indicate to the Court that she (Ms A Grange) paid for the shipping container for her father. Indeed, Ms A Grange was cross-examined at the trial. She gave evidence that she bought the shipping container so that her father could park his car (transcript page 104 line 33).
The husband (Mr Grange) gave evidence in relation to the shipping container. I note page 94 of the transcript from approximately line 19 as follows:-
MR FOLEY: I see. So you got a shipping container for $2200; is that right?
MR GRANGE: Ms A Grange has, yes.
Mr Grange's evidence is that the shipping container belongs to Ms A Grange. But Ms A Grange says that she bought the shipping container for her father.
The conclusion that I have come to is that both the husband and Ms A Grange are not being truthful to the Court. They are attempting to mislead the Court. This conflicting evidence between the husband and Ms A Grange puts in doubt the veracity of their evidence generally. It lends weight to the conclusion that I have reached which is that the husband is not a truthful witness. This glaring discrepancy in the evidence (concerning the ownership of the shipping container) was not explained by the husband and nor was it explained by the husband's counsel. Further, the discrepancy was not clarified in re-examination. That is because it is not possible to clarify the situation. Nor is it possible to explain it. Either the shipping container is owned by Mr Grange or it is owned by Ms A Grange. They have given conflicting evidence.
There was, for instance, no evidence that there is more than one shipping container. If there was more than one shipping container – I am certain that it would have been explained to the Court.
I note exhibit 1. It is a two-page document. The front page document is headed “NN Region Business Directory 2020”. On the second page of exhibit one there is an advertisement which states as follows:-
G Pty Ltd
C Street
D Town QLD
T …
…@gmail.com.
It was put to the husband that he is running a business. The husband denied this. I do not believe the husband. I note that particular exchange occurred at page 80 of the transcript at approximately line 15. Counsel for the husband (Mr Foley) pointed out to the husband that the telephone number contained in the advertisement is the husband's telephone number. I note page 82 of the transcript from line 32 where the following evidence is contained:-
MR FOLEY: Okay. And that telephone number …, that’s your number?
MR GRANGE: That belonged to the factory.
MR FOLEY: Yes, but it’s your number, isn’t it?
MR GRANGE: Yes, it was our number. My number now is different to that.
There was no explanation provided by the husband in relation to why it would be that the “NN Region Business Directory” for the year 2020, contained an advertisement for a business at C Street D Town with a telephone number which is the telephone number (or perhaps was the telephone number) at the property where he lives. Mr Grange is the only person who lives at that property. Mr Grange was very careful in the wording that he used – he said, "that belonged to the factory" – in reference to the telephone number. He did not say when the telephone number changed. He referred to the fact that he now has a different telephone number – but he provides no specifics.
The inference that is open to the Court and the inference that I draw is that the husband has been conducting a business from the “S Property land”. At the very least – the husband is assisting with the running of a business. This is another reason why I have come to the conclusion that the husband fails at the first hurdle. He has not satisfied the threshold test (as described In the Marriage of Bevan (1993) 19 Fam LR 35). The husband has not proved that he is unable to support himself adequately – by reason of the matters referred to in Section 72 (and Section 75(2)).
The husband filed an “Affidavit of Documents” on 22 October 2020. It comprises 400 pages. Mr Foley (counsel for the wife) cross-examined the husband in relation to some of the documents and invoices contained in this affidavit of documents. Mr Foley also provided a written addendum of submissions highlighting other pages within the affidavit of documents. I note the following:-
(a)At page 103 of the affidavit there is an invoice from “DD Company” dated 19 September 2019. It is an invoice in the sum of $674.65. Various items of equipment were purchased, including wire and mesh for fencing. As noted earlier in these reasons, the husband builds and mends fences on the two properties (a combined 14 acres). I note he gave further evidence about this at page 86 of the transcript;
(b)At page 113 of the affidavit of documents there is an invoice from "JJ Veterinary Services" dated 24 September 2019. It is addressed to "Mr Grange V Street". The invoice is $51.85 for tick fever vaccinations for cattle. The husband denied running a "cattle business". I note the following question and answer from page 88 of the transcript in relation to page 103 of the affidavit of documents:-
“MR FOLEY: So why is it in your disclosed documents if it's not involved with you and your financial affairs?
MR GRANGE: Because we share in this, because they run on the property that I have to look after, as well to keep the grass down.”
The husband never explained what he meant by “we share in this". It must be the case that he and his daughter Ms A Grange may well have joint ownership of the five cattle. He stated later (at line 18 of page 88) in answer to my question:–
“MR GRANGE: No, we haven't sold any cattle”.
Again, this indicates that both he and his daughter own the cattle.
(c)Certainly the conclusion that I have reached – namely that both the husband and Ms A Grange own the cattle jointly would explain why Mr Grange’s name appears on the invoice from JJ Veterinary Services for the tick fever vaccination. Mr Grange and his daughter (Ms A Grange) have, once again, not been upfront and honest with the Court in relation to this issue. There was no frank admission that they both owned the cattle. It is apparent from some of the invoices and some of the answers from the husband that both the husband and Ms A Grange own the cattle.
(d)I note page 117 of the affidavit of documents. This is an invoice from "KK Pty Ltd” dated 2 October 2019. The invoice is made out to "Mr Grange". It relates to the delivery of steel in the amount of $483.17. The husband said in evidence that this was steel for fence posts. He appeared to maintain (in relation to this invoice and in relation to other invoices that were paid by cheque) that the invoices were paid by Ms A Grange from her cheque account. I do not consider it necessary to reach a conclusion in that regard. Certainly the invoice is addressed to Mr Grange.
(e)At page 123 of the “Affidavit of Documents” – there is another invoice from "JJ Veterinary Services" for vaccine for cattle. That invoice is addressed to "Mr Grange".
(f)I note an invoice contained page 127 is an invoice from, “LL Company”. It is dated 5 October 2019 and the invoice is addressed to “Mr Grange”. The invoice appears to be for some sort of electric starter and a fuel filter and the total of the invoice is $358.95. It seems to have been paid for by a MasterCard – but there was no further evidence provided as to who owned the MasterCard.
(g)At page 135 of the “Affidavit of Documents” there are four documents entitled "Rent Receipt". There are four separate dates in October, November and December 2019. The documents purport to be receipts in respect of rent apparently paid by the husband to his mother. The documents are signed "Ms B". There is no affidavit from Ms B – whose full name is Ms B Grange. My attention has not been drawn to any bank statements disclosed by the husband that would indicate cash withdrawals or transfers in the amount that he says he has paid his mother for rent. I also note that there are other copies of receipts within the affidavit of documents in similar terms. For instance, I note page 253. Given that I have come to the conclusion that the husband is not a reliable witness – I am not prepared to accept that he is paying his mother rent – in the absence of some further evidence – such as an affidavit sworn by Mrs B Grange or the provision of a bank statement from the husband to show that he has made those payments.
(h)I note a further invoice at page 137 of the affidavit from, "LL Company". This invoice is dated 31 October 2019 and relates to a machinery attachment and another item. Total of the invoice is $290.81 and the invoice is addressed to, "Mr Grange C Street". The husband provides no explanation in relation to the machinery.
(i)When one looks through the 400 pages contained in the affidavit of documents there are, literally, dozens of invoices that have been disclosed by the husband that are, in fact, addressed to the husband, “Mr Grange”. The conclusion I have reached is that the husband is taking care of the two properties and, noting the number of invoices from a diverse group of businesses addressed to the husband – leads me to further conclude that he is in fact the manager of the two properties. These are inferences that are open on the evidence and I draw these inferences. As to precisely what is happening on these properties – in terms of the large number of deliveries, et cetera – is not clear. Neither the husband nor his daughter (Ms A Grange) are (in my estimation) reliable witnesses. They have not been candid with the Court.
(j)I note, for instance, page 369 of the affidavit of documents. This is an invoice from the "MM Pty Ltd” the invoice is dated 19 September 2020. The invoice is addressed to, "Mr Grange and Ms A Grange V Street D Town QLD”. The work relates to a Motor Vehicle 2 registration number … – in respect of an exhaust tailpipe. What has not been explained by the husband is why the invoice is addressed to "Mr Grange and Ms A Grange".
My consideration of the affidavit of documents confirms in my own mind the correctness of the conclusion that I have reached. The husband has not been candid with the Court. The husband is working at the two properties at C & V Street D Town. At the very least, the husband is working both as a caretaker for the two properties and probably he is working as a manager in respect of the two properties. Furthermore, it will be noted that I have concluded that he has also conducted or has worked in an excavation business from the property – as evidenced by the entry in the “NN Region Business Directory 2020” – exhibit 1.
A close consideration of the available evidence leads the Court to the conclusion that the husband has not satisfied the threshold test. The husband has not proved that he is unable to support himself adequately in the manner required by section 72(1).
The wife’s situation
For completeness, I will also consider whether the wife would have been (in any event) reasonably able to "maintain" the husband.
After the final separation between the husband and the wife the wife gained employment in the resources industry. The wife has worked on a fly in fly out basis. The wife earns approximately $128,000 gross per year. In addition, the wife receives the benefit of $350 per week from her de facto partner (Mr OO). Mr OO pays $350 per week directly into the wife’s mortgage.
The wife saved for (I infer from the evidence) a significant period of time to get together a deposit in order to purchase the property in which she now lives. She obtained a mortgage to help her complete the purchase of the property.
The wife was cross-examined about some so-called “unexplained transaction” in relation to an amount of approximately $10,300 that was transferred by the wife from her bank account to another account ending in the numbers, …78. The wife’s ANZ access account ends with the numbers …49. Contained within the relevant bank statements for that account are various transactions between March 2019 and October 2019. It is during that period of time that the sum of $10,300 was transferred to the other account mentioned – namely the account ending in …78.
To the best of the wife’s recollection she saved $30,000 as a deposit for the purchase of her new house (duplex). It was put to her that she might have had a different savings account. I think it is more likely than not that the wife is correct when she says that the transfers that were made (many of which were in the amount of $1,000) were transfers that she was making to a separate account in order to save money for the deposit for her house. If that is the case it is said, on behalf the husband, that the wife has not made disclosure in respect of the bank account ending in the numbers …78.
It was submitted on behalf the husband that the Court should draw an adverse inference against the wife on that basis. I believe the wife. It is highly likely she was transferring money into that account to save for a deposit. The established facts are that the wife works on a fly in fly out basis at a mine site. The wife makes approximately $128,000 gross per year. The wife is a believable witness. This is not the type of case where I am prepared to draw an adverse inference against the wife in relation to this particular issue. It is not a “Weir & Weir (1992) 110 FLR 403 type situation”. The wife has no independent source of wealth or money apart from what she has explained in evidence. She disclosed her bank statements for her ANZ access account. She probably had a separate savings account that ended in …78. That is the most likely explanation.
When the wife was asked about these matters in the witness box she gave truthful answers. She could not remember exactly what account that was that ended in …78 – but she did remember transferring money in the same approximate sum identified ($1,000) when she was saving for her deposit.
I was also asked to make a finding against the wife in respect of her credibility because (it was said on behalf of the husband) that the $350 from the tenant that had been disclosed by the wife in financial statement number one – was not mentioned in financial statement number two. Those documents were filed as follows – wife's original financial statement was filed on 15 May 2020. The second financial statement (the amended document) was filed on 22 April 2021.
The wife was cross-examined about this. The tenant (Mr OO) is now the wife’s de facto partner. As noted, he pays the $350 into the mortgage. It is the case that this fact should have been disclosed in financial statement number two as an additional resource. However, when asked about this in the witness box the wife candidly explained the situation to the Court. The wife told the truth. The wife was not evasive. This is in contrast to the husband who has not told the truth.
In relation to the two issues referred to above (the account ending in the numbers …78 and the $350 paid into her mortgage by her de facto partner) the evidence given by the wife at the trial of this matter was candid, truthful and reasonable. I accept the evidence. I accept that the wife is a witness of truth.
When one examines the evidence it is plain to see that the income or resources available to the wife each year are her gross salary of approximately $128,180 plus the $18,200 paid into her mortgage by her de facto partner. The total is a gross figure of $146,380. The wife has to pay tax on that sum.
The wife gave evidence that her expenses total approximately $140,000 per year. During submissions I made this point to counsel for the husband and I stated at page 110 of the transcript:-
HIS HONOUR: That’s a near run thing.
MR FISHER: It is on those figures.
That exchange appears at page 110 of the transcript from approximately line 33. The wife was cross-examined about her financial statement and her expenses. Her evidence was not seriously challenged in that regard. The Court is asked to draw an inference that the wife has other money available to her because of the savings in the amount of $10,300 that were transferred to the account ending in …78. It is apparent from the evidence available – or it is at least open to the Court to draw an inference (which I draw) – to conclude that the wife saved for the deposit for her home from her salary. There is no secret source of funds available to the wife in this case. The wife has (as I have stated several times already) given truthful evidence. Therefore, the total income that the wife receives each year is approximately $146,380 (before tax). This comprises her salary plus the amount available to her from her de facto husband. On the other hand, her expenses each year total approximately $140,000. On the available evidence therefore the wife has financial commitments which leads the Court to conclude that the wife is not reasonably able to maintain the husband – and certainly not to the extent sought by the husband.
Section 75(2)
By section 72(1) of the Act the Court is to have regard to any relevant matter referred to in subsection 75(2). I have, throughout these Reasons for Judgment taken into account all the various aspects of section 75(2) without mentioning those subsections specifically. For instance, the Court has referred to the age and the state of health of each of the parties. The Court has noted the income, property and financial resources of the parties.
Of particular note is section 75(2)(o). That subsection relates to:-
(o) any fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into account; and
The Court notes the adverse findings in relation to the husband's credibility and the adverse findings in relation to the credibility of Ms A Grange. Within the context of this case these are important matters which the Court is taking into account.
It is also particularly noteworthy (whether by reason of section 75(2)(o) or section 75(2)(n)) – that there was no property available for a property settlement order under section 79 of the Act. After approximately 30 years of marriage the parties had no property. It is to be noted that the Full Court concluded that the legal effect of what occurred was that the only property of the parties (the Sales Permit referred to previously) – was gifted by the parties to Ms B Grange – the husband's mother. Those net proceeds were in the approximate sum of $1 million.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated and noting section 74(1) – the Court has come to the conclusion that it is not proper to make any order for maintenance in this case. The husband's application is dismissed for the reasons contained herein.
I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Howard. Associate:
Dated: 18 June 2021
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