Granas v Berkley Challenge Pty Ltd

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[2015] FWCFB 1795
FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION


Fair Work Act 2009

s.604—Appeal of decision

Gary Granas
v
Berkeley Challenge Proprietary Ltd T/A Spotless
(C2015/1504)

JUSTICE ROSS, PRESIDENT
SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT ACTON
DEPUTY PRESIDENT GOSTENCNIK

MELBOURNE, 31 MARCH 2015

Appeal against decision [[2015] FWC 39] and order [PR559894] of Commissioner Cloghan at Perth on 9 January 2015 in matter number U2014/4776 - settlement agreement concluded – unreasonably failed to discontinue application – discretion to dismiss application – permission to appeal in public interest – order quashed.

[1] Mr Gary Granas made an unfair dismissal remedy (UDR) application to the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) on 19 February 2014. The application was made in respect of the termination of his employment by Berkeley Challenge Proprietary Ltd T/A Spotless (Spotless).

[2] On 28 October 2014, the respondent made an application to the Commission pursuant to s.399A(1)(b) and (c) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) for the dismissal of the UDR application made by Mr Granas.

[3] Section 399A(1)(b) and (c) of the FW Act is as follows:

    “399A Dismissing applications

    (1) The FWC may, subject to subsection (2), dismiss an application for an order under Division 4 if the FWC is satisfied that the applicant has unreasonably: …

      (b) failed to comply with a direction or order of the FWC relating to the application; or

      (c) failed to discontinue the application after a settlement agreement has been concluded.”

[4] Section 399A(1) provides, relevantly for present purposes, that the Commission ‘may’ dismiss an application if satisfied the applicant has unreasonably failed to discontinue the application after a settlement agreement has been concluded.

[5] In Mihajlovic v Lifeline Macarthur, 1 a Full Bench of the Commission pointed out the following about the use of the word ‘may’ in a statute:

    “Section 33(2A) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) provides:

      ‘(2A) Where an Act assented to after the commencement of this subsection provides that a person, court or body may do a particular act or thing, and the word may is used, the act or thing may be done at the discretion of the person, court or body.’

    Section 40A of the [FW] Act provides that the Acts Interpretation Act as in force on 25 June 2009 applies to the [FW] Act, but that amendments after that date do not. Section 33(2A) came into effect on 18 December 1987, and therefore applies to the [FW] Act. Under s 2 of the Acts Interpretation Act, that Act applies inter alia to all Commonwealth Acts unless an Act is subject to a contrary intention”. 2

[6] The Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Amendment Bill 2012 (Cth) in respect of now s.399A said:

    “161. Item 2 inserts a new section 399A to enable the FWC to dismiss an unfair dismissal application where the FWC is satisfied that the applicant has unreasonably:

      ● failed to attend an FWC conference or hearing relating to the application

      ● failed to comply…

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Details
Case
[2015] FWCFB 1795
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Granas v Berkley Challenge Pty Ltd, the respondent sought an appeal against the decision and order of Commissioner Cloghan, dated 9 January 2015, concerning a settlement agreement in a matter before the Fair Work Commission. The applicant, Granas, had argued that the respondent had unreasonably failed to discontinue an application, and the Commissioner had subsequently ordered that the application be dismissed. The respondent appealed this decision, contending that the dismissal of its application was unreasonable and that it should be granted permission to appeal in the public interest. The case came before the court to determine whether the appeal should be allowed and whether the order dismissing the application should be quashed.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Commissioner's decision to dismiss the respondent's application was unreasonable and whether the respondent had demonstrated sufficient grounds to appeal in the public interest. The court had to assess the merits of the respondent's argument that the dismissal was unjust and consider the criteria for granting permission to appeal in the public interest. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the order issued by the Commissioner should be quashed based on the respondent's appeal.

The court found that the Commissioner's decision to dismiss the application was indeed unreasonable, and the respondent had demonstrated sufficient grounds to appeal in the public interest. The court reasoned that the dismissal of the application without proper consideration of the respondent's arguments was unjust and that the appeal had the potential to clarify important legal principles. Consequently, the court quashed the order and granted the respondent permission to appeal, recognising the public interest in ensuring that such legal proceedings were conducted fairly and justly. The court's decision highlighted the importance of adhering to procedural fairness and the potential consequences of unreasonable dismissals in legal proceedings.

The final orders of the court were to quash the order issued by the Commissioner and to grant the respondent permission to appeal the decision in the public interest. This outcome underscored the court's commitment to ensuring that legal processes are conducted with fairness and due consideration of all parties' rights.

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